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Contrary to Russia’s present-day position on the political and psychological 
periphery of Europe, the period from the end of the Napoleonic Wars to the 
Crimean War (1853–56), and arguably until the Bolshevik Revolution of Octo-
ber 1917, represented a time of full integration into European society and poli-
tics. During this period, the Quadruple Alliance, the general alliance, the grand 
alliance, and the European political system stood as cornerstones of Russian 
diplomacy. Russia had led the allied coalition that defeated Napoleon in 1813–14, 
its armies had performed heroically and honorably in 1812, and its emperor had 
come to be seen by his subjects and intimates as the divinely anointed savior of 
Europe. From the Russian point of view, the glorious victory of 1812 and the sub-
sequent wars leading to Napoleon’s dethronement showed that Emperor Alex-
ander I (ruled 1801–25) and his people, together with their allies, served as God’s 
instrument in human history. Not surprisingly, in the eyes of Russia’s monarch 
and diplomats, the peace settlement reached in 1814–15, and the peacemaking 
that continued in subsequent years, appeared equally providential.
e basic contours of what contemporaries referred to as the European polit-
ical system were forged at the “Congress” of Westphalia, where rulers and diplo-
mats recognized state sovereignty (not empire, dynasty, or religious belief) as the 
foundation of European order. Based on the principle that state sovereignty gave 
to each government the right to choose a domestic religion and political structure, 
free from the threat of outside intervention, the peacemakers also embraced the 
principle of a balance of power between independent states that aimed to preserve 
European equilibrium and prevent any one country from becoming powerful 
enough to achieve hegemony. Ultimately, the treaties of Westphalia failed to stop 
revolutionary France from overturning the equilibrium or Napoleonic France 
from dominating Europe. us, once Napoleon had been defeated militarily, it 
became necessary to reconstruct the European state system. Aer roughly twen-
ty-ve years of brutal warfare, fragile coalitions, and exhausting diplomacy, the 
continent’s rulers and diplomats were eager to establish an enduring peace and 
prepared to make substantive compromises to achieve that goal. In a series of 
multilateral treaties, conventions, and protocols—produced primarily but not 
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exclusively in Paris and at the Congress of Vienna in 1814–15—political leaders 
reconstituted the public law of Europe, which then provided the legal framework 
for interstate diplomacy and relations between governments and peoples.
Generations of historians have researched the chess game of European politics 
during the French Revolution, the Napoleonic Empire, and the peacemaking 
that followed the victory over France. e quality of this scholarship is impres-
sive, yet the diplomacy of the era continues to fascinate and bae. In recent de-
cades, the reconstruction of Europe at the Congress of Vienna has been seen as a 
model of multilateral diplomacy and collective security arrangements that estab-
lished precedents for today’s United Nations and European Union. In addition, 
historians have moved beyond simplistic characterizations of Russia’s actions, 
recognizing instead the critical and oen salutary role of Emperor Alexander I. 
Scholarly perspectives have become diversied; however, signicant aspects of 
European politics in the Restoration era remain understudied. ese include the 
conceptual apparatus developed in diplomatic discourse and the relationship of 
diplomacy to national or local political cultures.
Among the great powers of Restoration Europe, the Russian Empire is the 
least integrated into both past and current historiography. rough study of 
Russian diplomacy in the years 1815–23, this book broadens the knowledge base 
available to historians and helps to ll a striking historiographical gap. Begin-
ning in the immediate aermath of the Congress of Vienna and continuing 
through the Congress of Verona, Europe’s statesmen worked tirelessly to im-
plement the edice of pacication and peace constructed in 1814, 1815, and 1818. 
ey completed territorial negotiations, codied political arrangements, and 
brought a defeated France back into the alliance of great powers. Equally sig-
nicant, they confronted dangerous revolts and military crises in Europe, the 
Ottoman Empire, and Spanish America. In response to these developments, 
Emperor Alexander’s hopes for peace, his pragmatic adaptability, and his com-
mitment to act in concert with the other great powers came fully into focus. 
Close attention to Russian diplomacy, based on sources of Russian provenance, 
challenges characterizations of Alexander’s behavior as erratic and his foreign 
policy as heavy-handed and expansionist. Indeed, as historians assimilate the 
Russian perspective on European order (as well as the perspectives of other less 
well-studied countries and peoples), they encounter a multifaceted Restoration 
built upon the practices of enlightened reformism and direct experience of costly 
revolution and war.
Decades have passed since European historians began to reevaluate the Eu-
ropean restorations and rebalance their understanding of the achievements and 
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consequences of the French Revolution. e research presented here contrib-
utes in multiple ways to debates about the Restoration. As noted, this book 
highlights Russian diplomacy, which continues to occupy a peripheral and un-
derstudied position in European historiography. It does so, moreover, not by 
analyzing political maneuvers in the high stakes game of diplomatic chess, but 
by exploring the ideas and concepts that dened Russian foreign policy. e 
conceptual history of diplomacy leads in turn to emphasis on the dynamics of 
peacemaking over more familiar themes such as empire building, the emergence 
of ethno-nationalism, or the struggle between “progress” and “reaction.” Finally, 
this book focuses on the intersection of principle and action in order to un-
derstand how Emperor Alexander and his diplomatic agents presented Russian 
foreign policy to Europe and the world, what they thought they were doing (or 
wanted others to think they were doing), and how they thought they were going 
to establish and preserve a durable peace.
Concrete investigation of what it meant to act in concert (concerter) encour-
ages a deeper, more nuanced analysis of the Vienna settlement’s outcomes and 
of Russia’s role in European society than is suggested by current historiography. 
How did Russian statesmen interpret and represent the principles, problems, 
solutions, and goals of Alexander I’s foreign policy? How did they respond to 
events on the ground as the process of implementing the peace unfolded? To 
address these questions, this book builds upon decades of research in Russian 
military and diplomatic archives. Archival access, especially since the end of the 
Cold War, has enhanced historians’ knowledge of the socioeconomic, institu-
tional, and cultural backdrop to foreign policy. As early as 1980, this author 
began to work in the Central State Military Historical Archive of the former 
Soviet Union. Scholars such as Patricia Kennedy Grimsted, whose 1969 book, 
e Foreign Ministers of Alexander I, remains foundational, lacked the opportu-
nity to consult archives on a regular basis. roughout the 1960s, the Military 
Historical Archive and the Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire 
kept their doors closed to foreign researchers. Today, in the post-communist en-
vironment of open scholarly exchange, Grimsted’s book continues to represent 
the most recent English-language study of the personnel and political thought 
behind Alexander’s foreign policy. ere is, in other words, much work to be 
done before the history of Russian diplomacy has been subjected to the same 
degree of scrutiny as Austrian, British, or French diplomacy. Nor is there a bet-
ter way to gain insight into Russia’s current foreign policy goals and ambitions 
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During the nineteenth century the Julian calendar used in Russia (Old Style 
dating) was twelve days behind the Gregorian calendar used by most states in 
Europe (New Style dating). Because Russian diplomatic sources generally indi-
cated Old Style (OS) and New Style (NS) dates, I follow the dating of the Rus-
sian documents and try to give both dates. Where I do not use double dating, the 
New Style date presumably is given (though in Russian sources that lack double 
dating, it sometimes is unclear which date has been provided). When discussing 
Russia’s domestic environment, I use the Old Style dates that are followed in the 































Map 2. Detail of Italy. Map by Mike Bechthold (mike@blackight.ca).
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Russia as a Great Power in Europe
R ussia’s rise to great power status in modern Europe began with the military reforms and foreign policy ambitions of Tsar Peter I (ruled 1682/1689–1725), whose reign has for generations of historians embodied 
the transformation of the Muscovite tsardom into the Russian Empire. In Octo-
ber 1721, following the defeat of Sweden in the Great Northern War (1700–21), 
Tsar Peter assumed the titles “Father of the Fatherland, All-Russian Emperor, 
and Peter the Great.” Scholars debate the meaning of Peter’s greatness, and 
depending on the specic reform under investigation, they nd varying degrees 
of continuity, change, and eectiveness.1 With respect to military capability and 
foreign policy, Peter’s reforms successfully addressed critical problems that Mus-
covite institutions could not overcome. ese included the legal mechanisms 
connecting state service to social status and the relationships of authority bind-
ing the monarchy, church hierarchy, and nobility. As the monarchy embraced 
European-style military mobilization and Westphalian principles of sovereignty, 
the church and nobility accepted the need for a strong state to guarantee their 
own security and advancement. From Peter’s reign onward, the monarchy and 
nobility also agreed that the importation and adaptation of European technol-
ogy and cultural models oered the best means to confront European power. 
For this reason, Europeanization became the hallmark of government-directed 
reform and the symbol of social progress.
e lasting impact of Peter’s reforms appeared most evident in the organiza-
tion of the navy, standing army, o
cer corps, and apparatus of military admin-
istration and supply. But the growth of military power also required the reform 
of basic social and political institutions. e new arrangements, which would 
remain in place until the emancipation of the serfs in 1861, accounted for Rus-
sia’s military success in the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. Indeed, 
decades before the emergence of France’s citizen army, Russia implemented a 
system of mass conscription built upon the institution of serfdom and the as-
cription of individuals to local communities and social groups. Together with 
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conscription, the ability to mobilize economic resources allowed the Russian 
government to support the large standing army that made possible Napoleon’s 
defeat. In contrast to conditions in revolutionary Europe, Russia’s military eort 
did not depend on the fusion of politics and war associated with an ideologi-
cally motivated nation in arms.2 Rather, it sprang from sheer physical necessity, 
popular belief in God and Divine Providence, a willingness to serve the tsar, 
and devotion to household, community, and the Russian land—all bolstered by 
extraordinary endurance and the omnipresent threat of coercion.
Based on the Muscovite Law Code (Ulozhenie) of 1649, all subjects of the 
Russian monarch belonged to legally dened social categories that performed 
prescribed service obligations and beneted from class-based privileges. Begin-
ning in 1719, periodic censuses registered the male souls liable for conscription 
and payment of the capitation. Census registration, which also bound individ-
uals to their communities of origin, placed the burden of defense primarily on 
Russia’s laboring people, the overwhelming majority of whom were either state 
peasants or privately owned serfs. Townspeople also provided recruits and paid 
the capitation, though individuals who possessed su
cient capital to qualify for 
merchant status were exempted on an annual basis. Nobles and clergy likewise 
avoided the capitation; however, sons of clergy and non-ordained churchmen 
who failed to obtain church appointments could be conscripted by special levy. 
Nobles, too, starting as early as the mid-sixteenth century, performed obligatory 
military or civil service. eoretically, they served for life, or until inrmity, 
in return for the right to possess land and serfs. Although obligatory service 
for nobles ended with the emancipation of 1762, Tsar Peter’s educational and 
service reforms had made them the main source of o
cers for the Russian army. 
According to the Table of Ranks enacted in 1722, promotion in service became 
the primary pathway to social advancement, bringing higher rank to nobles and 
ennoblement to commoners. For these reasons, Russia’s hereditary and service 
nobles, like noble elites across Europe, sought glory, honor, wealth, and status 
by pursuing military careers.3
Observers long have marveled at the Russian government’s ability to mobilize 
human and material resources on a large scale in a peasant society built upon 
community-based agriculture. As early as 1630/31, well before the Petrine re-
forms, regular levies of recruits and lifelong terms of service became part of Rus-
sian life. During the irteen Years’ War (1654–67) with Poland, military dras 
swept up around 100,000 men, a sizeable number, though one that pales in com-
parison to the levies of the eighteenth century. Scholarly estimates of recruits 
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into the Petrine army count 205,000 men from 1700 to 1711 and at least 140,000 
from 1713 to 1724. At the time of Peter’s death in 1725, the army consisted of 
130,000 regular troops, 75,000–80,000 garrison troops, and 20,000 Cossack 
irregulars. By the mid-eighteenth century, the number of men in arms reached 
292,000 in a population of 23,230,000, and in 1800, 446,000 in a population 
of 37,414,000. Stated dierently, from 1705 to 1801, the Russian military con-
scripted roughly 2.25 million men, and from 1796 to 1815, 1,616,199. When com-
bat operations against France ended in 1815, Russian troops numbered 727,414. 
e empire preserved this capability for the rest of Alexander I’s reign, and in the 
period of relative peace from 1815 to 1853, the army grew even larger. From 1816 to 
1822, the number of recruits reached 3,158,199. Compared to the 696,000 troops 
available at the time of Napoleon’s invasion in 1812, the army counted 859,000 
troops just prior to the outbreak of the Crimean War.4
Russian data are notoriously fragmentary before the late nineteenth century, 
and in the case of military statistics, it can be unclear which troops historians 
are counting. In addition to the regular standing army, the Russian military 
establishment included garrison troops, veterans’ units, military colonies, Cos-
sacks, and a variety of irregular hosts manned by ethnic minorities. e absence 
of precise information is problematic, yet one critical point can be made: the 
numbers correctly illustrate the organizational eort needed to conscript, train, 
and maintain Russia’s large ghting force. However ine
cient and arbitrary 
this eort sometimes appeared, it eectively sustained costly military victories 
and imperial expansion over the long duration. Beyond the ability to mobilize 
resources across a large, sparsely populated territory, Russia’s military successes 
also highlighted the tenacity of the empire’s combat troops.5 As Frederick the 
Great reportedly commented, opponents found it “easier to kill Russian sol-
diers than to defeat them.”6 Frederick’s words are surely apocryphal, but there is 
ample evidence and broad scholarly consensus that Emperor Alexander’s army 
performed courageously and honorably in the wars of 1812–14.7
Precisely because of Russia’s military triumphs, the capabilities of the army 
aroused distrust among the other great powers of Europe. During the diplomatic 
negotiations that followed the victory over Napoleon, Russia’s allies could not 
understand why in conditions of peace, Emperor Alexander did not demobilize 
his soldiers. Preservation of the army on what seemed to be a wartime footing 
raised questions about the monarch’s intentions. In reality, the size and orga-
nization of Russia’s peacetime forces had less to do with military plans than 
with the geographic, demographic, economic, social, and legal-administrative 
conditions of the empire. For economic more than diplomatic reasons, Russia’s 
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military commanders understood all too well the need to reduce the number of 
troops. But within the framework of a society built on serfdom, the problem of 
how to organize conscription and maintain a reserve ready for call-up in time of 
war prevented signicant reductions.
When not on campaign or assembled in summer camps—where in addition 
to training, soldiers also performed state works—Russia’s semi-standing peasant 
army quartered primarily in rural villages scattered across vast distances. Equally 
important, because conscription brought emancipation from serfdom or from 
the authority of state villages and urban communities, once a recruit became a 
soldier, his legal status, and that of his wife and future ospring, changed. No 
longer registered to his place of origin, the soldier belonged to the military com-
mand until his release from service. Soldiers could not, therefore, be demobilized 
or sent home before they became disabled or completed the long term of service 
(twenty-ve years at the time). Due to the great expanse of the empire’s borders 
and the slowness of communications, the monarchy had no choice but to keep 
large numbers of men in active service. Also because of geographic constraints, 
the relatively centralized command structure of the Russian army had to be pre-
served to ensure administrative and scal viability.8 Simply put, in order to under-
stand Russia’s military and diplomatic posture aer the defeat of Napoleon, it is 
critical to consider the country’s physical vulnerabilities and broad security needs.
e Russian Empire maintained a robust military establishment both to se-
cure extensive landlocked borders and to support imperial expansion into con-
tiguous territories, an ongoing process since the sixteenth century.9 Prior to the 
Petrine reforms, the country’s enemies included Sweden, the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth, the Crimean Khanate, and the Ottoman Empire. Following 
the Time of Troubles (1598–1613)—a period of government collapse, social re-
bellion, civil war, and foreign invasion—the reconstituted Muscovite monarchy 
struggled to protect its borders from opportunistic neighbors. e Treaty of 
Stolbovo (1617) with Sweden relinquished signicant territory along the shores 
of Lake Ladoga and le Russia completely cut o from the Gulf of Finland. 
e Deulino armistice (1618) ceded to Poland territory along Muscovy’s western 
border, including the strategically important city of Smolensk. Not surprisingly, 
Russia’s young dynasty spent much of the seventeenth century trying to recover 
the lands that had been lost. In 1656–58, Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich (ruled 1645–
76), father of Peter I, challenged Swedish control of the Baltic trade, and from 
the 1620s, when the Orthodox population of Ukraine began to seek protection 
from Catholic rule, Muscovy again came into con­ict with Poland. In 1654, fol-
lowing a rebellion against Poland that had begun in 1648, Ukrainian Cossacks 
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took the oath of allegiance to the Muscovite tsar. at same year Russia also 
reconquered Smolensk and launched the irteen Years’ War against Poland. 
Peace returned in 1667 with the truce of Andrusovo, which le Muscovy in 
control of Le-Bank (eastern) Ukraine, Kiev, and Smolensk.10
Territorial gains in Ukraine also produced a shared frontier with the Otto-
man Empire. e Russian-Ottoman War of 1677–81 stemmed from Poland’s 
surrender of a large part of Right-Bank (western) Ukraine to the Ottomans in 
1676. e war brought no territorial changes to Russia, and Ottoman policy 
continued to focus more on southeastern Europe than on thwarting Muscovite 
acquisitions in Ukraine. But the advances highlighted another ongoing threat 
from the Crimean Tatars, vassals of the Ottomans, who raided and pillaged 
Russian settlements in the southern borderland. Because the Crimean Khanate 
traced its origins back to the empire of Chinggis Khan, Tatar raids not only 
wrought destruction but also recalled past subjugation to Mongol rule. Al-
though Muscovy tried to confront the Tatars in campaigns of 1687 and 1689, the 
eort produced little direct combat and did nothing to enhance Russian secu-
rity. e campaigns did, however, expose Muscovy’s limited military capability. 
Seventeenth-century breakthroughs in military technology, tactics, and opera-
tions had not solved the structural problem of endurance—the combined eect 
of logistics, transport, training, reinforcement, and nance.11 In other words, 
Muscovite military eectiveness lacked the capacity to support obvious military 
needs. It was precisely the problem of endurance, laid bare in the Crimean cam-
paigns, that Peter I’s military reforms aimed to address.
Tsar Peter inherited long-standing security challenges in the north, west, and 
south, yet his early actions also revealed ambitions beyond the protection of bor-
derlands and foreign trade. From the outset, Peter used the military tools at his 
disposal to project Russian power and pursue aggressive strategic goals. Aer an 
unsuccessful campaign in 1695, Peter’s troops captured the Ottoman fortress at 
Azov in 1696, and the monarch ordered the building of a naval ­eet in the Sea 
of Azov. With this move Peter hoped to challenge Ottoman control of the Black 
Sea—Russia lacked access to a warm water port—and disrupt communications 
between the Ottomans and Crimean Tatars. Instead, Peter’s army suered a 
major defeat. In the battle on the Pruth River in Moldavia (9 July 1711), Russian 
troops succumbed to a much larger Ottoman-Tatar force. Peter was compelled to 
surrender Azov, dismantle his southern ­eet, and destroy fortresses at Taganrog 
and Kamennyi Zaton. Russia retook Azov in 1739, though only in the reign of 
Catherine II (ruled 1762–96) did the empire achieve signicant victories against 
the Ottomans.12
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Developments in Europe told a dierent story, which hinted at the glorious 
military history to come. Indeed, the military endeavor that most fully expressed 
Tsar Peter’s ambition and also signaled Russia’s emergent power in Europe was 
the Great Northern War against Sweden. Aer Charles XII acceded to the 
Swedish throne in 1697, at the age of fourteen, the surrounding monarchs of 
Denmark, Poland, and Russia joined in a plot to destroy Sweden’s Baltic empire. 
In the spring of 1700, Frederick IV and Elector Augustus of Saxony initiated 
military operations, and Peter followed with a declaration of war on 9 August. 
As is well known, Charles proved to be the most formidable of foes. Even before 
the Russian mobilization, Sweden threatened Copenhagen by sea, and Denmark 
sued for peace. Peter began operations with a siege of the Swedish fortress at 
Narva, and aer a few months, on 20 November, the Swedes routed the Russian 
army. Swedish troops numbering only 9,000 crushed a Russian force of 40,000. 
Charles quickly seized the advantage and moved on Riga, which had been under 
siege by Augustus. ere he achieved another impressive victory against Russian, 
Polish, and Saxon troops. is triumph opened the door to an invasion of Poland.
e military failures against Sweden propelled the reforms that over the 
course of the eighteenth century brought to Russia great power status in Eu-
rope and Asia. Alongside mass conscription and the capitation, the translation 
of human and material resources into eective power resulted from substantial 
changes in the organization of Russia’s armed forces. ese included the imposi-
tion of military discipline, the creation of centralized sources of supply, the man-
ufacture of armaments and military cloth, the formation of an educated o
cer 
corps, the establishment of specialized technical schools, the mastery of strategic 
planning, and operational practices that emphasized fortication, troop mobil-
ity, and naval support.13 Although Peter’s rst victory against Charles came in 
December 1701, before any of the military reforms could have yielded results, the 
impact of his policies became apparent over the next twenty years. As Russia and 
Sweden traded victories and defeats, Peter kept up the grueling military eort. 
A key advance occurred in 1703, when the tsar founded the city of Saint Peters-
burg, giving to Russia a new capital and a permanent foothold on the Baltic 
Sea. e following year, a summer campaign led to Russian control of Dorpat, 
Narva, Swedish Ingria, and the Neva River. Bold as these accomplishments ap-
peared, they quickly faded due to Swedish victories in Poland and Saxony. e 
abdication of Augustus in 1706 allowed Charles to move against Russia at the 
beginning of 1708. But instead of marching toward Moscow, Charles led his 
troops south into Ukraine. ere he joined forces with the Cossack hetman Ivan 
Mazepa, a former ally of Peter.
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A more decisive victory over Sweden—one that continues to be celebrated in 
Russian history and culture—occurred on 28 June 1709 at the fortress of Poltava. 
Charles ­ed to the Ottoman Empire, but the threats to Russia did not subside. 
e Ottomans declared war in 1710, and the battle on the Pruth (1711) resulted 
in signicant territorial losses for Russia. e defeat also forced Peter to grant 
Charles safe passage back to Sweden. In 1713 the Peace of Adrianople ended 
hostilities between the Russian and Ottoman empires, and in November 1714, 
Charles reached Sweden. By that time, Russia also had made gains in Swedish 
Pomerania and Finland. Still, Charles persevered. In 1716 he attacked Danish 
possessions in Norway, and only in 1718 did peace talks begin—aer Britain, 
Denmark, Poland, Russia, and Saxony all decided to oppose Sweden. Military 
operations continued during the negotiations, and even aer Charles’s death at 
the end of the year, Russia maintained military pressure by launching destructive 
raids into Swedish territory. Finally, on 30 August/10 September 1721, Russia and 
Sweden signed the Treaty of Nystad. Russia acquired Livonia, Estonia, Ingria, 
part of Karelia, and the Baltic islands of Oesel and Dagoe. Except for Vyborg, 
Finland was returned to Sweden, which also received an indemnity from Russia. 
Broadly speaking, Russia replaced Sweden as the dominant Baltic power, a posi-
tion that would lead to great power status in Europe. What had changed between 
1700 and 1721 was the ability to sustain a large-scale military eort over the long 
duration—to overcome, to a satisfactory degree, the problem of endurance.
Although Russia’s early steps toward great power status arose from the need 
to secure frontiers against dangerous enemies, including the steppe societies of 
the south and southeast, it quickly became apparent that tsarist military power 
also would be used to support imperial expansion. e start of the Great North-
ern War illustrated Peter’s aggressive intentions, and as a result of the Persian 
campaign in 1722, Russia acquired lands along the southwestern and southern 
shores of the Caspian Sea. Treaties of 1732 and 1735 returned these territories to 
Persia. But then in 1783, 1787, and 1800, Russia partially occupied, abandoned, 
and then formally annexed Georgia. Although protracted and uneven, Russia’s 
forward movement into Transcaucasia, Crimea, and Ukraine produced ongoing 
con­ict with the Ottoman Empire. is led to wars in 1695, 1696, 1711, 1735–39, 
1768–74, and 1787–91. Peter’s initial success against Azov had proven illusory, 
but in the war of 1735–39, Russia retook the port, brie­y occupied part of the 
Crimean Peninsula, and also gained access to the Black Sea, on condition that 
the Black Sea trade use Ottoman ships. In short, Russia’s ongoing wars (and di-
plomacy) with the Ottoman Empire encapsulated the crisscrossing of defensive 
and oensive actions that dened imperial expansion.
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Later in the eighteenth century, Catherine II’s victories over the Ottoman 
Empire would produce gains that far surpassed those of her predecessors. In 
the Russian-Ottoman War of 1768–74, Catherine’s army drove the Ottomans 
from the northern shores of the Black Sea and established a protectorate over 
the Crimean Khanate. By 1777, the Russian monarch eectively appointed the 
ruling khan, and in 1783, aer a rebellion by Tatar nobles, annexed the penin-
sula. Henceforth the khanate came under the authority of a Russian governor. 
Other southern lands incorporated into the empire during Catherine’s reign 
included the territory of the Zaporozhian Cossacks, the Kuban steppe, the 
Taman Peninsula, and Kabarda in the Caucasus. Of particular importance, 
Russia gained the right of free navigation in the Black Sea and the Straits of the 
Bosporus and Dardanelles. Russia also blocked Sweden’s eort to reassert power 
in the Baltic region (war of 1788–90) and ended the independent existence of the 
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (partitions of 1772, 1793, and 1795). Follow-
ing the partitions, which also beneted Austria and Prussia, Russia controlled a 
large swathe of territory stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea.14
Another sphere of empire building, both defensive and oensive, grew out 
of the porous frontiers separating Russia’s sedentary communities from the no-
madic peoples of the steppe. e steppe peoples lived in parts of present-day 
Moldova, Ukraine, Russia, and Kazakhstan.15 In the imperial period, the 
steppe’s geographical boundaries ran from the Danube River in the west to Lake 
Balkhash in the east, and from the forest zone of European Russia in the north 
to the Black and Caspian Seas in the south. Russia’s struggle to secure and sub-
jugate the steppe began in the sixteenth century with the conquest of the khan-
ates of Kazan (1552), Astrakhan (1554), and Siberia (1580). e incorporation of 
these heirs to the Golden Horde then led to struggles against the Nogay Tatars 
in the north Caucasus, the Bashkirs around the southern Ural Mountains, and 
from the 1630s, the Kalmyks in the Caspian steppe. e protracted bloodletting 
took the form of destructive raids, armed rebellions, and brutal suppression. 
Eventually, the Tatar, steppe, and Volga peoples succumbed to Russian power. 
e peoples of the Caucasus would submit, and then only sporadically, in the 
rst half of the nineteenth century. e Kazakhs, who during the eighteenth 
century attained dominance in the steppe, did not become fully integrated into 
the Russian Empire until the 1860s.
Russia’s complicated relations with the steppe and Caucasus lay at the core 
of empire building but did not deeply impact diplomacy in Europe. Excep-
tions arose in areas bordering on the steppe such as Crimea and Georgia, where 
challenges to Ottoman and Persian interests could have consequences for the 
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European system, especially within the context of nineteenth-century imperi-
alism. On average, however, Russian movement into the steppe, at least during 
the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, remained a domestic aair, much 
like the westward expansion of the United States. For this reason, policy in the 
steppe and Caucasus has been characterized as an organic process of coloniza-
tion driven by geopolitical imperatives such as the need to defend an unstable 
frontier. But clearly, expansion also aimed to command human and material 
resources and to impose sovereignty over foreign peoples. us, historian John 
P. LeDonne describes Russia as a Eurasian state in search of hegemony from 
the Elbe River to eastern Siberia.16 Although LeDonne’s analysis may overstate 
the intentionality and coherence of Russian imperialism, it recognizes that 
policymakers and intellectuals viewed territorial expansion as the bringing of 
civilization to barbarous lands and peoples. In relations with the steppe, the 
Caucasus, and later Central Asia, Russian elites clearly articulated this colonial-
ist thinking.17
Eurasian interests highlighted Russia’s global emergence and imperialist 
reach. Yet in the period of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, and 
subsequently in the Restoration era, the European theater commanded the lion’s 
share of military and diplomatic resources. For decades aer the death of Peter I, 
political instability and struggles over the succession could not be disentangled 
from diplomatic relations with Europe. e turmoil temporarily abated when 
Peter’s daughter Elizabeth became empress in 1741, roughly one year aer Fred-
erick II of Prussia occupied Austrian Silesia (December 1740). During much of 
Elizabeth’s reign (ruled 1741–61), Russia maintained good relations with both 
Austria and Britain, but grew ever more suspicious of Prussia. According to 
historians, Prussia’s rise to great power status disrupted the equilibrium of the 
Westphalia state system and caused a realignment in the European balance of 
power. Prussia abandoned its alliance with France for union with Britain, while 
Austria le its alliance with Britain for union with France.18 Eventually, the 
realignment led to the Seven Years’ War (1756–63), in which Austria, France, 
and Russia faced o against Prussia, whose ally Britain provided subsidies to 
Frederick and received protection for Hanover. roughout the con­ict, Russia 
managed to preserve the all-important trade relationship with Britain, and also 
took an active stand against Prussia. In return for Elizabeth’s pledge to sup-
port Austria in the recovery of Silesia, Russia received subsidies and the promise 
of territorial gains in eastern Prussia. e Russian government hoped to use 
these territories to make border adjustments with Poland that would further 
secure the Baltic-Black Sea corridor. Elizabeth achieved her war aims in 1758 and 
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continued to honor the commitment to Austria by sending troops on campaign 
in 1759, 1760, and 1761.19
When Elizabeth died in December 1761, her nephew Peter III (ruled 1761–
62), a known supporter of Prussia, acceded to the throne.20 Although Peter ruled 
for only a few short months before a palace coup brought his wife Catherine 
to power, he initiated another rebalancing of power relations in Europe. Peter 
abandoned the war against Prussia, an action that violated treaty obligations to 
Austria, and handed a key victory to Frederick II. e withdrawal could have 
benetted Russia; the empire’s nances had become precarious, and the war 
had become a divisive issue within the governing elite. But Peter, born Prince 
of Holstein-Gottorp, remained a German ruler. In May 1762, he ordered mili-
tary commanders to prepare for a summer war against Denmark with the goal 
of restoring Schleswig to his native Holstein. Although Frederick promised to 
send 15,000 Prussian troops to assist Peter, the pledge did not convince Russia’s 
elites to support the planned campaign. For this and other reasons, Peter lost 
his throne on 28 June and his life on 5 July. Russia’s military leadership, upper 
bureaucracy, and guard regiments stationed in Saint Petersburg all supported 
the accession of Catherine, initially as regent for her son Paul. Aer Catherine’s 
death, Paul ruled just long enough, from 1796 to 1801, to end the political un-
certainty of the eighteenth century by establishing a clear order of succession. 
Ironically, the promise of security did not save him from a murderous overthrow, 
tacitly approved by his son and heir, Alexander I, widely known as the tsar who 
defeated Napoleon and the tsar diplomat who became a key architect of the 
Vienna settlement.21
e decades of war against revolutionary and Napoleonic France, which 
culminated in the Congress of Vienna, are critically important for historians 
of European diplomacy and the restorations. Russia’s participation in the wars 
began when Emperor Paul joined the Second Coalition (1798–1802) consisting 
of Austria, Britain, the Kingdom of Naples, the Ottoman Empire, and Portu-
gal.22 During the months of negotiation that produced the coalition, Russia 
sent a naval squadron to support British operations along the Dutch coast (July 
1798) and cooperated with the Ottomans to occupy the Ionian Islands (Sep-
tember–November 1798).23 In February 1799, Russian troops captured Corfu, 
and Field Marshal Aleksandr V. Suvorov (1729–1800) became commander of a 
combined Russian-Austrian army. In the spring and summer of 1799, Suvorov 
scored signicant victories in northern Italy, though instead of seizing the op-
portunity to march on Paris, his superiors sent him across the Alps into Swit-
zerland. ere Suvorov was supposed to join forces with General Aleksandr M. 
Russia as a Great Power in Europe 11 
Rimskii-Korsakov (1753–1840), whose corps was advancing from the Rhine val-
ley. In late September, before the Russian armies could be united, Rimskii-Kor-
sakov and the Austrians suered defeat near Zurich. Faced with unchecked 
French power, the coalition began to unravel. Suvorov managed to extricate his 
men from the disastrous situation in Switzerland, and in January 1800, Em-
peror Paul ordered all Russian troops to return home. Austrian forces fell to the 
French in the Battle of Marengo in June and again in the Battle of Hohenlinden 
in December. Aer Hohenlinden, Austria’s military eort collapsed.
e War of the Second Coalition inaugurated one of the most dramatic pe-
riods in the history of European warfare. In November 1799, French general 
Napoleon Bonaparte became First Consul and head of the military dictatorship 
known as the Consulate. For the next een years, until Emperor Napoleon’s 
nal defeat at Waterloo in June 1815, Europe’s monarchies faced the threat of 
military conquest and revolution. France’s eorts to dominate Europe led to 
years of brutal warfare, intermittent peace, and unreliable alliances. Although 
Britain and Russia remained steady obstacles to French advances, Napoleon’s 
opponents generally failed to unite for collective action. On occasion the need 
to protect economic interests, freedom of the seas, or established thrones pro-
duced a degree of unity. But more oen than not, alliances crumbled in the face 
of French military success. Repeatedly, Napoleon’s enemies abandoned allies 
in hopes of avoiding territorial losses or concluding illusory agreements with 
France. us, the Second Coalition evaporated within a few years, as France 
reached separate agreements with previously allied states: rapprochement with 
Russia (1800–1), the Treaty of Lunéville with Austria (February 1801), and the 
Treaty of Amiens with Britain (March 1802). anks to these accords, the de-
feated powers recouped territorial losses and even made some gains. For the rst 
time in a decade, Europe seemed to enjoy a modicum of peace.
But the respite did not last, as France continued to challenge Britain’s control 
of the seas. By May 1803 the two powers once again went to war, and within 
two years, in March 1805, Napoleon began to plan an invasion of England. is 
aggression led in April to the ird Coalition, which joined Austria, Britain, 
and Russia. e deployment of troops began in late August, and the monumen-
tal naval victory of Admiral Horatio Nelson o Cape Trafalgar occurred on 21 
October 1805. Britain staved o invasion and preserved naval superiority, while 
Austria and Russia suered humiliating losses that paved the way for French 
domination in the Germanies and Poland. In September Napoleon’s Grand 
Army marched eastward from Boulogne, and Austria invaded Bavaria. A Rus-
sian army also moved westward to join up with the Austrians. Before the two 
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armies could be linked, on 20 October, the French defeated the Austrians at 
Ulm in Bavaria, opening the door to an invasion of Austria. Although Russian 
forces managed temporarily to delay the French advance, at Dürenstein on 11 
November and at Hollabrünn on 15–16 November, they could not prevent the 
occupation of Vienna. Allied defeats at the hands of Napoleon continued to 
mount, and on 2 December, Russian and Austrian forces succumbed to French 
military might at Austerlitz in Moravia. Russia again abandoned its coalition 
partners and retreated into Poland. Austria surrendered unconditionally and 
on 26 December signed the Treaty of Pressburg. Prussia already had signed a 
treaty of alliance with France on 15 December. Roughly six months later, in July 
1806, een German states joined the Confederation of the Rhine under French 
domination, and during the next year, Napoleon consolidated his mastery over 
Western and Central Europe.
In the aermath of Austerlitz, Europe’s monarchs understood all too well the 
reality of Napoleon’s intentions. But this did not mean that they were ready or 
able to sustain a unied response. e Fourth Coalition against France began 
to take shape at the same time that Napoleon formed the Confederation of the 
Rhine. In July 1806 Prussia and Russia agreed to cooperate in anticipation of 
further hostilities. e coalition congealed in October with the participation of 
Britain, Prussia, Russia, and Sweden. On 9 October, in a challenge to France’s 
continued occupation of German lands, Prussian king Frederick William III
declared war. But before Emperor Alexander could make good on the commit-
ment to his ally, France defeated Prussia simultaneously at Jena and Auerstadt 
on 14 October. Frederick William ­ed to the east, and French troops occupied 
Berlin. At the end of 1806 Russian forces began to engage the French in limited 
actions in Poland. en in February 1807, the Russian and French armies fought 
the inconclusive Battle of Eylau. Just a few months later, on 14 June, combined 
Russian-Prussian forces succumbed to the French at Friedland. Alexander I and 
Frederick William III signed the treaties of Tilsit.
Based on the Treaty of Tilsit (25 June 1807) and the subsequent negotiations 
in Erfurt (September–October 1808), Russia recognized the French control over 
Western and Central Europe represented by the Confederation of the Rhine 
and the Grand Duchy of Warsaw.24 e Grand Duchy consisted of Prussia’s Pol-
ish provinces without the district of Belostok, which went to Russia. In addition, 
Emperor Alexander agreed to break relations with Britain and close the empire’s 
Baltic ports to British trade, unless Britain accepted French demands to respect 
freedom of the seas and trade among neutral states. Russia also consented to the 
demand that Britain return Dutch, French, and Spanish colonies taken since 
Russia as a Great Power in Europe 13 
1805. Beyond the direct actions against Britain, the French and Russian emper-
ors pledged to promote the blockade of ports in Denmark, Portugal, and Swe-
den, and to encourage these powers to declare war on Britain. Finally, Alexander 
promised to hand over the Ionian Islands to France and withdraw the Russian 
navy from the Adriatic Sea.
Emperor Alexander’s concessions to Napoleon were substantial, but the Rus-
sian monarch also seemed to get what he wanted from his would-be ally. e 
French emperor agreed to mediate in Russia’s war with the Ottoman Empire, 
which had broken out in 1806. If mediation failed, Napoleon promised to sup-
port Alexander against the Ottomans. In this scenario, Russia would be required 
to vacate strongholds in the eastern Mediterranean occupied between 1798 and 
1806, while France would accept Russian control over the Ottomans’ European 
provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia. If, however, Russia and the Porte reached 
an agreement, Alexander would at a future (unspecied) time withdraw his 
troops from the Danubian Principalities. Finally, the two emperors pledged that 
France and Russia would ght together as allies in the event of a European war.
Despite the displays of friendship on view in Tilsit and Erfurt, the years of 
peace from 1807 to 1812 turned out to be an uneasy breathing spell for both 
empires. “e probability of a new war between Russia and France came into 
being nearly at the same time as the Peace of Tilsit.”25 is was the judgment in 
1812 of Russian statesman Mikhail M. Speranskii (1772–1839), who added that 
“the peace itself included nearly all the elements of a war.” For just as Russia 
could not “maintain this peace exactly,” France could not “believe that the peace 
would be maintained.”26 Napoleon’s hope that he could use the Russian alli-
ance to undermine Britain’s economic strength came to naught. e commercial 
relationship between Britain and Russia had been robust since the sixteenth 
century. Although in Tilsit Emperor Alexander implicitly adhered to the Con-
tinental Blockade, which had been established in 1806 to strangle the British 
economy, he generally neglected to enforce the ban on trade. In November 1807 
Russia broke diplomatic relations with Britain but then never followed up with 
any military action. As the neglect to act illustrated, the Peace of Tilsit “oered 
both sides astonishing opportunities to evade unpleasant obligations or to de-
duce their own claims from the treaty.”27
Over time, the avoidance of obligations gave way to overtly hostile acts. In 
1809 Napoleon challenged Russian interests by incorporating western Galicia, 
Polish lands taken from Austria, into the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. e Polish 
question, which during the Congress of Vienna would come close to starting 
a war among the peacemakers, could not have been more critical for Russia. 
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Clearly, Emperor Alexander, whose grandmother Catherine II had spearheaded 
the partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, did not want to see a 
strong, independent, or French-dominated Polish state on the western border of 
his empire.28 Further French aggressions followed in July 1810 when Napoleon 
annexed the Kingdom of Holland. en in December he incorporated the Han-
seatic cities of Hamburg, Bremen, and Lübeck, as well as Lauenburg, the terri-
tory from Lippe on the lower Rhine to Steckenitz, and the Duchy of Oldenburg. 
Alexander’s sister Catherine was married to the heir apparent of Oldenburg, and 
the security of the duchy had been explicitly guaranteed by Tilsit.
At the same time that Napoleon displayed increasingly aggressive behavior, 
Emperor Alexander also violated the spirit of Tilsit. e Russian monarch re-
jected the Trianon Tari of August 1810, which heavily taxed British colonial 
products arriving on neutral ships. In addition, he refrained from closing Rus-
sia’s ports to the neutral ships that commonly carried British goods. Finally, in 
December 1810, Alexander openly refused to abide by the rules of the Continen-
tal Blockade and even imposed duties on products, primarily of French origin, 
brought to Russia by land. Napoleon’s inability to cripple Britain meant that Al-
exander’s reluctance to act on economic promises carried military implications. 
Nor did the oenses end there: instead of accepting Napoleon’s proposal for the 
hand of his sister Anna Pavlovna, the Russian monarch suggested postponement 
due to the girl’s young age. Snubbed by Alexander, Napoleon decided to marry 
Marie Louise of Austria. e marriage negotiations, like the implementation 
of trade policies, illustrated the Janus-faced nature of the Russian-French al-
liance. Both parties sidestepped its spirit and concrete provisions. Starting in 
1811 and continuing into early 1812, o
cials in Russia and France talked openly 
of possible hostilities. e game of chance came to an end, as both countries 
prepared for war.
e war in Russia started on 24 June 1812, when Napoleon’s Grand Army, 
“one of the largest armies the world had ever seen,” crossed the Nieman River. 
e French forces consisted of 368,000 infantry, 80,000 cavalry, and more than 
1,000 guns.29 From the outset, Russia’s military leaders relied on tactics of deep 
retreat, meaning that they avoided giving battle in order to preserve the ghting 
capability of their forces.30 In mid-August, when the French reached Smolensk, 
the Russians absorbed a two-day assault before setting the city ablaze and leav-
ing it to the enemy. roughout the war of 1812 Russia’s strategic patience and 
tactics of retreat proved eective against the combat and logistical capabilities 
of Napoleon’s army. French troops carried supplies for just twenty-four days and 
therefore lacked su
cient shelter and provisions. Napoleon had not prepared 
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for a lengthy campaign, hoping instead to in­ict a lethal blow that would force 
Alexander into speedy accommodation. Aer the Russians retreated from Smo-
lensk, Napoleon pressed onward to Moscow. Russia’s military commanders re-
sponded by forcing upon the French a brutal war of attrition.
On 5–7 September, near the village of Borodino, located 120 kilometers west 
of Moscow, the French and Russian armies met directly on the eld of battle. 
French troops numbering 135,000 faced a Russian force of 125,000 in one of 
the most vicious contests of the entire Napoleonic era. e dead and wounded 
on both sides reached harrowing numbers: 58,000 Russian and 50,000 French 
casualties.31 Military historians call the Battle of Borodino a draw, though the 
Russians handed Napoleon a nominal victory by again withdrawing from direct 
combat. is le the road to Moscow wide open, and on 14 September, Napo-
leon’s army occupied Russia’s ancient capital, the site of Romanov coronations 
since the founding of the dynasty in 1613. Mirroring the tactics of deep retreat, 
Moscow o
cials had evacuated most of the city’s 300,000 inhabitants. Napo-
leon’s Grand Army entered a ghost town instead of the vibrant second capital of 
the Russian Empire.
For the French troops, conditions in Moscow quickly deteriorated. Fires 
broke out almost immediately, destroying the grand and modest homes where 
Napoleon’s men could have quartered, as well as the stores of grain and am-
munition that could have supplied their needs. Indeed, by the time the res 
were brought under control, one-half to two-thirds of the city had burned down. 
In mid-October, roughly one month aer Napoleon’s entry into Moscow, the 
supply situation became untenable, and the French army began to withdraw. 
But Russia had not yet won the war. On 24–25 October, at Maloiaroslavets, 
the two armies again met in battle. Napoleon tried but failed to destroy the 
main Russian force commanded by General Field Marshal Mikhail I. Kutuzov 
(1747–1813). Again, in military terms, the battle proved indecisive, as each side 
suered casualties of about 7,000 men.32 Despite the balance of losses, aer the 
Battle of Maloiaroslavets, the French retreat became a catastrophe.
e last major clash between the opposing armies took place at Viazma on 3 
November, and for once French losses signicantly surpassed those of Russia. 
Yet even in these circumstances, Russia’s commanders did not seek to destroy 
Napoleon’s forces and again pulled back from further military action. In the 
words of Dominic Lieven, Kutuzov “preferred to leave the job to the winter.” 
Despite milder than normal weather, “Russian Novembers are cold, especially 
for exhausted men who sleep in the open, without even a tent, with very inad-
equate clothing, and with little food.”33 e warmer temperatures created the 
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additional problem of thawed ice on the Berezina River. As the French retreated, 
Russian troops and partisans on both sides of the river kept up attacks on Na-
poleon’s soldiers. When unusually deep cold did come in December, the French 
army already had been decimated. Of roughly 100,000 men who le Moscow, 
60,000 reached Smolensk, and only 40,000 departed the Russian Empire.34
To this day, the decision to leave Moscow to Napoleon remains controver-
sial. e occupation and destruction of the city represented a blow to the spirit 
of the Russian people. Across generations, the experience has been seared into 
public consciousness by the depiction in Leo Tolstoy’s War and Peace. But Rus-
sia survived the loss, eventually to triumph, and throughout the crisis Emperor 
Alexander preserved his dignied determination. Repeatedly, the monarch ig-
nored oers of peace put forward by Napoleon. Strengthened by spirituality 
and Orthodoxy, he weathered the dire circumstances of 1812. Alexander sought 
solace in daily Bible readings, an activity that in no way indicated a ­ight into 
religious mysticism. To the contrary, the monarch’s religious experience helps 
to explain his ability to carry on the war beyond Russia’s borders, his subse-
quent commitment to peace, and the pragmatic ­exibility of his foreign pol-
icy. Emperor Alexander and his subjects found strength in Christian belief and 
in the knowledge of their providential role in human history. As the monarch 
wrote to his friend, ober-procurator of the Synod Prince Aleksandr N. Golitsyn 
(1773–1844), “in moments such as those in which we nd ourselves, I believe that 
even the most hardened person feels a return toward his creator. . . . I surrender 
myself to this feeling, which is so habitual for me and I do so with a warmth, an 
abandon, much greater than in the past! I nd there my only consolation, my 
sole support. It is this sentiment alone that sustains me.”35 Aer Napoleon’s army 
le Russia, and for virtually the rest of Emperor Alexander’s reign, the trauma of 
the invasion both tested and fueled his resolve.
Following the ­ight from Russia, more than a year would pass before the allies 
nally defeated Napoleon and removed him from power. In the spring and sum-
mer of 1813, Austria, Britain, Prussia, Russia, and Sweden formed yet another 
coalition against France. Hostilities began in August, and in mid-October, the 
Battle of the Nations at Leipzig sent Napoleon’s army retreating across the Rhine 
River. Over the next several months, the French suered a series of setbacks. e 
Confederation of the Rhine came apart, the Dutch provinces rebelled, and the 
Austrians achieved military victories in northern Italy. In Spain, where since 
the summer of 1808 resistance to Napoleonic domination had been ongoing and 
supported by British troops, ghting continued, and French losses mounted. At 
the beginning of 1814 allied forces nally crossed the Rhine, and on 31 March, 
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Alexander I and Frederick William III rode into Paris. Napoleon abdicated in 
April and went into exile on the island of Elba. e Bourbon dynasty returned 
to power when Louis XVIII, brother of the guillotined Louis XVI, ascended 
the throne as a constitutional monarch. e peacemaking process began imme-
diately in Paris and continued in Vienna later that year, only to be interrupted 
by Napoleon’s return to power in March 1815. Fortunately for the cause of peace, 
the Hundred Days passed quickly. In June a combined force of Belgian, British, 
Dutch, and German troops under the command of the Duke of Wellington, 
who had led successful military operations in Spain, routed Napoleon at Water-
loo. On 21 June, Napoleon abdicated for the second time and on 15 July he was 
sent into remote exile on Saint Helena. ere he died on 5 May 1821 at a time 
when post-Napoleonic peacemaking still demanded constant attention from his 
opponents.
The Russian monarchy that helped to forge the European peace had been 
strengthened, not weakened, by the Napoleonic Wars. Educated in the Enlight-
enment culture of the Catherinian court, Emperor Alexander I continued the 
policies of political reform and cultural advancement pursued by his predeces-
sors.36 Within Russia this meant the improvement of justice and administration, 
consideration of constitutional projects, the establishment of state schools, the en-
hancement of educational requirements for advancement in military and civil ser-
vice, and lavish support for letters, arts, and sciences. Alexander’s government also 
introduced modest reforms to curb the abuses of serfdom, and in the Baltic prov-
inces of Courland, Estonia, and Livonia, carried out an emancipation without 
guaranteed access to land. Although indicative of humanitarian concerns, none 
of these measures indicated a serious commitment to the abolition of serfdom, 
which remained the backbone of Russia’s military system. Nor did the political 
reforms place formal limits on the monarch’s absolutist power or even institution-
alize consultation with representatives of the nobility and educated service classes. 
In a word, the authority of the Russian monarchy, legitimized by the Russian 
Orthodox Church and defended by a peasant army, remained uncontested.
Intellectual dissent had begun to make inroads in the late eighteenth century, 
and by the time of Alexander’s death in December 1825, produced open rebel-
lion. But this development did not prevent the monarchy, church, and educated 
elites from uniting around the idea that the conditions of human life could be 
improved through lawful reform, educational progress, and Christian morality. 
e servicemen who assisted Emperor Alexander in the peacemaking of 1815 to 
1823 clearly shared this outlook. Most of the monarch’s diplomats originated 
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from the educated Russian, Ukrainian, and Baltic German nobilities who dom-
inated the empire’s service classes. A second diplomatic cohort entered Russian 
service from other European countries, including Poland, at the end of the eigh-
teenth or beginning of the nineteenth century. Finally, the diplomatic corps 
contained sons of foreigners who long had served the Russian monarchy. As a 
group, Alexander’s high-level diplomats, born primarily in the 1760s, 1770s, and 
1780s, were individuals who had grown up in multilingual, multiconfessional, 
and multiethnic environments and who moved easily in the highest government 
and social circles of Europe’s cosmopolitan capitals and courts.37
Emperor Alexander’s co-ministers of foreign aairs embodied the worldly 
qualities of the diplomatic elite. Count Karl V. Nesselrode, minister of foreign 
aairs under Alexander I and Nicholas I (ruled 1825–55), was born in Lisbon, 
where his father served as Russia’s envoy. Nesselrode was baptized in the An-
glican Church and completed gymnasium in Berlin. His Catholic father came 
from an ancient family of German counts and his Lutheran mother from a fam-
ily of wealthy merchants. Nesselrode’s co-minister, Count Ioannis A. Kapodis-
trias, originated from the Greek aristocracy of Corfu, received his education 
at the University of Padua, and served in the government of the Ionian Islands 
(the Republic of the Seven United Islands) under Russian protection. Aer the 
terms of Tilsit transferred the islands to French protection, Kapodistrias en-
tered Russian service. During the European restorations, Nesselrode and Ka-
podistrias dominated Russia’s foreign policy, but other diplomats shared their 
social prole and cultural orientation. David M. Alopeus, the son of a noble 
from Finland, received his education in Berlin and Stuttgart. Ivan O. Anstett 
entered Russian service from French service in 1789. Prince Adam E. Czarto-
ryski originated from a family of Polish magnates but ended his life in exile in 
Paris. Andrei Ia. Italinskii came from the lesser nobility of Ukraine, graduated 
from the Kiev eological Academy, and studied medicine in Saint Petersburg, 
Edinburgh, and London. Prince Christoph A. Lieven belonged to a renowned 
family of Baltic German nobles who served the Russian monarchy in numerous 
military and civil capacities. Peter I. Poletika, also a Ukrainian noble, was born 
in Kiev province to a Turkish mother captured in the siege of Ochakov. Count 
Karl O. Pozzo di Borgo represented Corsica in the French Constituent Assembly 
in 1789–91. A royalist, he emigrated in 1796, entered Russian service in 1805, and 
became Alexander’s minister in Paris in 1814. Not surprisingly, among Emperor 
Alexander’s diplomatic agents, one also nds representatives of Russia’s great 
noble families: Prince Dimitrii I. Dolgorukii, Prince Andrew K. Razumovskii, 
Baron Grigorii A. Stroganov, and Dmitrii P. Tatishchev.
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ese are just a few of the men who served Emperor Alexander as professional 
diplomats. Diverse in their national and religious origins, educational experi-
ences, and career paths, their common language was usually French, and their 
common loyalty was always to the monarch they served, the personication of 
Russia’s power and greatness. As the foot soldiers of Alexander’s foreign policy, 
they proved capable of putting before the monarch divergent points of view and 
of taking the initiative in complicated diplomatic negotiations. Yet for as long 
as they remained in Russian service, they worked faithfully to fulll the wishes 
and execute the policies of Emperor Alexander. As the author of Russian foreign 
policy and as a leading peacemaker in Europe, Alexander expected his diplo-
matic agents, in their dealings with other powers, to speak his voice collectively 
and harmoniously. During the years from 1815 to 1823, the diplomats did just 
that, laboring tirelessly alongside their sovereign to construct and preserve the 
European peace.
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Pacication and Peace (1815–17)
T he history of pacification and peace a
er the victory over Napoleon in 1814–15 provides unique insight into how Europe’s dip-lomats, socialized and educated in the reformist spirit of the late 
eighteenth century, responded to changed historical conditions that required 
imaginative thinking and the recalibration of social and political expectations. 
e eorts of Europe’s post-Napoleonic peacemakers succeeded in some respects 
and failed in others. eir policies could be progressive and farsighted, but also 
narrow-minded and self-interested. ey le
 behind a world dominated by great 
powers in pursuit of empire and riches—a world full of violence, prejudice, cru-
elty, and exploitation—but they also led their respective societies into a process 
of accommodation to liberal democratic change. e overarching result of their 
labors, a
er more than two decades of excruciating warfare and exhausting 
diplomacy, was that European society became a little more pluralistic and a lit-
tle more civilized.
A mélange of ingredients from the so-called old and new regimes, the peace 
settlement that ended the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars has occupied the 
attention of generations of scholars.1 Writing in multiple European languages, 
historians have produced high-quality studies that incorporate a variety of per-
spectives—national, international, political, diplomatic, military, strategic, and 
cultural.2 Recent scholarship stresses the novelty of France’s mobilization for 
revolutionary war and the originality of the peacemakers who brought the wars 
to an end. From the conduct of total war to the evolution of diplomatic protocol 
to the chess game of international politics, the impact of new ideas and practices 
dominates current approaches to study of the era.3 Consistent with the focus 
on innovation, scholars argue that the Vienna peace settlement represented not 
a restoration of the old regime or of the prerevolutionary international order, 
but rather the codication of new legal principles and procedures for the con-
duct of European politics and the organization of European society. Eloquently 
and persuasively set forth in the works of Paul W. Schroeder and others, this 
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interpretation holds that the treaties produced by the Congress of Vienna (1814–
15) replaced eighteenth-century balance-of-power politics, which encouraged 
conict, greed, and aggression, with a new understanding of European order 
or the European equilibrium (l’équilibre européen) based on mutual restraint, 
multilateral cooperation (the concert), and respect for treaties, international law, 
the principle of legitimacy, and the rights of states and nations.4
e distinction drawn between the Westphalia state system, which relied 
on the principle of a balance of power, and the Vienna system, which deployed 
grouping methods to prevent great power aggression, has in recent years led 
scholars to see in the diplomacy of the Restoration era a model for world gov-
ernance in the twentieth and twenty-rst centuries. us, historians depict the 
new public law of Europe—elaborated in the treaties of 1814–15 and in the mech-
anisms of collective security established by regular congresses, conferences, and 
allied consultations—as the precursor to European integration, the European 
Parliament, the European Union, the United Nations, and other present-day 
institutions of world governance. Jennifer Mitzen, for example, highlights the 
principles of shared European governance enshrined in the Vienna settlement 
when she characterizes the “Concert of Europe” as “the rst international public 
power.” O. V. Orlik’s analysis of Russian foreign policy a
er 1815 describes the 
Treaty of the Holy Alliance (14/26 September 1815) as Russian emperor Alex-
ander I’s European idea, a form of European unity designed to strengthen con-
servative principles of reaction, legitimism, and restoration. Mark Jarrett simi-
larly claims that Alexander I intended the “Congress System” to function as an 
“embryonic world government.”5 e eort to achieve an enduring peace based 
on multilateral treaties, ongoing cooperation, and face-to-face conferences that 
addressed recalcitrant problems and immediate crises surely required original 
thinking and enlightened perspectives; however, when historians use anach-
ronistic phrases such as “global governance,” “a kind of ‘constitutional’ order,” 
and “a European legal space,” they exaggerate the extent to which systemic inte-
gration, behavioral psychology, modern jurisprudence, and even constitutional 
politics were characteristic of the early nineteenth century.6
ere is, however, another body of recent scholarship devoted to the Con-
gress of Vienna that provides a more critical and traditional perspective. Adam 
Zamoyski emphasizes the emergence of great power politics and domination 
by four or ve states in Napoleonic and post-Napoleonic Europe.7 According 
to Zamoyski, the Vienna settlement allowed a handful of great powers—in 
this case Austria, Britain, France, Prussia, and Russia—to impose their will on 
smaller, relatively vulnerable states.8 In more nuanced studies that also stress the 
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postwar dominance of the four great powers (Austria, Britain, Prussia, and Rus-
sia) or the hegemony of Britain and Russia in deciding territorial arrangements 
and regulating the peace, there is less emphasis on the Vienna settlement as a 
security regime or culture and more attention to the mechanisms of strategic 
restraint that were put into place.9 In order to make the peace terms palatable 
to victors, vanquished, bystanders, and secondary players alike, the great powers 
accepted limits on their own power without, however, giving up their postwar 
gains. e result was a system of consensus, a “mutually restraining partner-
ship” rather than a “balance against potential aggressors.” Based on a belief in 
eternal principles, a commitment to moderation, the rejection of territorial ag-
grandizement, and the organization of direct meetings between rulers or their 
plenipotentiaries, the institutional innovation of the Vienna settlement lay in 
the ability of the allies to continue into the postwar era the consultations that 
had led to the defeat of Napoleon.10 e promise to hold peacetime conferences 
to address matters of common concern represented the creation of an “ongoing 
joint management mechanism.” Although this mechanism fell short of any spe-
cic obligation to provide “mutual protection and enforcement,” it repeatedly 
created opportunities for the great powers to monitor and inuence one anoth-
er’s policies and actions.11
Also highlighted by recent scholarship is Russia’s critical military and dip-
lomatic role in the Restoration era. From the 1790s, Russian policymakers and 
intellectuals grappled with the question of how to achieve peace and stability 
in Europe. In the process of conceptualizing European order, they developed 
ideas about the empire’s place in Europe and the larger world. Based on Russian 
diplomatic communications (usually written in French), this chapter highlights 
the perspective brought to the Vienna settlement by the empire’s historical ex-
perience and political practices. e thinking and sentiments of Emperor Alex-
ander I largely dened Russian diplomacy; however, this diplomacy should not 
be described as the product of a “highly personal and erratic foreign policy.”12 To 
the contrary, close attention to Russia’s understanding of the Vienna settlement 
reminds scholars that, as Henry Kissinger and his interpreters repeatedly note, 
the foreign policy of a country or people is rooted in its historical self-aware-
ness, memory, and consciousness.13 e Russian story also reminds historians 
that a social science or structural approach to the study of diplomacy—one that 
focuses on “the question of decisive determinants.  .  . and their correlations as 
far as domestic, economic, and international politics are concerned”—cannot 
eectively account for the messy process of interpreting the terms of the peace 
and applying them to specic developments on the ground.14
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e Legal Settlement
Historians date Enlightenment discussions of perpetual peace that envisioned a 
league of independent European states to the period when the treaties of Utrecht 
(1713–14) concluded the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–14). By the 1780s 
the idea of codifying international law to provide the basis for everlasting peace 
among civilized (read Christian) states appeared in the writings of Jeremy Ben-
tham.15 Of more immediate signicance for this study, the complicated coalition 
politics that ultimately led to the military defeat of Napoleon and the peace 
settlement reached at the Congress of Vienna began as early as the summer of 
1792 in the wake of the French Revolution and onset of the revolutionary wars. 
According to historians of Russia, Emperor Paul repeatedly expressed interest 
in conference diplomacy, and in 1804–5, Emperor Alexander I and his diplo-
matic agents—for example, assistant foreign minister and Polish patriot Prince 
Adam E. Czartoryski—developed proposals for an enduring peace in Europe. 
Communicated in September 1804 to the British government by Nikolai N. 
Novosil’tsev, one of the monarch’s “young friends” and member of the Uno-
cial Committee, the proposals grew out of negotiations for a military alliance 
against Napoleon that also articulated general plans for the organization of Eu-
rope a
er France’s defeat.16 e principles presented in the Russian proposals 
included: (1) recognition of a right to neutrality; (2) the idea that nations should 
live under political arrangements corresponding to their character; (3) acknowl-
edgment that the world had changed and that the sacred rights of humanity 
should be respected; (4) acceptance of the need to prevent further revolutions, 
which could only lead to war; (5) recognition that while principles were univer-
sal, their applications varied depending on the locality and people involved; (6) 
the commitment to administer institutions in a spirit of wisdom and benevo-
lence; (7) the idea of a European federation or league of nations based on respect 
for nations/peoples, international law (the law of nations), and principles that 
could serve as the foundation for all European politics; (8) the idea that no gov-
ernment should declare war without rst seeking mediation; and nally, (9) the 
need for an international system to guarantee the peace.17 Although vague and 
multifaceted, the principles set forth in the Russian proposals made their way 
into the peace treaties of 1814–15.
e British response, delivered by William Pitt the Younger in a state paper 
of 19 January 1805, preferred the language of confederacy or alliance rather than 
league or federation, but nonetheless accepted the idea of an association of states 
under Russian and British protection designed to ensure the rights of peoples. 
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Among the concert of measures presented as acceptable to the British and Rus-
sian governments, the state paper envisioned “at the restoration of peace, a gen-
eral agreement and Guarantee for the mutual protection and security of dier-
ent Powers, and for re-establishing a general system of public law in Europe.” To 
give solidity and permanence to the peace, the paper proposed “a Treaty to which 
all the principal Powers of Europe should be parties, by which their respective 
rights and possessions . . . shall be xed and recognized; and they should all bind 
themselves mutually to protect and support each other, against any attempt to 
infringe them.” e treaty would “re-establish a general and comprehensive sys-
tem of public law in Europe, and provide, as far as possible, for repressing future 
attempts to disturb the general tranquility; and above all, for restraining any 
projects of aggrandizement and ambition similar to those which have produced 
all the calamities inicted on Europe since the disastrous era of the French Rev-
olution.” e treaty would be placed under the special guarantee of Great Britain 
and Russia, by which the two powers would commit “jointly to take an active 
part in preventing its being infringed.”
In April 1813, as the alliance that eventually defeated Napoleon took shape, 
British foreign secretary Robert Stewart, Viscount Castlereagh, forwarded a 
copy of the state paper of 1805 to the British ambassador in Saint Petersburg, Vis-
count William Cathcart.18 According to Castlereagh, even though some of the 
suggestions made in 1805 no longer applied, the dispatch remained a “masterly 
outline for the restoration of Europe,” which the ambassador was instructed 
to discuss with Emperor Alexander I.19 As Pitt’s state paper highlighted, the 
Novosil’tsev mission concerned the formation of a British-Russian alliance to 
defeat Napoleon, restore the balance of power in Europe, and create a new sys-
tem of international law.20 ese goals could be pursued and implemented in a 
variety of ways. For this reason, not all historians are convinced that Alexan-
der’s proposals of 1804 actually constituted a plan for perpetual peace. Another 
decade passed, moreover—a decade lled with volatile coalition politics, failed 
alliances, broken peace treaties, and bloody military defeats—before the diplo-
mats and statesmen of Europe came together to work out the details of what they 
hoped would be a stable peace settlement.21
Concrete construction of the edice of pacication and peace began with 
the Treaty of Chaumont, a military alliance against France concluded on 17 
February/1 March 1814. In this treaty, the future peacemakers began to con-
ceptualize the reconstitution of European order, European society, and the Eu-
ropean political system—a task they would not complete until the Congress 
of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818, when France rejoined the European alliance as one 
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of ve great powers. Following Napoleon’s nal defeat in June 1815, the specic 
agreements identied as the Vienna settlement included the Treaty of Chau-
mont, the First Treaty of Paris (18/30 May 1814), the Final Act of the Congress of 
Vienna (28 May/9 June 1815), the Treaty of the Holy Alliance (14/26 September 
1815), the Second Treaty of Paris (8/20 November 1815), the Quadruple Alliance 
(8/20 November 1815), and the protocols and declaration of the Congress of 
Aix-la-Chapelle (3/15 November 1818). Taken as a whole, these treaties, conven-
tions, and protocols constituted the public law of Europe and therefore dened 
the legal framework for European diplomacy, interstate communications, and 
relations between governments and peoples until the outbreak of World War I, 
or from the Russian perspective, until the Crimean War of 1853–56.
e Treaty of Chaumont, preceded by Foreign Secretary Castlereagh’s project 
for a “Treaty of Alliance Oensive and Defensive against France” (18 September 
1813), was signed separately by each of the four powers—Austria, Britain, Prus-
sia, and Russia—with the other three.22 At the time, the allies were conducting 
peace negotiations with France, and in the event that Napoleon rejected the 
terms oered, the signatories pledged to prosecute a vigorous war to end the 
misfortunes aicting Europe and to reestablish a just equilibrium among the 
powers. Each government agreed to contribute 150,000 soldiers toward the war 
eort and promised not to sign any separate peace or truce with the enemy, 
a particularly signicant provision in light of the anti-French coalitions that 
since 1792 repeatedly had collapsed. Britain also promised to pay the allies an 
annual subsidy of ve million pounds sterling for the duration of the war.23 In 
addition, at the conclusion of peace with France, the allies would commit to 
guarantee the rights and liberties of all European nations by acting in concert 
to prevent France from disturbing the provisions of the settlement. If any of the 
four powers faced the danger of a French attack, the others promised to inter-
vene to thwart the aggression. Finally, all hostilities, current and future, would 
be ended by common agreement among the allies united in a defensive alliance 
against France.
Because the alliance aimed to preserve the equilibrium in Europe, ensure 
the repose and independence of the powers, and prevent future invasions, the 
contracting parties accepted the terms for a period of twenty years and agreed 
to consider a possible extension three years before the date of expiration. More 
concretely, a separate set of secret articles outlined the specics of a broader Eu-
ropean peace. Germany would be composed of independent sovereign states 
united in a confederation for purposes of military defense, and Switzerland’s 
independence would be guaranteed by the allies. Italy would be divided into 
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independent states that would serve as intermediary bodies between France and 
Austria’s Italian territories. Spain would be governed by King Ferdinand VII, 
and Holland would become a free and independent state ruled by the prince 
of Orange (the future King William II) with augmented territory and suitable 
borders.24 Finally, even a
er the anticipated peace with France became reality, 
the allies promised to maintain an army on a temporary basis to strengthen the 
settlement and ensure implementation.
e next step in pacifying Europe and building the peace came a
er Napo-
leon’s abdication and exile to Elba in April 1814 and the return of the Bourbons 
to the French throne under King Louis XVIII. By the First Treaty of Paris, the 
French king and the allies (Austria, Britain, Portugal, Prussia, Russia, Spain, and 
Sweden) accepted a France conned to the borders of 1792 with the addition of 
territories in Savoy and the Palatinate. Described by historians as generous and 
not at all punitive, the peace assigned to France, clearly the aggressor, more than 
600,000 inhabitants over its population of January 1792. Nor did the allies im-
pose war reparations, limits on the size of the French army, or border changes 
along the Pyrenees. e treaty also allowed France to keep art treasures taken 
during the wars, and most of the French overseas colonies seized by Britain were 
returned.25 France reciprocated by renouncing all territorial claims in Belgium, 
Germany, Holland, Italy, Malta, and Switzerland. Based on additional secret 
clauses, France ceded Venetia to Austria and Genoa to the Kingdom of Sardinia, 
the Habsburg-Lorraine dynasty of Ferdinand III was restored in Tuscany, and 
the Austrian border with Italy was xed at the Po River and Lake Maggiore. 
Secret provisions also envisioned an independent German Confederation and 
recognized the incorporation of Belgium into Holland. e allies agreed that to 
ensure peace and security in an integrated Europe, France must be strong and 
stable. For this reason, Britain and Russia favored a constitutional charter for 
France and a peace of equilibrium. Although signicant segments of the French 
population opposed the nal terms of the European settlement, believing that 
the victors had punished and subjugated their country, historians generally con-
clude that on average, defense, safety, and the spirt of reconciliation held sway.26
e edice of pacication and peace remained incomplete, however, and so 
the allies agreed to convene a congress in Vienna to decide outstanding issues: 
the Polish and Saxon questions, the reorganization of Germany, and territo-
rial adjustments in Germany, Holland, Italy, and Switzerland.27 For Russia the 
future of Poland was paramount. e once powerful Polish-Lithuanian state 
had ceased to exist in the late eighteenth century following three partitions 
spearheaded by Russia, which also handed over Polish territories to Austria and 
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Prussia (1772, 1793, and 1795). By the Treaty of Tilsit (25 June/7 July 1807) be-
tween France and Russia, Emperor Alexander had accepted the creation of the 
Duchy of Warsaw, which restored the Polish state and placed it under the king 
of Saxony.28 But in 1814–15, Alexander became determined to dissolve the Duchy 
of Warsaw and replace it with a Polish kingdom tied to Russia by a constitution 
that granted administrative autonomy, recognized a budgetary role for the diet, 
and crowned the Russian tsar king of Poland.29 To reconcile Alexander’s plans 
for Poland with the commitment to return Prussia to its territorial expanse and 
population of 1805–6, the monarch hoped to compensate Frederick William 
III with Saxony. Allied discussions began in September 1814, and by October 
it became clear that Castlereagh and Austrian foreign minister Prince Clemens 
von Metternich opposed eorts to dispossess or remove the king of Saxony. ey 
instead argued that the king’s removal would violate the principle of legitimacy 
(even though he had been slow to abandon Napoleon).30
Negotiations continued into 1815 and throughout the Congress of Vienna, 
which began in mid-September 1814.31 anks to the personal relationship be-
tween the Prussian and Russian monarchs and to Frederick William’s loyalty to 
Alexander, Prussia refused to enter into agreements designed to thwart Russia’s 
plans. Eventually the Russian ruler had his way, though not before his military 
governor in Saxony handed over provisional administration of the territory to 
Prussia (8 November 1814) and not before Austria, Britain, and France concluded 
a secret defensive alliance directed against Prussia and Russia (3 January 1815).32
Emperor Alexander, a resolute empire builder like his grandmother Catherine 
II, believed that Russia possessed a moral right to Poland, that the happiness 
of the Polish people depended on the restoration of a unied national life, and 
that a united Poland under the Russian crown would help to ensure European 
security. In December 1814 and January 1815, to achieve this broader goal, Al-
exander accepted territorial compromises in Poland and recognized that not all 
of Saxony could go to Prussia. By mid-December, Austria and Britain became 
reconciled to Russia’s position, even though the question of Saxony remained 
unresolved. Final agreement occurred in February 1815. Austria retained Galicia 
and made gains in Italy, Cracow became a free city, and Prussia received about 
half of Saxony’s territory and two-
hs of its population, in addition to Swedish 
Pomerania, the Duchy of Westphalia, and much of the le
 bank of the Rhine.33
e serious tensions among the allies exposed by the Polish-Saxon dis-
pute, France’s implicit restoration to great power status as one of “the Five,” 
and the secret defensive alliance directed against Prussia and Russia seemed 
to evaporate when Napoleon returned to the continent at the end of February, 
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threatening not only the progress of negotiations in Vienna, but also the gen-
eral peace of Europe. In late March, King Louis XVIII ed to Belgium, and 
Bonaparte reclaimed the French throne. roughout the crisis, the Congress 
of Vienna, which had brought together the representatives of 216 powers (2 
emperors, 5 kings, and 209 principalities), continued the work of redrawing 
territorial boundaries in Europe based on principles of equilibrium and mutual 
respect among sovereign states.34 e allies likewise responded to the military 
danger quickly, eectively, and in unison with a formal renewal of the alliance 
to overthrow Napoleon (Treaty of 13/25 March 1815).35 Never mind that war 
against Napoleon might constitute intervention in France’s domestic aairs or 
that it might violate the right of the French people to choose their ruler and 
constitution. In this instance, “the Big Eight” (Austria, Bourbon France, Brit-
ain, Portugal, Prussia, Russia, Spain, and Sweden) agreed that Napoleon was a 
criminal who must be defeated.36 at happened on 18 June at Waterloo, and 
on 22 June Napoleon abdicated for the second time. On 8 July, Louis XVIII
returned to Paris. Despite the dangers, disruptions, and uncertainties of the 
Hundred Days, the peacemakers signed the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna 
on 28 May/9 June 1815.37
Work at the Congress of Vienna continued over nine months, and by June 
1815 the participants had agreed on Europe’s territorial boundaries, the form 
of government to be established in restored and newly independent states, and 
who would rule in those states.38 rough land swaps that traded population 
for population the Final Act of the congress, ratied by all the participants, 
undid most of the territorial changes imposed by Napoleon. To achieve this 
outcome, the peacemakers subordinated national sentiments and aspirations to 
legitimate dynastic claims and the broader geopolitical goals assumed by the 
four great powers to be in the common interest of all Europe. e Final Act af-
rmed the First Treaty of Paris and created a German Confederation composed 
of thirty-nine sovereign states with a federal diet in Frankfurt. e independent 
states and free cities pledged to join together in a defensive league, the specics 
of which would be worked out by the diet.39 In addition, the Final Act ratied 
agreements concerning the territorial boundaries and political organization of 
the United Netherlands (Belgium and Holland), the Ionian Islands, Italy, Scan-
dinavia, and Switzerland.40 Finally, the proceedings and legislation of the con-
gress established diplomatic regulations and protocols that set the standard for 
nineteenth-century diplomacy, accepted in principle the abolition of the slave 
trade, and established international control over the navigation of key rivers.41 In 
eect, the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna provided an implicit guarantee of 
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recognition and enforcement by tying together in one package multiple treaties 
devoted to dierent situations.
e last components of the legal settlement put into place in 1814–15 consisted 
of the Second Treaty of Paris and Quadruple Alliance, both of 8/20 November 
1815.42 If the treaties ratied in the Final Act of the congress dened the legal pa-
rameters of pacication and peace in Europe, those of November 1815 prescribed 
how the great powers would regulate and maintain the peace going forward. Not 
surprisingly, the Second Treaty of Paris imposed harsher terms on France than 
had the First.43 Territorial losses returned the country to the borders of 1790: 
Saarland went to Prussia and part of Savoy to Piedmont. e treaty also levied 
an indemnity of 700 million francs and a ve-year allied military occupation in 
the north to be funded by France.44 France agreed to pay for the construction 
of barrier fortresses in Belgium and Germany as part of the indemnity and to 
return art works seized during the wars. Most signicantly for the future, the 
allies renewed the Treaty of Chaumont in the form of the Quadruple Alliance 
and armed the twenty-year term. e Quadruple Alliance excluded Bourbon 
France and established French aggression or the return of Napoleon (or any 
member of his family) to the French throne as the casus foederis or treaty event 
that would trigger military action by the allies. Based on article 6 of the alliance, 
the four powers also agreed to call future congresses and conferences to promote 
peace, prosperity, and the repose of Europe. Described by some historians as 
an administrative body or a permanent league, the conference of ambassadors 
established in Paris provided a forum for ongoing diplomatic negotiations to 
ensure implementation of the Second Treaty of Paris and cooperation on other 
problems that might arise.45
ere is a rich historical and juristic literature dating back to the early nine-
teenth century that depicts the Vienna settlement as a legal system. More re-
cently, Matthias Schulz has referred to instruments of so
 and hard power that 
provided the basis for a collective security mechanism. ese included the mul-
tilateral guarantee of a territory, the recognized neutrality of a state, the use 
of mediation to eect compromise, collective dispatches, joint ambassadorial 
representations, ultimatums, naval demonstrations, naval blockades, and mili-
tary interventions. Any of these instruments could be deployed collectively or by 
delegation to individual states, and they could be authorized through diplomatic 
conferences, congresses, commissions, protocols, and joint communications to 
the disputing parties.46 Whether or not these mechanisms rose to the level of a 
legal system is debatable. It should be noted, moreover, that while Russia invari-
ably claimed to conduct foreign policy based on treaty prescriptions, in Russian 
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governance of the era, justice and strict adherence to the law were not equivalent. 
Russia was not a rule-of-law state (Rechtsstaat), even though the monarchy gov-
erned through laws (the rule of laws as opposed to the rule of law). So before de-
claring the Vienna settlement a coherent legal system, historians must consider 
how justice was administered and what role law played within specic polities.47
Dierent understandings of law and the meaning of legal prescriptions may help 
to explain the almost immediate disagreements that arose as the powers set out 
to implement and live by the terms of Chaumont, Paris, and Vienna, and of 
earlier treaties still in eect.
e Moral Settlement: e Holy Alliance
Emperor Alexander I and his diplomatic agents appreciated the originality of the 
Vienna settlement; however, their understanding did not give preference to in-
ternational governance or collective security mechanisms. Nor was their concept 
of treaty obligations limited to the public law dening territorial arrangements, 
legitimate political authority, and regular meetings in diplomatic conferences. 
Of equal signicance from the Russian perspective was the Treaty of 14/26 Sep-
tember 1815 (the Holy Alliance), which historians tend to describe either as the 
cornerstone of a conservative post-Napoleonic foreign policy, designed to pre-
vent revolution by upholding church and monarchy, or as the expression of a 
proto-Slavophile romantic nationalism inspired by belief in the world historical 
mission of Orthodox Russia. Although certainly relevant to the history of the 
Holy Alliance, these interpretations focus more on what the alliance became 
a
er the reign of Alexander and less on what it meant at the moment of its 
inception. In the eyes of Russia’s monarch and Ministry of Foreign Aairs, the 
Holy Alliance functioned as one component in the corpus of European public 
law that dened territorial arrangements and interstate relations following the 
victory over Napoleon.48
Russian descriptions of the Holy Alliance highlighted the impact of a new 
moral spirit, visible across Europe, that placed the general interest in peace above 
the particular interests of territorial states and separate combinations.49 As the 
history of Restoration Europe shows, the post-revolutionary need to recalibrate 
social and political expectations did not require that the peacemakers abandon 
eighteenth-century principles of enlightened reformism. For this reason, recent 
biographies consistently make the point that Foreign Secretary Castlereagh, For-
eign Minister Metternich, and Emperor Alexander I became successful peace-
makers while also remaining men of the moderate mainstream Enlightenment.50
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Russian eorts to promote the Holy Alliance and explain its relationship to 
the larger Vienna settlement associated the originality of the peace with law-
ful political change, Christian morality, and belief in God’s providence for 
His Creation.51 In other words, the Holy Alliance dovetailed with established 
eighteenth-century conceptions of good governance and cultural progress.52
e Treaty of 14/26 September 1815, signed in Paris by Alexander I, Francis 
I, and Frederick William III, began by acknowledging the benefactions (bla-
godeianiia) of Divine Providence granted to the monarchs over the past three 
years.53 e signatories promised to rule their own states and to organize their 
relations with other governments in accordance with God’s commandments 
and the divine precepts of love, truth, and peace (liubov’, pravda i mir), which 
applied not only to private life but also to political action.54 More specically, 
the three sovereigns pledged to remain united by the bonds of brotherhood, to 
view one another as countrymen or compatriots (edinozemtsy), and to support 
one another in times of need. Toward their subjects and troops, they would act 
as fathers, and they would govern in the spirit of brotherhood to preserve faith, 
peace, and truth (vera, mir i pravda).55 In describing themselves and their peoples 
as members of a single Christian nation (narod), the monarchs vowed to live 
by God’s commandments and to ensure that their subjects did the same. Only 
through the fulllment of humanity’s duties to God, the treaty proclaimed, 
could peace be secured. Based on article 3, the signatories agreed to invite the 
heads of other (European) powers to join the alliance, a step that would obligate 
them also to govern and order their mutual relations according to the eternal 
principles of divine law. French King Louis XVIII signed the treaty on 7/19 No-
vember 1815, and over the next two years almost every European ruler, great and 
small, acceded to the alliance. e two exceptions were Pope Pius VII and the 
prince regent of England (future King George IV). e rst rejected the treaty 
as a violation of Catholic dogma, and the latter, unable to decree the alliance 
because of the English constitution, nevertheless expressed his support for the 
Christian principles it professed.56
For Emperor Alexander and his diplomats, this act of fraternal Christian alli-
ance embodied the spirit of the European peace, the hand of God in human his-
tory, and the role of monarchs as instruments of Divine Providence. In the words 
of the enlightened Russian statesman Mikhail M. Speranskii, the Holy Alliance 
emanated not from the self-love or personal actions of the sovereign signatories, 
but from their having become the organs of a “pure outpouring . . . of Christian 
goodness.”57 Viewed by Speranskii as “the practical realization of the spiritual 
function of kingship,” the Holy Alliance proclaimed that the purpose of human 
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societies was to lead people to union in Christ, the head of Christian states. 
e Holy Alliance would endure, moreover, only if sovereigns prayed, read Holy 
Scripture, and lived as true Christians.58 Religious teachings about the oneness 
of church and monarchy, human and providential history, and God’s sovereignty 
over the Christian people had long been pillars of Russian political thought.59
From the time of the European Renaissance onward, modern accompani-
ments to the eternal principles of Christian rulership—ideas about absolutist 
political authority, the common good, and the social contract—took root across 
Europe, though in Russia, moral philosophy did not make signicant inroads 
before the late eighteenth century.60 Even then, as elements of classical and folk-
loric culture became incorporated into the monarchy’s scenarios of power, Or-
thodox prescriptions dating back to the middle ages held rm. e traumatic 
experience of 1812 and the military campaigns of 1813–14 further enhanced 
the Christian foundations of Russian monarchical power. e Treaty of 14/26 
September 1815 expressed Alexander I’s religious sentiment and sense of God’s 
immediate presence through what today might be called a spiritual experience 
of existential crisis. Added to the fervor of religious faith were the realities of a 
Russian government that relied on personalized relationships of authority. In 
diplomacy, personalized politics translated into bonds of friendship among rul-
ers—friendship that also could be grounded in actual family ties.61
Eternal principles, harmonious oneness, and ideals of friendship and family—
these aspects of Christian morality, enlightened cosmopolitanism, and senti-
mentalist empathy all found expression in the lo
y abstract language of the Holy 
Alliance treaty. Consistent with countless legislative acts, ocial proclamations, 
and semi-ocial literary and journalistic compositions, the language of the 
treaty sounds familiar to historians of eighteenth-and early nineteenth-century 
Russia. To foreign ears, by contrast, the treaty may seem strange, irrelevant, or 
even threatening, which is perhaps the reason that modern European historiog-
raphy so o
en dismisses or condemns it.62 at Emperor Alexander was aware 
of actual and potential criticisms is evident from a rescript of 22 March/3 April 
1816 sent to Russia’s ambassadors across Europe in which he tried to counter 
misunderstandings about the purpose of the alliance and provided instructions 
on how it should be explained to foreign rulers invited to join.63
Alexander described the act of alliance as a pledge of unity and harmony 
brought about by providential action to ght the prevailing spirit of evil. Due to 
the experiences and struggles of recent years, the monarch and his allies sought to 
apply to the civic and political relations of states the principles of peace, harmony 
(concorde), and love embodied in Christian morality. Conservative precepts 
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(precepts conservateurs), long relegated to the narrow sphere of individual rela-
tionships, would now play a more active and uniform role in political arrange-
ments. A
er the calamities of recent years, the salutary principles of fraternity 
and love, the “true source of all civil liberty,” needed to be restored. Here, as 
elsewhere, the peacemakers of 1815 viewed the era of the Revolutionary and Na-
poleonic Wars as a time of utter moral disaster. e alliance, by contrast, aimed 
to preserve the peace by rallying the moral interests of peoples that Divine Prov-
idence had reassembled under the banner of the cross. In response to persistent 
fears about Russia’s geopolitical intentions, Alexander insisted that the alliance 
had nothing to do with conquest. Nor could its goals be achieved with the use of 
military force. Indeed, although the peaceful happiness currently enjoyed by the 
Christian nations emanated from their religion, the sentiments expressed in the 
alliance applied to Christians and non-Christians alike. Based on the principles 
of the Holy Alliance, Emperor Alexander, his brothers in arms, and his allies sup-
ported the internal prosperity of individual states and strove to base friendship 
among rulers on an indissoluble foundation independent of accidental causes.
To address the concerns of non-Christian powers, particularly the Ottoman 
Porte, and of European states that had not yet acceded to the alliance, Alexander 
appeared content to rely on diplomatic overtures, carried out in concert with 
Russia’s allies, that proclaimed the peaceful purpose of the alliance. e alliance, 
Alexander argued, was eminently peaceful because it was religious—a statement 
that centuries of European history and Russian-Ottoman relations would seem 
to belie. In 1816, however, the monarch’s idealism remained strong. In his view, 
conservative and immutable principles (principes conservateurs et immuables) 
provided the basis for the act of 14/26 September, which contained nothing 
contrary to the natural relations of states or to existing treaties. In the old po-
litical combinations, which had proven so harmful to the repose and morality 
of nations, these principles had been forgotten. What made the present alliance 
unique was precisely the reliance on Christian principles. Explicit recognition 
of this truth by the allies made the current era a new one for their peoples and 
for all humanity.
Emperor Alexander ordered that the Treaty of 14/26 September be read out 
in churches across the empire on 25 December 1815, Christmas day according to 
the Orthodox calendar in the nineteenth century. As the manifesto explained, 
the past course of political relations among the European powers had led to 
tragic consequences for the entire world—consequences that resulted from the 
absence of political relationships founded upon true principles (instinnye na-
chala) of divine wisdom. Harsh experience had taught Alexander I, Francis I, 
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and Frederick William III that only by means of eternal principles, particularly 
the divine principle of fraternity, could the peace and ourishing (pokoi i bla-
godenstvie) of peoples be ensured. To that end, the monarchs had decided to 
establish a Christian alliance (soiuz) and to live as brothers in peace and love.64
In the Russian context, the Holy Alliance also carried a deeper 
politico-religious meaning, signied by the choice of date for the signing. On 
14/26 September, Orthodox Christians celebrate the Feast of the Exaltation of 
the Cross (Vozdvizhenie). One of twelve Great Feasts and seven Feasts of the 
Lord, the Exaltation has longstanding military associations. According to the 
Festal Menaion, the feast highlights the relationship of the сross, rather than 
the Crucixion, to the history of the Orthodox Church. e cross is commem-
orated “in a spirit of triumph” and as a “‘weapon of peace and unconquerable 
ensign of victory’ (kontakion of the feast).”65 Equally signicant, the Exaltation 
is regarded as universal, which is to say that the power of the cross applies to the 
entire universe, and the salvation it brings aects all creation. In the ceremony 
of the Exaltation the priest blesses all points on the compass. According to the 
troparion read at the ceremony, “e four ends of the earth, O Christ our God, 
are sanctied today.”66 Historical associations also appear in the services for the 
feast. ere are repeated references to the vision of the cross seen by Constantine 
in 312, shortly before his victory over Maxentius. In addition, the feast recalls 
the nding of the True Cross by Saint Helen, Constantine’s mother, and de-
scribes the mass veneration of the cross that occurred in Jerusalem a
er Helen’s 
discovery. Similarly, the feast commemorates the second great Exaltation of the 
Cross in Constantinople in 629. In 614 the Persians had captured Jerusalem and 
taken the cross, which then was recovered by Emperor Heraclius (ruled 610–41), 
brought to Constantinople, and triumphantly exalted in the Great Church of 
Hagia Sophia. Finally, the feast alludes to an event commemorated in modern 
times on 13 September: the dedication of the Church of the Resurrection built 
by Constantine on the site of the Holy Sepulcher and completed in 335.67 e 
reference in the Holy Alliance treaty to the moral interests of peoples being 
reunited by God under the banner of the cross hints at the Russian association 
with the Exaltation.
With respect to European politics writ large, the Holy Alliance is best de-
scribed as the moral component of the Vienna settlement. e edice of paci-
cation and peace constructed in 1814–15 dened the public law of Europe, 
and from the perspective of Russian diplomacy, the holy allies placed a moral 
stamp on the legal arrangements. e text of the Holy Alliance treaty said noth-
ing about acceptable forms of government. e peacemakers recognized that 
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individual states lived under dierent constitutions, and while it was necessary 
that governments be legitimate and exercise legal authority, the legitimist prin-
ciple did not require that they be purely monarchist. Nor were changes to es-
tablished constitutions illegitimate, as long as these changes occurred by legal 
means, as opposed to violent or revolutionary action. Alexander’s idealism, as 
expressed in the Treaty of 14/26 September 1815, connected the alliance to a 
renewed moral spirit based on Christian fraternity that would ensure the peace. 
Neither the product of religious mysticism nor the cornerstone of a reactionary 
restoration, the Holy Alliance can be described as the means to implement a 
large-scale political policy or system grounded in the religious and Enlighten-
ment ideal of a harmonious interlocking universe. Diplomatic communications 
designed to persuade sovereigns to join the alliance and to counter allegedly 
erroneous interpretations of the treaty suggest that the Holy Alliance oered 
more than a statement of moral and political principles, bolstered by pledges of 
friendship among rulers. In the correspondence of Emperor Alexander and his 
diplomatic agents, the alliance also established a mechanism for regulating and 
maintaining the European peace.
Russian Power and Political Relations in Europe
As the process of implementing the peace quickly revealed, it was one thing 
to agree on principles, however sacrosanct or eternal, and quite another to put 
them into practice.68 From the outset Emperor Alexander’s role in deciding the 
Polish-Saxon question and forming the Holy Alliance fueled allied suspicions 
about Russia’s military power and proclaimed rejection of territorial aggrandize-
ment. With hindsight, the principles of Russian policy appear straightforward 
enough. In defending his own actions and in questioning those of others, Alex-
ander insisted on strict adherence to the treaties of 1814–15. In the larger world 
of European diplomacy, however, the attention to treaty obligations was not 
sucient to allay the allies’ distrust.
A clear statement of the Russian eort to address allied fears appeared in a 
general instruction to diplomatic missions issued by the Ministry of Foreign 
Aairs on 15/27 May 1815, in the midst of the Hundred Days.69 e instruction 
described the basis for political relations among the European powers. States 
that had joined the European system enjoyed mutual benets and ties built upon 
the rst causes (pervonachal’nye prichiny) found in all civil societies and the new 
considerations resulting from contemporary conditions. Among the momentous 
events of the era the instruction identied the origins of the military campaigns 
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of 1812–13; developments leading to the conclusion of peace in Paris; the rules 
established by the transactions of the Congress of Vienna; the alliance of 13/25 
March 1815, which renewed the earlier coalition to defeat Napoleon; and nally, 
the consequences of the current war, also against Napoleon. A
er identifying 
these events with the political foundations of the European system, the instruc-
tion highlighted two issues in need of attention: the condition of Europe’s po-
litical system, including its relationship to the political system of Russia; and 
the conduct of Emperor Alexander’s ministers, who should act consistently to 
strengthen Russia’s peaceful relations with other European powers.
In 1812, the instruction proclaimed, Napoleon had tried to complete the en-
slavement of the world by invading Russia. Suering from moral fatigue, the 
peoples of Europe appeared to accept the inevitability of living under French 
military despotism. is moral degradation combined with the infamy (bezsla-
vie) of governments to fuel Napoleon’s power. Although on occasion opposition 
arose, it lacked sucient strength to become general or decisive. Eventually, the 
hope and support needed to overcome Napoleon coalesced, thanks to the rm-
ness (tverdost’) of the Russian tsar. Inspired by Russia’s military victory in 1812, 
minds moved to act by revolution and French tyranny took heart. Subjugated 
governments began to resist and ght for independence. Based on the shared 
experience of endless hardship, this spirit spread from nation to nation, creating 
the will to use military force and to introduce representative or constitutional 
government. Experience, in other words, guided the powers as they worked to 
rebuild Europe’s political system on stable foundations.
Experience likewise showed that no human power could stop the movement 
of minds or return them to their previous orientation. inking had changed. 
To achieve stability, governments needed to follow wise policies that conformed 
to the aspirations of peoples. ey also needed to maintain the boundaries of 
authority (vladenie), the organization of internal state institutions, and the mu-
tual relations of the powers constituting the great European family. Here the 
instruction explained how and why the current political system diered from 
the old political balance (politicheskoe ravnovesie), which had relied on the action 
or eect of weaker states situated between more powerful ones. Because the years 
of war had sapped moral bonds and mainsprings, and because the inuence of 
military force had increased, states now depended on the possession of sucient 
territory to ensure internal stability. In addition, within each state, domestic 
tranquility required the establishment of wise institutions through constitu-
tional acts. France, for example, possessed ample territory based on the Treaty of 
18/30 May 1814 (the First Treaty of Paris); however, Emperor Alexander doubted 
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that the Bourbon dynasty, even when bolstered by other governments, could 
ensure the stability of Europe or the happiness of the French nation. Only if the 
people supported the restoration of the monarchy would it succeed.
e instruction of 15/27 May 1815 also addressed concerns about excessive 
Russian power—concerns that Emperor Alexander hoped to assuage with a 
policy of moderation. us, the Russian monarch had tried to separate diplo-
matic decisions from the inuence of military force, a position illustrated by 
his interest in assigning to a general congress the task of European restoration. 
Going forward, diplomatic resolutions should be based on mutual benet and 
the sacredness of rights (sviatost’ prav), as dened by the law of nations (kodeks
narodov). To ensure stability in Europe, all governments needed eective means 
to establish legal authority and achieve general trust. At moments when key 
questions remained undecided—the future of the Belgian provinces, Britain’s 
plans for its colonies and Malta, the borders and political organization of Po-
land, the constitutional order of the German Confederation, and the assignment 
of territories to Austria, Italy, and Prussia—Russia had avoided the use of mil-
itary power to achieve favorable outcomes. While not untrue, this description 
remained incomplete. In November 1814, in the midst of the Polish-Saxon con-
troversy, Russia’s military governor had transferred Saxony to Prussian admin-
istration, and Alexander had seemed ready to go to war.70
Despite the chronic suspicions and unresolved disputes, the Russian govern-
ment nonetheless assumed that the allies intended to fulll the obligations cod-
ied in wartime agreements and the [First] Treaty of Paris. Equally important, 
the Congress of Vienna would enact measures to solidify political equilibrium 
(politicheskoe ravnovesie) among all the states of Europe. To accomplish this goal, 
the power of each state would be augmented, preferably with contiguous terri-
tory, to allow for the preservation of its independence and to prevent any state 
from violating the independence of others. Clearly, this formulation expressed 
Russia’s understanding of how France could be reintegrated into European so-
ciety. A state that threatened the peace by infringing the sovereignty of another 
would meet with a united European response. In other words, any signatory 
country that broke the rules prescribed by the Final Act of the Congress of Vi-
enna would be considered an enemy in a state of war against other signatories.
When describing political relations in Europe diplomatic communications 
of Russian provenance invariably presented Emperor Alexander’s policies as 
moderate and his intentions as pure. For example, the monarch always put the 
law, the well-being of peoples, and the preservation of peace above his own just 
wishes and even Russia’s vital interests. is policy followed from his belief that 
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Divine Providence governed the fate of states. Changed circumstances came 
from God, not from human calculations or the eorts of governments. us, 
in connection with the Polish-Saxon question, Alexander had not gone to war 
over the secret alliance. In addition, he had conceded to Austria and Britain 
that the Ottoman Empire might be admitted into the Final Act, though only if 
negotiations with the Porte over disputed provisions in the Treaty of Bucharest 
continued on a bilateral basis without allied participation.71
At the time of writing, the Russian government regarded the alliance of 13/25 
March as a success and Napoleon’s nal dethronement as inevitable. Based on 
the agreements reached to date, the allies hoped to imbue the new political sys-
tem with the former respect “for the sacredness of rights, for utility (pol’za), 
and for moral ties.” Incrementally, adherence to these principles would make it 
possible to root out “the pernicious rules introduced by the abuses of military 
glory.” To ensure that all states recognized the advantages of the alliance, Em-
peror Alexander assumed that the allies always would work toward the common 
good (obshchaia pol’za), whether through military force or legal prescription. 
Again, the French question represented the key to the Russian formulation. e 
allied powers would limit their military actions to war with Bonaparte. ey 
would not use violence to compel the French people to accept a political order 
they did not want, including the return of Louis XVIII. Critical of the Bourbon 
dynasty, the Russian government insisted that the well-being of France could not 
be separated from that of Europe. Equally important, governments needed to 
be in alignment with the wishes of their people. Not at all a plea for democratic 
politics or a recognition of popular claim making (the will of the people), this 
principle appeared in numerous Russian documents of the post-war era.72 In this 
case, the goal of the great alliance was to establish in France a government that 
would forever be free of Napoleon and his supporters.
To eliminate the Napoleonic threat to European order, the allies had to do 
more than remove Bonaparte. e disposition of minds that allowed him to re-
turn to power and that encouraged people to accept revolution had to be changed. 
is could not be achieved by force of arms, but by an enlightened and magnani-
mous policy that respected freedom (svoboda/liberale). Concepts such as freedom 
or liberal, which should not be read in the modern democratic sense, conveyed 
a relatively simple message. Eective political authority depended on good gov-
ernance, which deserved and received the moral support of the people. Indeed, 
the conceptual novelty of Europe’s restored order appeared in the deliberate and 
explicit attention accorded to the needs and wishes of the people, though without 
any reference to civil rights, the general will, or popular sovereignty.
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Russian worries about the impact of yet another war and the conditions re-
quired for a successful outcome extended beyond the problem of political au-
thority in France. e instruction concluded by returning to the theme of un-
just and unreasonable distrust of Russia among the allies, despite Alexander I’s 
policies of moderation, discipline, legality, and conservative reform. e visible 
growth in Russia’s military and political power arose from the moral capabili-
ties of the people and therefore represented a natural expansion, not a grab for 
territory.73 Russia used its power for the benet and salvation of other nations. 
In diplomatic proceedings, the Russian government did not seek primacy, pref-
erence, or privilege. Emperor Alexander understood that the favor shown to 
Russia by Divine Providence and the military brilliance of the Russian people 
(narod) aroused suspicions. Disingenuous or not, the presentation of Russian 
power as benign and Russian intentions as disinterested would continue over 
the next two centuries.
e instruction ended with a clear declaration to Russia’s ambassadors 
abroad. ey must strive to consolidate the empire’s peaceful relations with the 
European powers and to convince foreign governments of Emperor Alexander’s 
pure motivations. Acceptance of the new political system, based on allied unity, 
precluded the formation of separate alliances. As Paul Schroeder argues, equi-
librium rather than Westphalian balance of power became the order of the day. 
Yet in May 1815, only Sweden and Prussia appeared convinced of Russia’s com-
mitment to peace. To highlight this convergence, Alexander instructed his am-
bassadors at all the European courts to display sincerity and friendship toward 
the ministers of these states. To encourage more general trust of Russia, they 
also should disseminate just information about the progress of the war in the 
societies where they resided. Finally, Russia’s diplomatic representatives should 
pay close attention to the policies and actions of the governments to which they 
were accredited and report to Saint Petersburg on how the latest events impacted 
political conditions in the states where they served.
e Russian experience of distrustful allies persisted throughout 1816 and 
into the summer of 1817. Diplomatic correspondence involving Emperor Alex-
ander I, co-Minister of Foreign Aairs Karl Nesselrode, co-Minister of Foreign 
Aairs and State Secretary Ioannis Kapodistrias, Russian ambassador (posol) in 
London Christoph Lieven, Russian envoy (poslannik) in Vienna Gustav Stack-
elberg, and governor-general of the Polish Kingdom Grand Prince Constantine 
Pavlovich expressed concern about the goals of Austrian and British policy and 
the need to convince the allies of Russia’s peaceful intentions.74 In a condential 
dispatch of 25 January/6 February 1816 addressed to Nesselrode, Lieven reported 
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on tensions between Britain and Russia. Alluding to changes in British policy, 
he conrmed that the government in London wanted peace, if only because at 
the moment its primary concerns were domestic.75 Lord Castlereagh, perhaps en-
couraged by Austria, feared any action that might disturb the repose of Europe 
and thus seemed suspicious of Russia. According to Lieven, suspicion arose from 
the empire’s colossal power, the glory attained by its large armies, and the alleged 
penchant of Emperor Alexander for war. Both Castlereagh and the prince regent 
armed Britain’s commitment to the Quadruple Alliance, which obligated the 
great powers to guarantee the peace and unite against any ally who threatened 
European order. In addition, the British urged Alexander to handle relations 
with the Ottoman Empire in a conciliatory manner and promised to facilitate 
negotiations with Constantinople to prevent further hostilities.
Lieven’s dispatch also summarized his reply to Castlereagh, which empha-
sized Alexander’s commitment to the peace he had done so much to achieve. 
Could the author of such a good deed possibly want to destroy his own work? 
Castlereagh and the prince regent denied harboring suspicions about Russia’s 
intentions, and both insisted that they had the highest regard for Alexander and 
his eorts to establish a durable peace. But Lieven characterized the British ruler 
as a person of weak spirit who appeared jealous of the Russian monarch and of 
the talents attributed to the Duke of Wellington.76 Fortunately, according to 
Lieven, other members of the British government did not share the preference 
for Austria or the distrust of Russia displayed by Castlereagh and the prince re-
gent, though there was concern about Russia’s inuence at the courts of France 
and Spain. Clearly, uncertainties and suspicions persisted; however, Castlereagh 
also appeared to welcome any proof of Alexander’s commitment to peace, in-
cluding, for example, communications from Poland and the monarch’s interest 
in reforming the internal administration of Russia. Above all, Lieven concluded, 
the British government continued to appreciate the power of Russia and the 
advantage of a close and sincere alliance (union) with the empire.
In early 1816, tensions among the allies also resulted from Austrian activities 
in northern Italy, which Russia viewed as a threat to European peace. rough 
negotiations with the Kingdom of Sardinia, Austria had been trying to gain con-
trol of the Simplon Road, which passed through upper Novaria in the region of 
Piedmont. But the king of Sardinia, supported by Russia, rejected any territorial 
changes that altered the stipulations of the Vienna treaties. In March, citing the 
legal obligations enshrined in the Quadruple Alliance, Nesselrode pointed out 
to the Russian envoy in Vienna, Gustav O. Stackelberg, that the border adjust-
ments proposed by Austria threatened to create new alliances (combinaisons) and 
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undermine the restoration of the French monarchy. Such developments would 
in turn weaken the association of states entrusted with maintaining the Euro-
pean peace.77
As the process of implementing European pacication and peace unfolded, 
the allies struggled to uphold the inviolability of codied principles. To ensure 
that France did not menace neighboring countries or suer domestic distur-
bances, they insisted on the futility of seeking security through alternative al-
liances. Nesselrode wrote that the moral force of the great alliance had to be 
preserved, by which he meant that allied courts must subordinate particular 
interests to the general interest of guaranteeing the tranquility of Europe. In 
other words, as negotiations continued, no great power (such as Austria) should 
try to impose its will on a weaker state (such as Sardinia). Nesselrode concluded 
his dispatch by instructing Stackelberg, in the name of the monarch, to defend 
the principles of the general system at the court of Vienna. Clearly, Emperor 
Alexander viewed Austria’s negotiations with the king of Sardinia as a violation 
of the Quadruple Alliance, an opinion he communicated directly in response to 
an overture from Austrian emperor Francis I. To diminish the force and unity 
of the alliance constituted a threat to European peace and to Russia’s primary 
goal: consolidation of the order of things established in Europe. Uniformity 
of action founded on compliance with principles provided the best means to 
preserve peace. Alexander’s appeal to Francis proved eective, and in May 1816 
Austria withdrew its claims against the Kingdom of Sardinia.78
Strict adherence to treaty stipulations remained a pillar of Russian foreign 
policy, as diplomats worked to protect the empire’s interests and mollify the 
allies’ hostility. On 31 January/12 February 1817, Emperor Alexander approved 
a personal letter to Stackelberg from Kapodistrias, who was responding to pri-
vate communications sent by Stackelberg in December 1816.79 According to Ka-
podistrias, the Russian government believed that separate alliances such as the 
secret Treaty of January 1815, directed against Prussia and Russia, originated in 
the allies’ jealousy of the empire’s military power and moral inuence. In some 
circumstances, this jealousy might lead to an aggressive policy directed against 
Russia. But regardless of how other powers of the rst order viewed Russia or 
sought to harm its interests, Alexander remained committed to the immutable 
principles that provided the basis for Russian foreign policy. is policy aimed 
to preserve peace through scrupulous execution of established treaty obligations, 
particularly the Treaty of the Holy Alliance, which Alexander regarded as the 
cornerstone of the European restoration. Unfortunately, because the pure mo-
rality of the Gospel had not penetrated the hearts of allied ministers, as it had 
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the hearts of Alexander’s fellow sovereigns, the former pursued a policy at once 
ambitious and timid.80
To highlight Alexander’s commitment to the principles of the peace and his 
desire to consolidate its benets, Kapodistrias noted that Russia was willing 
both to accept a degree of isolation and to overlook the intrigues of Austria and 
Britain. us, in matters concerning the German Confederation, Alexander did 
not want to intervene directly, unless Austrian-Prussian cooperation compelled 
smaller German states to appeal for assistance. Nor did the emperor see any-
thing alarming in British support for Austrian interests in Italy and the Illyrian 
provinces (present-day Montenegro and northern Albania) or in Britain’s close 
relationship with Persia, even though this relationship was designed to thwart 
Russian expansion in the east.81 Defensive alliances did not threaten allied unity 
or the eternal principles of the Vienna and Paris treaties, as long as the empire’s 
immediate interests were not aected and the alliances did not become aggres-
sive or hostile toward Russia.
e need to counter allied concerns about Russian power also led Emperor 
Alexander’s diplomats to comment on public discussions. In Kapodistrias’s let-
ter to Stackelberg, the co-minister of foreign aairs noted that because the insti-
tutions of the old regime had not been fully replaced by new ones, public opinion 
now played an unprecedented role in mediating social and political order. Kapo-
distrias’s understanding of public opinion had nothing to do with contested pol-
itics or unfettered debate. Public opinion was associated with moral authority 
based on justice and legitimacy (le bon droit). In uniting justice and good faith 
(la bonne foi), Divine Providence created an invincible and conservative force 
(une force conservatrice) capable of defeating any power that aspired to universal 
domination. us, the conduct of Emperor Alexander guaranteed the security 
of his empire, and humanity too learned to avoid political calamities that arose 
from the vulgar passions of statesmen.
In Stackelberg’s response to the instructions from Kapodistrias, the envoy 
conrmed that Russia’s elite stature and military capabilities caused anxiety and 
jealousy among the great powers.82 e allies, he wrote, did not understand that 
Alexander’s policy was religious and enlightened or that he was not seeking to 
expand his empire. Russia’s position in Poland represented one source of con-
cern, as did its negotiations with the Ottoman Empire. In addition, Russia’s de-
cision to sell warships to Spain had led to rumors about a secret Russian-Spanish 
alliance. Allegedly, in return for military assistance in the Americas, Spain had 
agreed to cede to Russia the island of Minorca, so that the empire could moor 
ships in the Mediterranean. Finally, together with the intrigues of Austria and 
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the phantom fears of Britain about a Russian move against British power in the 
East Indies (les grandes Indes), Stackelberg envisioned the possible development 
of a German unication or Germanisme, including Austria and Prussia, directed 
against Russia.
e need to address suspicions about Russia’s intentions and military power 
persisted into the spring and summer of 1817. On 1/13 May, Lieven reported to 
Nesselrode about talks with Castlereagh, during which the ambassador tried to 
calm British fears.83 Although the foreign secretary acknowledged the eorts of 
malicious persons who tirelessly worked to incite agitation, he nonetheless be-
lieved that the maintenance of Russia’s army on what many considered a wartime 
footing raised questions about the empire’s peaceful intentions. To European 
states that had reduced the size of their armies, the large number of Russian 
troops seemed to contradict the government’s peaceable declarations. Lieven cor-
rectly explained that the distinctive foundations of the Russian army limited the 
possibility of peacetime cutbacks. But the concerns of Castlereagh went beyond 
the size of Russia’s armed forces. e foreign secretary also believed that Rus-
sia’s ongoing discussions with the Ottoman Porte about the terms of Bucharest 
(1812) and earlier treaties allowed these malicious persons to accuse Alexander 
of harboring plans of conquest. At the same time, Castlereagh recognized that 
the great and immortal glory attained by the monarch during his last campaigns 
(against Napoleon in 1813–14) could not be enhanced by additional conquests. 
Lieven therefore assured Castlereagh that Alexander, whose intentions remained 
pure and peaceful, was not contemplating military action against the Otto-
mans. Indeed, the monarch’s willingness to publicize discussions with the Porte 
provided proof of his desire for peace, even though Russia’s claims against the 
Ottoman government were just and moderate. In subsequent decades, at least 
until the Crimean War of 1853–56, which destroyed the allied unity achieved in 
1813–18, Russia would continue to insist that its demands and eventual decisions 
to go to war resulted from the Porte’s violations of recognized treaties.
Another issue discussed in the meetings between Lieven and Castlereagh 
concerned Russia’s ties to Spain, particularly the personal relationship between 
Dmitrii P. Tatishchev, envoy in Madrid, and the Spanish king, Ferdinand 
VII. As Stackelberg had reported earlier in the year, suspicions about secret 
Russian-Spanish accords had spread across Europe. Lieven explained to Cas-
tlereagh that Tatishchev exercised no special inuence over the king of Spain 
and that there was nothing unusual about a diplomat enjoying easy access to the 
court of the sovereign to whom he was accredited. But in the years immediately 
following the Congress of Vienna, all the allies feared the formation of secret 
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and separate alliances. At the same time, they also understood that European 
peace depended on maintaining the unity that had made possible the defeat 
of Napoleon. For this reason, the alliance held, even though ongoing distrust 
colored the diplomatic thinking of Russia and its allies.
In a dispatch to Lieven sent on 10/22 June 1817, Nesselrode addressed the 
jealousies and suspicions causing anxiety in the British government.84 Approved 
by Emperor Alexander, the dispatch proclaimed the monarch’s desire to as-
suage British fears without, however, harming the legitimacy or dignity of other 
crowns, including his own. Nesselrode praised Lieven for his explanations to 
Castlereagh concerning Spain, relations with the Ottoman and Persian empires, 
and Russia’s military posture. Nesselrode admitted that Spain sought to pro-
mote its cause in alliance with Russia, though in every situation that had arisen, 
Alexander had encouraged the king to seek assistance through the great alliance 
with British mediation. To bolster these arguments and prepare Lieven for his 
conversations with Castlereagh, the Russian ministry forwarded copies of dis-
patches sent to Tatishchev. ese communications, Nesselrode claimed, showed 
that Russian policy was based not on private or particular considerations, but on 
immutable principles.
Interactions with France also led to strong statements of support for the prin-
ciples and prescriptions of allied agreements. In a dispatch of 21 March/2 April 
1817, conrmed by Emperor Alexander, Kapodistrias wrote to Grand Prince 
Constantine Pavlovich about a formal overture to the allies that armed Rus-
sia’s xed and immutable viewpoint on all alliances (combinaisons) subversive 
of “the political and social order established by the treaties of Vienna and Paris 
in the year 1815.”85 Occasioned by the intrigues of French emigres who sought 
to replace the Bourbon king with a representative of the Russian dynasty or 
the prince of Orange, Kapodistrias’s dispatch identied two republican refugees 
staying in Warsaw, who were entitled to protection only as long as they did not 
disturb public order.86 Kapodistrias asked Constantine to explain the bases of 
Russian policy to the emigres who sought his support. e edice of general 
pacication in Europe rested upon solemn, sacred, and inviolable commitments. 
In France, “the order of things established in 1815 and cemented by the blood of 
two generations” was monarchic and constitutional in form. Equally important, 
all the powers of Europe were bound to respect and ensure adherence to this 
order, which depended on the principles of religion and justice. No government, 
moreover, could ignore these principles without attacking its own existence. It 
was therefore in the interest of France and of every other European state to sup-
port the current system and to oppose any new upheaval that undermined the 
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ties already established between governments. In a word, violation of existing 
social and political agreements could only produce a spirit of conquest and sub-
version that would threaten peace and the independence of European powers.
Although Emperor Alexander had little condence in the Bourbons, Kap-
odistrias’s dispatch expressed the view that at last France was on track to re-
occupy the honorable position of great power assigned to it by nature. Clearly, 
the Russian monarch opposed eorts to remove the Bourbons from power. e 
present government needed to be supported, because its actions represented the 
best eort to defeat the enemies of peace. National representation, a smaller 
army of occupation, and the settlement of individual claims (poursuites) against 
the French government illustrated the tendency toward amelioration in France’s 
destiny. Again, Kapodistrias emphasized that the order of things in France had 
to be respected and that Alexander stood ready “to cooperate with all his power 
to maintain the rights consecrated by the treaties,” whether they be threatened 
by domestic action or foreign force. e Russian monarch remained absolutely 
committed to preservation of the just and salutary principles that ensured uni-
versal tranquility. Only inviolable adherence to established stipulations could 
provide the conditions needed for the progress and well-being of peoples. In the 
eyes of Russia’s diplomats, the stipulations contained obligations of a double 
nature: those between states and those between governments and peoples based 
on a salutary reciprocity of duties. “e edice of peace, the dread of factions, 
and the pitfall of any false policy” rested on these foundations. As long as the 
relationships of reciprocal duty remained intact, according to Kapodistrias, 
France had nothing to fear and Europe would enjoy peace. For his part, Alex-
ander would use all the means granted to him by Divine Providence to protect 
the existing relationships and obligations from anyone who tried to attack them. 
e treaties of 1814–15 constituted not only the public law of Europe, but also 
the sacred law of universal peace.
During the years 1816–17, neither political instability in France nor tensions 
in Russia’s relations with Austria and Britain threatened the legal keystones of 
European order. All the powers believed that the agreed-upon stipulations had 
to be respected. Suspicions and dierences of interpretation arose, but these 
uncertainties did not weaken the overall commitment to the peace settlement 
or the political arrangements of any particular country. To ensure that Russia’s 
diplomats understood the principles of tsarist policy and could explain how the 
government applied them in specic situations, in June 1817 Emperor Alexander 
sent additional instructions to his missions abroad in the form of an overview 
(aperçu) of Russia’s political relations in Europe.87 e monarch expected his 
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diplomatic agents to approach all issues that might arise from the same point 
of view and to promote Russian policy with uniform language and conduct. By 
sending out the overview, the Russian ministry aimed to provide positive direc-
tions for the empire’s ocial representatives.
To bolster the condence of second-order states and to address the suspicions 
causing anxiety among those of the rst order, Emperor Alexander began the 
instructions by pointing out that he had not created the current policy. To the 
contrary, the policy or system emanated from “the spirit and the letter of the 
transactions of Vienna and Paris” concluded in 1815. To preserve the inviolability 
of these acts, a goal to which all the European powers contributed, remained 
the sole object of Russian policy. e reasons for the allies’ identity of purpose 
were both moral and political. e moral reasons were carved into the enlight-
ened and pure conscience of every right-thinking person who had witnessed the 
extraordinary events of the revolutionary period, including the events that had 
ended that era. e political reasons were consistent with the most essential in-
terests of all the European governments and states, especially those that had 
been reestablished and reconstructed by the transactions of Vienna and Paris. 
Emperor Alexander did not yet believe that the European states had succeeded 
in rebuilding themselves on a solid and natural basis. ose that had emerged 
from long revolutionary crises continued to search for their line of direction. 
Others had avoided direct action but still preserved their military posture. All 
needed, moreover, to undertake, based on dierent propositions, “the dicult 
merger of new interests with old habits and of new habits with old interests.”
“States have their ages as do men,” the overview proclaimed. Governments of 
the day could not project “the consoling image of a family where order and ease 
are. . . inherent in its existence, where domestic peace is not at all a novelty, or an 
object of discussion, or a problem to resolve.” Here Emperor Alexander appeared 
to acknowledge the turbulence of modern political relations. But contested pol-
itics caused him unease, and he insisted that conditions in Russia diered from 
those in other European countries. All states needed repose in order to survive: 
Russia enjoyed calm and so did not fear movement. Compared to the power 
of other states, Russia’s was youthful and vigorous. Youthful power needed to 
act, yet Russia remained peaceful. is led the monarch to conclude that the 
empire’s peaceful policy was voluntary, while that of other states was imposed 
by circumstances. is dierence explained the suspicions caused by Russia’s as-
cendancy in the political order of Europe—suspicions that Alexander hoped to 
disarm through the example of his conduct. Regardless of the circumstances of 
one or another power, the Russian Empire’s relations with all would be peaceful, 
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amicable, and aectionate in principle, form, and purpose. Not only did Russia 
proclaim this doctrine, the imperial government put it into practice. Emperor 
Alexander religiously fullled his obligations to all the powers that had acceded 
to the peace. Equally signicant, in excluding from discussion Russia’s inter-
ests in the Ottoman and Persian empires, the monarch showed the world that 
neither the force of arms nor that of opinion could add anything to the force of 
legitimacy (le bon droit).
A
er explaining the principles of tsarist policy, the overview addressed 
their application and results. Ongoing negotiations between the governments 
of Austria, Britain, Prussia, and Russia focused on implementation of specic 
clauses in the treaties of Vienna and Paris. e content of these discussions en-
compassed the consolidation of thrones, placed under the safeguard of legiti-
macy; the political and territorial reorganization of Germany; abolition of the 
slave trade; removal of the Barbary pirates from the Mediterranean; the accession 
of Spain to the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna; and nally, disagreements 
that threatened to complicate Spain’s relations with the united kingdom of Por-
tugal and Brazil.88 In the talks devoted to these questions, Alexander ordered 
Russia’s diplomats to refrain from being the rst to express an opinion, decision, 
or vote. In addition, the language they employed needed to be clear, correct, 
frank, moderate, amicable, benevolent, and true to the text of the treaties. Be-
cause of Russia’s justice, benevolence, and moderation, the empire exercised a 
universal ascendancy that jealousy could not undermine. e reason for this was 
independent of Russia: it resulted from the nature of the current transactions 
and the spirit of the time.
e treaties of Vienna and Paris had created a universal alliance designed to 
maintain the current territorial possessions of the signatory states. Participating 
governments shared a general interest based on the transactions, which meant 
that they pledged to consult with one another in order to achieve mutual agree-
ment in all relevant matters. is was the primary purpose of the conferences 
established in Frankfurt, London, and Paris to address issues of common con-
cern to European governments. By taking positions founded on law and directed 
solely toward the general good, Russia supported parties interested in impartial 
justice and united the votes of second-order powers and public opinion, which 
constituted a signicant weight in the balance of aairs. e truth, frankness, 
and precision of Alexander’s instructions to his ministers helped to guarantee 
this result.
e next section of the overview moved beyond general considerations to 
describe how the principles of Russian policy applied in specic situations. 
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Austria’s eorts to complete its federal policy in Italy by proposing to the king 
of Sardinia an alliance and territorial changes had blatantly violated existing 
treaties. Yet a
er Emperor Alexander explained this to his august ally Emperor 
Francis, Austria dropped the matter. Based on the intra-German Treaty of Mu-
nich (2/14 April 1816), Austria also had requested that Russia agree to guarantee 
Bavaria’s acquisition of the Main-Tauber region. But the treaty neglected to com-
pensate the Grand Duchy of Baden, and so Russia refused to accept the terms. 
Consequently, the Grand Duke of Baden again controlled the territory, which 
he remained free to cede in ongoing negotiations. Finally, Austria had proposed 
that the allies pressure Spain to accept the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna 
by threatening to deny the infante Marie Louise the territories given to her by 
the same transaction. e allies resisted the proposal, and in negotiations con-
cerning the installation of Marie Louise and her son, the European powers had 
returned to a condition of intimate friendship with Spain.89
roughout the diplomatic conversations of 1816–17, Russia did not waver 
in its commitment to act in concert with the allies to uphold the terms of the 
Vienna and Paris treaties. As the overview pointed out, relations with Spain 
highlighted this commitment. Although Spain wanted to place its security 
under Russian protection, the empire’s diplomats consistently urged the Spanish 
government to work within the parameters of the great alliance and to accept 
British mediation. Russia’s position on abolition of the slave trade revealed the 
same devotion to legality. Britain, on the other hand, appeared to violate the Eu-
ropean legal settlement by going beyond the agreed-upon provisions concerning 
abolition. Invoking the authority of the united allied powers, Britain wanted 
to compel Portugal and Spain to accept abolition. In addition, the British gov-
ernment hoped to place the maritime relations of the European states under a 
central authority to be organized and coordinated in London. At the time of the 
overview’s composition, this proposal was being discussed by the ambassadorial 
conference in London.
e consolidation of legitimate and constitutional royalty in France repre-
sented another goal requiring the solicitude of European governments. But were 
all the powers equally disinterested? By common accord the allies had ordered a 
reduction in the size of the army of occupation stationed in France. A problem 
had arisen, however, that required the attention of all: the conduct of French 
refugees and exiles, who continued to threaten the French restoration. In re-
sponse to the large number of refugees gathered in Belgium, the Russian mon-
arch had sent General Alexander I. Chernyshev on special mission to Brussels. 
In addition, the Paris conference, where all the allies were represented, had been 
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ordered to develop a common approach to bringing the matter before the king of 
the Netherlands. Based on Alexander’s rescript to Chernyshev, dated 21 April/3 
May 1817, the purpose of the mission was to dissuade the prince of Orange from 
supporting French emigres who hoped to engineer the removal of the Bourbon 
dynasty. According to the rescript, Russia stood ready to use military force to 
prevent any violation of allied obligations to France.90
e overview also accused Austria, Britain, and Prussia of acting in concert 
against Russia in German aairs and in matters concerning the empire’s relations 
with the Ottoman Porte and Persia, despite Emperor Alexander’s commitment to 
the Vienna and Paris accords. e allies repeatedly had tried to intervene in Rus-
sia’s eastern relations, and by creating a Germany armed against Russia, they had 
sought to separate the empire from Europe. Still, the Russian monarch refused 
to use unauthorized tactics to counter the allies’ diplomatic maneuvers. Instead, 
he expected Russia’s diplomats to remain dispassionate spectators in all matters 
German. e treaties required that Russia refrain from action, and the monarch 
intended to fulll this obligation with scrupulous exactitude. At the same time, 
Russia’s relations with the Ottoman and Persian governments, which were reg-
ulated by separate bilateral treaties, could not be subject to foreign interference. 
Like India, these powers lay outside the circle of the European association.
Relations between Portugal and Spain did not, however, fall outside the gen-
eral interest of Europe. us, when the armies of the Portuguese king invaded 
the territory of the Rio de la Plata, Spain appealed for collective intervention 
by the European powers. Prospects for allied action in South America and else-
where remained on the table throughout the years 1815–22. According to the 
overview, Britain hoped to be the sole mediator between Portugal and Spain, 
an arrangement that Austria urged Russia to accept. But Russia already had re-
sponded directly to Spain, which rendered Austria’s overtures irrelevant. Equally 
signicant, according to the Russian government, only concerted action by the 
ambassadorial conference in Paris could impart to European intervention the 
character of grandeur and impartiality necessary for success. In other words, 
intervention in Portuguese-Spanish relations should remain a general Euro-
pean question.
Another situation that raised questions about intervention concerned the 
Treaty of Kiel, concluded between Sweden and Denmark in January 1814. 
Austria had invited Emperor Alexander to act in concert to guarantee the treaty 
by which Denmark had ceded Norway to Sweden in return for Swedish Pomer-
ania and Rügen. In June 1815, as part of the Vienna settlement, Norway had sub-
mitted to Swedish rule, and Denmark had accepted the Duchy of Lauenburg in 
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exchange for Swedish Pomerania, which Prussia then had purchased from Swe-
den.91 Alexander acknowledged these terms but argued that the allies were not 
authorized to intervene in the Danish-Swedish dispute. Nor was he convinced 
that Sweden would fail to meet its obligations under the terms of Kiel.92 e 
monarch therefore concluded that the courts of Copenhagen and Stockholm 
should continue their negotiations without collective participation by the allies.
A
er surveying the disputes that had occupied diplomats since 1815, the over-
view praised Russian policy for its truth and utility. Going forward Emperor 
Alexander instructed his agents at foreign courts to adhere strictly to his policy. 
All eyes, the overview warned, looked upon the representatives of Russia, who 
were eectively under surveillance. eir action and inaction, speech and silence, 
personal liaisons and domestic relations—all were subject to observation. Sur-
veillance was painful; however, it could be neutralized, as soon as those conduct-
ing the surveillance understood the uselessness of their work, expenditures, and 
anxiety. To that end, the last section of the overview described the principles of 
conduct to be followed by Alexander’s diplomats. e rst rule of behavior was 
inertia, which meant that diplomats should not pursue political goals beyond 
the fulllment of existing transactions. Assuming that all states were equally 
interested in the inviolable maintenance of the treaties, Russian diplomacy had 
to be completely stationary. Any active or anxious attitude toward the general 
alliance—which was founded on the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna, sanc-
tioned by the acts of Paris of 8/20 November, and consecrated by the act of 14/26 
September—contradicted Russian policy. Any action (activité) by tsarist dip-
lomats should signal only the inert and stationary posture of the government.
It was critical, the overview explained, that the empire’s diplomats avoid doing 
anything, directly or indirectly, to cause suspicion. If suspicions arose, ocials 
were expected to respond calmly and patiently within the bounds of the legal 
stipulations. e goal in these circumstances was to promote trust and to show 
European governments seeking to discover the secret of Emperor Alexander’s 
policy that there was no mystery to uncover. For this reason, the government’s 
diplomatic correspondence was conducted as conspicuously as possible, so that 
the record of Russia’s actions contained in its archives could be opened to “the 
public in good faith, without regrets, without remorse.” Another way to prevent 
distrust was to publicize general opinions based on legal transactions, which 
then could be applied to specic situations that emerged. In March 1816, in a 
condential note responding to overtures from Bavaria, Emperor Alexander had 
addressed a range of questions concerning relations between the German Con-
federation and non-German powers. In subsequent discussions with Austria, 
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Britain, and Prussia, the explanations elaborated in the note turned out to be 
relevant. is was because the Russian government’s response to the court of 
Munich did not articulate an opinion as such. Instead the note armed the text 
of the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna and recounted what had transpired 
at the congress. In this and other communications, Russian ocials tried to 
approach the subject under discussion from a general point of view that, to the 
extent possible, directed the gaze and attention of the governments involved.
e conduct of tsarist diplomacy, the overview proclaimed, must be free of 
pride and independent of personal interests. To prevent any diplomatic mission 
abroad from becoming a center of convergence for Russia’s political alliances, 
every ambassador, minister, and diplomatic agent was ordered to follow the pre-
cepts outlined in the overview for that part of the monarch’s service entrusted 
to him. In observing and reporting on developments in their respective juris-
dictions, and in executing the orders they received, Russian missions performed 
a single task: “to conserve [conserver] on the basis of existing transactions, the 
most amicable relations with the Courts to which they are accredited” and to 
ensure that these courts did likewise with respect to Russia and other European 
powers. rough the policy outlined in the overview and through Emperor 
Alexander’s pure intentions and right conduct, the Russian monarch hoped to 
guarantee long years of peace and prosperity in his states and to contribute to 
the same across Europe.
In reality, the overview admitted, the treaties and accords making up the 
Vienna settlement represented particular interests and ran the risk of leading 
states into the old political relationships and separate combinations that had 
produced so many disastrous conicts. It was, therefore, the regenerated moral 
spirit, based on eternal Christian principles, that would preserve allied unity 
and ensure European peace. For this reason, the edice of pacication and peace 
set forth in the treaties of Paris and Vienna envisioned both a legal and a moral 
settlement. Although many legal questions remained on the table, to be resolved 
in ongoing and future negotiations, the moral settlement allowed Russia’s dip-
lomats and tsar diplomat to continue their work amid chronic uncertainty and 
distrust and to believe in the ecacy of their labors and the possibility of achiev-
ing a durable peace. Without such hope and a measure of idealism to sustain it, 
the passage of peoples from destructive war to creative peacemaking would not 
have been practicable.
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Ch a pter 2
Completion of the General Alliance (1817–20)
I n 1818 when the members of the Quadruple Alliance convened the Con-gress of Aix-la-Chapelle, they had agreed upon the basic legal principles of European order. e diplomatic accords signed at the congress completed 
the settlement begun in Vienna and Paris by restoring France to its natural posi-
tion as a great power in Europe. Since 1814, much had been accomplished, and 
hopes ran high. Yet even as the French monarchy returned to full membership 
in European society, political uncertainty persisted in France and the German 
Confederation.1 Other unnished business that demanded the attention of the 
allies included mechanisms to retire the French debt and settle private claims 
against the French government, French claims against the supply ocers (com-
missaires) of foreign governments, and claims of French citizens against foreign 
governments. Territorial and nancial arrangements between German rulers, 
particularly the dispute between the Kingdom of Bavaria and the Grand Duchy 
of Baden, also needed resolution, as did disagreements between Sweden and 
Denmark arising from the Treaty of Kiel (1814). e prisoner status of Napoleon 
Bonaparte, still considered a potential military danger, continued to arouse gen-
eral concern, while the rights of Jews and reform of Jewish life largely aected 
Britain and Germany. Finally, the slave trade, both legal and illegal, and threats 
to European peace and commerce from the Barbary states, technically under 
the suzerainty of the Ottoman Porte but regarded as pirates by the Europeans, 
remained on the allied agenda. In the protocols of the conferences held in Aix-
la-Chapelle in the fall of 1818 (29 September–21 November), the allies addressed 
all of these issues.2
By the time the allies met, dierences over the organization and obligations 
of the codied international order already had arisen, including the legal au-
thority for the congress itself. e British government supported a narrow basis 
for the meeting, article 5 of the Second Treaty of Paris, which called for a review 
of allied relations with France aer three years. A second source of authoriza-
tion, reportedly preferred by British foreign secretary Robert Stewart, Viscount 
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Castlereagh, was article 6 of the Quadruple Alliance, which provided for the 
convening of conferences and congresses to ensure the general repose of Europe. 
According to Henry Kissinger, British foreign policy, at least in the European 
arena, remained defensive and committed to the principle of non-interference 
in the internal aairs of other countries. Austrian foreign minister Clemens 
von Metternich, by contrast, opposed any changes to the restored order, and 
Emperor Alexander I, hoping to include second-order powers in future nego-
tiations, favored a “treaty of guarantee” or Alliance Solidaire that would trigger 
collective action in the event of territorial aggression or internal revolutionary 
upheaval.3
e General Alliance of European States
During the years of active warfare and diplomacy from 1812 to 1823 Emperor 
Alexander I never lost sight of the hard work and harsh realities of peacemaking 
in Europe.4 Despite moments of self-doubt and spiritual abandon, the Russian 
monarch showed himself to be a determined and pragmatic realist committed 
to military victory and security. An illustration of these dynamics appears in a 
report of 24 June/6 July 1818, prepared for Alexander by Ioannis Kapodistrias, 
the co-minister of foreign aairs, and one of the liberals said to have inuenced 
his diplomacy.5 Aer describing the diplomatic principles followed by the Rus-
sian government since the treaties of Paris had completed the work of paci-
cation, the report analyzed critical questions to be discussed at the Congress 
of Aix-la-Chapelle. Russian policy, Kapodistrias wrote, sought to preserve “the 
political relations of the European association under the conservative [conserva-
teur] empire of the law of nations [le droit des gens].” Based on principles of truth, 
benevolence, moderation, and justice, the allied powers acted to enforce estab-
lished treaties under the auspices, at least publicly, of concord, friendship, and 
trust. e meetings in Aix-la-Chapelle continued the political process begun in 
Vienna and Paris, the ultimate results of which could not be doubted. Simply 
put, the allied governments, enlightened by radiant experience, aimed to ensure 
the peace and prosperity of the world. In preparing the report, Kapodistrias 
claimed familiarity with all the ocial correspondence exchanged among the 
allies since 1815, including the treaties and acts that preceded and accompanied 
these communications. In addition, the minister had reviewed the instructions 
sent to Russia’s diplomats and their reports to Saint Petersburg. Based on these 
sources, the author analyzed the relationship between Russian and allied pol-
icies, particularly dierences in their understanding of the European system.
54 chapter 2
Whereas Austria and Britain wanted to conduct negotiations on the author-
ity of the Quadruple Alliance, Emperor Alexander predicated his positions on 
the fraternal and Christian alliance (a reference to the Holy Alliance, the general 
or European alliance, and the grand alliance).6 According to Kapodistrias, the 
monarch strove for unanimity, while insisting on strict adherence to treaty pre-
scriptions. In order to appear impartial and disinterested, he preferred to hold 
diplomatic deliberations in regular and public forums. In other words, although 
Austria and Britain sought to limit decision making about general European 
policy to the Quadruple Alliance, Alexander envisioned a more inclusive process 
with the broad participation of all European states. e tension between Russia’s 
pursuit of unanimity and the allies’ tendency toward exclusivity appeared in 
discussions of multiple issues: participation of the Baden court in deciding the 
question of the Main-Tauber circle, the matter of Parma, and the accession of 
Spain to the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna.7 Another problem that Russia 
wanted to see addressed within the framework of the general alliance was the 
abolition of the slave trade. At conferences in London, Portugal and Spain had 
reached agreement with Britain on specic measures to limit the trade.8 Russia 
adopted a similar approach by inviting the ministerial conference in Paris to 
negotiate liquidation of the French debt and reductions in the size of the occupa-
tion force. By contrast, Austria, Britain, and Prussia all preferred that the four al-
lies decide these matters before the opening of the congress in Aix-la-Chapelle.9
e consultations illustrated the critical question posed by Kapodistrias: did 
the exclusive Quadruple Alliance or the more inclusive general alliance consti-
tute the foundation of the European political system? Kapodistrias believed that 
Austria and Britain favored the Quadruple Alliance and that Prussia’s policy 
remained uncertain. Russia, by contrast, supported a more open system rooted 
in legality and publicity.10
Why, Kapodistrias continued, did Vienna and London maintain such close 
relations? Russia’s enormous power and active role in European politics provided 
the principal explanation. During earlier negotiations in Vienna and Paris, 
the liberal ideas of Emperor Alexander had proven decisive in reconciling the 
French population to legitimate royal authority. e monarch’s inuence also 
had helped to solidify the independence and neutrality of Switzerland, restore 
the national existence of Poland, and ensure a better future for Europe. ese 
successes, combined with the Treaty of 14/26 September 1815, had convinced the 
Austrian and British governments that Alexander sought and continued to seek 
universal domination. Although clearly absurd, this hypothesis encouraged the 
allies to separate Russia from France, Germany, Spain, and all the second-order 
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states. Action in the name of the Quadruple Alliance would make it easier to 
isolate Russia. For the moment these eorts had failed, and the allies had ac-
cepted that France would participate in the meetings of Aix-la-Chapelle. Still, 
Kapodistrias concluded that while Austria’s interpretation of the Quadruple 
Alliance obligated Russia to accept allied policies, the governments of Berlin, 
London, and Vienna remained free to contract separate obligations and act in-
dependently of the alliance. To bolster this argument, the co-minister described 
the goals of Austrian and British foreign policy as long-term subordination of 
France and Spain, dependence of the Netherlands and Portugal on Britain, and 
subjection of the Italian states to Austrian authority. Other actions designed 
to block Russian power included arming the German Confederation against 
Russia’s alleged projects of encroachment, the establishment of direct relations 
between the German Confederation and Ottoman Porte, intervention in the 
northern states, and nally, interference in Russia’s relations with the Persian 
and Ottoman empires. But, Kapodistrias insisted, despite the allies’ policies of 
distrust and jealousy, Russia’s intentions remained pure, its orientation merciful, 
and the conduct of its government frank and loyal.11
Kapodistrias also believed that at least until March 1816 Prussia had avoided 
the alliances of distrust and seemed committed to the principles of the Holy 
Alliance. A memorandum written by Prussian state counselor Johann Ancil-
lon depicted the Treaty of 14/26 September as the source of a proposed general 
alliance.12 e general alliance would establish a collective guarantee (garantie
solidaire) of the territorial boundaries sanctioned by the treaties of Vienna and 
Paris, as well as those recognized in other agreements between European states. 
e guarantee would secure the inviolability of legitimate sovereignty. Based 
on the principle of “all for one and one for all,” it would require the states of 
Europe to take up arms against any power that violated the codied territorial 
boundaries.13 Force no longer would threaten right, and right would come under 
the aegis of force. Second-order powers would be protected by the great powers 
and, therefore, would gain more rights than they would lose. With respect to 
legitimacy, a treaty of guarantee would prevent violent attacks on constitutional 
sovereignty, changes imposed from below (de bas en haut), and revolution. e 
internal liberty of each state would be respected, and a government threatened 
by domestic troubles would be able to appeal to the guarantor states, which in 
turn would be authorized and obliged to defend the threatened power and social 
order. A general alliance, as proposed by Ancillon and interpreted by Kapodis-
trias, would allow each government to work toward the reform and perfection 
of its own social institutions, while preventing innovations imposed by violence.
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e Russian emperor had accepted the Prussian overture and asked that 
the allies be consulted. But at the time of writing, Kapodistrias could report 
only that no further communications about the proposal had taken place. e 
co-minister of foreign aairs took this to mean that Austria and Britain rejected 
the project. Instead of a “general association founded on development of the 
Treaty of 14/26 September,” they favored the exclusive system of the Quadruple 
Alliance. For the moment, Kapodistrias also assumed that Prussia’s apparent 
decision to side with Austria and Britain resulted from that power’s tendency 
to support British positions on Portugal and Spain and from the secrecy sur-
rounding Austrian-Prussian negotiations about the German Confederation. 
Be that as it may, when the allies began to plan the agenda for the meetings in 
Aix-la-Chapelle, the unity of Austria, Britain, and Prussia seemed unassailable.
In reality, the alliance of the four great powers, the Quadruple Alliance, re-
mained strong. All agreed that the purpose of the congress was to arm the 
European system so that the world would be protected from revolution and the 
right of the strongest (le droit du plus fort). Kapodistrias repeatedly distinguished 
the exclusive Quadruple Alliance from the general alliance based on the Treaty 
of 14/26 September, as supposedly envisioned by Ancillon, yet he also recog-
nized that since 1815 Russia had followed the policy of general alliance. Precisely 
because the Treaty of 14/26 September established a Christian fraternity among 
the sovereigns, it was impossible for any single government to make decisions 
impacting the interests of the others without their participation. Equally sig-
nicant, the Quadruple Alliance, which dened the principles for restoration 
of the French monarchy, had never assigned to the allies the right to intervene 
in the aairs of other states. Because the Austrians viewed the Quadruple Alli-
ance as conrmation of the Treaty of Chaumont, which they hoped to renew in 
Aix-la-Chapelle, they wanted to apply the guarantees of Chaumont to the pres-
ervation of legitimate authority in France. e distinctions between Chaumont, 
the Quadruple Alliance, the Holy Alliance, and the general alliance were sub-
stantive, yet none threatened allied unity in the months prior to the congress.14
Kapodistrias’s report repeatedly claimed that the Quadruple Alliance, as a 
secret alliance limited to the four powers, could not adequately combat revolu-
tion or territorial encroachments. Once the alliance decided to act, its actions 
would become public, and harmful moral consequences would ensue. In such a 
scenario, governments excluded from the alliance would nd themselves under 
the de facto tutelage of the four great powers, a condition that would under-
mine their authority, compromise their dignity, and degrade the spirit of their 
people. is moral impact would in turn fuel the revolutionary tendency of the 
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century. e obligation to combat revolution and invasion would then place an 
additional military burden on the contracting powers, which would not be able 
to prevent disturbances and disorders from taking place. Worse still, Europe 
would be divided into two systems. Decisions by the Quadruple Alliance would 
appear as an eort to dominate the rest of Europe, an injustice and degradation 
that other states would resist. Kapodistrias emphatically rejected the Austrian 
assumption that because the Quadruple Alliance had saved Europe, European 
peace depended on the Quadruple Alliance. He had a point with respect to 
the alliance’s inability to prevent future revolutions or satisfy the aspirations of 
second-order states, but it is not at all clear that a more inclusive alliance with 
numerous active participants could have responded to changing circumstances 
as eectively as the future grand alliance of the ve great powers in consultation 
with interested parties.
Referencing the ideas attributed to Ancillon, Kapodistrias called for the cre-
ation of a general alliance founded on the principles of 14/26 September that 
would strengthen the European system and arm legitimate constitutional au-
thority in France. France had fullled its obligations as specied in the treaties 
of 1815. e actions of Louis XVIII and the French government proved that the 
interests of the nation had become identied with the legitimacy of the throne 
and the system of representation. Even though the allies needed to take precau-
tions to prevent the return of revolution, conditions in France appeared stable, 
and the country no longer posed a threat to Europe. Indeed, once the allied 
occupation ended, a general alliance would oer better protection for France 
against both internal revolution and external aggression. Among the potential 
sources of internal revolution, Kapodistrias identied the supporters of Napo-
leon (“the prisoner of Saint Helena”) and his son, or more likely, abuses of royal 
power. e external threat came from Austria and Britain, for neither wanted a 
strong France able to challenge Austrian expansion in Italy or British commer-
cial interests and maritime dominance. In the mind of Kapodistrias, one thing 
was certain: to suppress the potential causes of revolution, both internal and 
external, measures beyond the existing alliance were needed.
Kapodistrias identied these measures with the idea of a general alliance. 
How could the legitimate monarchy and constitutional charter governing 
France, based on the Second Treaty of Paris (8/20 November 1815), be preserved? 
Equally critical, under what conditions—for example, a new revolution—would 
France be in violation of treaty obligations, thereby authorizing the allies to expel 
the country from the European association and use force to bring it back into 
compliance (the casus foederis)? In a strikingly idealistic statement, Kapodistrias 
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argued that combined with a collective guarantee of each state’s territorial pos-
sessions, the fraternal and Christian alliance would eliminate forever the allure 
of revolution, conquest, and pillage. A collective guarantee would deny to peo-
ples the hope that they could improve their lot by paying less and gaining more. 
While revolution was nothing more than the conquest of legitimate property 
and power, conquering princes were simply revolutionaries assuming the man-
tle of royal authority. In either case, “the right of the strongest and of the most 
immoral seeks to triumph.” Mutual territorial guarantees would eectively dis-
courage such pretensions. “Providence and time would do the rest.”
In the following section of the report, Kapodistrias addressed specic objec-
tions to the idea of a collective guarantee or general alliance. ese included con-
cerns about French haughtiness and possible weakening of the Quadruple Alli-
ance, the latter seen by some as a more potent means to achieve the goals ascribed 
to the general alliance. But, Kapodistrias countered, the equality and reciprocity 
of every power that joined the general alliance would oset any French vanity 
that might lead the restored power to disturb the harmony of the association. 
France was obligated by the Treaty of Paris to maintain the Bourbon dynasty 
and to be governed by a representative system. No other state in Europe had ever 
assumed obligations of this magnitude; consequently, in a general association 
France would come under the de facto tutelage of all Europe. e country’s own 
restoration would be strengthened, and possible French aggression in Austria, 
Belgium, Germany, Italy, or Switzerland would be easier to thwart. Over the 
previous three years the four powers had decided political questions in union 
and unanimity, with the participation, not the exclusion, of other interested 
parties. Here Kapodistrias appeared to contradict his earlier characterization 
of the Quadruple Alliance as exclusionary. Clearly, its role in ongoing peace ne-
gotiations did not preclude participation by other states in discussions touching 
on their interests. As Kapodistrias himself described the matter, since 1815 Eu-
ropean politics had been governed in accordance with the universal benevolence 
sanctioned by the Treaty of 14/26 September. Still, the co-minister concluded, 
based on reason and experience, it was the general alliance that would cement 
the unity of the Quadruple Alliance, not the other way around. It was the gen-
eral alliance, repeatedly identied with the Holy Alliance, that would allow the 
union of the four powers to endure independently of immediate circumstances. 
Not only would the four great powers be discouraged from acting against the 
alliance; the spirit of insurrection among the peoples also would be opposed by 
the majority of European states, eager to preserve a system that oered territorial 
security, civil and political liberty, and substantial recognition.
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Relentless in his critique of the Quadruple Alliance, Kapodistrias argued 
further that an exclusive alliance contained within itself elements of dissolution 
and discord. e critical question remained how to prevent a return to partial 
alliances, political egoism, revolution, military despotism, and the right of the 
strongest. Kapodistrias viewed the Quadruple Alliance and general alliance 
as separate systems or policies. He underestimated the extent to which they 
functioned as complementary components in a multifaceted European system 
policed by the Quadruple Alliance and committed above all else to preserving 
unity and peace.15 For Kapodistrias, though perhaps less so for Emperor Alex-
ander, the general alliance oered the best hope for advancing the European 
system. According to the co-minister’s report, two tendencies threatened the 
peace: (1) the desire of peoples or their leaders (meneurs) to establish new rela-
tions between nations and sovereigns through revolution from below, and (2) the 
desire of governments to reproduce or support the old politics of arbitrariness in 
internal administration and partial alliances in diplomacy. Because revolution 
had aected every European country, a general alliance based on the Treaty of 
14/26 September, which critics erroneously described as a holy league of sov-
ereigns directed against the nations, would obligate all the European states to 
preserve the existence of their allies on an equal basis. Only this form of alliance, 
concluded Kapodistrias, could counter revolutionary ambition. e general alli-
ance would be armed not against the progress of social institutions, but against 
innovations brought about by violence. e system that had brought peace to 
Europe existed in the treaties of Vienna, Paris, and 14/26 September. ere was 
no need, therefore, to create new political alliances. Established treaties already 
encompassed all the interests of the European family, and the general alliance 
already existed in the Treaty of 14/26 September.
If established treaties already constituted the general alliance, why was a new 
agreement needed? In trying to persuade the allies that a formal collective guar-
antee or general alliance would not alter the edice of peace so painstakingly 
constructed in 1814–15, the Russian government repeatedly undercut the argu-
ment for concluding another positive transaction. What did it mean to base de-
cisions on the general alliance, and who specically would make those decisions? 
e accords reached in Vienna, Paris, and elsewhere certainly were not formu-
lated by all participating or impacted states. Repeatedly, the four great powers 
had made decisions among themselves, in consultation with interested parties, 
and then invited other states to accede to their agreements. Kapodistrias’s pref-
erence for the general alliance over the Quadruple Alliance was understandable, 
but from a present-day perspective, one cannot help but hear in his analysis the 
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pleas of a Greek patriot speaking on behalf of Europe’s small peoples.16 Emperor 
Alexander’s position on the alliance question seemed less consistent than that of 
his advisor, though historians correctly see in the Russian proposals support for 
an Alliance Solidaire. At the same time, when problems involving second-order 
powers appeared to interfere with the primary goal of European peace, Russia’s 
diplomats did not hesitate to assert great power primacy.17 e peace process of 
1814–15 provided the model for this approach, and Russia’s insistence on repre-
senting the interests of the Polish nation could not have made the point more 
clearly, despite promises of a constitutional relationship.
Emperor Alexander approved Kapodistrias’s report of 24 June/6 July 1818 and 
asked that a memorandum (mémoire) be prepared for submission to the Con-
gress of Aix-la-Chapelle. Dated 12/24 July, the memorandum did not ocially 
see the light of day. e Russian government had become aware of allied oppo-
sition to a formal treaty of general alliance. Consequently, on 26 September/8 
October, Russia submitted a modied condential memorandum to Viscount 
Castlereagh, Prince Hardenberg, Prince Metternich, and the Duke of Welling-
ton.18 During the prior three years, the memorandum proclaimed, the letter and 
spirit of the treaties concluded in 1815 had been observed. But once the mili-
tary occupation of France ended, how would the allied courts ensure the peace, 
which depended on the French restoration? How would they protect Europe 
from the twin dangers of renewed revolution and the right of the strongest?
In principle, the treaties of 1815 had resolved these questions by creating a new 
order in Europe, which contained revolution and protected all interests under 
the aegis of justice. e alliance of great powers (grands États) had become a gen-
eral alliance of all the states of Europe. Legitimate government had returned to 
France, bolstered by institutions that joined the rights of the dynasty with those 
of the people. Principles of equality, friendship, trust, and harmony—the work 
of the great powers and of Divine Providence—had overcome past errors that 
resulted from human egoism and partial or exclusive alliances (combinaisons). 
Under “the empire of Christian morality and the law of nations,” Europe had 
begun to enjoy peace and well-being. As a general association, the European sys-
tem rested on the legal foundation established by the Final Act of the Congress 
of Vienna and the treaties of Paris. Its conservative principle (principe conserva-
teur) was the fraternal union of the allied powers, and its primary objective was 
to guarantee all recognized rights. As the work of Divine Providence rather than 
of any single government, the system favored “the interests most dear to the great 
European family and to each particular state.” As a policy engraved on the hearts 
of men and intended to be eternal, the system ensured the advantages of civil 
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order for the association of states; the inviolability of persons and things, which 
consecrated legitimacy ab antiquo or legitimacy recognized by treaties; and -
nally, the territorial boundaries of each power. Situating the Russian overture 
in the broad context of European restoration, the memorandum noted that like 
all the communications between allied governments this one addressed present 
and future interests.
e rst question to be addressed in Aix-la-Chapelle was the military occupa-
tion of France, described as the material guarantee of the European system based 
on the treaties of 1815. But to protect the European association from revolution 
and the right of the strongest, a moral force also was needed, one that went beyond 
the renewal of existing obligations and temporary material measures. is force 
could be found in the present European system and in an alliance embodying the 
cohesion and indissolubility of that system. e components of the moral force 
included the Quadruple Alliance and the general alliance, the rst described as 
principle and the second as consequence. e Quadruple Alliance, according to 
the Treaty of 8/20 November 1815, established an armed federation to protect le-
gitimate constitutional monarchy in France. In the eyes of the peacemakers, who 
understood that restoration of the French monarchy represented the foundation 
of the European system, this federation performed a critical function. e general 
alliance, based on the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna and the subsequent 
treaties of Paris, guaranteed the inviolability of territorial possessions and of the 
legitimate representative of a given territory (propriété). e Quadruple Alliance 
of great powers, forged by successive accessions in 1814–15, had in practice become 
the general alliance. Having failed to persuade the allies to accept a treaty of col-
lective guarantee, the Russian government now sought to strengthen the general 
alliance, which it presented as already in existence.
As Russia’s diplomats portrayed the problem, if revolution returned to France, 
Europe would fall into chaos, and without the general alliance, the eort and 
sacrices needed to respond to the crisis would not materialize. Claiming to 
be in complete agreement with the allies, the Russian monarch hoped that the 
conferences in Aix-la-Chapelle would illuminate the true relationship between 
the Quadruple and general alliances. Once this relationship was properly un-
derstood, all Europe would accept three key points. First, the sole purpose of 
the Quadruple Alliance was to maintain legitimate constitutional monarchy 
in France based on the (Second) Treaty of Paris. To that end, the Quadruple 
Alliance remained morally and militarily prepared to occupy France should 
that country violate its treaty obligations. Second, the Final Act of the Con-
gress of Vienna and the treaties of Paris constituted a general alliance among the 
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contracting parties, the purpose of which was collective guarantee (garantie sol-
idaire) of the territories assigned to each and of legitimate authority ab antiquo
or as recognized by the treaties. Finally, based on the third point of allied agree-
ment, the original signatories and the powers that later acceded to the treaties 
of 1815 all belonged to the general association of European states. By presenting 
these three truths to the world, the powers meeting in Aix-la-Chapelle would 
fulll article 5 of the Second Treaty of Paris and article 6 of the Quadruple 
Alliance. ey also would preserve the tutelary and conservative force of the 
Quadruple Alliance. e very fact of the meeting, and especially the allies’ strict 
adherence to existing treaties, gave to the European system a new guarantee of 
stability. e organization of the congress and the work to be done likewise 
represented the fullment of treaty obligations, including clauses not yet carried 
out that required the allies’ attention.
As things turned out, and as the Russian memorandum explained, the pro-
tocols produced by the congress would extend and further rene the obligations 
already imposed by the Quadruple Alliance, the Final Act of the Congress of 
Vienna, and the treaties of Paris. In arming the Quadruple Alliance, the pro-
tocols would dene the casus foederis; possible military measures to be taken by 
the allies; and the organization of future meetings, ordinary and extraordinary, 
of the sovereigns, including precautions designed to ensure that these meetings 
did not harm the dignity of other crowns or weaken the ties of the general associ-
ation. Another product of the congress’s work would be a declaration of the great 
powers announcing to Europe the results of the meetings and the allies’ commit-
ment to the stipulations of existing treaties. e declaration would explain the 
basis for the evacuation of French territory and the guarantees that remained in 
eect, including the responsibilities of all signatories to the treaties of Vienna 
and Paris. e Russian government accepted the need to preserve the Quadruple 
Alliance, if only to provide a rapid response to catastrophe in France; however, 
the real purpose of any action by the alliance would be to maintain the general 
peace in cooperation with all the states of Europe. Finally, to ensure that the 
Quadruple Alliance did not become a partial or exclusive alliance, the declara-
tion would direct governments and nations to focus attention on the moral guar-
antees already enacted and consecrated by reciprocal obligation. If revolution and 
conquest threatened the general peace, the four powers stood ready to fulll their 
obligations. Having claried their collective responsibilities, they would invite 
the other states of Europe, France among them, to accede to their declaration. 
For those fearful of conditions in France, it would become clear that a French 
revolution would lead to the country’s exclusion from the general association.
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e conclusion to the memorandum proclaimed that in order to prevent 
the formation of opposing alliances, the protocols approved in Aix-la-Chapelle 
should highlight the interconnectedness of the Quadruple and general alliances. 
e former should not operate in secret, because the conscience of the four con-
tracting powers was insucient to protect against the vagaries of human nature. 
In addition, the Quadruple Alliance should be extended to all European states. 
Otherwise, the second-order states would try to form separate arrangements 
with one or another of the great powers. Only by invitation to accede to the 
declaration of Aix-la-Chapelle could the states of Europe be persuaded that the 
Quadruple and general alliances constituted a single indivisible system, that this 
system guaranteed all the rights and interests recognized by existing treaties, and 
that no separate alliance purporting to protect these rights and interests could 
become part of the public law of nations. Once governments and peoples rec-
ognized the value of existing treaties, particularly the territorial guarantee and 
the principle of legitimacy, they no longer would be attracted to the promises of 
aggrandizement and pillage associated with revolution and conquest. Once time 
and experience gave authority to “the moral force of this great association,” the 
law of nations would be placed under a guarantee analogous to that which pro-
tected individuals. e security of governments and peoples would be ensured, 
the spirit of revolution thwarted, and the progressive development of social in-
stitutions encouraged. Placed under voluntary obligations rather than dictator-
ship, governments would be able to give their subjects reformed institutions. As 
history showed, the enslavement of men and classes diminished in proportion 
to the improvement of social life. e purpose of the collective association of all 
the states would be “to regulate application of the principle of mutual defense,” 
a principle elevated from “the sphere of civil society to that of political order” by 
the interest of humanity. From this state of aairs, the liberties of peoples, wisely 
regulated, could emerge.
In a supplement to the memorandum, also dated 26 September/8 October 
1818, the Russian government evaluated the European political system. In the 
process of delivering Europe from revolution and conquest, the powers were an-
imated by a spirit of concord and Christian brotherhood, which allowed them 
to base their mutual relations on principles of law (droit). In restoring legitimate 
monarchies and states, the powers dened territorial boundaries and established 
mechanisms to preserve peace, the independence of nations, and the progress of 
peoples toward true civilization. Adherence to the treaties of 1815 obligated all 
signatories collectively to guarantee their execution, the territorial boundaries 
dened by the acts, and the legitimate sovereignty representing the territorial 
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possessions of each state. e response of the allies when Napoleon returned 
to France in March 1815 had proven the eectiveness of the principles followed 
in 1813–14. e Treaty of 13/25 March 1815 had dened the rules by which the 
great federation brought France back into compliance with the law. In fall 1818, 
a time when the temporary military guarantees of French compliance were being 
dismantled, it was important to reinforce the moral guarantees that the allies 
also had put into place.
Russia’s diplomatic communications repeatedly identied in existing treaties 
the essential ingredients of the new moral force. Fidelity to the principle of legit-
imate sovereignty and the inviolability of territorial possessions promised to give 
the world a long peace. At the same time, the concert of the four powers consti-
tuted a precautionary measure, authorized by the past, to protect Europe from 
the threat of renewed revolution in France.19 e Russian government assumed 
that the Quadruple Alliance would be able to count on all the states of Europe 
to act against an aggressive revolutionary France. To that end, the conferences 
in Aix-la-Chapelle needed to develop rules to govern the general coalition. is 
could be accomplished in a protocol or declaration dening the measures to be 
taken in case of war not only by the Quadruple Alliance, but also by the other 
states that had acceded to the treaties of Paris and the Final Act of the Congress 
of Vienna. Critical to the preservation of peace in Europe was an explicit state-
ment of the relationship uniting all states in a general pact—a pact that would 
prevent the isolation of the four powers from the other governments of Europe 
and the consequent formation of partial or counter-alliances. In light of Spanish 
pretensions and French overtures seeking admission to the Quadruple Alliance, 
it was important to make clear that the Quadruple Alliance was nothing more 
than “the center of the general alliance of the European system.”
Proceedings and Protocols of Aix-la-Chapelle
Despite tensions within the Quadruple Alliance and irrespective of Emperor 
Alexander’s supposed generosity toward France, the proceedings and protocols 
of Aix-la-Chapelle revealed a exibility in Russian diplomacy that sought above 
all to preserve allied unity through concerted action and compromise. e allies 
departed the conferences in general agreement about a variety of issues and bet-
ter informed about how the component parts of the European system connected 
to one another and should work in practice. Of particular signicance were the 
distinctions drawn between the Quadruple Alliance, the grand alliance of “the 
Five” (the Quadruple Alliance plus France), and the general alliance of European 
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states. Russian hopes for a collective guarantee based on the moral principles 
of 14/26 September remained on the table but did not play a critical role in the 
daily meetings of the congress.20 Taken as a whole, however, the proceedings 
and protocols of Aix-la-Chapelle did not diverge from the substance of Russia’s 
concerns, arguments, and proposals.
e rst item on the congress’s agenda concerned the military occupation and 
nancial obligations of France.21 e French and English kings, who did not at-
tend the congress, were represented by plenipotentiaries, the Duke of Richelieu 
for France and Viscount Castlereagh and the Duke of Wellington for Great 
Britain. e three monarchs, Francis I, Frederick William III, and Alexander I, 
did journey to Aix-la-Chapelle, though in the daily meetings Prince Metternich 
represented Austria, Prince Hardenberg and Count Bernstor spoke for Prussia, 
and Counts Nesselrode and Kapodistrias stood for Russia. General conferences 
included France and on occasion representatives of Portugal, Spain, and various 
German states. Other conferences were considered private (particulière) and in-
cluded only the four allies. e distinctions were signicant and imparted to 
the meetings a sense of order, hierarchy, reasoned deliberation, and solemn duty.
e congress opened on 29 September (NS) with discussion of the French 
question, specically France’s request for a speedy end to the military occupa-
tion.22 e four courts recognized the urgency of the situation, and on 9 October 
their plenipotentiaries signed a convention ending the occupation and retiring 
the French debt, which had been under discussion since autumn 1817.23 By the 
Convention of 27 September/9 October 1818 the allies agreed to complete the 
military evacuation of French territory by 18/30 November 1818.24 Financial 
terms designed to ensure payment of the 265 million francs owed by France, 
according to article 4 of the Second Treaty of Paris, made it possible to end 
the military occupation two years early. Until 18/30 November France would 
continue to cover the cost of maintaining allied troops. To retire the debt, the 
French treasury would pay 100 million francs directly as rentes, and foreign 
bankers, Baring Brothers of London and Hope of the Hague, would deliver the 
remaining sum through bills of exchange to be paid in nine monthly instalments 
beginning 6 January 1819.25 Finally, all governments that had signed the Second 
Treaty of Paris (8/20 November 1815) would be informed about the convention 
and invited to accede to the agreement.
Closely intertwined with the French question was the European question, 
usually discussed in the private conferences of the four courts. e European 
question referred to the application of the Treaty of the Quadruple Alliance, 
particularly article 6, to the circumstances of 1818. On 19 October, the allied 
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representatives agreed that in light of the current peaceful relations with France, 
the European powers needed to dene new bases for their association.26 eir 
rst goal was to preserve the power of the Quadruple Alliance for the casus foede-
ris dened in the Treaty of 8/20 November 1815. A secret protocol would then 
dene the military measures that the allies planned to implement in case of 
need. e second goal was to preserve in pure form the moral principle of the 
Quadruple Alliance, again based on article 6, and to apply this principle in a 
manner consistent with the general system. ird, the invitation to France to 
join the allies in maintaining the treaties that ensured the general peace would 
fall outside the secret protocol arming the Quadruple Alliance and authoriz-
ing the casus foederis et belli. France and the four courts would sign a separate 
protocol explaining the reasons for and the principles of the grand alliance (la 
grande union). In this instance, the ve allies would declare their commitment 
to preserve the general peace based on scrupulous adherence to the treaties of 
1815 and the laws (droits) regulating relations in the general association. Finally, 
the ve powers would make no decisions concerning the interests of other states 
without their participation.
At the private conference of 4 November, the allies assigned to the Duke of 
Wellington the task of communicating to the French prime minister and minis-
ter of foreign aairs, Armand Emmanuel du Plessis, Duke of Richelieu, the proj-
ects they intended to formalize at the congress: the secret protocol to be signed by 
the four signatories to the alliance of 1815, a note addressed to Richelieu, and the 
protocol to be signed by the plenipotentiaries of the ve powers as a consequence 
of Richelieu’s response to the allied note. In the exchange of notes (23 October/4 
November 1818 and 31 October/12 November 1818), the allies expressed their 
trust in France, the French king, and his minister, the Duke of Richelieu. e al-
lied note declared that France had fullled its obligations based on the Treaty of 
8/20 November 1815 and explained that the Convention of 27 September/9 Oc-
tober 1818 constituted a supplement to the general peace.27 In France’s response, 
Richelieu accepted the allies’ invitation to participate in the conferences, adding 
that no other nation had ever carried out its treaty obligations so scrupulously. 
Louis XVIII, the note proclaimed, would be pleased to join his counsel to that 
of his fellow monarchs for the purpose of consolidating the peace, maintaining 
the treaties, and guaranteeing the mutual rights and relationships recognized by 
all the states of Europe. Based on the signed convention, the exchange of notes 
between the French and allied ministers, and the protocol that would be agreed 
to a few days later, France would be restored to full membership in European 
society and to great power status in the European political system.
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e Protocol of 3/15 November 1818, approved by the plenipotentiaries of 
Austria, Britain, France, Prussia, and Russia, began with the simple proposition 
that following ratication of the Convention of 27 September/9 October it had 
become necessary to dene relations between France and signatories to the peace 
treaty of 8/20 November 1815 (Second Treaty of Paris). e rst point of the pro-
tocol proclaimed that the monarchs intended to organize their associations with 
one another and with other states in accordance with the principle of intimate 
union that heretofore had guided their relations and common interests, a union 
made “stronger and indissoluble by the bonds of Christian fraternity that the 
Sovereigns had formed among themselves.” Real and durable, their union did 
not concern an isolated interest or a transitory alliance. Its sole purpose was to 
maintain the general peace, founded on religious respect for treaty obligations 
and the totality of rights (droits) that derived from them. France too accepted 
the system that had brought peace to Europe. Going forward, the ve powers 
would hold private meetings to discuss their common interests, and in the event 
that future meetings touched on the interests of other states, the latter would 
be invited to participate. e protocol, which the ve powers would formally 
announce to all the courts of Europe, armed the moral and religious foun-
dations of the peace.28 Russia’s diplomats could not convince the allies that the 
Holy Alliance was equivalent to the general alliance, which should supersede 
the Quadruple Alliance (Kapodistrias’s formulation in the report of 24 June/6 
July 1818); however, the idea that peace required both moral principles and legal 
stipulations remained central to diplomatic discussions.
e protocol signed by the ve powers expressed the belief that stability in 
Europe depended on a complete and successful French restoration. At the same 
time, the four powers understood that loy aspirations, religious convictions, 
and good intentions could not guarantee an enduring peace. Consequently, be-
fore signing the protocol with France, though also on 15 November, the members 
of the Quadruple Alliance met in private conference to formalize a secret pro-
tocol and a military protocol limited to the four.29 Unlike the other acts agreed 
to at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, these protocols remained unpublished. 
Equally noteworthy, on 21 November, following a trip to Brussels, the Duke of 
Wellington announced that the king of the Netherlands had sent his minister 
of foreign aairs to accede to the military protocol.30
e Secret Protocol armed that because the process of pacication had been 
completed and allied troops had begun to evacuate French territory, the four 
powers needed to discuss how the Treaty of the Quadruple Alliance applied 
to France’s new relationship with the allies and the rest of Europe. Unwilling 
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to remove all the safeguards that had been in place since 1814, the four govern-
ments declared that the mutual obligations prescribed in the rst articles of the 
treaty did not concern current conditions. But then they added that in the event 
of war with France, these provisions would again become applicable. us, the 
allies also decided to preserve the military measures stipulated in the Treaty 
of the Quadruple Alliance. ese measures appeared to contradict subsequent 
provisions of the Secret Protocol describing France as an essential member of 
the European system and declaring that military dispositions could not serve as 
the basis for permanent peaceful relations. Instead, the intimate union between 
the four powers, dened in article 6 of the Quadruple Alliance and reinforced 
by the “bonds of Christian fraternity that today unite all the States,” provided 
the foundation for relations with a France restored to a state of legitimate and 
constitutional sovereignty. at said, in yet another attempt to square the circle, 
two additional provisions explained the decision to maintain the casus foederis et
belli specied in the Quadruple Alliance and the Military Protocol of 3/15 No-
vember 1818. Although the obligations set forth in articles 1–4 of the Quadruple 
Alliance were rearmed, the allies viewed them as potential actions far removed 
from present-day circumstances. In addition, France would be included in the 
union of the four powers and the general system of Europe, a step that preserved 
existing treaties and conrmed the friendly intentions of the allied sovereigns. 
e secret nature of the protocol, the allies claimed, actually illustrated their 
amicable attitude toward France.
Among themselves the allies represented their decision to preserve the Qua-
druple Alliance as defensive. ey did not want to appear hostile to France or 
alarm other European states. Although Emperor Alexander I may have been less 
committed to the Quadruple Alliance than Austria or Britain, their dierences 
paled in comparison with shared concerns about potential troubles in France 
and recognition of the need for allied unity in addressing any upheavals that 
might occur. e trick was to preserve the mutual defensive obligation without 
appearing to isolate France or threaten the second-order powers. Referring to the 
grand alliance (la grande union) of the ve powers, the signatories to the Secret 
Protocol agreed to invite France to participate in formulating the protocol that 
would dene relations between the ve courts. is latter protocol, signed by the 
four powers and France, would then be announced to all the states that had ad-
hered to the (First) Treaty of Paris of 30 May 1814, the Final Act of the Congress 
of Vienna, and the Paris treaties of 1815. With this declaration, the ve powers 
would show that their alliance aimed only to preserve the general peace, based 
on the inviolability of rights assured to every European state by existing treaties 
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and consolidated by the spirit of mutual goodwill uniting all the members of the 
European family in the same system of peace.
Aer repeating familiar statements about friendly intentions, the plenipo-
tentiaries of Austria, Britain, Prussia, and Russia declared that the obligations 
stipulated in the Treaty of the Quadruple Alliance remained in full force for the 
casus foederis et belli. In case of need the four monarchs or their representatives 
would meet to discuss appropriate measures. Once again, their goal would be to 
prevent the deadly consequences of revolutionary upheaval in France. e nal 
statement contained in the Secret Protocol may have been the most revealing, 
and its theme was one that recurred in Russian documents of the era: “e allies 
always remember that the progress of the evils that for so long desolated Europe 
was stopped only by the intimate relations and pure sentiments that unite the 
four sovereigns for the happiness of the world.” Discourses of Christian morality, 
enlightened harmoniousness, and sentimentalist friendship pervaded the diplo-
matic discourse of Restoration Europe.
Closely related to the Secret Protocol was the Military Protocol, also secret, 
unpublished, and dated 3/15 November 1818. e Military Protocol came di-
rectly from the Treaty of the Quadruple Alliance (articles 1–4) and the Treaty 
of Chaumont (articles 7, 8, and 12). According to the protocol, allied agreement 
on the existence of the casus foederis would trigger preparations for a military 
campaign. Because of the distances involved, Russia would have three months 
to reach Mainz; however, the British corps in Brussels, the Prussian corps in 
Cologne, and the Austrian corps in Stuttgart would be assembled within two 
months. Defensive works already prescribed by the conference protocol of 21 
November 1815 would continue in the Netherlands and in other countries bor-
dering France. To man these garrisons, including a second line of fortresses along 
the old frontier of Holland, troops would be sent from Britain, the Netherlands, 
and Prussia. Although the Netherlands did not belong to the Quadruple Alli-
ance, the seven ministers (Metternich, Castlereagh, Wellington, Hardenberg, 
Bernstor, Kapodistrias, and Nesselrode) agreed that defense of the kingdom 
was in the interest of all the powers. In their minds, the Military Protocol, to 
which the Netherlands adhered, constituted a part of the Secret Protocol.
e nal act incorporated into the legal settlement completed in 
Aix-la-Chapelle was the Declaration of 3/15 November 1818 signed by the repre-
sentatives of the ve courts and addressed to all the states of Europe.31 Like the 
protocols already discussed, the declaration explained that the pacication of 
Europe had been achieved. Foreign troops would therefore evacuate French ter-
ritory, and precautionary measures previously put in place would be dismantled. 
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e Convention of 27 September/9 October had completed the peace and the 
political system that preserved it. “e intimate union of the monarchs associ-
ated with the system, based on their principles and the interests of their peoples, 
oers to Europe the most sacred guarantee [gage] of future tranquility.” e 
purpose of this union was simple, great, and salutary. It did not constitute a new 
political alliance or a change in the relations sanctioned by established treaties. 
To the contrary, the union was calm and constant in its action. Its only goal 
was to maintain the peace and secure the transactions upon which it rested. 
Having brought France back into the European fold as one of ve great pow-
ers, the sovereigns were keen to publicize their commitment to observe in their 
mutual relations, and in relations with other states, “the principles of the law of 
nations, principles that in their application to a state of permanent peace alone 
can guarantee eectively the independence of each government and the stabil-
ity of the general association.” In future meetings to discuss common interests, 
the sovereigns or their representatives would observe these principles, and they 
would do likewise when other governments formally asked for their intervention 
on questions that might arise. Finally, the sovereigns would continue to perfect 
the work they had begun, in light of their duty before God and their peoples to 
protect the peace treaties, increase the prosperity of their states, and provide for 
the world an example of justice, harmony, and moderation.
Although the four allies tried to present their deliberations as consistent with 
the rights of second-order powers, they rejected a proposal from the Kingdom 
of Hanover to invite states represented at the Paris conference to accede to the 
military evacuation of France before the great powers made their decision public. 
e Hanoverian minister in London had submitted a formal protest to the Brit-
ish government contesting the allies’ right to exclude other states from negotia-
tions about the military evacuation and arguing that second-order powers had a 
right to vote on the question. Keen to assert the rights of every independent state 
and to preserve the dignity of interested powers without hindering the process 
of negotiation, the minister warned that great power decisions about European 
questions aroused jealousy, anxiety, and opposition to “the powerful tribunal 
of the great States.” Clearly, however, the allies viewed the restoration (and sen-
sitivities) of France as more important for European peace than the rights of 
second-order states. us, the ve powers meeting in Aix-la-Chapelle informed 
the states of Europe about France’s restoration to its natural position as a great 
power. Although Austria, Britain, Prussia, and Russia preserved the Quadruple 
Alliance, in relation to the rest of Europe they treated France as an equal and 
made sure that its restoration did not appear to follow upon the accession of 
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the second-order states. Despite the decidedly upbeat representations emanating 
from the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, controversy and ambiguity also colored 
the proceedings.32
e ambiguity associated with treating France as an equal power, while pre-
serving the Quadruple Alliance, reappeared as the meetings in Aix-la-Chapelle 
came to a close, and the Russian government made one last attempt to promote 
a treaty of guarantee.33 In a note approved by Emperor Alexander and submitted 
to the representatives of Austria, Britain, France, and Prussia, Russia’s plenipo-
tentiaries returned to questions about the nature of the alliance raised in the 
months leading up to the congress. e note stated directly that in addition to 
the protocols of 3/15 November, another more positive transaction was needed, 
the conservative inuence of which would encompass the future. rough such 
a transaction, states that had acceded to the Final Act of the Congress of Vi-
enna and subsequent treaties of Paris would agree collectively to guarantee “the 
integrity of their rights and the inviolability of the state of their respective pos-
sessions,” as dened in the treaties of 1815.34 Initially proposed by the Prussian 
government, this collective guarantee already existed in the meaning and literal 
content of the Treaty of 14/26 September 1815. us, Emperor Alexander stood 
ready, if his allies agreed, to put into more common diplomatic forms the princi-
ples consecrated by the Treaty of 14/26 September and “the system of peace and 
security which is the fruit of these principles.”
Russia’s plenipotentiaries also prepared a treaty proposal that they hoped 
would be accepted by Austria, France, the Netherlands, and Prussia.35 e sig-
natory powers would honor the territorial boundaries established in Europe by 
the treaties of 1814–15. e only possible changes envisioned by the project were 
those that resulted from inheritance, marriage, or mutual agreement. e sig-
natory powers also would agree to act together against any state or states that 
violated the established boundaries. In the event that common action became 
necessary, the powers would invite Britain to participate on terms of complete 
reciprocity. Britain also would be invited to accede to the proposed treaty at any 
time on a temporary or permanent basis. e German Confederation likewise 
would be invited to join; however, to prevent expectations that might weaken 
the collective guarantee, no other power would be admitted to the alliance, un-
less all the contracting parties agreed. In this bid to enact a reciprocal guarantee 
of defensive action, the Russian government pulled back from earlier formula-
tions suggesting that the general alliance, based on the Holy Alliance, should 
supersede the Quadruple Alliance. Reduced to a bare minimum, the Russian 
proposal expressed the desire to oset the vulnerabilities that had led to the 
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disastrous coalitions, treaties, and military campaigns of the Napoleonic era. If 
the Russian project had produced a new agreement, it would have required that 
the great powers of the continent, including France, protect one another’s terri-
tories from war and conquest not by balance of power but by mutual defensive 
guarantee. As was the case in 1814–15, the great powers equated peace among 
themselves and the protection of their territories and interests with peace for 
all Europe.
Organization of the German Confederation
In the aerglow of the Congress of Vienna, another unnished component 
of European order was the reorganization of Germany. e Territorial Com-
mission in Frankfurt completed its work on 8/20 July 1819, bringing to a close 
the complicated process of dening borders across Europe.36 e commission’s 
General Act (recès général), signed by Austria, Britain, Prussia, and Russia, ad-
dressed questions related to territorial swaps, indemnities, rents, maintenance 
of garrisons, and rights of inheritance, some of which already possessed legal 
standing based on earlier agreements between great and second-order powers. 
Technically, the General Act nalized the cessions and reversions initiated in 
the treaties of Paris and the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna. In reality, 
agreements between individual states on borders, indemnities, property rights, 
and family claims continued to be negotiated.37 Although far less weighty than 
the restoration of France or the armation of the Quadruple and general alli-
ances, the disputes discussed in Aix-la-Chapelle were noteworthy for what they 
revealed about how the great powers understood European order and hoped to 
preserve European peace.38 Several motifs stood out in the decisions concerning 
German aairs: the necessity of strict adherence to existing treaties, the commit-
ment to decide territorial questions under the aegis of the Territorial Commis-
sion working in Frankfurt, and the critical importance of stability in Germany 
to the overall success of the peace settlement.
At the Congress of Vienna it had become strikingly clear that not all of the 
legitimate claims of German sovereigns would be satised.39 Nor, given the 
localism and diversity of the German states, could all appeals receive equal 
consideration. When the Elector of Hessen asked the four powers meeting in 
Aix-la-Chapelle to accord him the title of king, they replied with an emphatic 
refusal.40 e allies regarded the elector’s request as unjustied, arguing that it 
lay outside the authority of the congress. In addition, they and France agreed 
to reject any proposed changes to the titles of sovereigns or their own princes 
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without prior consultation. e protocol of 13 October 1818 armed that in 
making this decision, the powers adhered to established treaties, which is to say, 
they upheld European public law.
e allies seemed more receptive to overtures from the Grand Duke of Baden, 
perhaps because the empress of Russia, Elizabeth Alekseevna, was a princess of 
Baden, but more likely because the military evacuation of France, a matter of 
general European interest, directly aected the grand duchy.41 As part of the 
evacuation Bavarian troops would pass through Baden; consequently, the allies 
accepted responsibility for limiting the inconveniences this might cause and for 
facilitating resolution of the ongoing territorial dispute between the two states.42
Although territorial arrangements between Baden and Bavaria also came under 
the purview of the commission in Frankfurt, the allies invited the Grand Duke 
of Baden to send plenipotentiaries to Aix-la-Chapelle to consult (act in con-
cert) with the powers in an eort to restart the stalled negotiations. rough 
Russia’s representatives, the grand duke submitted proposals for an exchange of 
territory and population between Baden and Bavaria, a military route through 
Baden for Bavarian troops, and a payment to Baden of more than one million 
orins to support the troops and defray hospital costs dating from the military 
campaigns of 1813–14. Because the Bavarian king did not respond to the propos-
als, the grand duke rejected the territorial cessions requested by the commission 
in Frankfurt, appealing instead to the Russian government for support. Sensi-
tive as the situation appeared, allied unity held, and the four powers meeting in 
Aix-la-Chapelle concluded that Baden’s demands seemed excessive and not at all 
conducive to good relations between neighboring states.
Baden’s claims dated from 1813 when the grand duke joined the coalition 
against Napoleon. At the time, he also agreed to give up territory that might be 
needed in the reconstruction of Germany and received promises from the allies 
of appropriate compensation for any cessions. e dispute with Bavaria stemmed 
from the Treaty of Munich, concluded between Austria and Bavaria on 2/14 April 
1816, which in return for unfullled territorial promises contained in the Treaty 
of Ried (8 October 1813) assigned to Bavaria the Main-Tauber circle belonging to 
Baden. Baden received no compensation for this loss, and when Emperor Alexan-
der refused to conrm the agreement, Austria agreed to remove the Main-Tauber 
provision. e rulers of Baden, Hessen-Darmstadt, Prussia, Russia, and Würt-
temberg all believed that Austria had given too much power and territory to Ba-
varia, which the Russian monarch characterized as a country with exaggerated 
pretensions to territorial aggrandizement and great power status.43 Negotiations 
dragged on, and during the meetings of 10 November 1818 in Aix-la-Chapelle, 
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Russia’s representatives observed that neither Baden nor Bavaria could be forced 
to accept the territorial and nancial demands being negotiated in Frankfurt. 
Bavaria already had accepted payment from Austria to concede the Main-Tauber 
circle, and the Grand Duke of Baden had revised his oer to Bavaria.
According to the modied terms, Baden agreed to exchange upper Wertheim 
for Geroldseck, give up a monetary claim of 2 million orins against Austria and 
Bavaria, and allow Bavaria to maintain a military route through Baden’s terri-
tory in the direction of Frankenthal so that old and new provinces belonging 
to Bavaria could be connected. Given these concessions, Russia was prepared 
to insist that Bavaria accept the plan for reconciliation. e territories in ques-
tion lay within the frontiers of Bavaria, and the Russian government believed 
that Baden’s oer contained more than the Bavarian king had a right to expect. 
Further postponement of a decision, Emperor Alexander concluded, would be 
harmful to the internal and external relations of several states within the Ger-
man Confederation. Allied authority in this matter rested on existing treaties 
and on the obligation to establish the tranquility of the German states on an 
immutable foundation.44 Eager to prevent further trouble and disagreements, 
the Russian government also proposed that the four courts send a collective 
communication to the king of Bavaria, urging him to accept Baden’s most recent 
proposals. Prussia agreed that the terms of reconciliation should be accepted 
and that the repose of Germany superseded all other considerations; however, 
Frederick William III rejected the idea of sending a joint allied letter.
Discussion of the conict between Baden and Bavaria concluded when on 20 
November 1818 the four powers signed a protocol designed to serve as the basis 
for a common instruction to allied representatives attached to the Territorial 
Commission in Frankfurt. In the years aer the Congress of Vienna common 
instructions provided an eective tool for communicating allied agreement on 
concrete questions without appearing to dictate to the interested parties. Diplo-
matic pressure in the form of allied consensus did not in itself carry legal stand-
ing; however, the common instruction represented a form of concerted action 
that allowed the great powers to exert inuence over second-order states and over 
one another. Equally signicant, the common instruction created a mechanism 
whereby a government not in agreement with the shared policy could abstain 
from intervention while remaining fully committed to the alliance and to allied 
unity. In this instance, France joined the allies in their eorts to persuade the 
king of Bavaria to agree to Baden’s proposals. A Bavarian refusal, the protocol 
stated, would release the Grand Duke of Baden from the obligations to Bavaria 
that he had accepted both here and in previous transactions. Bavarian consent 
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would be formalized in separate agreements between the allies and the courts 
of Baden and Bavaria. Ultimately, Bavaria rejected the indemnity agreed upon 
in Frankfurt, which meant that Austria continued to pay rent to the kingdom, 
based on the Treaty of Munich. At the same time, according to the General Act 
of the Territorial Commission (8/20 July 1819), a treaty of 29 June/10 July 1819 
between Austria and Baden, and a second agreement of the same date signed 
by Austria, Baden, Britain, Prussia, and Russia, Geroldseck went to Baden and 
upper Wertheim to Austria.45
Despite the allied preference for negotiating German territorial disputes 
within the framework of the commission in Frankfurt, German princes contin-
ued to seek great power intervention during the conferences in Aix-la-Chapelle.46
Among some of the smaller German states there existed a particular tendency 
to see Russia as their protector.47 Citing articles 49 and 50 of the Final Act of 
the Congress of Vienna, the Duke of Oldenburg, the Duke of Sachsen-Coburg, 
and the landgrave of Hessen-Homburg all solicited support for land swaps and 
reclamations.48 e princes hoped to obtain lands closer to their ancient states, 
exchanges that involved other German states, including Bavaria and Prussia. 
e Duke of Oldenburg and the count of Bentinck also claimed lands, Elseth 
and Kniphausen respectively, that during the Napoleonic Wars had been incor-
porated into France, based on treaties between the great powers. Elseth had 
become part of France according to a treaty of 6 April 1803 signed by France and 
Russia with the mediation of Prussia. Kniphausen had been occupied by Dutch 
and French armies, mediatized into Oldenburg, incorporated into France, oc-
cupied by Russia, and then returned to the Duke of Oldenburg. In 1815 the 
peacemakers had recognized the independence of Kniphausen, and the count 
of Bentinck had begun the eort to restore his rights of sovereignty over the 
seigneury. For his part, the Duke of Oldenburg sought to clarify whether he 
or the count exercised sovereignty over the territory in question. Although at 
the session of 7 November Russia’s co-minister of foreign aairs, Count Nes-
selrode, argued that the House of Holstein-Oldenburg possessed the right of 
succession over Kniphausen, the allies asked Prince Hardenberg of Prussia to 
investigate and shed further light on the matter. Hardenberg’s report address-
ing the claims of Oldenburg, Sachsen-Coburg, and Hessen-Homburg stated un-
equivocally that Frederick William III rejected any changes that aected Prus-
sian territory. Based on existing agreements, the princes in question already had 
received lands on the le bank of the Rhine. e allies therefore concluded that 
in this case they had no obligation to intervene on behalf of the German princes. 
e princes remained free to negotiate with Prussia or other powers to obtain 
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territorial swaps by mutual agreement; however, such negotiations were not the 
responsibility of the four allies.
e restoration of Prussia’s territory and population had been a cornerstone 
of the edice of pacication and peace constructed in 1814–15, and claims af-
fecting Prussian interests were not likely to produce an armative allied re-
sponse. Count Nesselrode did, however, present demands from the landgrave 
of Hessen-Homburg, who sought territory or an indemnity from the Grand 
Duchy of Hessen.49 e allies considered these demands legitimate, and their 
ministers in Darmstadt and Frankfurt received orders to urge the grand duke to 
reach a just settlement, including a voice for the landgrave in the German Diet. 
e four powers repeated this approach in response to the claims of the prince of 
Windischgrätz, whose lands had been incorporated into the Kingdom of Würt-
temberg. Based on an agreement of 1811, the prince had given up his sovereign 
rights, but only for so long as the Napoleonic Confederation of the Rhine ex-
isted. He therefore sought an indemnity or the restoration of his ancient rights. 
In response, allied diplomats in Stuttgart received instructions to use friendly 
and private means to encourage satisfaction of the prince’s claims. e plenipo-
tentiaries meeting in Aix-la-Chapelle agreed that the prince should be paid an 
indemnity. Yet another appeal came from the princess of urn and Taxis who 
was prepared to cede territories to the prince of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen in 
return for recognition by the German Diet as one of the sovereign princes of 
Germany. Both Austria and Prussia supported this arrangement.
e claims and counterclaims of German princes, ranging in status from 
kings to dukes to free cities to mediatized counts, can seem insignicant and 
certainly are dicult to describe based on the legal, archival, and secondary 
sources consulted here. e disputes mentioned do not in any sense represent a 
complete picture of the complicated process leading to the emergence of modern 
Germany.50 Still, they are noteworthy for the purposes of this study, because 
they document the allies’ ability to intervene in potentially disruptive situations 
without appearing to impose great power decisions on second-order states. In 
discussions involving German princes, the allies meeting in Aix-la-Chapelle 
appeared willing to support legitimate claims based on treaty obligations and 
historic rights, as long as the changes would not signicantly alter the settle-
ment codied in the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna. Nor did the allies 
rule out future territorial adjustments, land swaps, or indemnities. ey insisted, 
however, that additional changes should be worked out by mutual agreement 
among the princes involved without allied intervention. Mediatized princes and 
counts approached the allies gathered in Aix-la-Chapelle, including the Russian 
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emperor, about their relationship to the German Confederation. But as German 
states, Austria and Prussia played a more active role and assumed responsibility 
for ensuring that these princes had a voice in the diet. Precisely because the al-
lies agreed that mediatized princes enjoyed legal and honoric rights based on 
the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna, they instructed their representatives 
at German courts to insist that all interested parties adhere to existing treaty 
obligations.
Discussions about the Kingdom of Westphalia further illustrated the allied 
preference for negotiations between aected parties based on established trea-
ties. In 1807 Napoleon had created the kingdom for his brother Jerome out of 
lands taken from Prussia, Hanover, and much of Electoral Hessen. e Congress 
of Vienna had dissolved the kingdom and restored to Prussia most of old West-
phalia, which Napoleon had assigned to the Grand Duchy of Berg.51 Questions 
remained, however, about land transactions and obligations incurred within the 
framework of Napoleonic Westphalia. e Elector of Hessen did not want to 
recognize any sales or gis of land concluded under the authority of Jerome’s 
kingdom. e allies held a dierent view, believing that obligations and rights 
based on the legislation of Napoleonic Westphalia should be respected. Both 
article 22 of the First Treaty of Paris (1814) and article 41 of the Final Act of the 
Congress of Vienna recognized the property rights of French subjects in lands 
ceded by France. To resolve the outstanding conicts, Prussia planned to invite 
interested parties to participate in a commission that would decide questions 
related to debts, pensions, feudal relations, indemnities, and restitutions in prov-
inces that had belonged to Napoleonic Westphalia. Legitimate claims needed to 
be satised, including those related to the lands of Electoral Hessen. In addition, 
because the claims in question had arisen from the victory and generosity of 
the allied powers—from the dissolution of the Kingdom of Westphalia and the 
reintegration of dispossessed princes—the ministers meeting in Aix-la-Chapelle 
would ask their sovereigns to send letters to the Elector of Hessen requesting 
withdrawal of his demands. In situations where similar eorts failed to produce 
a resolution, the German Diet could refer the dispute to an arbitration com-
mission. e time had come, the four powers agreed, for German authorities to 
decide German territorial questions.
Russia’s general desire to stand aside in German disputes grew as political 
debates within the confederation intensied. In response to student unrest that 
erupted during the Wartburg Festival of October 1817, Russia joined Austria 
and Prussia in denouncing the displays of seditious intent and in criticizing the 
inaction of the Grand Duke of Saxony-Weimar-Eisenach, Karl August, who 
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presumably could have taken steps to prevent the alarming demonstrations.52
e Russian government agreed with the allies that the radical proclamations 
of students and professors from the University of Jena constituted an assault 
on the German Confederation, the sovereigns of other German states, and an 
older generation who did not share the nationalist sentiments of liberal youth. 
Still, Russia’s diplomats received instructions to avoid public criticism of Grand 
Duke Karl August, who nonetheless should be informed of Emperor Alexan-
der’s concerns. Consistent with the policy of non-intervention and with the line 
taken on territorial disputes, the monarch resisted Austrian and Prussian ef-
forts to draw him into concerted (re)action.53 Alexander recognized the threat 
posed by unfettered freedom of speech, but he also believed that Russia should 
remain a spectator in Germany and insisted that the German states must agree 
on measures to remedy the situation. Despite talk about possible interventions, 
Alexander ordered his diplomatic agents to avoid any appearance of involvement 
in the internal aairs of the German Confederation. He did admit, however, 
that based on the authority of established treaties, intervention to suppress the 
symptoms of revolution might be warranted, if legitimized by a majority of the 
federated states or a unanimous decision of the allies.54
Emperor Alexander’s appraisal of the events in Wartburg illustrated the lim-
its to enlightened reformism (or early liberalism) so characteristic of his reign. 
As Nesselrode explained the matter, and the monarch conrmed, the consti-
tutional order of Weimar suited both the spirit of the times and the territories 
governed by Grand Duke Karl August, “the sole dispenser of liberties to his 
people.” Based on their constitution, the subjects of Saxony-Weimar-Eisenach 
enjoyed freedom of speech and the press, understood as freedom to discuss 
the public good (le bien public) with reference to state, class, and individual 
interests. In fact, the grand duke could not contest these constitutional liber-
ties without contravening the conservative principle to preserve the German 
Confederation, the stability of which was critical for European peace. At the 
same time, the grand duke’s federal relations obliged him to repress and pre-
vent abuses of “this same emancipation of discourse and the press” that violated 
either the constitution of Saxony-Weimar-Eisenach or the jurisdiction of the 
German Confederation. In other words, no member state should act in a way 
(or permit actions from within its territory) that prejudiced the federal system 
or interfered in the internal aairs of a co-state. e Wartburg speeches vio-
lated these prescriptions by implicitly condemning all German states and class 
distinctions and by proclaiming the existence of a pan-German association of 
youth. Subversive student groups, the Russian government declared, should not 
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be allowed to act as constituent parts of the German Confederation. Universi-
ties, in other words, were not diets, and national representation did not mean 
overt political contestation.
In the summer of 1819, as the Territorial Commission in Frankfurt moved 
toward conclusion of its work, the foundations for an enduring peace within the 
German Confederation and between the German states and France appeared to 
be in place. But events on the ground continued to generate new apprehensions 
and discussions. As early as March 1819, the assassination by an avowed revolu-
tionary of August von Kotzebue, an agent of the Russian legation in Mannheim, 
had caused disquiet among Russia’s diplomats.55 More ominous, political unrest 
and anti-Jewish violence (the Hep! Hep! riots) that began in Würzburg (King-
dom of Bavaria) in August had spread among students, artisans, and farmers 
across the German lands.56 ese and other signs of radical inuence led the 
federal diet in Frankfurt to enact the Karlsbad Decrees (20 September 1819), 
which called upon German governments to prevent subversive speech in the 
universities and forbade universities to employ teachers who had been dismissed 
for sedition from other institutions. e decrees also created a commission to 
regulate the press throughout the confederation and established a federal oce 
to investigate the revolutionary agitation that had appeared in several states. 
Although supportive of strong state action, the Russian government continued 
to profess a policy of non-intervention in German aairs.57
Allied concerns about student unrest in the German states also fueled dip-
lomatic conversations about constitutional politics. Metternich in particular 
pushed for a concerted response to what he perceived as the revolutionary 
menace arising from the spread of constitutionalism, though he did not oppose 
constitutions as a matter of principle. In May 1818, the king of Bavaria decreed 
a constitution, and three months later the Grand Duke of Baden followed suit. 
In September 1819 Württemberg received a constitution, based on agreement 
between the monarch and estates. In Prussia, the eorts of Hardenberg and 
others to institute national representation continued through the summer of 
1819. e Prussian debate ended when Frederick William III ordered Hard-
enberg to join Metternich in renouncing the idea of universal representation 
of the people. Austrian-Prussian cooperation then produced the Karlsbad 
Decrees in September 1819 and the Schlussakte the following year. Negotiated 
at conferences in Vienna, the Schlussakte of 1820 replaced the Bundesakte of 
1815 as the constitutional basis for the German Confederation. e Schlus-
sakte strengthened monarchical power and the instruments of political repres-
sion but did not eliminate the basic tension, described repeatedly in Russia’s 
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diplomatic communications, between the legislative power of the Frankfurt 
Diet and the independence of individual German states, including constitu-
tionalized states.58
roughout the political debates and social unrest swirling about the Ger-
man lands in 1817–20, Emperor Alexander refused to join Austria, and even-
tually also Prussia, in condemning constitutional reforms. In Baden, Bavaria, 
and Württemberg, legitimate sovereigns had issued the constitutions; in Prussia, 
aer years of social and institutional reform, the monarch nally had decided 
against constitutional arrangements. In the period since the peacemaking of 
1814–15, the Russian government always had insisted that existing treaties be 
honored, including the Act of Confederation in Germany, and that the sov-
ereignty of all states, large and small, be respected, based on the Final Act of 
the Congress of Vienna. Both Britain and Russia adhered to the principle of 
non-intervention in the domestic aairs of sovereign states, as long as revolution 
did not threaten the general interest of European peace. Repeatedly, Emperor 
Alexander and his foreign ministry forbade Russia’s diplomats to comment on 
implementation of the Karlsbad Decrees or constitutional reform in German 
states. Communications with diplomats assigned to German courts made clear 
that while Alexander supported strong measures to suppress the threat of the 
revolutionary spirit, he remained legally and morally bound not to take any ini-
tiative on German questions or even to oer concrete advice. Only if asked by a 
fellow monarch, such as his friend the king of Prussia, would Alexander express 
his opinion on a specic situation.59
Emperor Alexander’s reluctance to speak in a public or ocial manner 
did not indicate indierence to German aairs. Nor did it mean that he and 
his diplomatic agents had no thoughts or opinions to share. Diplomats’ re-
ports from Germany praised the moderate policies of the rulers in Baden and 
Hessen-Darmstadt who sought to accommodate liberal deputies in the cham-
bers of the Estates.60 Russia also worked with Britain to coordinate the language 
their diplomats would employ in the German states and Frankfurt. e Russian 
government repeatedly expressed fears about the harmful consequences of rev-
olution and of repressive military and police measures. In response to Austria’s 
plans to revise the act of confederation and to evidence that the Karlsbad De-
crees had not produced the desired unity in the German Confederation, Alexan-
der and his representatives highlighted the signicance of moral inuence. is 
included the moral force represented by the intimate union of allied sovereigns 
and embodied in the precepts to which they paid homage by the Act of 14/26 
September 1815 (the Holy Alliance).61
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On 21 November/3 December 1819, Emperor Alexander approved an over-
view of his ideas concerning German aairs in the form of a memorandum is-
sued by the Ministry of Foreign Aairs.62 Noting that the measures agreed to in 
Karlsbad had been presented as temporary, the memorandum warned that lack 
of unity among the German states would make it dicult to prevent anarchy in 
the future. Alexander expressed support for the Karlsbad Decrees, but on this 
occasion, he also noted that because they were instituted by the German Diet 
in Frankfurt, they rested on the principle of the diet’s sovereignty. is, how-
ever, violated a key provision of the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna, which 
recognized the equality of rights and sovereignty of all German states. In other 
words, a contradiction existed between the legislative authority of the diet and 
the sovereign independence of member states.
Concerned about divisive responses to the Karlsbad Decrees both in Ger-
many and among his own ocials, Emperor Alexander insisted that only 
through persuasion, inspired by moderation and benevolence, could the repres-
sive measures, agreed to in principle, be implemented. In other words, enforce-
ment of the decrees should not violate the 1815 Act of Confederation or the con-
stitutions of second-order states. is meant that individual governments should 
apply the new decrees based on local conditions. e diet in Frankfurt should 
not try to impose uniformity in enforcement. Indeed, assignment of supreme 
legislative power to the diet required either that the diet assume dictatorial au-
thority or that the Act of Confederation be amended. How, the memorandum 
asked, could the general interest of the German union, upon which peace in 
Europe depended, be reconciled with the particular interests and institutions, 
constitutional and non-constitutional, of sovereign member states? In seeking 
to illuminate a pathway beyond the contradictions of 1819, the memorandum 
articulated a vision of institutional arrangements that can be described as liberal 
or constitutional, though not in the sense implied by Enlightenment radicalism 
or modern politics of contestation.
As things stood, the legislative authority of the German Diet could super-
sede that of individual states only through dictatorship or changes to the Act of 
Confederation. Still, Emperor Alexander hoped that within the confederation 
the unity required for true power could be achieved. In other words, the general 
interest and legal power of the German Confederation could be realized de facto 
(par le fait). e more powerful states, which were not bound by competing 
constitutions, could decide the question of legislative authority with the unan-
imous approval of their co-states, based on visible facts and the development of 
institutions that responded to legitimate aspirations. A handful of ambitious 
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and malevolent men, the Russian monarch believed, should not be allowed to 
terrorize German governments. eir ability to do so resulted from the lack of 
prestige enjoyed by the governments of the day, the power of which depended on 
the strength of the liberal institutions given to their people. But what did Em-
peror Alexander and his diplomatic agents mean by liberal institutions? As other 
foreign policy statements made clear, the Russian government hoped that across 
Europe public authority would be augmented through the use of moral force, 
whereby governments would oppose unrest among their peoples by procuring 
their happiness and well-being.63 In Russia, from roughly the mid-eighteenth 
century, enlightened concepts of good governance, embodied in the reforms of 
monarchs such as Catherine II, dened these legal-administrative policies (or 
aspirations). In the reign of Alexander I, the prerevolutionary vision of regular 
government and enlightened monarchy remained predominant.64
According to the memorandum of 21 November/3 December 1819, liberal 
institutions were not pacts wrested from weakness, contracts imposed on sov-
ereigns by the leaders of the people, or “constitutions granted in dicult cir-
cumstances.  .  . to ward o the storm of the moment.”65 Rather, governments, 
especially those that had emerged from revolutionary crises, were obligated to 
operate under clearly explained conditions and solidly established forms. In ad-
dition, the times demanded that representatives of the nation vouch for and 
guarantee the inviolability of these conditions and forms. Aer this nod toward 
the principle of representation, the memorandum turned to a discussion of lib-
erty, a principle that t more easily with Russia’s legalistic and moralistic under-
standing of the Vienna settlement. Liberty existed only within just limits, and 
limits on liberty were “nothing other than the principles of order.” ese prin-
ciples in turn corresponded to the practice of Christian morality, so that liberty 
became a benet, the fruits of which governments could reap. In recent times, 
liberty without morality (no doubt a reference to revolution) had produced ter-
rible misfortunes. “Deprived of its natural guide,” liberty led to corruption.
Once corruption took root, patriotism turned into passion, honor into im-
moderate criticism of government, and popularity into the destruction of public 
power. In these conditions, the fate of the state might hinge on a single election. 
Corruption also represented the absence of good faith (bonne foi), which, as the 
companion of Christian morality, should be sucient to guarantee the legiti-
mate supremacy of government. Indeed, benevolent governments that fullled 
their promises had nothing to fear from critics. eir authority rested on the 
sentiment of happiness. In conditions of happiness, the majority of men, those 
who knew how to appreciate happiness, would act as an involuntary movement 
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in support of benevolent governments. People would feel connected to ocial 
actions, passions would be silenced, and governments would follow victorious, 
benecial, and national policies. Assuming that the non-constitutional German 
states governed in the manner described, uniform principles of administration 
would emerge as the necessary eect of a happy example. Federal and state in-
terests would meld into one general interest, and the true power of unity would 
become a reality. Alexander’s vision of how the German lands might become 
united and the German Confederation function alongside the sovereign rights 
of independent states had much in common with literary idealizations of the pa-
triarchal household. Enlightened harmoniousness and the benevolence of family 
relationships could be transferred to the political arena.66
Notwithstanding the hopes for harmonious development, in early 1820, 
Britain, France, and Russia continued to express concern about Austrian and 
Prussian domination in Germany. Second-order German states continued to 
look to Russia for protection, though Emperor Alexander still insisted that his 
diplomats appear impartial with respect to German aairs.67 In response to re-
ports received since August 1819 from Berlin, Frankfurt, Karlsruhe, Munich, 
Stuttgart, and Vienna, the monarch acknowledged his diplomats’ conicting 
views on the Karlsbad Decrees and constitutional negotiations in Vienna. To 
some, Alexander’s policy appeared inconsistent and changeable, wavering be-
tween support for absolutist monarchy and acceptance of so-called liberal insti-
tutions. e monarch noted these criticisms but armed that his vote on Ger-
man matters always resulted from delity to established treaties. Finally, while 
continuing not to take a public position on internal German politics, Alexander 
did concede that the Karlsbad Decrees and discussions about strengthening the 
federal German state might give excessive power to Austria, Prussia, and the 
diet. Development in this direction would be inconsistent with conservation of 
the political relations dened by established treaties, specically the Final Act 
of the Congress of Vienna, the treaties of Paris, and subsequent supplemental 
and complementary acts. For these reasons, Russia would only support a single 
federal state if the German states and other European powers agreed to it. Russia 
now accepted that the transactions of 1814–15 constituted a general guarantee of 
the territorial possessions of signatory powers. Going forward, European peace 
depended on sustaining allied unity and opposing a return to the old system of 
partial alliances and counterforces (the balance of power).68
A more emphatic statement of Russia’s reaction to the ongoing political de-
bates within Germany appeared in a memorandum dated 4 February 1820 that 
was sent to the monarchs of Austria and Prussia. Endorsed by the Ministry of 
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Foreign Aairs, “the Memorandum on the Measures Taken by German Govern-
ments with Respect to Freedom of the Press and Public Education” was solicited 
by Kapodistrias from Aleksandr S. Sturdza, who also had participated in writing 
the Treaty of Alliance of 14/26 September 1815 (the Holy Alliance).69 Precisely 
because signatories to the Treaty of 14/26 September had a duty to speak with 
frankness about the political system they had vowed to uphold, Emperor Alex-
ander wanted his allies to receive the memorandum. e document began with 
a discussion of press freedom, which recognized the open expression of political 
opinions as inherent in representative forms of government. But in the German 
Confederation, freedom of the press and all the other rights enjoyed by citizens 
needed to be applied dierently, depending on local conditions and the laws of 
each state. In addition, because human societies remained subject to divine law, 
power could not be taken from sovereigns or religion. is meant that govern-
ments should not concede to the spirit of the century the authority to dene 
representative political forms or anything else within the purview of religion, 
good morals, and experience. Put another way, legal liberty did not apply to the 
religious, moral, scientic, or literary creations of the human spirit. Sovereign 
authority rested on divine authority, and concessions in these areas would un-
dermine the work of government.
How did Russia’s diplomatic agents understand the spirit of the century? Ac-
cording to the memorandum, the absence of Christian fraternity had caused the 
calamities of the last half century. Once a civilization ceased to be religious, it 
lost the benets of civilization. Jealousy and distrustful politics set neighboring 
countries against one another, as calculated interest replaced the calming eect 
of faith and Christian benevolence. Equally harmful, distrust passed from the 
domain of (international) politics into the internal relations of each state. Peo-
ples fell into a state of nature, ceasing to live in the state of society restrained by 
the law of nations. Having questioned the power of God, nations easily ques-
tioned the power of sovereigns. Having embraced “the phantom of self-interest, 
liberty, and vague perfectibility,” they silenced the voice of duty. Without faith, 
there could be no loyalty. Without the interior peace of conscience, there could 
be no public tranquility. Without the principle of harmony (union) and sub-
mission to God, there could be no durable society. In this section of the memo-
randum, the voice of Sturdza prevailed. Because the ancient religious and social 
values that had created Europe were gone, the best intentions of governments 
and the legitimate aspirations of peoples could not be achieved.70 Prosperity, 
material wealth, commerce, discoveries, and gigantic enterprises could not pro-
duce tranquility, in contrast to religion, which prepared in silence the happiness 
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of future generations. Indeed, false science and false virtues thrived in times of 
crisis, as moral corruption, the extinction of faith, unjustied resentment, and 
exaggerated pretentions propelled revolution.
Numerous diplomatic documents associated the French Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic Wars with moral catastrophe. In the Russian ministry’s memoran-
dum, Emperor Alexander reminded his fellow monarchs of what this meant. 
Europe had been rescued from the quagmire of moral collapse by Divine Provi-
dence, which had intervened to preserve Creation. is had allowed an unprec-
edented alliance among the sovereigns of Europe to defeat anarchic military 
despotism. As a result, through the Treaty of Alliance of 14/26 September 1815, 
religion and trust had returned to governments. is Holy Alliance recognized 
God’s rights over human societies and guaranteed inviolable rights to sovereigns 
and peoples by imposing on them the reciprocal duties of conscience and Chris-
tian family.
Turning to the restrictions on political speech recently enacted in Germany, 
the memorandum criticized the Karlsbad Decrees, because they failed to address 
the interests of religion and public morality. Silent on the rights of God over 
human societies, the regulations allowed demagogues to use abstract thought 
and corrupt imagination to fuel radical doctrines. e speech of science and let-
ters, including speech concerning the fundamental truth of the Christian reli-
gion and Divine morality, remained unrestricted. us, the restrictions on press 
freedom seemed designed not to protect religion and morality, but to prevent 
attacks on governments and ocials. Because the regulations did not address 
the convictions of religious men and friends of order, force would be needed to 
ensure compliance. e eectiveness of legal acts lay in their ability to persuade 
people that the limits imposed by law were benecial. But the German regula-
tions failed to do this and therefore missed the opportunity to apply the maxims 
protective of social order to which all the sovereigns of Europe had adhered in the 
Treaty of 14/26 September. While one might object that a religiously heteroge-
neous federation such as the German Confederation could not promulgate a gen-
eral law of censorship directed at religious works, the law could arm the truths 
explained in the Treaty of 14/26 September and already accepted by German 
rulers. Such restrictions would not impinge on the profession of diverse faiths.
e Russian government’s critique of German press regulations also applied 
to public education. e emancipation of science and abstract thought under-
mined the surveillance of education. Secret societies might renounce political 
goals, yet continue to spread impious abstract ideas, a process that would lead to 
further revolutionary explosions. e solution to this conundrum was Christian 
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regeneration. Christian education, instilled from an early age, inspired voluntary 
submission and erected insurmountable barriers against revolutionary doctrine. 
Following the years of revolution and warfare, Divine Providence had given in-
dependence to the nations of Europe in return for submission to God’s law. So 
yes, the external enemy was defeated, but the internal enemy remained, and in 
order to overcome the internal enemy, governments had to do more than apply 
administrative restrictions. Only through return to the truths consecrated by 
religion and justied by experience would it be possible to restore the necessary 
sense of duty and counteract the illusions of the people. Only through proper 
education could the errors of conscience and understanding that had produced 
so many calamities be eliminated. If these steps were taken, then once again and 
for the betterment of all humankind, legitimate authority would be based on the 
blessings of Divine Providence.
e Politics of Peace and Friendship
When Emperor Alexander and his associates denounced the politics of ideo-
logical contestation, this was not because they rejected political reform or even 
constitutional government.71 Clearly, they failed to understand modern politi-
cal pluralism, and they felt uncomfortable with impassioned political debate, 
whether in the press or in representative bodies; however, they did understand 
religious and cultural pluralism, and they accepted the reality of competing in-
terests. at said, they also could not conceive of future progress without allied 
unity—the same allied unity that had made possible the military victory over 
Napoleon. Only by acting in concert to preserve peace could the repose of Eu-
rope and the happiness of the world be achieved. For the Russian monarch, to act 
in concert also meant that the allies would support each other both materially 
and morally. Moral inuence, no less than military force, represented a critical 
tool of concerted action. Since the reign of Catherine II, the Russian monarchy 
had tried to rely more on moral persuasion than overt coercion in the practice of 
government and the imposition of authority. e attention to moral force may 
also explain the Russian preference for the general alliance, based on the prin-
ciples of Christian morality and fraternity contained in the Holy Alliance, over 
the Quadruple Alliance. Although both Austria and Britain viewed the Qua-
druple Alliance as more critical to the preservation of peace, Russia’s diplomats 
described it as an alliance of exclusivity rather than inclusiveness.
Despite divergent interpretations of established treaties, both the Rus-
sian and Austrian-British perspectives found their way into the protocols of 
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Aix-la-Chapelle. e dierence of opinion (or emphasis) at no point threatened 
the unity of the alliance or the commitment of the allies to the work they had 
begun. e personal authority and friendship of the sovereigns remained critical 
to the process of completing and implementing the peace. e allies strongly 
believed that recent history and the principle of experience authorized rear-
mation of the Quadruple Alliance in case of revolution in France. In 1818 they 
expected (or hoped for) stability in France yet continued to see Napoleon and 
his supporters as a threat.72 eir understanding of legality and legitimacy, en-
shrined in the treaties of 1814, 1815 and 1818, also assumed ongoing reform of 
the social, civic, and political institutions of European states. Laws, treaties, and 
established political arrangements were needed not only to dene constitutional 
legitimacy and territorial possessions, but also to counter and check the foibles 
of human nature. It was no accident that post-Vienna diplomatic documents 
repeatedly presented the moral principles of family and friendship as the model 
for political relationships and administrative order.73 e equilibrium so oen 
mentioned in documents of the era referred not only to European politics and 
international relations, but also to the just equilibrium between governments 
and the public mood (l’esprit public).74 is was not the balance of power pur-
sued under the old regime. is was a balancing of interests and obligations, 
domestic and international, designed to preserve tranquility, peace, and order 
in Europe.
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Ch a pter 3
Alliance Unity and Intervention in Naples (1820–21)
G lorious as the edifice of peace had appeared at the end of 1818, troubling events continued to unfold. Repeatedly, local circumstances forced the great powers to reexamine the Quadruple and general 
alliances, including the question of what it meant to act in concert (concerter). 
Simply put, the perils of war and revolution never receded from what the peace-
makers saw before them. In the years 1820 and 1821, diplomats faced political 
uncertainty, the threat of revolutionary upheaval, and the looming prospect of 
war.1 Since 1817 German politics had caused concern, and in December 1818, 
the French government again had shown signs of instability.2 e departure of 
the Duke of Richelieu, a moderating inuence and trusted interlocutor, fueled 
nagging suspicions about the viability of the Bourbon restoration.3 Outright 
assaults on the Bourbon rulers of Spain and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies 
heightened the sense that volatility reigned in French politics, and conrmed 
the fears of radicalism and revolution.4 e peace settlement would survive, but 
the longing for tranquility would not be satised.
On 1 January 1820, Spanish troops in Las Cabezas, under the command of 
Lieutenant Colonel Rafael Riego, disobeyed royal orders to set sail for South 
America, where colonial insurrections had been underway since 1808–10. e 
disobedience became more than mutiny when Riego proclaimed restoration of 
the liberal constitution of 1812. e constitution provided for an independent 
judiciary, civil liberties for the nation, and an elected Cortes to share power with 
the king. Initially, the great powers responded to the events in Spain with re-
straint, making no commitment to concrete action. Indeed, not until 7 March, 
when King Ferdinand VII accepted the constitution, did it become clear that 
a revolution had taken place. Even then, the ambiguity continued. Civil strife 
erupted in multiple localities, yet the king remained on his throne as a constitu-
tional monarch. e allies dared to hope that popular loyalty to the monarchy, 
which had inspired admiration during the French occupation, would overcome 
the revolutionary spirit and defeat the forces of disorder.5 During the summer, 
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however, the situation became more perilous. e constitutional movement 
spread to Portugal, where on 24 August, liberals proclaimed support for the 
Spanish constitution. is new political order lasted until May 1823, at which 
time monarchists emboldened by the French intervention in Spain returned 
King John VI to absolute power.6
Disturbing as conditions in Spanish America, Spain, and Portugal appeared, 
it was rebellion in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies that most frightened the 
allies and led to military intervention.7 e Neapolitan mutinies began on 2 
July 1820 in Nola and quickly spread to Avellino, where General Guglielmo 
Pepe also declared support for the Spanish constitution. Within a few days, 
King Ferdinand I and his son Francesco, Duke of Calabria and vicar-general, 
accepted the Spanish constitution for the kingdom. On 9 July, Ferdinand and 
Francesco greeted General Pepe as he led royal troops into Naples. Finally, on 
13 July, the king swore allegiance to the constitution, while also promising un-
specied reforms. As in Spain, where Ferdinand I of the Two Sicilies remained 
a potential successor to the childless Ferdinand VII, the monarchy in Naples 
survived liberal revolution by accepting the liberal order. Publication of the 
constitution on 24 July paved the way for parliamentary elections in September. 
Once assembled, the parliament elected a Permanent Deputation with seven 
members to monitor the king’s government when the legislative body was not 
in session.
For the ve great powers, developments in Italy transformed abstract con-
demnations of revolution and discussions about collective intervention into 
concrete negotiations to address an alarming sequence of events. In the absence 
of a clear and present danger such as war with Napoleon, talk of an allied re-
sponse produced public disagreement, which threatened the unity assumed to 
be so essential to European peace. Beginning with the Spanish Revolution in 
January 1820 and continuing through the Congress of Verona, which met at the 
end of 1822, questions of intervention dominated diplomatic discussions and 
exposed ssures in the European political system. Conict resulted from di-
vergent interpretations of treaty obligations and from the tension between the 
legal stipulations dening the alliance and the right of sovereign states to reform 
their domestic political institutions. As in earlier negotiations concerning the 
nature of the European alliance and Russia’s proposal for a treaty of guarantee, 
Emperor Alexander I pursued a pragmatic course focused on preserving great 
power unity. In the end, the overriding commitment to peace held rm, and the 
allies accepted that an enduring peace required neither complete agreement nor 
the absence of military action.
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Russia Responds to the Revolutionary Spirit
Prior to the allied meetings in Troppau and Laibach that would sanction Aus-
trian intervention in Naples, Russia’s diplomats penned a series of surveys as-
sessing political conditions in Europe.8 e surveys showed that the Russian 
monarch and his diplomatic agents remained committed to the legal stipulations 
of 1814, 1815, and 1818, the principles and prescriptions of which they tried to 
apply to tumultuous events on the ground. Predictably, conditions in France 
loomed large. roughout 1819 and into early 1820, Russian ocials discussed 
political instability in France both among themselves and with the other great 
powers. eir analyses revealed concern about the spirit of party and genie of 
revolution that had revived in France and threatened to drag the kingdom into 
political crisis. Revolution, Russia’s policymakers believed, easily led to military 
aggression, which might compel the allies to undertake armed intervention.9
As early as March 1819, Emperor Alexander had received communications from 
Austria and Prussia warning of threats to the regime of King Louis XVIII. By 
September Prince Metternich had proposed convening allied ambassadorial 
conferences in Paris, where the four powers could monitor developments and 
coordinate a response.
e British position on possible intervention in France was transmitted by 
Foreign Secretary Castlereagh to Russia’s co-minister of foreign a airs, Ioannis 
Kapodistrias, and ambassador in London, Christoph Lieven, in a memorandum 
of 24 September 1819.10 e British government believed that the political rum-
bles in France posed no danger to peace or the European system. Equally signi-
cant, the creation of a center for allied communication in Paris would violate the 
protocols of Aix-la-Chapelle, which had brought France into the alliance of great 
powers. Based on the protocols, if an imminent threat of revolution or military 
aggression arose, any of the four allies could call for an extraordinary conference 
to organize a coordinated response.11 In light of this provision and the need to 
consider public opinion, the British government refused to commit to any spe-
cic action in advance of actual events. Russia’s diplomats seemed to understand 
Britain’s constitutional constraints. Moreover, as Castlereagh also pointed out, 
it was essential that the allies not appear opposed to the current government in 
France. e French people needed to feel connected to their monarchy, and the 
perception of foreign opposition could undermine the connection.
On the question of French politics, Russia’s monarch and Ministry of Foreign 
A airs agreed with Austria and Prussia that France had deviated from the path 
taken in 1816, which had led to the happy results of Aix-la-Chapelle. Russia’s 
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diplomats saw in the allegedly liberal government headed by Élie Decazes, which 
was formed aer elections in the fall of 1819, the potential for military aggression. 
At the end of 1819, however, before the trajectory of the Spanish insurrection 
became clear and before the outbreak of revolution in Naples, the Russian com-
mitment to allied unity remained paramount. Emperor Alexander continued to 
tout the most intimate union of the great powers. is union, which constituted 
the core of the general alliance of European states, needed to be preserved, so 
that France could benet from legitimate and constitutional monarchy. Russia 
therefore tried to steer a middle course, by which the allies would explain to 
Louis XVIII the dangers threatening his regime and urge him to change direc-
tion.12 Such action would not alter France’s relationship to the general alliance, 
as dened by the protocols of Aix-la-Chapelle, but it would fulll an important 
duty required by both the protocols and the Treaty of 14/26 September 1815 (the 
Holy Alliance). is was the duty of veracity that obliged the allies to speak 
truthfully about potential dangers and in this instance to remind France of its 
obligation to uphold the conservative principles of the social order. Because the 
allies remained divided, Alexander avoided proclaiming an opinion on French 
politics. He did, however, instruct his minister in Paris, General Karl O. Pozzo 
di Borgo, to point out to the French government its responsibility for Europe’s 
present and future tranquility. If France at any moment threatened European 
peace, Russia stood ready, based on existing treaties, to cross into French terri-
tory with an allied army.
One month later, instructions sent to Russia’s diplomats abroad armed the 
policy of non-interference in the domestic a airs of France and the German 
Confederation.13 If solicited, Russia’s opinion could be shared, assuming that 
any statement conformed “to the principles of law, the dignity of crowns, and 
the real well-being of the peoples.” is well-being would be real, moreover, 
only insofar as it resulted from the moral force of the governments involved. As 
things turned out, the Duke of Richelieu returned to power in February 1820, 
following the assassination of the Duke of Berry, Louis XVIII’s nephew.14 Fears 
about France had exposed potential ris in the alliance; however, the decision 
to stand aside seemed prudent. Spain emerged as the more obvious threat to 
European peace, and some in the Russian government even expressed an overt 
pro-France position.
In a memorandum of February 1820, Aleksandr M. Obreskov (1793–1885), 
counselor (sovetnik) at the Russian mission in Vienna, openly called for a 
Russian-French alliance, based on the idea that the interests of Austria, Britain, 
and Prussia did not align with those of Russia.15 Although Obreskov’s position 
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contradicted an important principle of Alexander I’s foreign policy, the avoid-
ance of separate alliances in Europe, it is worth reviewing for the discussion of 
what constituted a viable political alliance. Writing of the Quadruple Alliance, 
Obreskov noted that an e ective and sustainable alliance rested on shared inter-
ests and provided advantages to all contracting parties. e experience of history 
showed that alliances lacking this “principle of existence and conservation” re-
mained illusory, onerous, and unequal. Precisely because nature assigned to each 
state a special existence, dened by distinct interests and relationships, alliances 
succeeded only where a community of shared interests formed. Not surprisingly, 
the greater the number of contracting parties, the more likely it became that par-
ticular interests would diverge. Only if all parties agreed could general harmony 
be achieved. Complete agreement, moreover, usually required a society of war, 
as in the successful coalition to defeat Napoleon, where equality of interests had 
existed in the nature of things.
In the current Quadruple Alliance, Obreskov continued, the common pur-
pose lay in maintaining legitimate monarchy in France, if necessary, through 
coercive action or war. But despite the shared purpose, members of the alliance 
had di erent interests in its success. England, the natural rival and enemy of 
France, sought to weaken the latter by fomenting disorders inside French terri-
tory and arming other European states against the kingdom. e vital princi-
ple of the Quadruple Alliance, the preservation of the Bourbon dynasty on the 
French throne, thus stood in opposition to British interests. A peaceful France 
inevitably would grow in power and prosperity, which meant that British par-
ticipation in e orts to pacify France would never be active or sincere. Nor did 
Britain possess the resources needed to take part in a continental war. Because 
public opinion and electoral politics played a key role in decisions about taxa-
tion and other ocial actions, the British government could not prosecute an 
unpopular war. At the same time, Britain’s refusal to participate in a war would 
violate both the spirit and letter of the Quadruple Alliance. In other words, in 
the event of an allied military intervention in France, the particular and relative 
situation of Britain would compel the government to remain on the sidelines as 
a benevolent spectator.
e historian can see in Obreskov’s appraisal the memory of Russia’s wartime 
experience in 1812, a moment when the lands and peoples of the empire had 
withstood the onslaught of Napoleon’s multinational Grand Army. Emperor 
Alexander’s diplomats had good reason to fear that the burden of a European 
war would fall disproportionately on Russian troops. Austria’s inability to ght a 
war also concerned Obreskov. Another rival of France, Austria too would benet 
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from upheaval in the Bourbon kingdom. Moreover, because Austria had reached 
the apogee of its political power and had exhausted the resources given to it by 
Divine Providence, scal constraints, specically the discontent fueled by higher 
taxes, would prevent sincere participation in an armed intervention. For Austria, 
only peace could secure stability. So once again, the interests of a contracting 
party stood in opposition to the interests of the Quadruple Alliance, which 
remained responsible for ensuring tranquility in France. Lacking the earnest 
involvement of both Austria and Britain, the Quadruple Alliance was doomed 
to fail. As an alliance of principles, rather than interests, it was illusory. As an 
alliance that was hostile toward a nono ending state, it was unequal. France 
had returned to the rights and great power status of its natural position, and the 
French government had fullled all treaty obligations. Condent that future 
obligations also would be met, the allies had formally renounced all coercive sur-
veillance of the country’s domestic relations and government actions. In other 
words, the Quadruple Alliance had achieved its legitimate goal of guaranteeing 
that the French government carry out its legal obligations. In light of this suc-
cess, the alliance now rested on abstract principles, not positive interests.
Of all the allies, Obreskov continued, Russia had the most interest in preserv-
ing the full force of the Quadruple Alliance plus France (sometimes referred to 
as the grand alliance). Russia was too strong either to need or to wish that other 
states be weakened. Loyalty had been and remained the supreme regulator, the 
religion of Emperor Alexander’s foreign policy. Loyalty required scrupulous ex-
ecution of contractual obligations, especially with respect to the casus foederis et
belli. But could Russia fulll the purpose of the alliance with its own forces? In 
the event of an appeal to the Quadruple Alliance, the defection of Austria and 
Britain would produce a political schism at a time when unity and fraternity 
among heads of nations would be most needed. Obreskov, like other Russian 
diplomats since 1815, sensed his country’s political separateness. He accepted this 
as the empire’s normal position, but he did not want to isolate France, which 
an appeal to the Quadruple Alliance would do. In addition, despite Austria’s 
domination in Germany and sovereignty in Italy, Prussia remained independent, 
though still unable to play an active role. Russia’s only useful ally, therefore, was 
France, which if alienated might ally with Austria.
Obreskov did not conclude that the Quadruple Alliance lacked a purpose or 
function. e alliance remained benecial. Peace in Europe depended on good 
order in France, where the moral force of the Quadruple Alliance strengthened 
legitimacy and served as an obstacle to rebellion. But if the goals of the Quadru-
ple Alliance began to appear tentative or impossible, Russia should reject appeals 
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for action. Only if France became outwardly aggressive should Russia recognize 
the casus foederis et belli. As long as the conservative treaties of order and peace 
were respected in Europe, and as long as the form of government adopted in 
France seemed appropriate and prudent, Russia should remain a passive specta-
tor. Austria’s (unspecied) shared interests with other powers, which diminished 
the inuence of Russia, provided proof of the eternal truth that real, useful, 
and sincere alliances could be based only on the nature of things and on shared 
positive interests, not on abstractions or individual relationships that invariably 
changed as circumstances evolved. e nature of things, according to Obreskov, 
called for an alliance between Russia and France, based on a happy convergence 
of interests.
Obreskov’s realist description of European order did not correspond to the 
foreign policy of Emperor Alexander I, who upheld the Quadruple Alliance and 
placed his hopes in personal friendship among the sovereigns. In March 1820 the 
court of Vienna denied the existence of any separate or secret alliance between 
Austria and Britain.16 e Russian monarch had resisted Kapodistrias’s earlier 
critique of the Quadruple Alliance and le Aix-la-Chapelle satised, despite the 
failure to secure a defensive treaty of mutual guarantee. Reasonable concerns 
persisted, however, as illustrated by Aleksandr S. Sturdza’s “Review of the Year 
1819,” which was prepared by imperial order for anonymous publication abroad.17
Working from an outline provided by Kapodistrias, Sturdza’s composition re-
ceived Alexander’s endorsement. e review’s original purpose had been to in-
uence foreign opinion, but circumstances had changed with the outbreak of 
the Spanish insurrection, and a period of crisis had begun. e review remained 
unpublished, and the author’s reective voice—said to be inspired by a spirit of 
concord, peace, and truth—no longer seemed appropriate. Nor did the claim 
that Sturdza’s judgments should not express the viewpoint of a particular party, 
sect, or government.18 Although the author’s moderate tone conveyed a sense of 
calm deliberation, he could not disguise his yearning for tranquility or anxiety 
about the future. e peacemakers may have possessed tools that allowed them 
to navigate a great deal of turbulence, and the promise of peace seemed real 
enough, but loy principles were one thing and harsh realities another.
Despite the tension between principle and reality, an ongoing theme in the 
review, Sturdza began on an optimistic note. e current historical moment 
represented a time of calm following years of crisis, an opportunity for impartial 
reection, and a period of change in the moral order of the entire world. In writ-
ing the review, Sturdza hoped to counter the extremism threatening stability in 
Europe and preventing recognition of the truth. Truth could be advanced, he 
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argued, through thoughtful, objective appraisal of the political events of 1819. 
Indeed, even though the spirit of party and the banner of belligerent opinion 
endangered the fragile peace that Europe had achieved, it remained possible, 
based on good sense and the examination of past experience, to nd the voice 
of reason. e voice of reason, purportedly embodied in the review, sought to 
transcend radical positions and illuminate the truth. If we could begin to under-
stand the past, Sturdza explained, it might be possible to achieve a better order 
of things, a return to moderation, which would allow conscience and religion to 
be heard and truth to prevail. Progress, in other words, depended on impartial 
analysis of the past and on the ability of individuals to get hold of and control 
their passions.
e “Review of the Year 1819” stressed the novelty of the historical moment 
and rejoiced in the political reunication of Europe—a unity that had not been 
seen since the “Congress of Westphalia.” At the same time, given the diculty 
of conducting diplomacy and the enormity of the task undertaken by the peace-
makers, Sturdza also concluded that the need to guarantee all the rights, satisfy 
all the desires, and reconcile all the conicts of Europe’s interested parties cre-
ated problems without parallel in the annals of the world. It was not surprising 
that complete reconciliation had not been attained and the germs of disorder 
persisted. As Sturdza summed up the complications, wishes were not the same as 
rights, and hopes were not the same as realities. e e ort to create a new world 
had not succeeded in fully reconciling the past with the present or in harmo-
nizing the old and new order of things. Notwithstanding the great and worthy 
achievements of Vienna, Paris, and Aix-la-Chapelle, critical problems continued 
to threaten good order. ese included political divisions in France, Spain’s re-
lations with its American colonies and with Portugal, tensions between Sweden 
and Denmark, German disquiet, and unilateral British action to suppress the 
slave trade and Barbary pirates.19
Sturdza understood that the peacemakers had not begun their work with 
a blank slate; past issues and historical claims could not simply be erased. In 
addition, the desire to restore France to great power status had challenged the 
idea of a general European alliance in which every state claimed parity and inde-
pendence. Indeed, as generations of historians have documented, and as Sturdza 
armed, it became clear at the Congress of Vienna that the great powers had 
become the arbiters of the European system. Second-order states had little choice 
but to accept decisions made by others that nonetheless a ected their interests. 
According to the review, the diplomatic agents of the great powers shared a deep 
and sincere desire for good order, yet because of contradictory and ambiguous 
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principles, and more important, because of irreligion and uncontrolled human 
passions, threats to stability remained.
e next section of the review addressed conditions in critical parts of Eu-
rope. For the moment (at the end of 1819), the situation in France had improved, 
and although deep political divisions remained, the formation of the new gov-
ernment encouraged optimism. Despite the harmful spirit of party, France’s 
recovery from revolutionary upheaval continued and allowed the country to 
grow stronger.20 Spain, by contrast, had not been able to restore its position 
in the European system, a situation that Sturdza attributed to internal polit-
ical conditions and the government’s limited wisdom. Although deserving of 
a brilliant destiny and loyal to the sacred relationship with its king (this soon 
would change), the Spanish nation remained vulnerable to insurrection. Dan-
gers loomed throughout Europe, which having been freed of a tyrant, still faced 
the threat of revolution. Even Britain, which seemed more happily situated than 
its old rivals, faced the challenges of radicalism and agitation for reform. Like 
Spain, Britain also possessed a colonial system, which created another source of 
discontent. If Britain hoped, moreover, to triumph over the threats emanating 
from attacks on property, religious dissent, indirect taxation, and seditious writ-
ings, two conditions were needed: wise government to undertake reform of the 
colonial system and the continuing strength of the British nation’s unwritten 
laws or moeurs, which religiously guarded family life.
In Sturdza’s mind, only Russia seemed immune to the pan-European threat 
of revolution. Deploying some of the proto-Slavophile arguments for which he 
would become famous, Sturdza did not see in Russia the desire for reform or 
change that a ected social life in the rest of Europe. Russia soon would experi-
ence its own jolt of radicalism in the Decembrist Rebellion of 1825, but in 1819 
Sturdza still could draw attention to the absence of unrest, and he could at-
tribute what turned out to be a deceptive calm to the continuing inuence of 
religion, which in Russia guided social and political behavior. Characterized by 
youth, vigor, and savage energy, Russia had been assigned a special destiny em-
bodied in the growth of imperial power. Having reached the apogee of its phys-
ical and material grandeur, Russia now was obligated to use those treasures to 
perfect its own internal condition. Equally noteworthy, unlike the other states of 
Europe, Russia had not rejected the dictates of religion. Sturdza therefore hoped 
that in exercising its newly acquired inuence, Russia could avoid a mortal blow.
Critical to any understanding of European politics aer 1815 were conditions 
in the reconstituted collective life of Germany, anchored by Austria and Prus-
sia. Here too danger lurked. Germany, in Sturdza’s analysis, was a place where 
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the rapid dissemination of ideas, a phenomenon broadly characteristic of con-
temporary Europe, threatened good order and undermined the national spirit 
(esprit national).21 e same ideas could a ect di erent places in di erent ways; 
in Germany, external inuences and irreligion had led to the rejection of reality 
and attacks on authority. Sturdza did not mention the murder in March 1819 of 
August von Kotzebue, an agent of the Russian legation in Mannheim, but he did 
express outrage over assaults on Jews that had begun in August at the Univer-
sity of Würzburg and spread among students, artisans, and farmers in western 
Germany.22 Sturdza found it deeply disturbing that this violence could occur in 
the century of tolerance. Germany needed unity, he concluded, which then com-
pelled him to evaluate the governments of individual German states based on 
their adherence to the federal system. Critical of the repressive Karlsbad Decrees, 
which emphasized police measures, and of the Act of Confederation, which cre-
ated ambiguities and contradictions in the forms of German government and 
in the relationship between federal power and individual states, Sturdza saw 
disorder looming in Germany, despite the restoration of Austrian power.23
e role of Austrian power in Germany led Sturdza also to consider political 
conditions in Italy, where the Habsburg Empire’s geographic position gave it 
signicant inuence. is inuence, Sturdza argued, needed to be exercised rea-
sonably within natural limits that did not threaten the general European associ-
ation. Arguably more dangerous for European order than any abuse of Austrian 
hegemony was the lack of security and the potential for violence in a territory 
where individual kingdoms and states had not yet returned to their natural po-
sition and where the universal agitation a ecting so much of Europe remained 
visible. Sturdza did not doubt that revolution continued to threaten the Euro-
pean system, even though the tyranny of Napoleon and the decades-long state of 
war had ended. is was because the state of agitation did not result from social 
inequity or competing political interests, but from uncontrolled passions that 
had been stirred up for so long and could not be easily calmed. Religion, reason, 
wise government, and moral order—these were the ingredients that would guar-
antee the equilibrium of Europe.
Aer surveying the fragile stability prevailing (but soon to be overturned) in 
Europe, the review commented on other parts of the world where specic prob-
lems and events a ected European politics. Discussion began with America, the 
New World, though also a world enriched by European civilization. Although 
Sturdza expected America (North and South) to play a moral and political role 
commensurate with its physical size and natural endowments, he focused on 
the more urgent situation in South America, where the descendants of Spanish 
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conquerors and African slaves struggled for liberty and independence. Begin-
ning in January 1820 the Spanish Revolution would force Alexander I to take 
a more active interest in Latin American a airs. For the moment, however, 
Sturdza could write that neutrality represented the appropriate course, when 
geography removed a state from direct participation in events such as the revolts 
in the Spanish colonies. Nor, while critical of Spain and of the Portuguese court 
in Rio de Janeiro for their handling of the colonies, did Sturdza see any reason 
for a European power to support rebellion in the New World. e only possible 
motive was aggrandizement, and so, given the absence of a viable Spanish plan 
to reunite the colonies with the metropolis, he expected the troubles to be pro-
tracted. e Spanish colonial system lacked the exibility needed to survive in 
modern times, and the rebellious Spanish colonies lacked the social maturity of 
their North American counterparts. Resolution would not come quickly, which 
did indeed pose a threat to stability in Europe.24
Closely related to conditions in the Americas was the question of the slave 
trade, outlawed in principle by the acts of Vienna and Paris. Sturdza acknowl-
edged that justice cried out for abolition, but he remained suspicious of British 
intentions. When should the internal policies and principles of a particular na-
tion, in this case Britain, become universal? No doubt aware of the parallels 
between slavery and serfdom, Sturdza argued that in agreeing to eliminate the 
slave trade, the European powers had taken a position on a matter in which they 
had no direct interest. In other words, they had no right (droit) or credit (mérite) 
to decide this great and important question. Fortunately, the British initiative 
to organize a joint military expedition to suppress the slave trade was being re-
placed with separate negotiated agreements, such as the treaty between Britain 
and Spain, which as of May 1820 should end Spanish involvement in the trade. 
Similar negotiations were underway with the court of Rio de Janeiro.25
Questions of interest and legitimate authority likewise informed Sturdza’s 
discussion of e orts to suppress the Barbary states, another collective interna-
tional action being pursued by Britain.26 Again, the desire to end human su er-
ing—specically the su ering of European captives—represented a noble idea, 
as did the implied anity between the trac in black Africans and the captivity 
of white Europeans. But the Ottoman Porte, suzerain of the North African 
states, refused to reach an agreement on this question. Nor, in Sturdza’s opin-
ion, would the e ort to protect commerce and other economic interests ever be 
sucient to guarantee peaceful navigation of the seas. Of greater consequence 
were the motives animating the interested parties. To speak and act in the name 
of su ering humanity represented an appeal for divine intervention, which did 
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not depend on human actions. Sturdza was reluctant to reject the just princi-
ple of eliminating the slave trade and piracy, but he refused to condone joint 
European action or ignore the legitimate interests of Spain, Portugal, and the 
Ottoman Empire. To reconcile the contradiction, he retreated into a statement 
of religious aspiration. Commerce and industry would not bring civilization to 
Africa, end the slave trade, or suppress the Barbary pirates. Only the Christian 
religion could enlighten Africa and lead the continent to a form of social life 
that corresponded to the dignity of the human being and the grandeur of God’s 
providence. As he did previously in explaining the European powers’ generosity 
toward France, Sturdza insisted that the work of God be distinguished from 
human plans and understandings.
Europe’s relations with the Ottoman Empire received more direct attention 
in Sturdza’s discussion. e author seemed to treat Asia—specically the Ot-
toman Empire, Persia, and India—as part of the European political system, 
though he also noted that religious di erences prevented any fusion of inter-
ests and races (sic). In civilization, commerce, and enlightenment, peoples com-
peted; only in religion could they be united. is was precisely the reason that 
the Muslim states of Turkey and Persia were fundamentally incompatible with 
Europe. Although both had forged long-term alliances with European powers 
(Austria, Britain, France, and Russia), these alliances were changeable, and as a 
result, the Muslim states had not attained a stable position in the European sys-
tem. Commenting further on conditions within the Ottoman Empire, Sturdza 
perceived irreversible decline. He praised Sultan Selim III for his enlightened 
views and commitment to reform, proof that he could have been a worthy 
Christian, but described the inertia of the empire as both a threat and a form 
of resistance to the European association.27 Unable, moreover, to conceal the 
Russian position for which he spoke, Sturdza also claimed that integration of 
the Ottoman Empire and of Russia’s relations with the Porte into the European 
system might lead to disorder. Just as Emperor Alexander did not wish to get 
involved in rooting out the transatlantic slave trade, he likewise did not want 
his European allies to interfere in Russian-Ottoman relations. e same could 
be said of Russia’s relations with Persia. Although the principles of Europe’s new 
political system—equity and Christian fraternity—also should be applied to 
the Ottoman and Persian empires, this had to be done in a manner that would 
not upset the order of things.28 e lack of internal change in these societies 
was something that human action could not currently overcome. Only God’s 
providence, his sovereign care in governing his creation, could produce the de-
sired outcome.
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Aleksandr Sturdza’s “Review of the Year 1819” identied a range of problems 
that might impact European peace, and by March 1820, events on the ground, 
specically military rebellion in Spain, had borne out his predictions. Emperor 
Alexander had quickly recognized the danger and ordered his diplomats to re-
port on the reactions of allied courts.29 Once again, the monarch hoped to nd 
a satisfactory solution in the moral force represented by the intimate union be-
tween the rst courts. More concretely, he wanted the allies to discuss in con-
dence three critical questions. What measures would the allies be duty bound to 
take: (1) if the Spanish government could not quash the rebellion with wisdom 
and proper means; (2) if the Spanish king solicited assistance from the allies; 
and (3) if the crisis dragged on in a manner that threatened the peninsula, the 
colonies, and the rest of Europe?
In a memorandum written by Kapodistrias and read to Emperor Alexander 
on 30 March/11 April 1820, the co-minister of foreign a airs analyzed the on-
going crisis and revolutionary threats, based on reports received from Russia’s 
missions abroad since the end of 1819.30 e themes of the memorandum echoed 
earlier discussions. Subversive projects threatened the states of the German Con-
federation. e French government remained weak in its struggle with both the 
ultra-royalists and the supporters of Napoleon (les hommes des Cent jours), though 
steps taken since the assassination of the Duke of Berry—another reorganization 
of the government, laws to protect the royal family, and restrictions on civil lib-
erties, especially freedom of the press—represented an e ort to return to the ad-
ministrative course that had proven successful in 1816–18.31 Schism between the 
Belgians and Dutch endangered the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and in Britain, 
a host of circumstances fueled disorder and opposition to the government: radi-
calism and popular unrest; political assassination (a reference to the Cato Street 
conspiracy of 23 February 1820 to assassinate the British cabinet); repressive police 
measures; and controversy surrounding the accession of George IV and the king’s 
separation from his wife, who claimed her rights as queen consort. In Spain, the 
consequences of the military insurrection had spread: the king had been forced to 
accept the constitution of 1812, British and Prussian mediation regarding the Rio 
de la Plata appeared ine ective, and the rebellious provinces of Spanish America 
continued to move toward emancipation.32 In the midst of these developments, 
Switzerland alone enjoyed tranquility, and Italy’s su ering seemed containable. 
e northern states (Denmark, Russia, and Sweden) experienced tremors, but not 
of the sort to weaken the foundations of social order. In general, and despite some 
bright spots, countries across Europe had begun to feel the e ects of a conspiracy 
secretly organized by men raised in the school of the French Revolution.
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How had the revolutionary danger arisen and what had caused the catastro-
phes menacing the two hemispheres? Could a solution to the problem be found? 
Revolutionary conspirators persisted in trying to destroy the “old institutions 
based on principles of morality and religion and to replace them with new [ones] 
created in the spirit of democracy or in the system of so-called national represen-
tations.” To that end, they sought to supplant established monarchies with the 
authority of royal magistrates (rois magistrats). e simultaneity of the events 
described, political conditions in Germany, and the investigations undertaken 
by the British government all pointed to a growing revolutionary peril. Gov-
ernments lacked authority in the eyes of their peoples, and the loss of credibil-
ity led the inferior classes to demand an active role in lawmaking and public 
administration. e decisive consequences of these demands could be seen in 
the independence of North America, the movement to abolish slavery, and the 
French Revolution. Neither the wars that had ended in 1815, nor the policies of 
individual governments had e ectively stemmed the revolutionary tide. Many 
governments, moreover, clung to the dangerous illusion that revolution had been 
imprisoned with Bonaparte on Saint Helena. European governments needed 
time, wisdom, and moderation to restore their authority. But to expect that ve 
years of political reorganization and legal order could undo the violent action 
caused by thirty years of military despotism was unrealistic. Kapodistrias did not 
elaborate on this point, though over the years, Russia’s diplomatic communica-
tions frequently referred to the need for good governance to prevent revolution.
Broadly speaking, the concept of good governance assumed that people 
(whether subjects, citizens, or nations) identied with their rulers and that each 
government had a responsibility to formulate and implement policies designed 
to reinforce the desired connection. In this instance, Kapodistrias armed the 
critical role of the pact of Christian fraternity (the Holy Alliance) at the center 
of which stood the alliance of the four great powers (the Quadruple Alliance) 
plus France. “e intimate union of the sovereigns, founders of the European 
alliance [had] delivered the world from revolutionary despotism.” Only through 
this union could peace be preserved. Although at the time of writing the allies 
had not yet agreed to respond collectively to the insurrection in Spain, the Rus-
sian government continued to argue for a legal and moral obligation to act in 
concert, even if only to speak in concert. Revolution in the Kingdom of the Two 
Sicilies soon would overshadow discussions about Spain, and not until the end 
of 1822 would the allies nally decide to act on the peninsula. For the moment, 
Kapodistrias could argue only that the Quadruple Alliance had been cemented 
through coercive force and that present circumstances required not the passive 
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alliance preferred by Austria and Britain, but an active alliance willing to use 
military power. Such an alliance inevitably would highlight Russian power, 
which was exactly what the allies feared.
In the spring and summer of 1820, conditions on the ground continued to 
worsen.33 French politics remained inamed, and Louis XVIII felt increasingly 
insecure about the monarchy’s future. News of the Cato Street conspiracy and 
the tensions caused by George IV’s refusal to recognize his wife as queen likewise 
rattled the nerves of seasoned peacemakers.34 Nor did the political crisis in Spain 
subside. Radicalism and civil strife continued to spread, even though Ferdinand 
VII appeared to accept the role of constitutional monarch. Most disturbing, 
however, was the revolutionary eruption in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies on 
July 2, even though earlier in the year Italy had been judged containable. Ceding 
to the will of the people, King Ferdinand I had proclaimed the Spanish consti-
tution of 1812 and turned over the reins of government to his son. Reporting 
from Paris, Russia’s minister plenipotentiary, Count Karl O. Pozzo di Borgo, 
decried the arrogance of the rebels and the dangerous example being established 
for the rest of Italy. Nesselrode wondered at how quickly the king of the Two 
Sicilies had bowed to the alleged wish of the nation by promising to establish a 
constitutional order.35 From Prussia, the minister of foreign a airs, Christian 
Gunther Bernstor , described his country’s political mood and the condition of 
its military as tranquil, but he nonetheless urged the allies to convene a meeting 
of the sovereigns. e Prussian government had been countering constitutional 
demands for two years and wanted the alliance quickly to sanction Austrian 
action in Italy.36 In the climate of political uncertainty engulng the European 
continent, could the idiom of enduring peace—treaty obligations, legitimate 
sovereignty, moderate constitutional reform, good governance, and religious 
morality—sustain allied unity?
e Decision to Intervene in Naples
e revolution in Naples produced a urry of diplomatic activity, which led to 
the opening on 11/23 October 1820 of allied conferences in the town of Troppau 
in Austrian Silesia. Attended by the “holy allies” (the monarchs of Austria, Prus-
sia, and Russia), their most important ministers (Metternich for Francis I, Bern-
stor  and Hardenberg for Frederick William III, and Kapodistrias and Nessel-
rode for Alexander I), and observers from Britain and France, the meetings have 
been described as a congress of the Holy Alliance at which Metternich’s policy of 
social repression to counter revolution got the better of Alexander’s willingness 
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to accept liberal constitutional reform.37 e image of a conservative turn in the 
Russian monarch’s foreign policy downplays both the complexity of the events 
being addressed and the nuances of his diplomatic posture.38 Also underesti-
mated is Britain’s contribution to critical discussions about the functioning of 
the alliance. roughout the conferences in Troppau and subsequently in Lai-
bach, the British government argued that legally established treaty obligations 
to combat revolution applied only to France. Because France was not threatened 
by revolution, allied intervention in Spain, Italy, and elsewhere could not be jus-
tied. e British insistence on non-intervention did not cause an open breach 
with the alliance, but it did force policymakers to change their understanding 
of what it meant to act in concert.
Reports of seditious activities in Naples appeared as early as June 1820, be-
fore revolution struck the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. Earlier in the spring, 
the Austrian government had suggested a private meeting between Francis and 
Alexander, which the Russian monarch had declined.39 Having begun in March 
to push for joint allied discussion of the events in Spain, Alexander continued to 
insist that any meeting to discuss Spain or Italy should be constituted as a formal 
conference of the alliance. e polite back and forth between Austria and Russia 
dragged on into early September, when the two powers plus France, Prussia, 
and several Italian governments nally agreed to hold discussions in Troppau.40
Russian policy remained what it had been since the start of the Spanish insur-
rection. As important as any concrete decision to address a specic crisis were 
larger questions about how the alliance should function and on what legal basis 
the allies possessed the authority to act.
While Russia preferred a broad discussion of the revolutionary crisis, Austria 
kept the focus on the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, based on the special rela-
tionship between the two countries. By a treaty of 12 June 1815, Francis I and 
Ferdinand I had promised to honor the territorial integrity of their respective 
states and protect their subjects from uprisings and innovations that might lead 
to disorders. In addition, the treaty allowed Francis to station 25,000 troops 
in Austria’s Italian provinces, and if necessary, required Ferdinand to place the 
Neapolitan army under Austrian command.41 Consistent with Austria’s special 
interest in the Two Sicilies, a memorandum of 28 August 1820 also informed 
the governments of Britain, France, Prussia, and Russia that Francis I had sent 
troops into his Italian territories.42 Certain of his right to act, the Austrian 
emperor sought moral support from the allies. He asked them to: (1) declare 
the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies to be in a state of rebellion against legitimate 
monarchy; (2) deny recognition to the new Neapolitan government and refuse 
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to negotiate outside the alliance framework; (3) send common instructions ex-
plaining the nature and causes of the events in Naples to their diplomatic repre-
sentatives; and (4) entrust negotiations concerning Naples to an ambassadorial 
conference in Vienna.
e allies did not question Austria’s right to take the initiative in the King-
dom of the Two Sicilies; however, they did hold di erent views on the nature of 
the crisis and the appropriate actions to be pursued. Prussia accorded full powers 
to Austria as the sole guardian and protector of the interests of Italy.43 Russia 
continued to press for a unied allied response encompassing Spain and the 
Two Sicilies. France agreed with Austria that the unrest in Italy represented the 
more urgent manner. But based on the protocols of Aix-la-Chapelle, the French 
government also supported a meeting of the sovereigns that would discuss mea-
sures to contain the revolutionary spirit. Austria and Britain clearly objected 
to Russia’s call for a common response to the Spanish and Neapolitan crises, 
arguing that conditions in the two countries were distinct and should be treated 
separately. In Spain, for example, there were just reasons for discontent, whereas 
in the Two Sicilies, no justication existed. Britain, moreover, would not par-
ticipate in any collective response, though in August, Russia’s ambassador in 
London, Christoph Lieven, had reported that Castlereagh supported swi allied 
action.44 Repeatedly in August and September, the British government declared 
neutrality on the Two Sicilies and insisted that both the Spanish and Neapolitan 
revolutions represented domestic a airs outside the authority of the alliance. 
In rejecting the Austrian memorandum of 28 August and Russian pressure to 
attend the meetings in Troppau, Castlereagh explained to Lieven that the allies 
could not alter the meaning of established treaties. e foreign secretary like-
wise considered public discussion of abstract questions to be dangerous, and he 
warned that in addressing the internal crises of independent states, a single allied 
language could not be found.45
e Russian government took a di erent position on the allies’ legal obliga-
tions. Based on the treaties of 1814, 1815, and 1818, revolutionary events in Spain 
and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies fell under the jurisdiction of the grand 
alliance (the ve great powers) and therefore required a unied allied response.46
is principle applied to all situations threatening European peace. ere ex-
isted a single Europe, the unity of which was political, moral, and Christian. At 
moments when the progress of enlightenment (le progrès des lumières) produced 
disorder, the grand alliance represented the only force, whether moral or coer-
cive, capable of defeating the explosion of evil. Only by speaking with one voice 
could the allies preserve the Europe of the treaties founded on regular bases of 
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order and truth. In a dispatch of 21 August/2 September 1820, approved by Alex-
ander and sent to Russia’s diplomats in Naples, Rome, Turin, Berlin, Frankfurt, 
London, Paris, and Vienna, Kapodistrias informed Gustav O. Stackelberg, Rus-
sia’s envoy in Naples, that neither he nor any other Russian diplomat possessed 
the authority to o er an ocial opinion on political conditions in the Kingdom 
of the Two Sicilies.47 Stackelberg did receive permission to communicate the 
Russian monarch’s disapproval of the criminal revolution, including its origin 
and means of action. But even though Alexander’s condemnation was unam-
biguous, he still preferred to address the crisis with persuasion. He continued to 
hope that the Neapolitan government would take e ective measures to end the 
revolution, so that once again it could become “the source of institutions legally 
adapted to the particular needs of the nation” and capable of rallying “around 
the throne all moral interests, all a ections, and all desires.”
Two additional communications produced by Kapodistrias in the weeks prior 
to the Troppau conferences illustrated the Russian government’s preference for 
moral force. In a letter of 23 September/5 October 1820, Kapodistrias invited 
Aleksandr Sturdza to communicate his ideas about how to stamp out the dan-
gerous contagion of revolution that had infected Spain, the Two Sicilies, and 
more recently, Portugal.48 Because the allied governments would be discussing 
grave questions central to the fate of the universe and European civilization, Ka-
podistrias sought advice on how they could extirpate the germs of revolution in 
the countries a ected and how their restorative and conservative policy (système
réparateur et conservateur) could be implemented so as to receive unanimous 
consent from the European federation.
In soliciting Sturdza’s thoughts, Kapodistrias also summarized Russian pol-
icy. e treaties concluded in 1815 and 1818 dened the principles of law govern-
ing allied decisions and obliged the allies to deliberate in common on the revo-
lutions disturbing Europe. In the current crisis, the adoption of new principles 
was unnecessary. e allies could justly apply the principles that had served as 
the basis for restoring legitimate monarchy in France. e critical problem at 
stake was how “to pacify the kingdoms of Spain, the Two Sicilies, and Portu-
gal, internally and within the social and political order of Europe, and how to 
guarantee in a stable manner the territorial integrity and public independence 
of these States.” Clearly, revolution should be suppressed and legitimate mon-
archy restored, but this had to be done through institutions that allowed each 
government “to maintain the order, integrity, and independence of the State.” In 
addition, the measures adopted needed to ensure the cohesion of the European 
association and peace for the world.
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e Russian government claimed that countries a ected by revolution no 
longer belonged to the general alliance. eir exclusion not only conformed 
to established principles of law, but also increased the likelihood of defeating 
revolution through negotiations wisely combined with obligations. In Naples, 
therefore, the allies should demand unanimously that the insurrectionary acts 
be annulled de facto and de jure. In addition, they should expect the king to rees-
tablish his administration and give to his people institutions capable of ensuring 
their internal well-being and political independence. Finally, the allies should 
propose reforms, which if rejected by the Neapolitan government, would trigger 
military intervention. e purpose of the intervention would not be territorial 
aggrandizement, but the restoration of order. e prospect of military interven-
tion also would protect the royal family and inspire condence in the kingdom’s 
right-thinking men. Assuming that the measures adopted in the Kingdom of the 
Two Sicilies were e ective, preferably without resort to military force, the allies 
should then apply the same principles in Spain and Portugal. Kapodistrias asked 
Sturdza not only to comment on the situation, but also to dra a note that the 
ve allies could address to the Neapolitan government.
A second more opaque statement of Russian policy appeared in a memoran-
dum of 5/17 October 1820, submitted to Emperor Alexander by Kapodistrias.49
Kapodistrias began by explaining that although the ve allies (Austria, Brit-
ain, France, Prussia, and Russia) recognized the need to oppose revolution, the 
enemy of all peoples and governments, they did not agree on how to realize this 
shared goal. Currently, they pursued two policies: the policy of convenience and 
the policy of duty. e policy of convenience, advocated by Britain, assumed 
that existing treaties did not require allied action to combat revolution, except 
in France. e policy of duty, by contrast, rested on the spirit of the treaties, 
specically the Paris treaties of 1815 and the Aix-la-Chapelle protocols of 1818. 
is policy held that wherever revolution threatened the order established by 
the general alliance, the ve courts must act. e British government continued 
to insist on the policy of convenience, and France did not want to oppose Brit-
ain. Russia’s government hoped to persuade the allies to embrace the policy of 
duty. Once again, Alexander’s foreign policy assumed the need for allied unity 
in craing an e ective response. is meant that even if the British position did 
not change, the other allies should pursue a common course of action.
e allies might even conclude a new treaty to address the revolutionary cri-
sis. ey had done this with the Treaty of 13/25 March 1815, which had armed 
the casus foederis et belli against France at the time of Napoleon’s escape from 
Elba. But regardless of the form that the acts of the conference took, they should 
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leave no doubt as to the general course of allied policy or the legal foundations 
supporting it. Whether justied by established treaties or new agreements, the 
allies must crush the current revolutions and restore the legitimate authority of 
sovereigns. Otherwise the victimized states and the larger European associa-
tion would lose the benets of internal tranquility and external independence. 
Again, a precedent existed in the allied restoration of the French monarchy, even 
though today’s statesmen disagreed on how to proceed. Some believed that the 
principles of 1814–15, particularly the constitutional charter adopted in France, 
sanctioned the germs of revolution. In their eyes, the original problem had not 
been solved, and France did not provide a model for action; hence the revolu-
tions aicting Spain, the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, and Portugal. Other 
statesmen focused on the causes and e ects of the French Revolution (or any 
political revolution); however, as historical experience showed, no human power 
could defeat revolution. In Spain, the Two Sicilies, and Portugal, public author-
ity lacked the means to resist insurrection.
Having acknowledged the di erences of opinion among political leaders, Ka-
podistrias still argued that the principles used to reconcile France with Europe 
o ered a way forward and could be applied on the two peninsulas. Kapodistrias’s 
formulation allowed him to decry as exaggerated and partisan both approaches 
to the current crisis that were being discussed. e co-minister’s preferred solu-
tion harkened back to the heady peacemaking represented by the promises of 
14/26 September 1815 (the Holy Alliance) and Aix-la-Chapelle. Kapodistrias be-
lieved that peace depended on truth (vérité), which could be found in the happy 
medium or middle ground (le juste milieu). In other words, the plenipotentiaries 
meeting in Troppau could nd the truth in both responses to the ongoing crisis 
and agree in principle on measures to restore sovereign authority and deliver the 
world from revolution. e allies then could apply the agreed-upon measures 
to the situations in Spain, the Two Sicilies, and Portugal. Here Kapodistrias 
restated Alexander I’s desire for a collective statement of principle, suggested 
originally in the monarch’s response to the Spanish insurrection, but also rele-
vant to the subsequent revolutions. Kapodistrias went beyond his master’s pro-
posal, however, by bringing the Treaty of 14/26 September into the conversation, 
something he previously had tried to do in connection with Russia’s proposal for 
a treaty of guarantee in Aix-la-Chapelle.
Ordinary alliances, Kapodistrias continued, could not rebuild the moral 
power of a government forced to sign legal acts dictated by a victorious insurrec-
tion. Governments in their public relations mirrored individuals in private life. 
One circumstance or event, happy or unhappy, and one display of courage or 
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weakness could decide the future. It might be dicult for a discredited govern-
ment to nd security without outside help; however, in seeking assistance, such 
a government risked compromising not only its own interests, but also those of 
the intervening power. For this reason, extraordinary and unexpected measures 
were needed—measures promised by the Treaty of 14/26 September. e treaty 
spelled out great truths that all the courts of Europe accepted, even if for di er-
ent reasons. But why had these truths not produced the desired extraordinary 
alliance? Why did sovereigns refuse to recognize that their power was inferior 
to the authority of divine law? According to Kapodistrias, the Treaty of 14/26 
September had established divine law as the basis for political legislation—for 
a code that would emanate from “the precepts of the supreme legislator of all 
Christian peoples.” is code would consecrate all rights, respect all moral and 
material attributes, spell out rules of administration, and produce an extraordi-
nary, unexpected system of laws. In addition, it would rally “to the cause of order 
and legitimate power a great mass of people, friends of the good, convinced that 
only through religion can empires prosper.”
e idea of a code based on the truths of the Treaty of 14/26 September raised 
another question. How could benecent laws be protected from the current 
corruption of morals caused by so many years of crime and immorality? e 
problem went beyond the moral degradation of the French revolutionary and 
Napoleonic eras. For three centuries one revolution had followed another across 
Europe. Impure morals had constituted both cause and e ect, as each genera-
tion perpetuated the previous immorality. Although good education could ef-
fectuate the reform of morals, good education also presupposed good morals. In 
the context of ongoing political revolution, morals became corrupted and good 
education impossible. Finally, Kapodistrias declared, only aer the elimination 
of revolution could lawmaking reclaim its conservative power and society recon-
stitute itself based on the principles of the Christian religion.
e memorandum of 5/17 October was read to Emperor Alexander, but not 
formally approved. Kapodistrias restated the case for why the revolutions af-
icting Europe should be suppressed, which already represented Russian policy, 
as did the acceptance of Austrian military intervention, assuming moral force 
failed. Kapodistrias also argued that once revolution was extirpated, the princi-
ples of the Treaty of 14/26 September 1815 should become the basis for legislation 
across Europe. Only then, he implied, would enduring peace be achieved. In 
the search for solutions to unanticipated challenges Kapodistrias returned to 
the promise of the Holy Alliance, which in his view had not yet been fullled. 
e co-minister did not say so, but Alexander’s diplomacy, while faithful to the 
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presumed truths of 14/26 September, followed a less exalted path: continual 
application and adaptation of specic treaty obligations to evolving conditions 
on the ground. Whatever the purpose of Kapodistrias’s memorandum or the 
appeal of his moral vision, neither seemed much in evidence during the Troppau 
meetings. Russian overtures about the need for an allied statement of principle 
did not delay or substantially alter the course of decision making. Kapodistrias, 
moreover, like the monarch he served, revealed the capacity to combine ights 
of political idealism and religious fervor with the forceful and realistic pursuit 
of a pragmatic foreign policy.
e daily grind of diplomatic negotiation began formally in Troppau on 11/23 
October 1820 and continued until Christmas Eve (12/24 December).50 Only 
Austria, Prussia, and Russia participated in the formulation of an ocial allied 
policy. British and French diplomats observed the proceedings, and while their 
governments did not approve the decisions made, they also did not publicly op-
pose them. Prior to the signing of the infamous Preliminary Protocol, Kapo-
distrias and Nesselrode held unocial discussions with Metternich to ascertain 
Austria’s plans for the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. In reports of 14/26 and 15/27 
October submitted to Alexander, Russia’s ministers summarized the condential 
conversations.51 e reports armed earlier expressions of deference to Austria’s 
special interest in Italy, though clearly, Russia expected the three powers to con-
sider how Austria’s plan would be organized and presented not only to the gov-
ernment in Naples, but also to the allies and the rest of Europe. Russia’s ministers 
likewise continued to advocate for the use of moral over military force to achieve 
the goal of restoration, and they still hoped to bring discussion of Spain into the 
meetings. Austria, by contrast, continued to insist on keeping the two crises sepa-
rate. All agreed, moreover, that any armed intervention in the Two Sicilies should 
be legitimized as a concerted act of the alliance. Russia did not expect allied co-
ordination on the ground, but rather wanted to know in advance what course of 
action Austria would pursue. In addition, Kapodistrias and Nesselrode tried to 
impress upon Metternich that the presence of foreign troops in the Two Sicilies 
might endanger the authority, the credibility, and even the life of King Ferdinand 
I. Although Metternich acknowledged potential dangers, he insisted that the rev-
olutionary threat to Europe made intervention inescapable. Austria also claimed 
to have the support of the Neapolitan government and thus to need only moral 
support from Russia. Nor did Metternich expect the governments of Britain and 
France to pronounce freely on the question of Naples. “ey will speak their 
constitutional language,” he remarked, while also urging that the allied courts 
remain united in refusing to recognize the new government in Naples.52
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e moment had arrived, Metternich declared, to support Austria’s plan to 
suppress the revolutionary conspiracy, aer which it would be necessary “to re-
construct the monarchy of the Two Sicilies under the auspices of the European 
alliance.” If Russia’s ministers hoped that a satisfactory moral solution to the Ne-
apolitan revolution might be possible, they made little e ort to convince Met-
ternich to change course. Instead, they seemed to accept Austrian intervention 
as inevitable and not unjustied, all the while insisting that decisions be made 
within the framework of the Troppau conferences. e Russian government also 
assigned great importance to the form and process of the negotiations. Allied 
governments must coordinate their opinions “in order to present them to the 
world from a position of moral and political unity.” Once again, Alexander’s dip-
lomats argued that there could be no victory in the struggle against revolution 
without a unied alliance. Only by adhering to established treaties could the 
powers win public support. e revolution in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies 
highlighted the potentially divergent views of Austria and Russia on questions 
concerning the domestic politics of sovereign states. ese di erences had been 
apparent since 1814, though only now did they become relevant to concrete pol-
icy decisions. If the Russian government was going to o er even moral support 
for Austrian intervention, it expected the allies to produce a joint statement of 
principle. Specically, they must agree on the just milieu (milieu juste) and right 
line (la ligne droite) to be followed in deciding such questions, and they should 
not deviate from the policy both courts had pursued since 1814.
Soon aer the private meetings between Kapodistrias, Nesselrode, and Met-
ternich, the allies moved quickly toward public agreement. As Russia’s diplomats 
described the situation, only the three courts meeting in Troppau—Austria, 
Prussia, and Russia—possessed the freedom to pronounce on the great question 
of Naples.53 For the moment, Britain and France supported the Austrian enter-
prise; however, both governments remained vulnerable to political changes that 
might result from forthcoming elections, and neither could participate directly 
in the Troppau deliberations. In another report submitted to Alexander on 15 
October, Kapodistrias and Nesselrode described the Austrian government’s 
analysis of the political situation in Europe with reference to the revolution in 
Naples.54 Generally speaking, the revolutionary torrent threatened “with total 
ruin the existence of all the States and all the institutions, old as well as modern.” 
In other words, intervention in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies was not solely 
a response to Austrian interests. Nor did action by the three powers represent 
the realization of a separate Holy Alliance of the absolutist monarchies. e 
proclaimed basis for allied action was the obligation to support the conservation 
Alliance Unity and Intervention in Naples (1820–21) 111 
of society and institutions. Moral solidarity among the great powers, recognition 
of the duty to act, and uniformity in the point of departure leading to strong ac-
tion—this was the purpose of the plan for Naples accepted in Troppau. Austria 
recognized that the condition of strong action could not be fullled uniformly 
by all governments. Governments operated under di erent regimes, and moral 
solidarity could not always be maintained. But even though the great powers 
might not be united in their freedom to act, they still needed to prove to the 
public that no di erence existed “in their fundamental principles or in their real 
and unanimous wishes.”
e importance of public unity among the great powers led to further dis-
cussions about a treaty of guarantee. Russia had proposed such a treaty in 
Aix-la-Chapelle. is time the proposal came from Austria, and again the 
discussions went nowhere. Kapodistrias and Nesselrode reported on the pro-
posal to Alexander I. eir summary is interesting for what it reveals about 
Austrian thinking on questions of legitimate sovereignty and intervention.55
As mentioned previously, the image of a counter-revolutionary alliance of the 
absolutist monarchies seems overly simplistic. Based on the Austrian proposal, 
the signatory powers would guarantee legitimate sovereignty and fundamental 
institutions in the states of Europe. ere would be no intervention in an in-
dependent state as long as legitimate authority exercised power. e guarantee 
of fundamental institutions did not rule out political changes, again as long as 
they occurred by legal means and by the free action of the competent authority. 
Changes produced by revolt against legitimate authority or by an outside power 
would not be considered legal. Nor did the de facto existence of a government 
constitute legitimacy, though legal changes in the forms of government would 
come under the guarantee. Finally, the signatory powers would consider requests 
for intervention from a sovereign whose country or institutions had been at-
tacked by an illegal force. In situations where a sovereign had been deprived of 
his power and could not request intervention, they would discuss measures to 
restore his rights and reestablish legal order in his country.
On the face of it, the Austrian proposal for a treaty of guarantee (as reported 
by Kapodistrias and Nesselrode) appeared to be an act of counterrevolution. If 
a legitimate sovereign later recognized the political changes made by an outside 
power (as occurred repeatedly during the Napoleonic Wars), these changes could 
be guaranteed by the proposed agreement, but only if the signatory powers unan-
imously recognized them as compatible with public order and peace in Europe. 
Although proponents of political reform accused the allies of seeking to make 
the state of things immobile, the real goal of the great powers was to reserve the 
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right to make political changes to those who possessed this right. Obviously, this 
formulation did not accept change brought about by revolution or the will of 
the people. In addition, because legal changes could produce pernicious results, 
the allies distinguished imprudent innovations from criminal revolutions. ey 
could not prevent the errors of a legitimate government or function as a supreme 
tribunal authorized to judge its acts. Nor could they rule on the intrinsic merit 
of an institution or political change. e allies could, however, stop the enemies 
of legitimate authority, and they could determine if the origins of a political 
change were legal or illegal.
e proposed treaty of guarantee focused on political and moral barriers 
to illegal changes of government but did not exclude material measures. e 
goal was to establish as principle that the allies would deliberate on the proper 
means to maintain and restore legitimate power when it was overthrown or 
threatened by an illegal force. is principle did not prejudge any situation: in 
each particular case the powers would consider what action might be appro-
priate. e principle to be agreed concerned the allies’ attitude toward illegal 
changes, a tactic that also could not end the scourge of revolt. e proposed act 
would not prevent “audacious men, inamed by chimeric hopes or indi erent 
to the calamities” of their homelands from embarking on a revolutionary course. 
Still, the Austrian government hoped that a “moral and political proscription 
pronounced in advance by a great and respectable part of Europe” would re-
strain the less decisive and ferocious spirits upon whose support the success of 
any revolutionary endeavor depended. Perhaps, too, sovereigns who faced these 
cruel circumstances would be more e ective in resisting the factions, knowing 
that they could rely on the intervention of their allies. e proposed agreement 
would not represent a denite commitment to act in any set of circumstances. 
Rather, the agreed-upon principles would serve as the starting point for discus-
sion of possible action.
Although no treaty of guarantee ever materialized, the great powers remained 
in general agreement concerning political principles and the revolutionary men-
ace to Europe. Two memorandums, presented to Emperor Alexander by Kapo-
distrias and Nesselrode prior to the signing of formal transactions in Troppau, 
illustrated this point. e memorandums reviewed allied policy, the decisions 
reached on Naples, and the plans for implementation.56 According to the rst, 
the allies had chosen a course of action that applied accepted legal principles 
to the conditions of the day. eir decisions a ected only the Kingdom of the 
Two Sicilies; however, Russia’s ministers hoped that the actions taken would 
prevent further revolutions and inuence developments in Spain and Portugal. 
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In addition to the formulation of general principles to be applied in the event of 
revolutionary outbreaks, Kapodistrias and Nesselrode also planned to discuss 
a new treaty, based on the ideas of Aleksandr Sturdza, that would supplement 
the fraternal act of 14/26 September 1815. e co-ministers of foreign a airs 
assumed that the relevant negotiations would be postponed for at least eighteen 
months. Nor did they anticipate support from Britain or France, where political 
conditions could change unexpectedly. ey also continued to believe that it 
would be dangerous to conclude any new agreement without the consent of all 
ve great powers. Assuming, moreover, that Britain overcame its domestic di-
culties, France recognized and wished to use its power, and allied policy toward 
the Two Sicilies produced a salutary e ect—not only in Italy, but also in Spain 
and Portugal—it might become possible to achieve “universal peace and com-
plete a system of alliance and solidarity that would embrace all the governments 
and peoples of Europe.”57
Alexander I’s ministers seemed to expect that the countries joined in the 
general alliance would accept as codied principle the measures adopted for 
Naples by Austria, Prussia, and Russia. Based on existing laws, countries that 
sanctioned revolution stood outside the alliance. Consequently, intervention 
was appropriate in states that by their revolutionary example, contacts, and in-
uence threatened the repose of others. Using legal and amicable means, the 
allies always would try to bring excluded states back into the alliance. Only if 
these measures failed would they resort to military force. In the current crisis, 
the allies intended to propose to the Neapolitan government measures to restore 
an internal organization in concert with the king, which would establish the 
inviolability of legitimate power and lead to the creation of wise institutions 
consistent with the needs and wishes of the nation. e allies would guarantee 
Ferdinand I the integrity of his territorial possessions and sovereign authority, 
and they would work with him to formulate a plan of reparative administration 
designed to protect his government from insurrection and violence.
e memorandum compared the allied plan, including a temporary military 
occupation, to the measures implemented in France in 1815. Austrian troops, 
acting as a European army, would enter the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, and a 
conference of allied plenipotentiaries would negotiate specic transactions with 
the Neapolitan monarchy. Resolution of the crisis in Naples would be followed 
by similar actions in Spain and Portugal. is would allow the allies to conclude 
the anticipated pact of true solidarity, which would o er to all European gov-
ernments the double advantage of political independence and internal security, 
the latter assured by institutions appropriate for the happiness of their peoples. 
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Finally, the governments of Austria, Prussia, and Russia would ask Britain and 
France to accede to the proposed course of action, while acknowledging that 
particular circumstances might make this impossible.58
e second memorandum prepared by Kapodistrias and Nesselrode focused 
on execution of the allied plan for Naples.59 Fearing for the safety of the king 
and his family, the ministers assumed that public knowledge of the plan would 
intensify the danger. Another problem concerned erroneous opinions about the 
allies’ intentions in Italy. e memorandum armed that the allies sought to 
pacify the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies in its internal relations and to reconcile 
the country with the European social order. Finally, as earlier Russian commu-
nications had emphasized, the allies hoped to achieve their goals through ne-
gotiation, though they would use military force, if necessary. Yet another con-
sideration arose from the note of 1 October 1820, sent by the foreign minister 
of the Neapolitan government, the Duke of Campo Chiaro, to other European 
states.60 Directed at Metternich, the note denied that the change of government 
in Naples represented the work of the Carbonari, a secret society inspired by 
liberal ideas. Rather, the king, supported by his peoples, had established consti-
tutional government—a form of government that had proven to be no less stable 
than absolutist government. Indeed, the note proclaimed, “no foreign power 
has the right to deem as good or bad the Regime that an independent Sovereign 
thought proper to adopt for his States.” e note went on to denounce Austria’s 
hostile reaction to the reforms carried out in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies 
and declared that in the event of armed intervention, the Neapolitan people 
would defend their independence and constitution.
e threat of resistance suggested to Russia’s ministers that collective action 
in response to Campo Chiaro’s note might easily be interpreted as a declaration 
of war, especially if the king appeared to be carrying out the wishes of the allies.61
It was critical, therefore, to elucidate the legal grounds for the allies’ demands. 
To prevent war and safeguard the king and his family, Kapodistrias and Nessel-
rode hoped that the Neapolitan nation would abandon the revolution. ey ar-
gued that rather than respond to the note, the allies should invite the king of the 
Two Sicilies or his representatives to Troppau to discuss the consequences of the 
July events.62 If negotiation succeeded, the allied army would enter Naples with 
the support of the king and people. In other words, the revolution would end by 
means of persuasion, backed by the possibility of force, under the auspices of the 
general alliance. If agreement with the government in Naples did not material-
ize, the embassy sent to Troppau would remain with the allied army to answer 
for the safety of the royal family. In addition, regardless of which scenario played 
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out, it would be necessary for the three sovereigns to stay together at least until it 
became clear whether the peaceful or military path would be required.
e memorandums read to Emperor Alexander by Kapodistrias and Nessel-
rode outlined Russian policy, expressed the hopes of close advisors, and some-
times went beyond the monarch’s generally pragmatic orientation. Alexander 
may have identied with the ideas of Kapodistrias and Sturdza, and he would 
have preferred that coercive means be used only with the agreement of all ve 
great powers, but when it came to actual decision making, he consistently com-
promised to preserve allied unity. us, on 26 October/7 November 1820, aer 
Metternich threatened independent action, the monarch accepted the Austrian 
plan that had been submitted to the allies on 17/29 October.63 Austria, Prussia, 
and Russia now formally admitted the possibility of allied intervention in Spain 
and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. Before taking any concrete action, however, 
they would agree to exclude the o ending state from the European alliance. In 
the Neapolitan case, if the government rejected the peaceful course proposed by 
the allies, the Austrian army, acting as a European army, would be authorized to 
invade the kingdom. e authorization would include a commitment to respect 
the territorial integrity of the country and to strengthen its political and national 
independence. In addition, if Britain and France remained unable to sign on 
to the Austrian intervention, they still could become the guarantors of allied 
promises and take responsibility for determining the duration of the occupation.
A week later, on 2/14 November 1820, Russia’s plenipotentiaries submitted to 
Prince Metternich a memorandum, the content of which closely corresponded 
to what would become the Preliminary Protocol of 7/19 November 1820.64 Based 
on the spirit of established treaties, the memorandum tied allied discussions to 
the duty to maintain the peace. Collective action had become necessary, because 
as a revolutionary state, Naples stood outside the alliance and threatened other 
countries. e allies were obliged, therefore, “to reestablish the king and nation 
in their independence.” Royal power and the order of things in the Kingdom of 
the Two Sicilies needed to be returned to appropriate foundations that would 
prevent further revolutionary upheavals. Equally signicant, any allied action 
would be designed to secure tranquility for the nation and integrity for the king-
dom. e Russian government preferred the use of amicable measures; however, 
if these failed, the use of military force would be acceptable. Either way, an army 
of occupation, composed of Austrian troops but identied as European, would 
be deployed to benet the kingdom and the rest of Europe.
e formal Preliminary Protocol, signed on 7/19 November 1820 by the pleni-
potentiaries of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, elaborated on the points contained 
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in the Russian and other allied memorandums.65 As noted above, historians tend 
to associate the protocol with the reactionary goals of a holy league composed 
of the three absolutist monarchies. Ironically, the text of the protocol made no 
mention of the Treaty of 14/26 September 1815. e protocol began by charac-
terizing the meetings in Troppau as a response to revolutions that had erupted in 
multiple states. For that reason, the three powers had come together to consider 
how the principles of the alliance should be applied to current circumstances. 
Based on the rights consecrated by the treaties, they hoped to protect their peo-
ples and Europe from the contagion of revolution, which they understood as a 
criminal act. e allies described their actions as an e ort to ensure the happy 
and peaceful development of civilization and the reign of justice and law under 
the auspices of Christian morality, order, and enlightened solicitude. Having 
discussed their respective memorandums, they proclaimed their right and obli-
gation to prevent the progress of the evil that threatened the social body and to 
remedy its e ects in states that experienced revolution.
e protocol went on to explain the principles of allied policy and how they 
would be implemented. Governments formed out of revolt, which menaced 
other states, would be excluded from the European alliance. e formulation 
reinforced the ambiguity of earlier discussions. Did revolutionary governments 
by denition endanger other countries, or would allied intervention be justied 
only when these governments threatened others in a concrete manner? Either 
way, once revolutionary governments provided guarantees of legitimate order 
and stability, they could return to the alliance (as had happened with France). 
e protocol insisted that out of respect for the authority of legitimate govern-
ments, the allies would refuse to recognize changes e ected by illegal means. 
When a revolutionary state endangered other countries due to geographical 
proximity, the allies rst would try amicable measures to restore the excluded 
power to the alliance; only if peaceful means failed would they turn to coercive 
action. Because the conditions authorizing a collective response existed in the 
Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, the allies had agreed to act. But through their 
actions they intended to respect the integrity and political existence of the Two 
Sicilies in order to return liberty to the king and nation. e allies sought to 
reestablish royal power on foundations capable of withstanding future revolu-
tionary troubles, and they hoped to do this without the use of foreign troops. At 
the same time, they envisioned a temporary military occupation that would pro-
mote the conditions needed for the tranquility and happiness of the nation. As 
earlier communications already had acknowledged, Austrian troops would carry 
out the intervention in the name of the European alliance, and a conference of 
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allied plenipotentiaries, working under common instructions and headed by an 
Austrian representative, then would negotiate with the Neapolitan king.
Aer signing the Preliminary Protocol, the allies did not immediately move 
to military action. In a supplement to the protocol, also dated 7/19 November 
1820, they agreed to invite the king of the Two Sicilies to meet with them and 
pledged to send common instructions to their ministers in Naples. e three 
powers intended to return the king to full liberty of action but still hoped 
that this goal could be accomplished without the use of force. If the legitimate 
monarch served as mediator for the nation, it might be possible to reconcile 
the restoration of order in the Two Sicilies with tranquility in the rest of Italy 
and Europe. In other words, if the revolutionaries stepped aside, and the king 
returned to power, he might be able to restore his country to membership in the 
alliance. en, depending on what happened in Naples, the allies would adopt 
concrete measures to implement the plan outlined in the protocol. ey hoped, 
moreover, that Britain and France would participate in their friendly appeals to 
the king of the Two Sicilies.66 ey also would inform the courts of Rome, Turin 
(Sardinia-Piedmont), and Tuscany about the agreements reached in Troppau.
Russia Defends the Troppau Protocol
Announcement of the decisions made in Troppau occurred when the repre-
sentatives of Austria, Prussia, and Russia at foreign courts received a common 
circular, dated 24 November/6 December 1820, describing the results of the 
conferences. e circular declared that the allied powers possessed the unde-
niable right collectively to take measures to ensure the security of states whose 
governments had been overthrown as a result of revolution. To that end, the 
three allied monarchs had decided not to recognize the Neapolitan government, 
which had been created by open rebellion. Because only the legitimate monarch 
of the Two Sicilies, Ferdinand I, could act as mediator between his people and 
states threatened by the revolution in Naples, they also had invited the king to 
meet with them in Laibach (now Liubliana in Slovenia), where they planned to 
reconvene. In addition, they continued to hope that Britain and France would 
participate in the proposed course of action.67 e allies presented their deci-
sion as legal, based on the treaties of 1814, 1815, and 1818, and as defensive, based 
on the assumption that governments created by revolt represented a threat to 
all legitimate constitutions and governments and especially to their neighbors. 
e three powers viewed revolution as a crime, though again, it is important 
to remember that the rejection of revolution did not preclude the acceptance 
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of political change. e allies’ judgment stemmed from the experience of the 
French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, a yoke that Europe had carried for 
twenty years. Personal experience and the authority of history had taught them 
that revolution led to military tyranny. Having defeated revolution for a second 
time during the Hundred Days, it was no surprise that this third time the allies 
also equated the defeat of revolution with the promise of enduring peace.
Among contemporaries, the Preliminary Protocol signed in Troppau produced 
a range of critical reactions. Aleksandr Sturdza, whose opinions on diplomatic 
questions Emperor Alexander I repeatedly solicited, criticized the allies for failing 
to address the larger revolutionary threat in Europe.68 e protocol neglected to 
mention either Spain or the papacy’s role in Italy. Given the attacks on sovereign 
and religious authority, Sturdza argued, the allies had to do more than arm the 
policy of cohesion among the great powers. Because governments depended on 
the support of the people, the popular mood had to be reconciled with legitimate 
authority. Indeed, if the allies based their political, moral, and material actions 
on the spirit of the Holy Alliance, they might be able to avoid military measures. 
In other words, the possibility of religious and social restoration embodied in the 
Holy Alliance o ered the best means for e ectively ending the revolutionary cri-
sis visible across Europe. e principles embodied in the Treaty of 14/26 Septem-
ber 1815 not only subordinated sovereigns to divine authority, but also sought to 
replace the state of nature between independent nations with the state of family.69
e Russian government’s main defense of the Preliminary Protocol occurred 
not at home in response to intellectuals such as Sturdza, but in the diplomatic 
arena where close allies committed to the alliance and to European peace ob-
jected to the plan of action. If within the Russian Empire one could not yet 
speak of legal challenges to the monarch’s will, this was not the case within the 
broader alliance, where sovereign states had to be persuaded of the wisdom and 
legality of Emperor Alexander’s decisions. When trying to explain the measures 
adopted in Troppau, Russia’s diplomats invariably felt compelled also to discuss 
the meaning of the alliance and the critical importance of allied unity. An early 
instance of this message occurred when the Kingdom of the Netherlands recog-
nized the new government in Naples. Russia’s opposition to this move, conveyed 
in a verbal note of 10/22 November 1820, rested on the principle that any gov-
ernment or constitution established by violent means could not be accepted as 
legal.70 Equally important, alliance unity had to be preserved in order to combat 
the revolutionary spirit. Only through unity could the moral force of a common 
policy be e ective in preventing the need for military intervention. e deliber-
ations in Troppau aimed to achieve this great goal.
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Not surprisingly, despite the disclaimers of the great powers, second-order and 
especially Italian states expressed concern about allied intentions. In a personal 
letter from Kapodistrias, dated 11/23 November 1820 and approved by Emperor 
Alexander, the co-minister of foreign a airs instructed Russia’s envoy in Turin to 
explain to the Sardinian court that the actions agreed upon in Troppau applied 
only to the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, which the allies hoped to pacify and rec-
oncile with the European social order.71 Technically the claim was true, though 
in light of subsequent events—for example, revolution in Sardinia-Piedmont in 
March 1821 and the almost immediate Austrian intervention there—the Russian 
denial of a general policy to suppress revolution seems disingenuous. e allies 
also repeatedly claimed that the intervention in Naples rested not only on the 
agreements of 1814, 1815, and 1818, but also on the treaty of 12 June 1815 between 
Austria and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. us, the Troppau decisions nei-
ther altered existing treaties nor changed the legal bases of peace in central Eu-
rope. Despite Russia’s lingering concerns about the German Confederation, the 
ocially passive approach to German politics also remained in place.72
A memorandum of 19 November/1 December 1820, produced by Russia’s 
Ministry of Foreign A airs, further detailed the ocial perspective on the Trop-
pau conferences.73 e memorandum explained the reasons for the meeting, the 
questions discussed, the preliminary results of the deliberations, and how the 
allies proposed to protect the world from the scourge of revolutionary anarchy. 
As diplomatic pronouncements of the era so oen recalled, the intimate union of 
the great powers had delivered Europe from the military despotism engendered 
by the French Revolution. Returned to independence, the nations of Europe 
had begun to enjoy the benets of general peace under the auspices of the great 
transactions that guaranteed to all states complete security from the outside and 
from the inside. Europe’s peoples had experienced several years of relief from 
the hardships of war, yet traces of the revolutionary torment remained, for men 
(and women) had been “perverted by the errors and calamities of the century.” 
e troubles caused by revolution had returned, embodied in e orts to divide 
the allied courts, debase the majesty of thrones, and provoke criminal revolt. In 
Spain, the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, and Portugal, the foundations of the 
European edice—the law of nations (le droit des gens), religion, and Christian 
morality—once again had been undermined. In an epoch when each govern-
ment strove to address the real needs of its people, gradually and by legal means, 
the revolutionary onslaught paralyzed the purest intentions, betrayed the most 
just expectations, and endangered the realization of the most legitimate wishes. 
Instead of consolidating good order, Europe again faced incalculable horrors.
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e Russian government believed that the powers placed at the center of the 
general alliance (presumably the ve great powers) had contracted to combat 
revolution by the acts of 1814, 1815, and 1818. If they refused to fulll this obliga-
tion, the alliance would fail, and the states of Europe would be subjugated to rev-
olutionary despotism. Out of delity to treaty obligations, therefore, the three 
courts had decided to meet and formulate a common policy. ey had taken 
this step despite uncertainty about allied unity and the e ect of the measures 
adopted. Russia previously had called for a common response to the revolution 
in Spain, especially aer King Ferdinand VII accepted the constitution of 1812, 
but allied inaction had allowed the revolutionary contagion to spread to Naples. 
Given that contemporaries judged governments based on the material evidence 
of facts and events ( faits), the lack of an allied response had weakened both the 
authority of governments and their will to battle sectarians seeking to divide 
and conquer. e ministry’s memorandum acknowledged the potential appeal 
of revolutionaries, but attributed this to allied failings, rather than positive iden-
tication with radical goals. In other words, well-intentioned individuals had 
to be protected from the corruption of revolutionaries, who tried to persuade 
the people that absolute power (le pouvoir absolu) was opposed to the rights of 
nations (les droits des nations). It was essential to demonstrate that the punish-
ment of insurrection did not deny nations their rights. Equally critical, the allies 
needed to exhibit unity, so that the enemies of governments would not be able to 
represent the conferences in Troppau as a partial meeting of the three courts or 
a triple alliance opposed to the constitutional states (Britain, France, the south 
of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the two Americas).
e foreign policy statements of Alexander I repeatedly invoked allied unity. 
Despite di erent conditions in Austria, Britain, France, Prussia, and Russia, 
the powers needed to reach agreement on all points for all circumstances. is 
would move the alliance from the domain of abstract idea to the reality of strong 
and recuperative action. From the perspective of Alexander’s government, only 
Russia had consistently acted in harmony with treaty obligations. Although 
Austria had tried to justify intervention in Naples with reference to a partial 
treaty concluded with the king of the Two Sicilies on 12 June 1815, this approach 
lacked the authority to reconcile the peoples of Italy with the contracting states. 
In the e ort to bring Naples back into conformity with the laws of society, Rus-
sian ocials believed, Austria should act as a European power, not as an in-
dependent state. Nor had France, which continued to rely on alliance support 
to restore legitimate government, e ectively joined the common cause. For the 
moment, the allies still had to ensure that France fullled its treaty obligations. 
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Britain also, due to domestic diculties, could not be counted among the active 
members of the European alliance. Notwithstanding the power and riches of 
the British Empire, the three allies could hope only that Britain would avoid the 
appearance of assisting revolutionaries on the two peninsulas. Finally, Russia’s 
Ministry of Foreign A airs depicted Prussia as a subordinate or inferior great 
power lacking the political maturity to think through the urgent questions of 
the day. Occupied with domestic a airs and still adapting to the German federal 
system and to new relations with Austria, Prussia remained loyal to the spirit 
of the general alliance and therefore should accept the solutions proposed by 
Austria and Russia. In describing the particular circumstances of each country, 
the Russian government tried to make a simple point: the allies would have to 
do more, if they wanted to preserve world peace.
In evaluating the decisions of the Troppau conferences, the critical conclusion 
of the Russian government was that the acts of 7/19 November 1820 (the Prelim-
inary Protocol and supplement) were insucient to achieve the allies’ goals. e 
conciliatory policy toward the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies would not be suc-
cessful without British and French participation. Emperor Alexander continued 
to pressure these countries to join the three monarchs in Laibach, where they 
planned to complete the deliberations on Naples in consultation with the king 
of the Two Sicilies and the representatives of other Italian states. If a unied Eu-
ropean alliance could restore the reign of justice and law by constituting the Ne-
apolitan king as the legitimate mediator between his subjects and the countries 
that were threatened by the hostile example of revolution, moral force might be 
able to defeat insurrection, and peace would be consolidated. Spain too might 
be delivered from the oppression of insurrection, and thanks to the armation 
of the European system, each state would enjoy the possibility of working calmly 
on the improvement of its domestic regime. e very act of signing a Preliminary 
Protocol and reconvening in another location le open the possibility of new 
beginnings with full British, French, and Neapolitan cooperation. As Russia’s 
diplomats described the allies’ dilemma, military intervention, especially aer 
the respite from war enjoyed since 1815, would demonstrate only that peace de-
pended on coercion. It would not solve the broader problem of revolution in 
Europe. Ultimately the responses from Paris, London, and Naples would decide 
the question of moral versus military means; however, the Russian government 
continued to insist that the signatories to the protocol make every e ort to rely 
on persuasion. rough concerted action, the three courts needed to show that 
they had decided to ght the peoples of the Two Sicilies for the sake of peace and 
happiness in Europe.
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As the Russian memorandum of 19 November/1 December explained, the 
allies did not view the crisis in Naples as an isolated event. Assuming, there-
fore, that military intervention proved unavoidable, what could they do to save 
Europe from new disasters? For answers Russian ocials looked to further de-
velopment of the principles dened in the Preliminary Protocol, an approach 
that returned the diplomatic conversation to where it had been in the spring 
and summer of 1820, before the actual meetings in Troppau. Not surprisingly, 
Emperor Alexander’s perspective continued to evolve as events on the ground 
unfolded. In Aix-la-Chapelle, Russia’s diplomats had pushed for a treaty of col-
lective guarantee, beyond the exclusivity and narrow commitments of the Qua-
druple Alliance, that would require mutual defense of the territorial boundaries 
and political arrangements dened by the treaties of Vienna and Paris. Prior 
to the conferences in Troppau, the Russian monarch also had advocated for a 
collective statement of principle in response to revolutions in Spain, the King-
dom of the Two Sicilies, and Portugal. But in December 1820, Alexander took 
a more cautious approach to new treaty obligations. A Russian memorandum 
of 5/17 December 1820, approved by the monarch and addressed to the govern-
ments of Austria and Prussia, rejected the recent Austrian proposal for a general 
guarantee.74
According to the Russian memorandum, the governments of Austria, Prussia, 
and Russia agreed that a treaty of guarantee designed to preserve the domestic 
legal order of European states could take one of two possible forms: either it 
would constitute a new alliance (combinaison), based on principles of public law 
not explicitly sanctioned in existing treaties, or it would result from the princi-
ples of public law established by the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna and 
accompanying treaties. In the latter case, it would represent obligations that the 
European powers previously had contracted. But either way, critical questions 
would remain. How would the treaty be applied to states that had not signed 
it? Would contracting governments have the right to intervene to preserve legal 
order in noncontracting states? Or could the allies assume that all states com-
prising the general alliance had acceded to the treaty of guarantee? If not, then 
what would be the relationship of noncontracting states to the others? How 
would these arrangements impact the general alliance, and how would the mea-
sures adopted to prevent revolution a ect the noncontracting states? Allied in-
tervention in a state that had not accepted the treaty of guarantee could never 
be moral, because such an intervention inevitably would require the use of force. 
In other words, the intervention question could not be addressed without also 
considering broader questions about the Quadruple and general alliances.
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At the end of the Napoleonic Wars all the states of Europe had occupied an 
analogous position in that all depended on collective guarantee of their territo-
rial reconstruction. Consequently, all had acceded to the treaties and conven-
tions of 1815 and 1818. But in 1820 the security imperative of 1814–15 no longer 
existed. e Russian government doubted that countries such as Britain, France, 
the Netherlands, and some German states, where diplomatic transactions had 
to be justied before a national representative body, would sign a new treaty of 
guarantee. Without general acceptance, the treaty would cause anxiety, distrust, 
and isolation in noncontracting states, which would see it as the creation of a 
new alliance independent of established agreements. e current system of unity 
and solidarity would therefore be undermined. Was a new treaty really needed, 
the Russian memorandum asked, to guarantee the legal order of domestic in-
stitutions, including the legitimacy of thrones and the powers dependent on 
them? If so, then was a new treaty also needed to guarantee the inviolability 
of territorial boundaries? Did not existing treaties guarantee both internal and 
external security? e Russian government argued that the treaties of 1815 and 
1818 already provided the proposed guarantees, at least implicitly. e treaties 
did not require governments to seek recognition when they reformed domestic 
institutions; however, based on a virtual convention (convention virtuelle), fun-
damental change did require allied assent. is was why the new governments 
in Spain, the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, and Portugal all sought to legitimize 
their revolutions in the eyes of Europe. If established treaties did not give the 
allies this right of intervention, then they could not have expressed disapproval 
of the Spanish Revolution or decided to act in Naples. Precisely because existing 
treaties contained the guarantee of legal order, to conclude a new treaty would 
render the decisions that already had been made illegal.
Having dispensed with the legal question of a new treaty, the Russian mem-
orandum turned to future needs, specically remedies for the ongoing threat to 
social order. Europe had been enjoying a profound peace, when the catastrophes 
in Spain, Naples, and Portugal reminded the allies of the presence of a sinister 
enemy who supposedly had been defeated. In responding to the enemy, they had 
fullled the most important obligation imposed by the treaties of 8/20 Novem-
ber 1815 (the Second Treaty of Paris and Quadruple Alliance) and subsequent 
protocols of Aix-la-Chapelle. ey had acted to defend from revolution the al-
liance that guaranteed the peace. e decision to intervene in the Kingdom of 
the Two Sicilies had resulted from the threat to the rest of the peninsula rep-
resented by the Neapolitan revolution and from the allies’ ability to respond 
promptly and e ectively. e three powers expected that the measures set forth 
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in the Preliminary Protocol would bring Naples back into the alliance without 
exposing the world to the disasters of war. e return of order in the Two Sicilies 
would represent the triumph of religion and morality, the victory of law, and the 
defeat of the odious power of the revolution. is great result would be achieved 
by the force of allied unity and would demonstrate the value of the treaties and 
policies previously established to preserve the peace. So rather than conclude a 
new treaty, the Russian government hoped that the allies would work to perfect 
the Preliminary Protocol of 7/19 November. is additional protocol would de-
ne the principles that the allies intended to apply in all countries experiencing 
revolution. In each case, the allies would meet to decide on concrete actions, as 
they had done with respect to Naples. e allies also would agree to communi-
cate with each other regarding the reform of their domestic institutions. Success 
in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies would prove to other states the ecacy of the 
measures adopted, and all the countries of Europe would be invited to adhere 
to this nal protocol.
In the midst of responding to Austria’s proposal for a treaty of guarantee, the 
Russian government also worked to persuade Britain and France to join the al-
lied e ort. In 1818 Russia had argued in favor of concluding a new treaty of guar-
antee, but conditions had changed, and in late 1820, the critical concern had be-
come Britain’s relationship to the alliance in light of the Preliminary Protocol.75
Neither Britain nor France approved the protocol, and for British foreign secre-
tary Castlereagh and the government of King George IV, any codied statement 
of principle posed a problem.76 To counter this opposition, Russia’s diplomats 
tried to argue that the Preliminary Protocol did not constitute a new or separate 
alliance, but rather fullled established treaty obligations. ey insisted, more-
over, that the eternal principles of Emperor Alexander’s foreign policy had not 
changed. eir argument derived from the legal-administrative practices of the 
Russian Empire, where the spirit of the law invariably superseded the letter of 
the law.77 is is why in the Troppau discussions, Russia’s diplomats repeatedly 
pointed to virtual treaties and obligations. As Nesselrode wrote to Lieven, with 
Alexander’s approval, the treaty of 8/20 November 1815 and the protocols of 3/15 
November 1818 imposed upon the allies “the virtual obligation” to protect the 
peace in any country or territory threatened by the ravages of revolution.78
e Russian government also accepted that the spirit of a treaty could have 
multiple interpretations, based on the internal conditions and laws of a given 
country.79 On this basis, Russia did not see Britain’s rejection of the Preliminary 
Protocol as a renunciation of the treaties justifying the transaction. Britain re-
mained free to choose its own language in what Russia’s diplomats hoped would 
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be a formal pronouncement in support of the measures adopted. Emperor Alex-
ander did not demand allied unanimity in all situations. He did expect, however, 
that each ally would contribute, according to its power, to the execution of the 
Troppau plan, the success or failure of which might prove decisive for the destiny 
of Europe. In the present circumstances, this meant that Britain could remain 
silent on the question of principles but take a direct or indirect part in their 
application, according to its judgment of what was appropriate. e Russian 
response to Britain’s stance against intervention wavered between acceptance 
of divergent policies in concrete situations and insistence that e ective action 
against revolution required British support.
United in a tutelary and holy alliance, the three monarchs meeting in Trop-
pau had pledged to preserve the independence and territorial integrity of revo-
lutionary states, even if military force became unavoidable.80 e possible use 
of coercion coexisted with the claim that ambition had been banned from the 
domain of politics and removed from the counsels of kings. e powers had 
no intention of acting against the peoples or against “wise liberty, the friend of 
order.” ey claimed to respect the rights of nations and of monarchs whose le-
gitimate power should be freely exercised. Nor did the allies forget the needs and 
interests of the people or the stability that could be guaranteed by concluding a 
prudent transaction between what would cease to be (the revolutionary regime 
in Naples) and what should be (the restored monarch and legitimate govern-
ment). Nesselrode described as bizarre the possibility that Britain, “one of the 
most civilized states in the world,” would not support a doctrine so favorable to 
the progress of civilization. Emperor Alexander likewise continued to hope that 
Britain would declare support for the principles and measures agreed to by the 
three courts or at least give to the allies the sanction of silence.
Charles William Stewart (1778–1854), British ambassador in Vienna and 
brother of Foreign Secretary Castlereagh, represented his government in Trop-
pau and conveyed to the three courts Britain’s rejection of the Preliminary Pro-
tocol and supplement of 7/19 November 1820. In a dispatch to Lieven, dated 
11/23 November 1820, Nesselrode explained the British opposition on two 
grounds. First, Lord Stewart had not been consulted during the process of writ-
ing the transactions. Second, the form of the Troppau acts could be construed 
as the formation of an exclusive alliance between the courts of Vienna, Berlin, 
and Saint Petersburg.81 According to the British representative, the allies should 
have sought his input before announcing a general policy to address the cur-
rent crisis. Lord Stewart agreed that swi action, whether by persuasion or by 
force, had been necessary, but this could have been done without formalizing in 
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advance the principles of a general policy. From the Russian point of view, Lord 
Stewart had chosen not to participate in the Troppau conferences. Although 
Emperor Alexander had urged the British government to send a fully empow-
ered plenipotentiary who would be privy to all the deliberations, this had not 
been done.
Emperor Alexander also continued to believe that without British support 
the allies could not be successful in their endeavor. Needed to ensure justice and 
legality, the participation of Britain would help to show the world that the sole 
purpose of intervention was to reconcile the rights of legitimate power with the 
wishes and true needs of peoples. But because Lord Stewart had been instructed 
to maintain a neutral and passive position, he could not contribute to writing 
the transactions. Nesselrode’s communication hinted at the hope that this par-
ticular objection indicated an underlying desire to join the allies in a common 
course of action. Nesselrode also insisted that the signing of formal acts did not 
establish a new policy. e spirit of existing transactions, which had been sanc-
tioned by the English Parliament, provided the legal basis for the Troppau agree-
ments. On previous occasions, the British government had been instrumental in 
defending and helping to perfect the maxims of the alliance. In applying these 
maxims to the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, the three monarchs had decided 
that the statement of their common purpose should be formalized in a legal act. 
Nesselrode therefore authorized Lieven to read his dispatch to Castlereagh, and 
if the latter agreed, to communicate the acts of 7/19 November as simple projects 
without signatures.82 If Britain’s rejection of the transactions rested solely on the 
form of communication, concerted action might still be possible.
A follow-up dispatch from Nesselrode, issued the next day (12/24 November 
1820) and approved by Emperor Alexander, provided Lieven with more detailed 
instructions about appeals to the British government.83 Because the allies had 
an obligation to preserve social order and peace, the Preliminary Protocol repre-
sented a just application of principles already consecrated by established treaties. 
e protocol, in other words, gave a body to the spirit of the treaties. Highlight-
ing the critical importance of allied unity, yet also aware of British objections to 
the Troppau transactions, Nesselrode acknowledged that allied policy did not 
result from the letter of existing treaties. It did, however, derive from their es-
sence. Once again, the Russian preference for just outcomes, as opposed to strict 
adherence to the law, crept into diplomatic negotiations. e measures adopted 
allowed the allies to fulll their duty to the European family—a duty dened 
by the assumption that the well-being of each lay in the well-being of all. Given 
the current impassioned and agitated mood (esprit) of the European public, the 
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planned course of action represented the best means to stop the revolutionary 
evil that already had a ected three states.
To encourage British participation, the Russian government repeatedly made 
the point that the Preliminary Protocol and supplement required additional 
development; they were not in their nal form. A quick allied response in the 
Kingdom of the Two Sicilies had been necessary to prevent the consolidation 
and spread of revolution. For whereas diplomatic negotiations moved slowly, 
popular identication with sectarians could deepen quickly. Consequently, 
the three courts had neglected to consult Britain and France before signing 
the Troppau transactions. e voice of the allies had to be heard as swily as 
possible, and people in the Two Sicilies had to recognize the current regime’s 
incompatibility with world peace. Only the mediation of their king could lead 
them to reconciliation with the rest of Europe. e Russian desire for full British 
participation in the upcoming meetings in Laibach could not have been stron-
ger, whether or not the Neapolitan government allowed King Ferdinand I to at-
tend.84 Again, Nesselrode proclaimed disbelief at the thought that Britain would 
refuse to help save the world from bloody revolution. Emperor Alexander hoped 
that British involvement would make it possible to avoid coercion. To preserve 
peace by moral force required that the great powers act in unison. Resort to 
military measures could have the dangerous e ect of undermining the popular 
perception of the European alliance as a conservative rather than a conquering 
association. Britain previously had adhered to the treaties and principles that 
justied intervention, and at this critical juncture the allies needed British help. 
Russia’s commitment to allied unity was so rm, moreover, that regardless of 
what the British government decided to do (or not to do), Britain’s relationship 
to the alliance would not change, based on the letter of the transactions of 1814, 
1815, and 1818.85
Arguments repeated over and over again by Russia’s diplomats to justify the 
Troppau agreements did not alter Britain’s opposition to collective allied action. 
In a state paper of 5 May 1820, Castlereagh made clear that the treaty obliga-
tions of 1814–15 applied only to the liberation of Europe from Napoleon and the 
consequent requirement to ensure the collective security of the continent. e 
treaties did not concern other countries. Nor did the state paper declare a gen-
eral principle of non-intervention in foreign lands.86 e ocial British response 
to the Preliminary Protocol came in a note of 4 December 1820, which while 
condemning the revolution in Naples and acknowledging that the other powers 
possessed a right to intervene, nonetheless refused to deny recognition to the Ne-
apolitan government.87 Britain also would not countenance allied interference 
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in Spain and Portugal. Although serious, the crises in those countries did not 
threaten other states. Finally, the note informed the allies that the British gov-
ernment would reject any declaration designed to establish a policy of mutual 
guarantees. In subsequent conversations between Lieven and Castlereagh, the 
foreign secretary acknowledged the goodwill of the three monarchs and even 
tried to argue that the British position conformed to principles publicly em-
braced by Emperor Alexander, specically the rejection of new alliances and of 
e orts to seek guarantees outside the general alliance.88 e desire for mutual un-
derstanding was palpable, but no amount of politesse or goodwill could change 
the reality of discord. As Lieven bluntly characterized the situation, the British 
interpretation of the Troppau agreements was unfortunate and exaggerated.
According to Castlereagh, the Preliminary Protocol constituted a treaty and 
hence the basis for a new alliance. If the protocol were simply a condential 
agreement (entente), the result of shared opinions or current circumstances 
and future possibilities ( futurs contingents), why would the allies not keep their 
agreement secret? Instead, they proposed to create a new policy that would in-
validate existing agreements and fuel revolutionary discontent. e foreign sec-
retary rejected the Russian argument that the allies had further developed but 
not replaced old relationships based on established treaties. Worse still, despite 
the pure motives of the allies, the British government might have no choice but 
to oppose and even protest the principles set forth in the protocol. e three 
monarchs had asserted an exclusive privilege to intervene in the domestic a airs 
of independent states by peaceful or coercive means. is assumed privilege de-
prived states of rights enshrined in existing treaties. Once again Britain rejected 
the Russian interpretation, which did not see action against a revolutionary fac-
tion that threatened neighboring countries as coercion or interference in the 
domestic a airs of an independent state. In the Russian view, recourse to co-
ercion would occur only if legitimate power was overthrown, e orts to achieve 
reconciliation failed, and the repose of Europe was in danger. Although Russia’s 
diplomats believed that Castlereagh, constrained by the perils of British politics, 
remained sympathetic to the allied cause, the foreign secretary’s words to Lieven 
suggested a more divergent position, one that contemporary liberals and later 
generations of historians would echo: in Troppau three autocratic sovereigns 
assumed the authority to judge the appropriateness of intervention.
Castlereagh did not oppose the e ort to prevent disorder, revolutionary con-
tagion, and the overthrow of legitimate monarchs. But he did reject the forms 
and means of action chosen by the allies. e statement of principles contained 
in the Preliminary Protocol gave the allies a broad mandate to intervene in other 
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countries, and to decide that public unrest or the request of a monarch justied 
the use of force. In the case of Naples, Castlereagh argued, the application of 
severe principles that appeared hostile to the independence of nations would ex-
acerbate the revolutionary spirit. Instead of a collective allied proclamation, the 
Austrian government should explain the reasons and legal grounds for its own 
decision to intervene, and the other powers should respond in the manner and 
with the language appropriate to their particular circumstances. Going forward, 
the allies should act when and where it might be necessary, but without declaring 
general principles, which then could serve as a rallying cry for revolutionaries. In 
France, for example, sectarians might be able to use allied pronouncements to 
accuse the king of relying on a league of monarchs to battle political opposition. 
is would promote the interests of the revolutionaries and undermine the legit-
imate government. In Spain, moreover, the Troppau meeting already had caused 
mistrust and fear among the people. e expectation of an appeal to the three 
sovereigns by the Spanish king strengthened the perception that royal authority 
was opposed to the liberties of nations. Even though the allies possessed the 
ability to act speedily, Castlereagh concluded, they should proceed with caution, 
and more important, they should not abuse their power.
If the legitimacy of armed intervention by the allies was codied in Troppau, 
the actual staging of the intervention would take place in Laibach, where the 
three monarchs planned to meet with Ferdinand I. In the meantime, Britain 
accepted the practical necessity of intervention, and the allies accepted that Brit-
ain would neither sanction nor participate in their collective action. Castlere-
agh communicated to Lieven that Britain would not disavow the Preliminary 
Protocol as long as this did not become public.89 For regardless of how events 
unfolded, the British government needed to be able to claim before Parliament 
and people that it had opposed the principles adopted by the allies. Simply put, 
political conditions in Britain and the constraints imposed on king and cabinet 
by the English constitution did not permit open support for allied interven-
tion.90 Lieven claimed that in private conversation both Castlereagh and the 
Duke of Wellington expressed support and understanding. At no time did the 
disagreement over Naples seriously threaten the alliance. Castlereagh’s biogra-
pher tells a di erent story, one of widening cracks in the alliance from early 1820 
and of domestic pressure on the foreign secretary “to extricate himself from any 
notion of concerted action with the other European courts,” as early as Decem-
ber 1819.91 Contradictory narratives notwithstanding, the Russian interpretation 
held that unity was preserved, despite di erences over the meaning of treaty 
obligations. France’s rejection of the Preliminary Protocol likewise showed that 
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commitment to the alliance did not require unity of action. In a memorandum 
addressing French objections to the Troppau transactions, the Russian govern-
ment appeared to walk back the idea of excluding from the European alliance 
any state whose government was changed by revolution.92 e ve great powers 
agreed, moreover, to represent the current intervention not as a conquest, but 
as a reconciliation between the alliance and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, 
mediated by the Neapolitan king.
Legality and Reform
What did the negotiations surrounding the Troppau conferences and the Pre-
liminary Protocol reveal about the foreign policy of Emperor Alexander I? Ini-
tially, the Russian government supported a general pronouncement or statement 
of principle on how the allies, particularly the ve great powers, would respond 
to revolution, not just in France, but throughout Europe. In contrast to the Brit-
ish position, which emphasized the legal specicity of the Quadruple Alliance, 
Russian policy stressed moral duty; agreement in principle; and the spirit, not 
just the letter, of treaty obligations. e appeal to moral duty was consistent with 
Russian diplomatic initiatives since 1815: the Treaty of 14/26 September 1815 (the 
Holy Alliance), the proposal for a treaty of general alliance to supersede the 
Quadruple Alliance in the period leading up to the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, 
the proposal for a treaty of guarantee at the congress, and the priority always 
given to the preservation of allied unity, even if only the appearance of unity. 
Russia’s approach was countered by Britain’s refusal to sign on to abstract state-
ments of principle and by Prince Metternich’s focus on suppressing the revolu-
tionary threat in central Europe. By the time Austria came around to the idea 
of a collective guarantee, Russia no longer wanted to present the Preliminary 
Protocol as a statement of principle or general policy.
Alexander I’s foreign policy also illustrated key aspects of Russian political 
thought, specically the principle of the monarch’s absolutist authority and 
the elevation of moral outcomes (justice) over strict adherence to the law. In 
this context, during the critical years from 1815 through 1820, Alexander and 
his diplomatic agents developed a political message of good governance and re-
ligious morality to counter the liberal and radical ideologies emerging in the 
Restoration era. e period of diplomacy following the Congress of Vienna rep-
resented more than restoration, recuperation, and the birth of modern political 
ideologies. e opposition to political change brought about by revolution and 
violence was not simply a proclamation of conservative principles or a defense 
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of absolutist monarchy. e sincerity, adaptability, and pragmatism of Alexan-
der’s foreign policy shone through in the negotiations concerning Naples. e 
combination of moderate reformism, historical analysis, and modern nation-or 
people-based politics—all key components of political culture in the rst quar-
ter of the nineteenth century—illustrated both the power of tradition (or social 
memory) and the capacity for change.
e enlightened institutional reforms of Catherine II—inspired by her read-
ing of Montesquieu, Beccaria, and Bielfeld—could be seen in Emperor Alex-
ander’s search for European security within a stable legal framework and in his 
awareness of political conditions in other countries.93 e monarch’s concern 
for legality, understood as strict adherence to treaty obligations, continued the 
reformist trajectory of the eighteenth century, as did his acknowledgment of po-
litical realities in second-order states and their legitimate rights within the Euro-
pean system. e lessons of historical experience, particularly the trauma of the 
Napoleonic Wars, justied Alexander’s insistence on the paramount importance 
of allied unity and inspired the persistent e ort to act in concert with the allies. 
Also based on the authority of history were his determination and assumed ob-
ligation to prevent revolution and its consequences, dened as illegality, war, 
and conquest. Finally, Alexander’s recognition of modern political imperatives 
and his sensitivity to how the world had changed since the French Revolution 
appeared in the idea that governments and peoples had to be persuaded to accept 
decisions made by the alliance, even if in the interest of European peace. As an 
absolutist monarch, Alexander expected obedience, but he also understood that 
compliance was a two-way street. Governments had an obligation to connect 
with their people by implementing wise policies and constructing e ective in-
stitutions that served the nation’s needs. Great powers likewise had to convince 
the less powerful and one another of the benets their policies could bring by 
engaging in press debates, applying diplomatic pressure (moral force), encourag-
ing domestic reform, and if necessary, organizing military intervention. In other 
words, the actions of Emperor Alexander and his allies looked not to the resto-
ration of the old regime, but to the ecacious reconstitution of international 
order following decades of violent revolution and brutal warfare.
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To Act in Concert (1821–22)
I n a masterful study of the emergence of the modern world, C. A. Bayly describes a world crisis of 1780–1820, which originated in “a growing imbalance between the perceived military needs of states and their 	nancial 
capacity.” Even more consequential than the material crisis, according to Bayly, 
was the underlying social crisis caused by economic conict and a culture of 
opposition that “had made people more skeptical of, and hostile to, established 
authority.” Both the American and French revolutions highlighted the power 
of popular rebellion and the acceptance of war as a tool of modern progress. 
Napoleon’s empire likewise justi	ed military conquest under the mantle of 
progressive reform. With this history in mind, the peacemakers of 1814–18 and 
the European governments established, reestablished, or simply maintained in 
the aermath of Napoleon’s defeat appear less the harbingers of restoration or 
recuperation and more the representatives of “a moderating discourse of law, 
religion, or polity” that held out the hope of enlightened reform and peaceful 
advancement.1 Like reform-minded leaders in other countries, Emperor Alex-
ander I and his diplomatic agents saw in the transactions of Paris, Vienna, and 
Aix-la-Chapelle the political framework and legal foundations for peaceful order 
in Europe. In the Treaty of 14/26 September 1815 (the Holy Alliance), described 
by recent Russian scholarship as a form of Christian cosmopolitanism, they also 
identi	ed the means to end war and unite the peoples of Europe regardless of 
national and religious aliations.2 eir desire for peace and good order could 
not have been more genuine.
But peace and good order could be understood in myriad ways. Time and 
again, despite intensive diplomacy and laborious participation in conferences, 
the process of peacemaking raised questions about the capacity of legal prin-
ciples and treaty obligations to constrain what Leo Tolstoy called in the sec-
ond epilogue of War and Peace “the movement of peoples” or “the power that 
moves peoples.”3 From the perspective of Russian diplomacy, the movement of 
peoples in Spanish America, Spain, Naples, Portugal, and Piedmont threatened 
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European peace and exposed 	ssures in the general alliance. In 1821–22 the be-
ginnings of the Greek independence movement and the Russian-Ottoman war 
scare further underscored the fragility of allied unity, as well as the potential for 
opposition in Russian society. From the time of the Greek uprisings through 
the 	rst years of Nicholas I’s reign, Russian monarchs and their allies repeatedly 
chose peace through compromise and the avoidance of confrontation. More 
than revolution, the peacemakers feared war, and in their experience, war could 
be prevented only by preserving the European alliance. For several decades, this 
shared assumption encouraged the concert of great powers to moderate mili-
tary ambitions on the continent. At the same time, conditions on the ground, 
among the peoples and their movements, increasingly showed that the accepted 
framework for peace and order could not contain the larger global dynamics im-
pinging on European realities and relationships. European order did not depend 
solely on developments in Europe, where it would take more than the actions 
and commitments of the great powers to preserve peace.
Staging the Alliance in Laibach (1821)
When on 30 December 1820/11 January 1821 the allies resumed deliberations in 
Laibach, they already had agreed to intervention in the Kingdom of the Two 
Sicilies. On 4 February, an Austrian army of 35,000 crossed the river Po into 
Italy. On 13 February, the government in Naples declared war, and King Ferdi-
nand I’s son, Francesco, pledged loyalty to the constitution.4 On 23 March, Aus-
trian troops occupied Naples, and by summer it became clear that their presence 
would not lead to protracted military conict. e Neapolitan revolutionaries 
failed to mount a united resistance, and no broad-based popular uprising in de-
fense of the constitution occurred; consequently, the restoration of the king did 
not require severe or murderous measures.5 On 24 June 1821, Austrian foreign 
minister Metternich could write to Russian co-minister of foreign aairs Nessel-
rode that the work of the three monarchs (Alexander I, Francis I, and Frederick 
William III) had produced real and positive results. Nor had the British and 
French governments raised additional objections to the allies’ course of action. 
France remained a hotbed of revolution, but Metternich believed that for the 
moment Italy had been paci	ed.6
For the moment, indeed. As Russia’s diplomats continued negotiations in Lai-
bach, they paid close attention to how allied actions in Naples would be repre-
sented and received. ey insisted that the intervention adhere to the legal forms 
and prescriptions of the Quadruple and general alliances. Equally signi	cant, 
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they did not equate the repression of constitutional government in the Kingdom 
of the Two Sicilies with outright rejection of liberal political principles. Even the 
inuential foreign policy adviser Aleksandr S. Sturdza, who consistently defended 
the dignity of sovereigns and religion, feared that intervention might provoke war 
between Ferdinand I and his son, the heir presumptive.7 As Sturdza admitted in 
a report to co-minister of foreign aairs Kapodistrias from 31 December 1820/12 
January 1821, the germs of revolution had taken root in Germany, Italy, and Swit-
zerland. Europe had divided into two systems, one old and the other new. Among 
the states constructed on ancient foundations (anciennes bases), Sturdza named 
the great powers—Austria, Prussia, and Russia—together with second-order 
powers such as Denmark, Electoral Hessen, Hanover, the Roman (papal) state, 
Sardinia, and Saxony. States built upon the new constitutional system included 
Baden, Bavaria, Britain, France, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the 
Two Sicilies, Württemberg, and the two peninsulas (sic) of the American conti-
nent. e European political system, in other words, had changed forever.
e constitutional party, in Sturdza’s analysis, had become preponderant and 
therefore commanded resources such as the universal language and the univer-
sal motor composed of money, commerce, navigation, and science. Religion, by 
contrast, had become a weak weapon in the struggle against “the unbridled ten-
dency toward general emancipation.” Referencing the revolutionary situation 
in Spain, Sturdza pointed out that entire social classes had lost their property, 
the press refused to publish opinions favoring the legal regulation of speech, 
and sectarians of license (sectateurs de la license) now controlled the inquisition. 
In these conditions, defenders of the old system, struggling to counter exalted 
passions and revolutionary storms, possessed only one means of resistance: the 
austere voice of experience and duty, grounded in good faith and love of God. 
Sturdza saw in the paci	cation of Naples not a solution to, but a respite from, 
the revolutionary assault on religion and duty, which in its recent manifesta-
tions had gone beyond what even the French Jacobins had attempted. Sturdza’s 
recognition of the revolutionary threat seemed at once prescient, reactionary, 
and potentially reformist. Alongside irreligion, he also cited injustice and 	scal 
insolvency as vulnerabilities that explained the rebels’ success. But while intel-
lectuals and diplomats such as Sturdza believed that only the wholesale defeat of 
revolution could guarantee peace, the so-called holy allies interpreted their right 
to intervene in Naples dierently.8
e intervention in Naples was at once a suppression of revolution and a pol-
icy of enlightened reform. As the conferences in Laibach demonstrated, neither 
at home nor abroad did the Russian monarchy espouse unyielding opposition to 
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political change.9 Although the holy allies, supported ocially by France’s repre-
sentative and unocially by Britain’s, had refused to recognize the revolutionary 
government in Naples or negotiate with its representative, they nonetheless as-
sumed that King Ferdinand I’s restoration would include political reforms.10 At 
the start of the meetings, the Russian government once again pushed to conclude 
a legal act that all the governments of Europe might sanction. Characterizing 
the Troppau decisions as preparatory and preliminary, Russia’s diplomats tried 
to enhance the solemnity and legality of the 	nal decisions that would be made 
in Laibach. An ocial opinion approved by Emperor Alexander on 30 Decem-
ber 1820/11 January 1821 argued for a formal allied statement, based on the recog-
nized legal principles that governed the meetings of the European sovereigns and 
their plenipotentiaries. According to the Russian government, in matters such as 
the revolution in Naples, allied deliberations constituted a legal duty unrelated 
to questions of convenience or suitability. Russia’s position did not imply that a 
new political alliance should be formed; rather it aimed to arm the system that 
had given peace to Europe, independence to nations, and the means for govern-
ments to promote the happiness of their peoples. In accordance with established 
treaties, which required allied action on behalf of governments threatened by the 
events in Naples, the Italian states also had been invited to Laibach. In the end, 
given Britain’s continuing neutrality, the allies expressed appreciation for, but 
nonetheless rejected, the Russian proposal. As the plenipotentiaries of Austria, 
France, and Prussia put the matter, the forms followed in Troppau seemed ad-
equate to ensure that the policy of unity and general solidarity would continue 
to de	ne relations among European states.11
During January 1821, the three sovereigns who had accepted the Troppau pro-
tocol also reached agreement with King Ferdinand I of the Two Sicilies, who 
pledged to mediate between his people and the European alliance to eliminate 
the menace posed by the Neapolitan Revolution. Ferdinand had been allowed 
to leave Naples on the assumption that he would defend the constitution; how-
ever, upon arriving in Laibach, he reversed course and requested allied assistance 
to restore his authority.12 With the understanding that the great powers would 
take no action before all possible means of reconciliation had been attempted, 
the king accepted the allies’ refusal to recognize the current subversive govern-
ment, including its representative in Laibach. Ferdinand thus appointed his own 
plenipotentiary, the Duke of Gallo, whom he called to Laibach to hear the ex-
planations of allied policy.13 e Duke of Gallo would return to Naples with a 
letter from Ferdinand to his son, the Duke of Calabria, denouncing the political 
changes implemented since 2 July 1820. e Duke of Gallo also would deliver 
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joint instructions to the diplomatic representatives of Austria, France, Prussia, 
and Russia who served at the court of Naples. Again, Britain remained neutral, 
as did the Roman state; however, the plenipotentiaries of the Italian states of 
Modena, Sardinia, and Tuscany all accepted the plan.14
On 18/30 January, the Duke of Gallo met with allied plenipotentiaries to 
hear the instructions and dispatches that he would deliver to Naples.15 As the 
conference pronouncements made clear, the allies expected the king to be re-
stored to power, and they promised not to impose a war levy on the population 
of the Two Sicilies as long as formal resistance did not materialize. Tellingly, the 
allocution delivered by Metternich also implied that the great powers possessed 
the authority to decide what course of action served the true interests of the Two 
Sicilies and Europe. Peace and well-being, the allies consistently proclaimed, 
could be ensured only within the general alliance, which the current Neapolitan 
government had abandoned.16
Among the documents presented to the Duke of Gallo, a Russian rescript of 
9/21 November 1820 described the transactions of 1814, 1815, and 1818 as a pact 
of solidarity among all the Christian states of Europe, which aimed to ensure 
the territorial integrity, political independence, and internal tranquility of each 
country.17 Addressed to Count Gustav O. Stackelberg, Alexander I’s envoy in 
Naples, and composed before Ferdinand I of the Two Sicilies agreed to come 
to Laibach, the rescript included the invitation to the king.18 Stackelberg was 
instructed to act in concert with the representatives of Austria and Prussia to 
persuade Ferdinand that only by meeting with the allied sovereigns in Laibach 
would he be able to save his country from the disasters of revolution and war. 
Only by accepting the allied proposal could he lead the Two Sicilies to rec-
onciliation with itself and the world. If the king asked why the British and 
French monarchs had not signed on to the invitation, the Russian envoy was 
told to reply that irrespective of the invitation, Britain would never legitimize 
the revolution in Naples and France would cooperate with the allies to ensure 
the repose of Europe. Indeed, in 1815 France had accepted allied guarantees 
(guaranties concertées) of its institutions, and in 1818 the country had been ad-
mitted into the general alliance. Allied policy toward the Two Sicilies followed 
exactly this course: the location had changed, but not the system (or policy). In 
1815 the powers had embraced the European cause, and in 1820 they intended 
to defend it.19
e Russian version of the common instructions accepted in Laibach also was 
addressed to Count Stackelberg.20 e instructions began with a review of key 
points elucidated in earlier documents. Motivated by duty to their states and the 
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world, the allied sovereigns had negotiated with Ferdinand I of the Two Sicilies, 
who intended to mediate between his people and the alliance, from which his 
kingdom had been separated since the July events. Committed to the path of 
reconciliation, the king hoped to save his country from further misfortunes, 
while the allies sought to save neighboring states from the threat posed by the 
revolution. e allies had decided to act during the conferences in Troppau, 
where they also had recognized that the Neapolitan Revolution could not be 
treated as an isolated event. Unfortunately, despite the ongoing bene	ts of the 
general paci	cation, the spirit of trouble and disorder, the cause of widespread 
desolation, had revived. e situation in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies had 
become so grave that the current allied action, based on the transactions of Vi-
enna, Paris, and Aix-la-Chapelle, could only be interpreted as favorable to the 
general interest in the repose and happiness of all Europe.
e sectarians in Naples, by contrast, seeking political reform through revolt 
and crime, in reality had attacked religion, morality, and social bonds. Equally 
signi	cant, they had violated their vows to a legitimate sovereign. Having 
usurped the king’s authority, their revolution could lead only to anarchy and 
military despotism. e allies appreciated Ferdinand I’s desire to avoid civil war 
through compromise; however, they would never accept the current government 
and so had taken steps to end the disorders, preferably by force of reason. Simply 
put, the allies expected the king to persuade his peoples to suppress the revolu-
tionary regime, a course that spontaneously would return the Two Sicilies to 
amicable relations with the states of Europe and to membership in the general 
alliance. With this goal in mind, the allies had invited Ferdinand to explain how 
he planned to restore an order of things that could ensure the well-being, true 
interests, and stability of his subjects and the future security and tranquility of 
neighboring states. If this outcome could not be achieved, the allies would have 
no choice but to use armed force to end the disorders.
As the instructions to Stackelberg further recounted, King Ferdinand under-
stood and accepted the allies’ terms. To save his peoples from war and coercive 
measures, he wished to persuade them to disavow the political changes that had 
occurred. He believed, moreover, that his paternal voice would be heard. e 
monarch’s message would be communicated in a letter to his son, the Duke of 
Calabria, describing the negotiations in Laibach. Stackelberg and other allied 
representatives on the ground in Naples would then be responsible for explain-
ing to the duke that his father’s letter also corresponded to the decisions of their 
respective sovereigns. In the process, they would exhort him to recognize the 
urgency of the situation, repudiate the revolution, and accept his father’s advice.
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In two additional dispatches, both dated 19/31 January 1821, Stackelberg re-
ceived further instructions concerning communications with the Duke of Ca-
labria about allied policy, the cooperation of King Ferdinand I, and plans for a 
temporary army of occupation that might or might not be used.21 Again, the 
instructions repeated previous admonitions about the unacceptability of the 
current government, the isolation of the Two Sicilies from the states of Europe, 
the king’s desire to serve as mediator in reconciling his country with the alliance, 
the need to guarantee peace and repose for all the governments of Italy, and 
	nally, the inevitability of war, if the kingdom did not reject the revolutionary 
regime, which threatened the “happiness, strength, and survival of every polit-
ical and civil society.”22 Here too Stackelberg’s task was to convince the duke 
that peace, prosperity, and the exercise of legitimate rights were incompatible 
with the existence of a government formed in revolt. For this reason, if military 
intervention became necessary to end the crisis and restore the king’s authority, 
Emperor Alexander stood ready to send Russian troops to assist the allied army. 
Again it seems that although the great powers did not intend to compromise the 
territorial integrity or independence of Ferdinand’s kingdom, they did presume 
to de	ne the true interests of a second-order state.
Aer concluding negotiations with King Ferdinand and explanations with 
the Duke of Gallo, the allied plenipotentiaries discussed Austria’s plan for the 
army of occupation. Presented by Prince Metternich, the Austrian proposals 
described the troops poised to cross the river Po and march into the Kingdom 
of the Two Sicilies as an allied army operating on the basis of the transactions of 
Troppau and Laibach.23 e army would assist Ferdinand in an auxiliary capac-
ity, and assuming that voluntary submission to the king’s authority occurred, 
no indemnity or military contribution would be imposed on his peoples. e 
Austrian plan also called for an occupation of three years, regulated according 
to the forms that had been followed in France aer the victory over Napoleon. 
e allies then promised to help Ferdinand 	nancially, primarily as loan guaran-
tors, and to meet with him in 1822 to evaluate the kingdom’s internal condition 
and the duration of the occupation. e conference journal for 21 January/2 
February 1821 recorded formal approval of Austria’s military proposals, includ-
ing Alexander’s pledge to provide 	nancial assistance to Ferdinand. Prussia’s 
plenipotentiary also responded positively, though he had not yet received in-
structions from his government about the 	nancial guarantees. France likewise 
accepted that coercive measures might be necessary but refused to participate 
in a war against Naples; and the British representatives, who were not autho-
rized to give an opinion, armed their king’s commitment to the alliance. e 
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representatives of Modena, the Roman state, Sardinia, and Tuscany likewise 
lacked the authority to discuss military intervention but deferred to the pre-
sumably wise views of the Austrian emperor.24
Aer reviewing Austria’s plan for the occupation, the allies considered King 
Ferdinand’s project for political reconstruction.25 At the conference of 8/20 Feb-
ruary 1821, Prince Ruo, acting as royal plenipotentiary, presented the king’s 
thoughts (pensées) on the principles of reform.26 To enhance the monarch’s un-
derstanding of the needs and interests of his peoples, the plan envisioned sep-
arate administrations for Naples and Sicily, united under one scepter. In both 
parts of the kingdom, a consultative body would debate legislation and admin-
istrative measures prior to enactment, on the assumption that the “interests of 
the crown, the well-being of the kingdom, and enlightened justice” were of a 
piece. Provincial councils would allocate taxes, and communal administration 
would serve the needs of the communes and the preservation of their patrimony 
(patrimoine). Over the next two days, Austria, France, Prussia, Russia, and the 
participating Italian states (Modena, the Roman state, Sardinia, and Tuscany) 
approved the proposed principles of reform. In supporting Ferdinand’s ideas, 
Emperor Alexander highlighted the favorable response of the Italian states, 
which were most impacted by the events of 2 July, and expressed the hope that 
application of the proposed principles would, in accordance with article 4 of the 
protocol of 7/19 November 1820, lead to the creation of a stable order of things. 
Ideally, this order of things would be built upon foundations that would not 
require foreign assistance to guarantee the tranquility and independence of the 
Italian states.27
e formal closure of the Laibach conferences took place on 14/26 Febru-
ary 1821. Austrian troops had entered the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies on 6 
February, and on 7 March the Neapolitan army would be destroyed at Rieti. 
Satis	ed that the principal goal of the Troppau and Laibach meetings had been 
achieved, the allies agreed to reconvene in Florence in September 1822.28 e 
three sovereigns also arranged to stay in Laibach to monitor the intervention.29
It seemed as if the allies had succeeded in both addressing the revolutionary 
situation in Naples and preserving the alliance, despite disagreements. But they 
would enjoy only a brief respite from further crisis. On 9–10 March 1821, in-
surrection broke out in the Kingdom of Sardinia-Piedmont, where yet another 
provisional government proclaimed the Spanish constitution of 1812. King Vic-
tor Emmanuel I abdicated in favor of his brother, Charles Felix, who then ed 
to Laibach to appeal for allied support. Austria again intervened and on 8 April 
defeated the Piedmontese Revolution.30 To justify this unanticipated action, the 
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plenipotentiaries of the three powers, still in Laibach, issued a declaration, dated 
30 April/12 May 1821, which explained the need to repress rebellion in both Na-
ples and Piedmont.31 eir swi response did not, however, end the revolution-
ary threat. Greek subjects of the Ottoman Empire, a special Russian interest, 
also rebelled in March, and within a few months the allies faced the prospect 
of renewed war. In the midst of the volatile Greek crisis, Emperor Alexander I 
again worked to preserve allied unity and organize concerted action, based on 
the agreements of 1814, 1815, and 1818.
e Russian-Ottoman War Scare of 1821–22
Allied decisions in Troppau and Laibach assumed that not only military suc-
cess but also public perception of the intervention in Naples had broad implica-
tions for peace in Europe. e Spanish Revolution continued to be a problem, 
though before the allies could collectively address that situation, the start of the 
Greek independence movement created a more immediate crisis. Following the 
outbreak of the Greek insurrections, the future of the Ottoman Empire, the 
so-called Eastern Question, emerged as a critical problem for European diplo-
macy. During the crisis of 1821–22, Russia’s diplomats focused on the same issues 
of rebellion, intervention, and legitimate sovereignty that had occupied the al-
liance since the revolt in Spain. In the Ottoman sphere, however, the potential 
consequences of intervention extended beyond the suppression of insurgency 
into the centuries-old relationship between Christianity and Islam. Russia in 
particular had a long history of military conict, political entanglement, and 
treaty relationships with the Ottoman Empire. From the perspective of Emperor 
Alexander I, the legal obligations already binding the two empires appeared no 
less essential to European order than the transactions of 1814, 1815, and 1818. 
Further complicating the situation, Russian-Ottoman tensions carried broad 
implications for the interests of other great powers operating in the Balkans, the 
Mediterranean, and North Africa. Precisely because the allies continued to be-
lieve in allied unity and to view European society as a distinct entity, their most 
immediate goal became the avoidance of war and preservation of the Ottoman 
Empire. To achieve this goal, they needed to monitor one another’s thoughts, 
actions, and intentions, which they tried to do through the substance and stag-
ing of concerted action.
e backdrop to the crisis of 1821–22 lay in the Russian Empire’s military 
and diplomatic successes during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centu-
ries. Following the military conicts of 1768–74, 1787–92, and 1806–12, Russia 
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occupied a strong position in the ongoing struggle with the Ottoman and Per-
sian empires to control the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Transcaucasia. Critical 
Russian interests included internationalization of the Black Sea, free commercial 
navigation through the Straits of the Bosporus and Dardanelles, protection of 
the Christian religion and Orthodox coreligionists living under Ottoman rule, 
support of Balkan aspirations for political autonomy within the framework of 
Ottoman suzerainty, and 	nally, in the aermath of the Napoleonic Wars, use 
of the European political system to preserve peace and ensure adherence to es-
tablished treaty obligations. With the Treaty of Bucharest, signed in 1812, the 
Russian monarchy committed itself to preservation of the Ottoman Empire, 
enforcement of recognized territorial agreements, the principle of legitimism, 
and defense of sovereign authority.32 Still, the reconciliation proved eeting, for 
even in the best of times, the potential for conict between these chronic foes 
only partially abated.
In the era of European restoration, implementation of the Porte’s treaty obli-
gations to Russia did not proceed as Emperor Alexander I had hoped. Tensions 
quickly arose over delimitation of the Caucasian border, Russia’s role as defender 
of Serbia’s recently acquired political autonomy, and guarantees of free naviga-
tion in the Black Sea and the straits.33 Negotiations conducted by Alexander’s 
envoy Baron Grigorii A. Stroganov were ongoing, and as late as June 1817, the 
Russian government continued to proclaim that the Porte sought friendship and 
that the diplomatic endeavors in Constantinople would produce results. Rus-
sian-Ottoman disputes also had been addressed during the Congress of Vienna, 
though the Hundred Days had ended the discussions, and going forward Alex-
ander rejected the possibility of European participation in this long-standing bi-
lateral relationship. In the monarch’s view, neither the Ottoman nor the Persian 
Empire belonged to the political association de	ned by the treaties of Vienna 
and Paris.34 is approach prevailed until March 1821, when rebellions erupted 
among the Ottomans’ Greek subjects. Within a few months, the threat of yet 
another Russian-Ottoman war loomed large.35
e immediate crisis in 1821 resulted from multiple uprisings among the 
Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire: Greeks in Moldavia, led by Alex-
andros Ypsilantis (Alexander Ypsilanti), who recently had retired from Russian 
military service; Greeks in the Morea, in Attica, essaly, Macedonia, Epirus, 
and the Aegean Archipelago; and a peasant revolt in Wallachia, led by Tudor 
Vladimirescu against the Ottoman-appointed hospodar (governor) and great 
landowners. Equally ominous, Turkish reprisals against Christian civilians 
in the Danubian Principalities and Constantinople led to the destruction of 
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churches and the murder on Easter eve (22 April 1821) of Ecumenical Patriarch 
Grigorios V.36 Although Baron Stroganov continued to report diplomatic prog-
ress, these developments, together with ongoing violations of Russia’s economic 
and other treaty rights, convinced Emperor Alexander that the Porte intended 
to wage war against the Orthodox religion.37
Torn between the obligation to protect Christian subjects of the Ottoman 
Empire and the post-Napoleonic commitment to legitimist principles, Emperor 
Alexander consistently opposed the Greek rebellions. By late June, the revolts 
in the principalities had been suppressed.38 But Ottoman troops remained, and 
atrocities, committed by Greeks and Turks, continued.39 In these circumstances, 
diplomatic declarations had no eect, and on 6/18 July 1821, Baron Stroganov 
delivered an ultimatum addressed to the Porte by the Russian government. 
Russia’s demands included: (1) restoration of destroyed and damaged churches; 
(2) protection of the Christian religion and the rights of Christians; (3) recog-
nition of the distinction between innocent Greeks and those responsible for 
the troubles; and (4) a role for Russia in the paci	cation of Moldavia and Wal-
lachia, as established by the spirit of existing treaties. Stroganov’s instructions 
also authorized him to soen the tone of the note, if he thought such a gesture 
might be useful or justi	ed. But the Porte remained silent, and once the speci	ed 
eight-day waiting period had passed, the Russian envoy carried out his orders 
to leave Constantinople with all diplomatic personnel. Aer this formal break 
in diplomatic relations, the possibility of war became very real, encouraged in 
Russia by key foreign policy and military advisers and by pro-Greek sympathies 
in educated society. A period of dangerous uncertainty and grinding diplomacy 
ensued. Eventually, the Russian monarch, who had condemned the Greek rebels 
from the outset, opted for peace in the interest of European unity.40 How did 
this happen, and what did it reveal about Russia’s relationship to Europe?
When news of the Ypsilantis revolt reached the allies in Laibach, Emperor Al-
exander immediately disavowed support for both Ypsilantis and Greek rebellion 
against Ottoman authority. At the same time, the Russian monarch expected a 
collective response from the allies and therefore wanted to ascertain what their 
position would be if circumstances forced him to take military action (as Austria 
had done in Italy). More modestly, he hoped that the allied governments would 
publish a common declaration on the crisis, in order to mold public opinion and 
limit unfavorable press coverage. Beginning in the spring of 1821 and continuing 
into October, Russia’s diplomats in Berlin, London, Paris, and Vienna received 
instructions to pressure allied courts to support Alexander’s call for concerted 
action. e monarch also communicated directly with Francis I, George IV, and 
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British foreign secretary Castlereagh.41 Britain already had opposed intervention 
in Naples, but Russia still hoped to win Austrian, British, and French support in 
case of war with the Ottoman Empire.42
In 1821–22, even though the Ottoman Empire did not belong to European 
society, Russia’s policymakers approached relations with the Porte and insurrec-
tion in Moldavia, Wallachia, and Greece from the perspective of the European 
system. ey assumed, therefore, that the maintenance of peace could not be 
le to any one great power. Because the European alliance had a role to play 
and a responsibility to ful	ll, Russian diplomats, including the tsar diplomat, 
insisted that both the European allies and the Porte adhere to established treaty 
obligations and that the Ottoman Empire resume its place in the (European) 
political order. us, when the Russian government informed the allies of the 
July ultimatum to the Porte, Emperor Alexander also appealed for support and 
suggested that collective military force might be needed to pacify the East.43
Convoluted as this thinking sometimes appeared, it had the eect of prioritizing 
allied unity in the pursuit of international reconciliation.
e note of 6/18 July, delivered to the Porte by Baron Stroganov, began by pro-
claiming Russia’s commitment to the conservation of the Turkish government, 
considered necessary for the maintenance and consolidation of peace in Eu-
rope.44 Aer the 	rst signs of insurrection had appeared in Moldavia and Wal-
lachia, the Russian government had encouraged the Divan, the supreme council 
of the Ottoman government, to take measures to suppress the revolutionary evil. 
Equally telling, over the previous 	ve years, Russia’s diplomats had worked to 
ensure the “religious ful	lment of the treaties.” In other words, through coop-
eration with the Porte, Russia sought to stamp out rebellion and end the ca-
lamities aicting the people of the principalities, who, despite the insurrection, 
nonetheless remained innocent and loyal to the Ottoman government. Russia 
accepted the need to use military force to deliver Moldavia and Wallachia from 
the foreigners who had undermined internal tranquility; however, such force 
should be deployed wisely under the protection of a reparative government and 
in accordance with the public law of the principalities. Unfortunately, rather 
than following this course, Ottoman policy encouraged sympathy for the very 
people who attacked the Porte’s authority. In this manner, the Porte imparted 
to insurrection the character of a legitimate defense of the Greek nation and 
its church.45
During past crises, the Russian note continued, the Ottoman government 
had not encouraged Muslim subjects to persecute Christians. In this instance, 
however, the conditions of coexistence that for so long had prevailed in the 
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Porte’s European territories had been violated. Four centuries had passed since 
such vicious attacks on Christianity, exempli	ed by the murder of the patriarch 
and the destruction of churches, had been witnessed. e Porte, in other words, 
appeared to be waging war against the Christian religion. Unable, therefore, to 
	nd in the existence of the Ottoman Empire a guarantee of peace, Russia faced 
the prospect of being forced to defend its “insulted faith, broken treaties, and 
persecuted coreligionists.” At this juncture, the Porte should recognize, based 
on the representations of the great powers, that Russia’s cause constituted a Eu-
ropean cause. e Christian monarchs of Europe would not be able to ignore the 
repressions inicted both on the people responsible for the troubles and on the 
Greek nation en masse. Current Ottoman policies clearly threatened European 
peace, oended the Christian religion, and amounted to the extermination of 
a Christian people.
Although Russia’s immediate actions purportedly aimed only to defend the 
general interest, the treaties of Kuchuk Kainardji (1774) and Bucharest (1812) 
also remained in eect. Kuchuk Kainardji stipulated Russia’s right to protect the 
Greek religion in all the states of the Ottoman Empire. Bucharest assigned to the 
Russian government political rights in Moldavia and Wallachia. us, in press-
ing Russia’s claims against the Porte, the note of 6/18 July 1821 subsumed under 
the mantle of the European alliance the right to protect the Christian religion 
and Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire, as prescribed by earlier treaties. 
Invariably proclaiming the pure and peaceful intentions of the Russian mon-
arch, the language of the note ignored potential distinctions between the Greek 
church and other Christian denominations, as well as between Greeks, Molda-
vians, and Wallachians, whose insurrections unfolded as separate movements.46
Baron Stroganov’s ultimatum to the Porte likewise insisted that Russia’s de-
mands remained what they always had been. Furthermore, because the Porte’s 
policies posed a danger to the Ottoman Empire itself, acceptance of the condi-
tions would bring salvation to the Turks. Either the Porte had been operating 
under the inuence of fanatics or its policies had resulted from free will and a 
well-reasoned plan. In either case, Emperor Alexander demanded an explana-
tion, while also expressing the hope that the current policy could be altered by 
removing from power a few lost men. By accepting Russia’s claims, the Porte 
would show that it possessed the power to change course and once again engage 
in negotiations with Christian governments. Paci	cation in the principalities of 
Moldavia and Wallachia, to which Russia should contribute based on the spirit 
of the treaties, could then become a model for the paci	cation of Greece. If, by 
contrast, the Porte did not end the repressive and inhuman measures now being 
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applied, the Ottoman Empire would be in a state of open hostility against the 
Christian world. Russia’s government would have no choice but to oer refuge to 
Greek combatants, whose struggle would be legitimized. In other words, instead 
of cooperating with the Porte to end the uprisings and restore tranquility to the 
insurgent provinces, Russia and the Christian world would be duty bound to 
protect their brothers in religion from blind fanaticism. Russia remained com-
mitted to the conservation of the Ottoman Empire and the ful	llment of estab-
lished treaty obligations. It was the Porte’s responsibility, however, to take steps 
to end the troubles.47 As Russian diplomats depicted the situation, the Porte 
refused to accept the very conditions that would ensure its own salvation. Con-
sequently, the break in diplomatic relations had become unavoidable, and the 
threat of military conict had intensi	ed.
Because the departure of an entire diplomatic mission usually represented a 
step toward war, the ri between Constantinople and Saint Petersburg forced 
the allies to focus on Emperor Alexander’s conditions for the restoration of 
Russian-Ottoman relations. Among the communications generated by the dip-
lomatic crisis, historians have paid particular attention to Britain’s role as allied 
negotiator. In reality, the Russian government did not view allied diplomats as 
negotiators or mediators. eir accepted role was to pressure the Porte to meet 
the monarch’s legal demands, and in the event of failure, to establish a “concert 
of views and principles between Russia and the allied powers.”48 Even before the 
formal break in relations, Russia’s diplomats had connected the crisis in the East 
to European order and the general alliance. In a letter of 22 June/4 July 1821, 
Kapodistrias had explained to Baron Pavel A. Nikolai, Russian chargé d’aaires 
in London, that the Porte’s actions could only be interpreted as hostile toward 
Russia.49 Kapodistrias blamed the British ambassador in Constantinople, Lord 
Strangford, for the allies’ failure to respond to Russian appeals and insisted that 
they support Baron Stroganov’s negotiations.50 e issues identi	ed by Kapo-
distrias included Russia’s demand that the Porte ful	ll established treaty ob-
ligations and respect the Christian religion. Equally signi	cant, Kapodistrias 
reiterated that Emperor Alexander had never supported the Greek insurrections 
and had even tolerated Ottoman reprisals against rebellious subjects.
From the summer of 1821 until the war scare temporarily abated in the spring 
of 1822, the Austrian and British governments remained suspicious of Emperor 
Alexander’s objectives and worked collaboratively to prevent a Russian-Ottoman 
war. Although the issues they identi	ed and the diplomatic arguments they 
presented did not necessarily correspond, for Russia, the potential dangers of 
Austrian-British cooperation became painfully evident when Metternich and 
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Castlereagh met in Hanover from 20 to 29 October 1821 (NS). During the years 
of arduous diplomacy that followed the Congress of Vienna, the appearance of 
a uni	ed alliance could be as important as substantive agreement or disagree-
ment. us, under the guise of unity, Christoph Lieven, Russia’s ambassador 
in London, traveled to Hanover to convey Emperor Alexander’s con	dence in 
his allies.51
Lieven arrived in Hanover on 28 October, having learned along the way that 
Count Bernstor, Prussia’s minister of foreign aairs, had been invited to the 
meetings, but had declined to attend.52 Based on conversations with Castlereagh, 
Lieven then reported to Nesselrode that because the allies feared military con-
ict, they had not responded to Russia’s eorts to ascertain what their positions 
would be in case of war. Metternich and Castlereagh agreed, however, to instruct 
their respective diplomats in Constantinople to pressure the Porte to compro-
mise, so that direct communications between the Russian and Ottoman govern-
ments could be restored. e ministers seemed to understand that before negoti-
ations could resume, Russia expected to see evidence of military evacuation and 
just administration in the Danubian Principalities. Both ministers also wrote 
to Alexander not only to oer moral support, but also to express opposition to 
military action. For the moment, Britain opposed both Greek independence 
and the removal of Ottoman power from Europe. Although Lieven generally 
presented British policy in a positive light, he nonetheless saw in the Hanover 
meetings the potential for “a separate alliance [combinaison isolée], alien to the 
interests of Russia and contrary to the principles of the general alliance.”53 Rus-
sia’s envoy in Vienna, Iurii A. Golovkin, stated outright that with respect to the 
Eastern Question (la question orientale), Austrian and British interests stood in 
opposition to those of Russia.54
In Castlereagh’s conversations with Lieven (as reported by Lieven), the British 
foreign secretary highlighted three issues: apprehensions based on Russia’s diplo-
matic communications, particularly the ultimatum to the Porte of 6/18 July 1821; 
the British government’s refusal to consider participation in an armed conict; 
and 	nally, fears about the consequences of a war, including the political alliances 
that might result. Lieven believed that he had eectively calmed British anxiety 
about Russia’s intentions, and as a result, Britain now accepted the Austrian ver-
sion of Emperor Alexander’s conditions for the restoration of Russian-Ottoman 
relations. In addition, although both Austria and Britain recognized Russia’s 
demands as legal, just, moderate, and wise, the British government still hoped 
that Alexander would allow some leeway in the mode and form of Ottoman com-
pliance. Lieven continued to claim that the British government misunderstood 
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Russian policy, and while in Hanover, he insisted that Alexander’s demands 
could not be altered. Not only did they represent the only way to prevent war; the 
monarch also had a right to ask his allies to insist that the Porte comply. is did 
not mean that the desire for allied support and agreement in case of war consti-
tuted a call for military action. Emperor Alexander aimed only to preserve peace 
by means of an allied entente. In other words, it was critical that the enemies of 
disorder not be able to view Russian-Ottoman hostilities as an isolated war that 
portended the dissolution or weakening of the European alliance.55
Despite Lieven’s concerns about a four-power entente (Austria, Britain, 
France, and Prussia), he did not equate the Hanover meetings with the forma-
tion of an allied grouping directed against Russia.56 To the contrary, Austria and 
Britain, while eager to prevent war, did not want to oend Alexander. Suspi-
cions among the allies threatened their unity, but in the present circumstances, 
even if Russia went to war, Lieven did not expect the alliance to be harmed. In 
fact, he anticipated allied support for Russia, if military conict erupted. With 
hindsight, Lieven’s appraisal seems overly optimistic. e ambassador assumed 
that Britain recognized Russia’s treaty right to protect the Greek population 
of the Ottoman Empire, and he characterized Alexander’s immediate goal as 
eective paci	cation of the Danubian Principalities. e monarch’s conservative 
policy treated the principalities and Greek territories as Ottoman provinces. 
Equally promising, Russia’s position accorded well with Castlereagh’s reported 
belief that European peace would be better served if Christians lived within the 
Ottoman Empire. is would ensure the presence of a Christian population, 
as opposed to millions of “fanatical” and “vengeful” Muslims, along Russia’s 
borders. What Lieven did not mention, or perhaps did not understand, was that 
Alexander’s policy of paci	cation assumed a role for Russia inside the European 
provinces of the Ottoman Empire, including the archipelago and mainland of 
Greece. As Nesselrode explained in a con	dential expedition to the ambassador, 
dated 27 November/9 December 1821, Russia had to be associated with any peace 
proposals directed at the Greeks, based on the empire’s treaty right to protect 
coreligionists.57 But before this could happen, Russia’s diplomatic relations with 
the Ottoman Empire had to be restored. In other words, paci	cation of the 
Porte’s rebellious subjects could not begin before Lord Strangford convinced 
the Ottoman government to implement Russia’s requirements for the renewal 
of diplomatic negotiations.
At the end of December 1821, Austria, Britain, and Russia had not yet found a 
common path forward that could prevent war between the Russian and Ottoman 
empires. In a personal letter from Kapodistrias to Lieven, dated 27 November/9 
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December 1821 and approved by Alexander I, the co-minister of foreign aairs 
emphatically proclaimed that neither the Austrian nor the British government 
understood Russia’s position vis-à-vis the Porte.58 Rather, both seemed to inter-
pret the monarch’s diplomatic maneuvers as an eort to legitimize war, while 
drawing the allies into support for Russia—an interpretation that (from the 
Russian point of view) months of diplomacy contradicted. e focus of Kapodis-
trias’s letter concerned Russia’s obligation to protect the Christian subjects of the 
Ottoman Empire. Before Russia could negotiate, based on established treaties, 
the Porte needed to take concrete steps to ful	ll Alexander’s conditions, an in-
tention that could be demonstrated only by implementing “principles of human-
ity and justice toward the Christians.” Instead, the Porte had pursued a policy 
of vengeance and destruction directed against Greeks in Moldavia, Wallachia, 
Smyrna, Cyprus, and Crete. It was precisely Turkish persecution of Christians 
that had caused the rupture in Russian-Ottoman relations. Consequently, Em-
peror Alexander demanded a return to the conditions of March 1821, including 
respect for treaty obligations toward Russia’s coreligionists.
A second issue identi	ed in Kapodistrias’s letter concerned the possibility 
that together the allies and the Porte might reach an agreement with the Greeks 
without Russian participation. e co-minister insisted that only through direct 
and active Russian involvement in the paci	cation of the principalities would it 
be possible to rectify the errors and moderate the hopes of the Greeks. But until 
Russia and the Porte returned to normal diplomatic relations, there could be no 
Russian participation. For seven months Alexander had asked only that the Ot-
toman Empire ful	ll established treaty obligations. If the monarch had wished 
to drag the allies into war, he could have marched an army toward the principal-
ities. e allies, having previously recognized the justice of Russia’s grievances, 
would not have been able to condemn the military action. Assuming, Kapo-
distrias added, that Ottoman troops would have succumbed to Russian forces, 
Alexander also would have been in a position to dictate the terms of the peace. 
Yet in contrast to this scenario, the monarch’s intentions remained moderate. 
roughout the crisis he had kept in view the interests of the European system. 
For precisely this reason, he sought to engage the allies in a discussion of how, by 
acting in concert, they could preserve “the tranquility of Europe and the moral 
character of the European alliance.” Once again, Kapodistrias instructed Lieven 
to try to convince the British government that the Russian monarch continued 
to seek peace, as he had done since the troubles began in Moldavia and Walla-
chia. At the same time, notwithstanding Alexander’s patience, the monarch still 
considered war a possibility and hoped to obtain from the allies a commitment 
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to address in concert any consequences that might result. Indeed, in the case of 
war, Alexander’s calculations would concern not the exclusive interests of Russia, 
but those of the general alliance.
Lieven’s conversations with Castlereagh, which had begun in Hanover, con-
tinued in London, where once again the ambassador failed to obtain a commit-
ment to support Russia in a war against the Porte.59 Castlereagh did conrm, 
however, that Britain had no plans to mediate between the rebellious Greeks 
and the Ottoman government, a possibility suggested by the British role in ne-
gotiations between Spain and the Spanish American colonies. British media-
tion would require simultaneous invitations from both parties to the conict, 
an unlikely development given the sensitivities of the Divan and the lack of local 
authority among the Greeks. Britain, committed to the survival of the Ottoman 
Empire, also rejected the idea of an allied guarantee that the Porte would fulll 
its obligations to the Greeks. Nor did the British government believe that a gen-
eral pacication of the Ottoman provinces would succeed or even be consistent 
with British interests.
Ambassador Lieven accepted that given the uncertainty surrounding the 
Greek crisis, the British government hesitated to pronounce on a course of ac-
tion. Even aer reports of Greek military success against Ottoman troops and 
greater unity among rebel leaders reached London, British leaders sought to pre-
serve the Ottoman Empire, though they also expressed little condence in the 
Porte’s ability to restore order among its Christian subjects. Indeed, Castlereagh 
associated the Greek insurrections with revolutions in other countries and stated 
plainly that the Greek cause should not be characterized as a natural defense. 
e foreign secretary therefore hoped that Emperor Alexander would be able 
“to draw a line between the legitimate interest that the oppressed Greeks have 
the right to demand from Russia, based on the treaties, and the guilty men who 
march today under the banner of revolt.”60
Serious dierences among the allies persisted, but by January 1822, the great 
powers achieved a measure of consensus on how to approach the Greek ques-
tion. ey agreed that the Porte stood in legal violation of established treaties 
in relation to both Russia and the Greek/Christian population of the Ottoman 
Empire. e allies likewise viewed the Greek insurrections as part of the larger 
revolutionary upheaval spreading across Europe. Agreement on these principles 
did not, however, satisfy Alexander I’s expectations or ease allied pressure on the 
monarch to soen Russia’s demands. In reports from December 1821 and January 
1822, Russia’s envoy in Vienna, Iurii Golovkin, reported to Nesselrode that Met-
ternich’s depiction of the Eastern crisis aimed to make Russia appear responsible 
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if war broke out.61 e Austrian government believed that a Russian-Ottoman 
war would represent the triumph of the revolutionary faction in Europe and 
therefore insisted that Russia drop the three moral demands contained in the 
ultimatum to the Porte. By contrast, the one legitimate material demand, evac-
uation of the principalities, should be preserved. Although Metternich viewed 
the Greek rebellions within the broader framework of stopping the spread of 
revolution in Europe—a goal that required allied agreement—Golovkin admit-
ted that he had been unable to persuade the Austrian minister of the rightness of 
Russia’s position. Golovkin also remained suspicious of Metternich’s intentions, 
suspected a bilateral Austrian-British eort to intervene in the Greek cause, and 
expected Austrian neutrality in case of war. Equally concerning, Metternich 
continued to criticize Russia’s acceptance of Greek refugees and to accuse Alex-
ander’s government of supporting Greek Etairists, members of a political organi-
zation originally based in Odessa who stood behind the Ypsilantis uprising and 
sought to liberate Greece through armed insurrection.62
Emperor Alexander’s response to the Austrian claim that a war between the 
Russian and Ottoman empires would represent the victory of the revolutionary 
party in Europe appeared in a communication from Nesselrode to Golovkin, 
dated 31 January/12 February 1822 and approved by the monarch.63 Nesselrode 
began by highlighting the shared commitment of the Austrian and Russian 
courts to preserving the moral force of the European alliance, the intimate 
union of the allied powers, and the European peace that the powers had en-
joyed for the past seven years. In the mind of Alexander, the moral force of the 
alliance included protection of the peoples from subversive projects. us, the 
Russian government wanted to discuss whether or not war, which seemed inev-
itable, would advantage the revolutionaries, threaten the alliance, and imperil 
European peace. According to Nesselrode, the Russian answer to this question 
implied a need for action, whereas Austria’s policy remained one of inaction. 
As Russia’s diplomats repeated over and over again, since June 1821 Emperor 
Alexander had sought an allied remedy to the crisis based on persuasion. But 
if the Porte continued the current course, the use of force would be necessary. 
Consequently, in the event of war, the Russian government stood ready to act in 
concert with the allies.
If agreed upon in advance, the Russian government believed, war would en-
danger neither the general alliance nor peace in Christian Europe. Russia had 
no desire to become the sole arbiter of the Ottoman Empire’s destiny, and for 
this reason, the august friends of Emperor Alexander did not fear his intentions. 
Nesselrode tried to distinguish between Alexander’s fellow monarchs and the 
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allied governments fearful of Russia’s aims. Critics of Alexander’s foreign policy 
argued that a war against the Turks would make Russia an eective auxiliary 
of insurrection. ey also expressed concern about the potential for Russia to 
become bogged down militarily, which could prevent the empire from assisting 
allies faced with revolution. Such fears were unfounded, Nesselrode insisted, 
for Russia had never supported the Greek rebels and had been prepared to oer 
military assistance during the troubles in Italy. Equally important, Emperor Al-
exander’s principles in relation to Greece had always been noble and pure.
Nesselrode went on to identify two problems in need of an allied response. 
First, the allies must bring to an end the conict between the Muslims and the 
Greeks; and second, they must address the obstinance of the Turkish govern-
ment and the germs of anarchy and dissolution that existed within the Ottoman 
Empire. Since June, Nesselrode continued, Emperor Alexander had been asking 
his allies to deliberate on what their common response would be if the current 
crisis did not subside. Over the course of nine months the allied policy of con-
ciliation had failed to mitigate the evil that ravaged the East. Although the crisis 
had originated in the Greek insurrections, the Porte’s policy had aimed not to 
suppress the revolutionaries, but to attack the entire Greek nation. From the per-
spective of the Russian government, the Porte had pursued a war of extermina-
tion against Greek merchants, proprietors, and clergy, not just against sectarians. 
In other words, Muslims had been armed against Greeks in the name of religion. 
So if the allies hoped to dissuade the entire Greek nation from following the 
agitators, the Porte had to distinguish the innocent from the culpable. If the 
Porte hoped to achieve Greek submission to Ottoman authority, the innocent 
would have to receive guarantees of security, including pardons for those who 
had supported the revolutionaries in error.
But guarantees for the innocent would be useless, if the Ottomans continued 
to violate broader treaty obligations to Russia. If this happened, the present mis-
fortunes would go on inde	nitely, leading to the total annihilation of the Greek 
nation. To prevent this, either the Turks had to be persuaded to change course 
or armed intervention had to be used. Action in the Levant (the islands and 
coastal areas of the eastern Mediterranean ruled by the Ottomans) might pro-
duce unforeseen consequences; however, if the Porte did not cede to the power 
of reason, they would succumb to force. Russia would make clear that Emperor 
Alexander wanted to preserve the Ottoman Empire and the peace by cooperat-
ing with the Porte “for the reestablishment of tranquility in Greece on solid and 
durable foundations.” is policy would not encourage illegitimate hopes, but by 
enhancing the Greeks’ sense of security, it would allow them to repel agitators 
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and choose a moderate path forward. Inaction, by contrast, would allow the 
troubles to continue, thereby increasing the revolutionary threat across Europe. 
In these conditions, Russia would not be responsible for the eects of inaction 
or the broadening crisis.
Russia Chooses Peace
Although recent scholarship focuses on Austrian-British eorts to block Rus-
sian action during the crisis of 1821–22, there can be no question but that Em-
peror Alexander I sought to avoid war. Clearly, the monarch continued to see 
the European alliance as the best means to preserve peace. is is why histori-
ans of the Greek independence movement are careful to distinguish the rebels’ 
expectations of Russian support from the actual assistance they did or did not 
receive.64 Dmitrii P. Tatishchev’s 1822 missions to the Austrian court—missions 
that Alexander hoped would persuade the allies to act in concert (concerter) to 
protect Russia’s treaty rights—embodied the commitment to allied unity. e 
impetus to send Tatishchev to Vienna was Emperor Alexander’s ongoing disap-
pointment with eorts to dispel what he considered the Porte’s illusions. None 
of the allies, especially Austria and Britain, had committed to strong support of 
Russian interests. Aer close to a year of diplomatic conversation and evasion, 
Austria had failed to press upon the Porte the legitimacy of Russia’s demands. 
Instead, the threat of war had increased. To rectify this situation, Tatishchev 
received orders to convince Metternich of the need for (and justice of) forceful 
concerted action and, once again, to assess what Austria’s reaction would be, if 
the Russian monarch decided to go to war.65
Emperor Alexander’s instructions to Tatishchev appeared in a rescript dated 
5/17 February 1822.66 From the outset the monarch made clear that Tatishchev’s 
mission concerned the most vital interests—interests that the crisis in the East 
threatened and that could be protected only through the general alliance, as 
opposed to the exclusive combinations of the old policy.67 e substantive in-
structions began with a summary of Alexander’s response to Austria’s proposals 
of 23 December 1821 concerning Russia’s claims against the Porte, which was also 
transmitted to his agents at allied courts.68 By the time of the mission, Austria 
had assumed the lead role in allied negotiations with Constantinople, and as the 
Russian monarch made clear, at the Vienna court Tatishchev spoke for his sover-
eign. As the instructions emphasized, even though Austria represented the most 
likely allied participant in the crisis, Alexander expected cooperation from all 
the great powers. Repeatedly, he insisted that the grave matters at hand needed 
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to be resolved collectively “in the spirit of the alliance and for the common sal-
vation [salut] of all the States of Europe.” According to the monarch, the current 
task of the European allies was to protect interests threatened by the crisis in the 
Levant, if necessary by deploying an armed force that would act for the general 
good in the name of the alliance.69 e interests at stake represented one aspect 
of Russia’s relations with the Porte, and to compromise those interests would 
threaten the order of things enshrined in established treaties.
Having identi	ed Russia’s interests with the common European good and 
desire for peace, Emperor Alexander highlighted the danger posed by allied in-
action and by failure to convince the Porte to change course so that diplomatic 
relations with Russia could be restored. Continuation of the impasse would force 
Russia to act alone, a step the allies clearly hoped to forestall. As if to counter 
allied apprehensions that he aimed to expand Russia’s economic and territorial 
interests at Ottoman expense, Alexander warned that in the event of unilateral 
Russian action, the factions working to disrupt social order in Europe might 
easily conclude that the alliance was broken.70 e monarch reiterated his desire 
to avoid war, a position he believed Russian diplomacy already had established. 
However, if the Porte remained obstinate and the use of force became necessary, 
collective allied action would be more eective than any unilateral measures 
taken by Russia. Alexander rejected the potential claim that to address the Porte 
in the name of Europe was tantamount to recognizing the Ottoman Empire as 
a European power. To the contrary, the purpose of collective European action 
would be to return the Ottoman Empire to the position it had occupied in the 
political order of March 1821, before the start of the Greek rebellions.
Emperor Alexander’s instructions to Tatishchev can be read as a justi	cation 
of Russian demands and a plea for allied support. Repeatedly the monarch de-
scribed the policy of the Ottoman government as a threat to the tranquility of 
Europe. Russia’s calls for a formal allied guarantee to specify the actions that 
would be taken if the Porte refused to accede to Russian demands remained 
unanswered, though eventually the allies did promise moral support in the event 
of war. In the meantime, it was the job of Alexander’s diplomats to prod the 
allies into articulating a uni	ed position. Based on the events of the previous 
nine months, the monarch had concluded that without a change in the allied ap-
proach, the Ottomans would continue to violate established treaty obligations. 
Indeed, if the Porte rejected the modi	ed conditions put forward by Austria, 
Russia expected to employ coercive measures in the name of the alliance. Al-
exander understood that any movement of Russian troops into the Danubian 
Principalities would lead to war, even if Russia did not declare war. But backed 
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by an allied guarantee, the nature of which was not speci	ed, this war of con-
cert (guerre concertée) would quickly produce satisfactory results and would not 
compromise peace in other parts of Europe. Again, allied agreement in outlook 
and principle represented the best protection against the misfortunes caused by 
particular combinations—just the sort of combinations that Napoleon had used 
to break up multiple coalitions in the wake of French military victories.
Alexander ended the instructions by comparing the act he currently hoped 
to conclude with the Troppau protocol signed by Austria, Prussia, and Russia 
in November 1820. Russia’s expectations of the allies followed directly from 
the actions negotiated in Troppau and Laibach. Never mind that Britain and 
France had not formally acceded to the Austrian intervention in Naples. ey 
had not openly opposed it, and the ri had neither violated nor undermined the 
alliance. Similarly, if Russia acted alone to protect its interests in the East, this 
would not indicate a lesser commitment to the spirit of the alliance or to the 
principles upon which it rested. Ongoing communication, nimble and adaptable 
application of eternal principles to practical realities, mutual respect for the vital 
interests of the great powers, and an understanding of allied unity that allowed 
for unilateral military action—these were the hallmarks of the post-Napoleonic 
grand alliance.
Key to Emperor Alexander’s eventual decision to opt for peace was the allies’ 
recognition that Russia possessed a legal right to act. By February 1822, the time 
of Tatishchev’s 	rst mission, Russia had modi	ed its original ultimatum to the 
Porte, based on the Austrian proposals supported by Britain.71 Henceforth allied 
communications concerning the conditions for renewed diplomatic relations 
employed Metternich’s iteration of Russia’s demands: (1) restoration of destroyed 
Orthodox churches; (2) protection of the Orthodox religion; (3) recognition of 
the distinction between guilty and innocent Greeks; and (4) evacuation of the 
Danubian Principalities, accompanied by the appointment of hospodars and the 
establishment of a reparative administration.72 About a month aer arriving in 
Vienna, Tatishchev could report to Nesselrode (10/22 March) that because the 
Porte still refused to evacuate the principalities and even demanded the return 
of territories ceded to Russia by the Treaty of Bucharest, Emperor Francis I now 
described the Porte’s conduct as intolerable and expressed the belief that his fel-
low sovereign Alexander possessed the right to decide how Russia would obtain 
satisfaction. On 28 March/9 April, Tatishchev again wrote from Vienna that 
the Austrian government continued to act in a spirit of justice and would accept 
the Russian monarch’s decision about the use of force. Prussia also promised to 
adhere to allied diplomatic measures (2/14 March), and France acknowledged 
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Russia’s rights once the position of the other allies became clear. In early to 
mid-April, Russian ocials still expected war, but they also remained con	dent 
that should hostilities become unavoidable, allied support—no mention was 
made of material support—would be forthcoming.73
is appraisal continued into May, when Ambassador Lieven regretfully re-
ported that he had failed to obtain from ocials in London the guarantee of 
support desired by his sovereign. e memorandum of 6/18 February, sent to 
Alexander I’s representatives at the courts of Vienna, London, Paris, and Berlin, 
had included a proposal for a secret protocol whereby the allies would pledge to 
break diplomatic relations with the Porte (commercial agents could continue to 
operate) should the Porte not accept Russia’s modi	ed conditions.74 In keeping 
with Alexander’s demand for proof of action on the fourth condition, the pro-
posal called for complete evacuation of Moldavia and Wallachia, the establish-
ment of a provisional administration under Greek kaimakams (until permanent 
hospodars could be appointed), and the appointment of Russian and Ottoman 
plenipotentiaries to regulate jointly the ful	lment of treaty obligations in the 
principalities. Because recognized treaties placed the Ottoman Empire’s Chris-
tian provinces under Alexander’s protection, the proposal assumed that Russia 
would participate in ensuring their happy existence. Russia likewise wanted the 
allies to guarantee to the inhabitants of the insurgent provinces freedom of reli-
gion and security of property, person, and communal existence. Perhaps antici-
pating the refusal to sign on to a formal declaration, the proposal concluded by 
explaining that Alexander would be content with an allied statement supporting 
the justice of Russia’s demands and a declaration of neutrality in the event of a 
Russian-Ottoman war.
In a report to Nesselrode from 19 April/1 May 1822, Lieven described ongoing 
discussions with Castlereagh during which the foreign secretary spelled out Brit-
ain’s opposition to Russia’s proposal for an allied protocol.75 While Tatishchev 
appeared to make progress in Vienna, Lieven continued to complain about the 
cautiousness of the British government and Castlereagh’s preference for infor-
mal diplomatic communication. According to the foreign secretary, the British 
government would not be able to justify before the British public the break in 
diplomatic relations that Emperor Alexander hoped to see. Such a step would 
endanger the property of British subjects within the Ottoman Empire and in-
vite violent reprisals, which then could lead to war. No responsible ministry 
could sanction war in pursuit of an interest not directly relevant to the British 
nation.76 Britain also opposed Russia’s insistence that the Porte respond directly 
to the original ultimatum, arguing instead for the acceptability of other forms 
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of communication. Finally, Castlereagh forcefully objected to the demand that 
the Porte act in concert with Russia to restore order in the Christian provinces 
of the Ottoman Empire. is would constitute an infringement of sovereignty 
by making Russia a “co-State” inside Ottoman territory. Indeed, the idea of com-
mon measures implied the existence of common rights, which further implied 
shared sovereignty. Britain’s understanding of Russia’s obligation to protect the 
Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire did not envision immediate or direct 
protection, but rather rested on the Porte’s responsibility to protect its Christian 
subjects. e creation of a continual guarantee on behalf of the insurgent prov-
inces would be equivalent to a Russian assumption of legislative authority in-
side the Ottoman Empire. Finally, as a noncontracting power, Britain could not 
guarantee commitments agreed to by the Russian and Ottoman governments.
Lieven countered that given the Muslim atrocities aicting the Porte’s Chris-
tian territories—Russia’s diplomats invariably neglected to mention Greek atroc-
ities—the Russian government did not see how the insurgent provinces could 
be paci	ed or future dissension prevented without Russian-Ottoman agreement 
on the measures to be adopted. In fact, Russian participation in the paci	cation 
process would serve the interests of the Ottoman Empire, for only under the pro-
tection of an allied guarantee to ensure a happy existence could the Porte’s Greek 
subjects place their future in the hands of the Turkish government. Despite this 
telling argument, Emperor Alexander understood, and Lieven accepted, that if 
the Porte refused to accept Russia’s demands, allied declarations of support for 
the Russian position would necessarily conform to the dignity and interests of 
each individual government. e collective force of these declarations would 
then guarantee that the Porte ful	lled the obligations agreed to in negotiations 
with Russia. Within these limits, moreover, the Divan would be compelled to 
choose between formal repudiation by the allies and their good oces. To sus-
tain this conclusion in the interest of a united alliance, Russia’s diplomats had 
no choice but to engage in wishful thinking.
e British government remained eager to end the Russian-Ottoman crisis 
and therefore encouraged Emperor Alexander to treat the four points of the 
ultimatum as the goal of, rather than the precondition for, negotiations. To sup-
press the insurrection and to secure Russia’s treaty rights and obligations on 
behalf of the rebellious Greeks, the Russian and Ottoman empires 	rst needed 
to reestablish diplomatic relations. As things stood, Russia’s four demands rep-
resented a path to war. Although established treaties supported the Russian 
conditions, the Porte would never agree to them. Russia, for its part, would not 
abandon the four points or the Greek people. Before relations with the Porte 
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could be restored, the Russian monarch wanted assurances that the insurrection 
would end—assurances that required the Porte to change course. Castlereagh 
applauded Alexander’s good intentions, commitment to the general cause of 
peace, and solicitude for the happy future of the Greek nation, but the British 
government could not support a formal guarantee for the Christian provinces of 
the Ottoman Empire. In an ocial memorandum submitted to Lieven, Britain 
did agree to support Russia’s four demands, if the Russian government pledged 
to restore diplomatic relations once the Porte accepted them and removed Ot-
toman troops from the principalities.77 In the end, Lieven and Castlereagh both 
recognized that while their governments shared a common goal, they disagreed 
on how to achieve it. Once again, moreover, as in the case of Naples, Russia did 
not interpret the disagreements as a threat to a united alliance.
Despite ongoing dierences among the great powers, the fruits of the alli-
ance’s adaptability became visible by May 1822, when Ottoman troops began 
to leave the principalities and Russia’s diplomats could report evidence of the 
Porte’s willingness to compromise, including the nomination of hospodars. 
In a letter to Britain’s ambassador in Saint Petersburg, Charles Bagot, Nessel-
rode wrote that evacuation of the principalities would demonstrate the Porte’s 
intention to abide by existing treaties. is would open the door to the 	rst 
act of peace, the sending of plenipotentiaries to discuss the bases for restoring 
Russian-Ottoman relations.78 In a rescript of 14/26 May, Emperor Alexander 
congratulated Tatishchev on the success of his earlier mission and ordered him 
back to Vienna as part of the ongoing allied eort to persuade the Porte to ful	ll 
Russia’s demands. Alexander had decided against military action, but he retained 
the right to reconsider. Over the next few months he continued to expect allied 
diplomacy, now entrusted to the British ambassador in Constantinople, Lord 
Strangford, to press for humane treatment of the Greeks and the restoration of 
hospodar administration in the principalities.79 War had been averted, because 
both Austria and Britain had committed to pressuring the Porte to satisfy Rus-
sia’s just demands. But the deeper conict had not been resolved.80 Only aer 
complete evacuation of the principalities and the restoration of free navigation 
in the Black Sea and the straits would Alexander be prepared to reestablish dip-
lomatic relations with the Porte. During conferences of allied plenipotentiaries 
that began in Vienna at the end of June, the Russian monarch kept open the 
possibility of war. As the meetings continued in July, he held fast to the idea of 
joint action should the Porte reject allied demands. e Russian government 
doubted the Porte’s good intentions, which meant that the call for concerted 
action did not recede.
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As early as February 1822, Russian military commanders had begun to develop 
war plans in case negotiations with the Ottoman Empire failed.81 By September 
most Ottoman troops had been withdrawn from Moldavia and Wallachia, and 
the sultan had nominated new hospodars, or governors. e hospodars came 
from indigenous boyars and princes rather than Phanariot Greeks; however, 
the Porte had not consulted the Russian government about the appointments.82
From Constantinople Lord Strangford also reported that at conferences with 
the Ottoman minister of foreign aairs (the reis efendi) held on 27 August, 
the Divan, the council of state presided over by the grand vizier, had formally 
rejected Russia’s proposal for a meeting of plenipotentiaries, declaring that 
there could be no role for the allies in the paci	cation of Greece.83 In a letter to 
Strangford, Prince Metternich con	rmed the allies’ understanding that all four 
conditions had to be met before the Russian monarch would restore diplomatic 
relations with the Porte. e Ottoman government continued to challenge the 
allies by insisting that it had carried out the 	rst three demands of the Russian 
ultimatum: the reconstruction of churches, protection of the Orthodox religion, 
and recognition of the distinction between the innocent and the culpable. In 
reality, only in Constantinople had protection for the Greek religion been re-
stored. Nor had the military evacuation of the principalities been completed. 
Lord Strangford’s proposal that the Porte communicate directly with Saint Pe-
tersburg concerning the appointment of the hospodars also had been ignored. As 
the reis eendi explained, although in the past Emperor Alexander’s minister in 
Constantinople had been informed of the nominations, such action could not 
occur in the absence of diplomatic relations.84
A clear statement of Russia’s position on the restoration of diplomatic rela-
tions with the Porte, approved by Alexander on 9/21 September 1822, appeared 
in the formal record of the allied conferences that opened in Verona on 20 Oc-
tober (NS).85 With respect to Russian-Ottoman relations, Alexander’s decision 
not to go to war already had been made, and allied negotiations with the Porte 
were ongoing. e discussions in Verona, like those in Laibach, can therefore 
be described as a staging of the European alliance. During eighteen months of 
discussions with the Porte, the Russian statement began, Emperor Alexander 
had declared his peaceful intentions.86 Nor had he tried to augment Russian 
inuence. To the contrary, he wanted only to return to the conditions that had 
existed before the insurrections in Greece, including recognition of Russia’s 
treaty rights and other political and commercial advantages. In actuality, the 
parameters of Russia’s demands had broadened. Before diplomatic relations 
with the Porte could be restored, three conditions had to be met. First, direct 
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negotiations between plenipotentiaries of the allies, the Porte, and Russia had 
to be organized to discuss the paci	cation of Greece (not just Moldavia and 
Wallachia). e purpose of these negotiations would be to provide guarantees 
for the Greeks who once again would submit to Ottoman sovereignty. rough 
concrete action, the Porte would need to demonstrate respect for “the religion 
that the letter of the treaties placed under the protection of Russia.” In other 
words, the bases for peace in Greece had to satisfy Russia’s concern for the fate 
of its coreligionists by ensuring their happiness and security. Second, with regard 
to the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, Russia expected to receive direct 
noti	cation of Ottoman plans to complete the military evacuation and nomi-
nate hospodars.87 Once these steps were taken, Russian consuls could return to 
the principalities as ocial veri	ers (commissaires véricateurs) to con	rm that 
the measures adopted by the Porte and hospodars conformed to the treaties and 
repaired the damage caused by the military occupation. Finally, free trade in the 
Black Sea had to be restored. Greek merchants ying the Russian ag handled 
Russia’s grain trade, which for the past year had suered disruptions.88 To restore 
free navigation, the Porte could allow Portuguese, Sardinian, Sicilian, Spanish, 
and other ships to pass through the straits, or it could respect the ags own by 
these vessels. e Russian statement concluded by forcefully proclaiming that 
the allies had accepted the justice of Emperor Alexander’s conditions.
A second statement of Russian policy, contained in a note of 14/26 Septem-
ber 1822, was submitted to the plenipotentiaries of Austria, Britain, France, and 
Prussia.89 Included also in the acts of the Verona conferences, this note can be 
read as a preliminary version of the declaration of 28 October/9 November, 
which the allies would formally approve and which embodied the success of 
concert diplomacy in preventing war between the Russian and Ottoman em-
pires. Comparison of these documents illustrates Emperor Alexander’s ongoing 
willingness to modify, moderate, and even obscure Russia’s demands in order 
to give allied diplomacy a chance to work, a tactic he had pursued since the 
fall of 1821. But the monarch also had reviewed the diplomatic communications 
produced during eighteen months of negotiations in Constantinople and had 
come to the painful conclusion that no progress had been made. Not only did 
the Porte refuse to satisfy Russia’s just demands; in recent conferences with the 
British ambassador, Ottoman ocials falsely accused the Russian government of 
supporting the Greek insurrections, and they claimed that all treaty obligations 
to Russia had been ful	lled. To counter this characterization, the Russian note 
described the Greek uprisings as the work of the same sects that had triumphed 
in Spain and Portugal, achieved temporary victories in Italy, and remained an 
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ongoing threat to other states in Europe. Russia denied any role in fomenting 
or supporting revolt in Greece and insisted that the Porte, which had not fully 
evacuated the Danubian Principalities or agreed to send plenipotentiaries to ne-
gotiate with the allies, remained in violation of recognized treaty obligations.
e facts set forth in the Russian note aimed to disprove the Porte’s accu-
sations. First, Russia had joined the allies to combat revolution in Naples and 
Piedmont. Second, Russian foreign policy invariably followed the same rules. 
ird, there existed in Europe a vast conspiracy directed against the security of 
thrones and the happiness of peoples. If subaltern agents of the Russian Empire 
supported revolution in Greece, they acted against the monarch’s explicit orders. 
e Russian government had been waiting a year for the Porte to answer Em-
peror Alexander’s demands, and during this period, despite the absence of insur-
gency in the principalities, Ottoman forces continued to destroy religious sanc-
tuaries and towns. Commerce in the Russian Empire’s southern provinces also 
remained in a state of paralysis. Indeed, the allies recognized the moderation, 
frankness, and steadfastness of Russian policy, and they likewise understood 
that Alexander did not seek to expand Russian inuence. Rather, he wished 
only to secure the political rights and commercial advantages already guaran-
teed by existing treaties. Precisely because the allies acknowledged Russia’s just 
demands, Alexander had entrusted negotiations concerning the restoration of 
relations with the Ottoman Empire to Austrian and British diplomats.
With one signi	cant exception, the statements of Russia’s conditions for re-
storing relations with the Porte were identical in the note of 14/26 September 
and the subsequent declaration of 28 October/9 November.90 e 	rst condition 
relevant to the paci	cation of Greece appeared in the same form in both docu-
ments. In one scenario, the Porte would negotiate with allied and Russian pleni-
potentiaries concerning guarantees for Greeks who returned to living under the 
Ottoman sultan’s authority. In an alternative scenario, the Porte would demon-
strate through concrete measures respect for the Christian religion, which ex-
isting treaties placed under Russian protection. In addition, the Porte’s actions 
should exhibit a desire to restore domestic tranquility to Greece on grounds 
that ensured peace and satis	ed Russia’s concerns about the fate of its coreli-
gionists. e second condition, which addressed the situation in Moldavia and 
Wallachia, contained wording in the September note that did not appear in the 
November declaration. e Porte would notify Russia about the military evac-
uation of the principalities and the nomination of hospodars. Russian agents 
would then return to the territories to exercise the rights granted by the treaties 
and to verify that the steps taken by the Porte and the new princes met treaty 
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obligations. Removed from the November declaration was the demand to repair 
damage caused by the Ottoman military occupation, wording that implicitly 
challenged the sultan’s sovereignty in the Danubian Principalities. Finally, the 
third condition called for the restoration of free commercial navigation in the 
Black Sea, where the Porte could permit the passage of Portuguese, Sicilian, 
Spanish, and other vessels, or respect ships ying the ag of navies previously 
allowed in these waters.
e ocial declaration of Russia’s position on the aairs of the East, read 
by Dmitrii Tatishchev at the conferences of 28 October/9 November, received 
approval in individual allied responses of 22 November (NS).91 In addition to 
the modi	ed conditions for restoring relations with the Porte, the declaration 
also contained a full summary of developments since the summer conferences 
in Vienna, where allied plenipotentiaries had accepted Russia’s demands as just, 
based on a communication from Metternich dated 31 July. At a conference on 
26 July in Constantinople, Ottoman ministers had accused Russia of hostile in-
tentions and of trying to interfere in the internal aairs of the Ottoman Empire. 
But during this time, the Porte continued to violate treaty obligations. Ottoman 
troops remained in the principalities, and attacks on Christianity persisted, in-
cluding the destruction of Jassy. For the past year, under the auspices of the allies, 
Russia had pursued the best means to restore peace in the Christian provinces of 
the Ottoman Empire. Nor had Russia acted against Ottoman interests. Yet the 
Porte still refused all reciprocity, including a meeting of plenipotentiaries, and 
continued to restrict Russian commercial navigation in the Black Sea. Finally, at 
a conference of 27 August, the Ottoman government again had accused Russia 
of complicity in the disastrous Greek uprisings, which in reality represented the 
work of the same revolutionary sects that had infected Spain, Portugal, and Italy. 
e Porte, it seemed, had forgotten the diplomatic overtures of Baron Stroganov 
and the fact that Emperor Alexander had ordered his troops to march against 
revolutionaries in Naples and Piedmont. Despite the mutual recriminations, in 
November 1822, the Russian monarch stood by his oer to act with the allies to 
restore peace in Greece.
On 15/27 November, during the conferences in Verona, Tatishchev could de-
clare that his sovereign was satis	ed with allied promises to take additional steps 
through their ambassadors in Constantinople to pressure the Porte to accept 
Russia’s conditions for the restoration of diplomatic relations. e European 
alliance, directed by the 	ve great powers, once again appeared fully united, as 
Austria, Britain, France, and Prussia all accepted the Russian declaration of 9 
November.92 Another declaration, approved by Alexander on 16/28 November, 
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acknowledged the allies’ response.93 e allies appreciated the sacri	ces Russia 
had made for peace in Europe and intended to continue their eorts to persuade 
the Porte to accept Russia’s just and moderate conditions. For the moment, Em-
peror Alexander had decided to act in concert with the great powers to resolve 
the Greek crisis and to convince the Porte of the need for amicable interven-
tion by the European allies. rough the conferences established in Vienna, the 
monarch would continue to rely on allied diplomacy to conduct negotiations 
in Constantinople. Based on the Verona declarations, it appeared that Alex-
ander would not insist on bilateral negotiations between Saint Petersburg and 
Constantinople to decide matters concerning the principalities or Russia’s rec-
ognized treaty rights. On 20 November, the allies meeting in Verona agreed not 
to sign a general protocol, and on 3/15 December, Emperor Alexander departed 
the conferences.94
If the diplomacy surrounding the war scare of 1821–22 revealed an eective 
European system capable of containing great power competition to ensure peace, 
this was not the result of shared governance or a collective security regime de-
	ned by recognized legal principles and administrative procedures. Between 1814 
and the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1853 successful peacemaking evolved 
from the exibility of the grand alliance and the ideal of unity that inspired the 
monarchs and diplomats of Europe.95 From the Russian perspective, memories 
of the Napoleonic Wars, particularly the trauma of 1812, reinforced the belief 
that only through allied unity and the prevention of particular combinations 
among the great powers could peace be preserved. Emperor Alexander’s desire 
for peace could not have been more powerful. It was so powerful, in fact, that it 
eclipsed long-standing strategic, economic, and political interests. e realiza-
tion of Catherine II’s plans for territorial aggrandizement and the restoration 
of a Christian monarchy in Constantinople—as recently as 1812 Russia had ac-
quired Bessarabia from the Ottoman Empire—had been temporarily set aside. 
us, during the war scare of 1821–22, the concert of great powers did not group, 
contain, or constrain Russia. Alexander I remained committed to allied unity 
and continued to rely on friendship among the sovereigns to preserve peace. 
Equally important, he opted for peace only aer the European powers recog-
nized the Russian Empire’s legitimate demands and right to act.96 Because of the 
moral support given to Russia, and the commitment to collective negotiations, 
represented here by the actions of Austria and Britain, the monarch decided to 
give diplomacy a chance.
Not surprisingly, the subsequent history of the Greek independence move-
ment exposed fundamental 	ssures in the much-touted European system. By 
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February 1824, diplomatic relations between the Russian and Ottoman empires 
had been partially restored. Still, allied conferences held in Saint Petersburg in 
June 1824 and March 1825 failed to produce a common policy toward Greece. 
In a memorandum of 9/21 January 1824, Emperor Alexander had proposed the 
creation of three semiautonomous principalities under Ottoman suzerainty, an 
arrangement modeled on political arrangements in the Danubian Principalities 
and Serbia. e response had been disappointing. Austria and Prussia showed 
no interest in supporting the claims of Greek rebels against their legitimate sov-
ereign. British ocials, the Ottoman sultan, and Greek leaders also refused to 
discuss the proposal. In the summer of 1825, Russia once again seemed headed 
toward unilateral action against the Porte. Even the cautious Count Nesselrode 
adopted a pro-war position, and Alexander, dissatis	ed with Strangford’s con-
tinuing mediation between Russia and the Porte, ended allied negotiations in 
late July. In December the Russian monarch died, and uncertainties surround-
ing the succession allowed the empire’s 	rst modern political opposition, led by 
elite military ocers, briey to attempt revolution.
Aer a temporary pause, diplomatic eorts to address the Greek crisis and 
Russian-Ottoman disputes resumed in 1826. Britain and Russia signed the Saint 
Petersburg Protocol, adopting a Greek request for mediation.97 In October 1826 
the Porte accepted the Convention of Akkerman in response to an ultimatum 
from Emperor Nicholas I, who continued to express disdain for the Greek rebels. 
e convention armed the obligation to implement Russian-Ottoman treaty 
provisions and to remove the last Ottoman troops from the Danubian Prin-
cipalities. Parallel to these developments, the European powers continued the 
eort to negotiate a common policy. Finally, on 6 July 1827, Britain, France, and 
Russia agreed to the Treaty of London, which called for the establishment of 
an autonomous Greek state under Ottoman suzerainty. e signatories rejected 
participation in Greek-Ottoman hostilities, though based on a secret article, 
they agreed to force the Greeks and Ottomans to accept an armistice. Not sur-
prisingly, the Porte continued to reject allied mediation. On 20 October 1827, 
following the establishment of a joint British, French, and Russian blockade to 
prevent Ottoman arms and troops from reaching Greece (already a violation of 
the Treaty of London), the allied squadron destroyed the Ottoman eet in the 
Bay of Navarino. en on 30 November, Nicholas withdrew from Akkerman. 
In December the sultan followed suit, vowing also to 	ght Russia to protect his 
empire. is step produced a formal break in diplomatic relations with Britain, 
France, and Russia, based on the Treaty of London. Full-scale war between the 
Russian and Ottoman empires began in April 1828, with no allied participation 
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or support for Russia. e allies did, however, provide military, naval, and 	nan-
cial assistance to the Greek government. Finally, on 22 March 1829, the Porte 
agreed to Greek autonomy, and on 3 February 1830, the London Protocol estab-
lished Greece as an independent monarchy.98
Unity amid Divergence
During the years from 1820 through 1822, Europe’s peacemakers responded 
to insurrections in Spanish America, Spain, the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, 
Portugal, Piedmont, and Greece by focusing on questions of legality, reform, 
and revolution. As in earlier discussions about conditions in France and Ger-
many, in the negotiations about possible intervention in Spain and the Two 
Sicilies, Russian policymakers, instructed by Emperor Alexander I, continued 
to proclaim the need for good governance and political reform, including even 
constitutional reform, to prevent rebellion and preserve peace. But although 
reform could appear both desirable and necessary, the overthrow of legitimate 
rulers could not be tolerated, even when popular disaection seemed justi	ed. 
e allies remained united on this principle, and although Britain and France 
did not ocially participate in the Troppau and Laibach conferences, they did 
not openly oppose collective action by the other great powers. Perhaps more 
revealing, when revolutionary situations directly impacted British and French 
interests, as in Greece and Spain, they actively embraced the commitment to act 
in concert. roughout the period from the Congress of Vienna (1814–15) until 
the French intervention in Spain (1823), all the principals among the great pow-
ers viewed revolution as a scourge, and all agreed that the scourge had infected 
much of Europe.
e Greek crisis and Russian-Ottoman war scare of 1821–22 exposed chal-
lenges to the eternal principles of European peace—challenges that arose from 
developments beyond the con	nes of Europe. At the same time, events on the 
ground and ongoing allied negotiations also highlighted the limits to Emperor 
Alexander’s enlightened vision of European unity. Based on documents of Rus-
sian provenance, the monarch’s moderation and commitment to legality ap-
peared genuine, illustrated by the ri with Kapodistrias and the insistence that 
Stroganov be prevented from encouraging war and spreading extremist views in 
Saint Petersburg society.99 But in relations with the allies, the pressure to address 
political arrangements and questions of stability within the Ottoman Empire 
also brought to the fore long-standing suspicions about Russian objectives. Nor 
did the allies satisfy Alexander’s expectations of what it meant to act in concert, 
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based on the legal obligations and moral duties codi	ed in alliance treaties. Even 
so, despite repeated disappointments embodied in the decisions of Troppau, Lai-
bach, and Verona, allied unity held.
Russia had a long history of diplomatic and military entanglements with the 
Ottoman Empire. e war scare of 1821–22 at once endangered the peace estab-
lished by the Treaty of Bucharest (1812) and represented a successful eort to 
defuse a major crisis within the framework of the European system. Alexander 
expected the allies to recognize Russia’s legal rights, including the right to pro-
tect Christians living under Ottoman authority and the right to use military 
force to compel compliance with treaty obligations. ese expectations, accord-
ing to Russia’s policymakers, were consistent with Prussian and Russian support 
for Austria’s intervention in Naples and with Alexander’s oer of military assis-
tance to France, if Spanish revolutionaries tried to move into French territory. 
Finally, the Russian-Ottoman war scare showed that Emperor Alexander’s idea 
of European unity could not be separated from Christian beliefs, which inside 
and outside of Europe, and certainly within the Russian Empire, undermined 
ideals of enlightened universalism and religious toleration. Both the Treaty of 
14/26 September 1815 (the Holy Alliance) and Baron Stroganov’s note to the 
Porte of 6/18 July 1821 proclaimed the idea of religious coexistence in Europe’s 
relations with the Ottoman Empire. Yet the crisis of 1821–22 exposed ongoing 
religious and nationalist excesses: anti-Greek, anti-Turk, anti-Christian, and 
anti-Muslim. As toleration and cosmopolitanism degenerated into religious and 
national strife, the potential for total war, already evident in the French Revo-
lutionary and Napoleonic Wars, reemerged.100 Moderate reformism, which em-
braced legal-administrative (and even constitutional) change without violence 
against established order, would be tested over and over again.
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Spain and the European System (1820–23)
R estoration Spain’s position in the European alliance oered a bird’s eye view of the challenges confronting political leaders during the peacemaking of 1815 to 1823. e Spanish Revolution represented the 

rst major insurrection of the Restoration era, and in Spain’s American colo-
nies, Enlightenment-inspired and popular movements had been ongoing since 
1808–10. In other words, the vulnerabilities and limitations of the European 
system, as conceived by Russia’s monarch and diplomats in the years following 
the Congress of Vienna, appeared strikingly evident in Spain’s relationship to 
the alliance and in the unstable political conditions engul
ng the peninsula and 
colonies. Well before the great powers (with the exception of Britain) collectively 
recognized the Spanish Revolution as a threat justifying intervention, events in 
Spain began to disrupt implementation of the peacemakers’ vision.
From the perspective of Russian diplomacy, an early challenge to peace in Eu-
rope appeared in Spain’s refusal to accept the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna 
and the Second Treaty of Paris. Based on the treaties of 1815, the duchies of Parma, 
Plaisance, and Guastalla belonged to the archduchess of Austria and wife of Na-
poleon, Marie Louise, and her descendants. Supported by Britain and France, 
Spain claimed that following the death of Archduchess Marie Louise, the terri-
tories should revert to the infante Marie Louise, daughter of the former Spanish 
king, Charles IV; her son, Charles Louis; and his direct male descendants. De-
spite the legality of Spain’s claims and the importance of bringing Spain into the 
general alliance, Emperor Alexander hesitated to oppose Austrian interests. In 
the end, Austrian emperor Francis I accepted territorial adjustments proposed 
by Britain, and in July 1817, Spain acceded to the Final Act of the Congress of Vi-
enna.1 Two years later, the General Act of the Frankfurt Territorial Commission 
(8/20 July 1819) de
ned the line of succession to the Spanish infante, her son, and 
his male descendants. Exceptions included districts on the le bank of the Po, 
recognized as Austrian possessions, and the Principality of Lucca, which at the 
death of the Austrian archduchess would go to the Grand Duchy of Tuscany.2
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Although Spain’s acceptance of the Vienna settlement represented a crucial 
step toward securing the peace, a Russian overview of European politics, dated 
5/17 June 1817, highlighted additional problems. As happened repeatedly in the 
history of the alliance, among European governments suspicions about Russia’s 
intentions abounded.3 In this instance, rumors of a special Russian-Spanish re-
lationship called into question Emperor Alexander’s commitment to the Euro-
pean system. e doubts seemed justi
ed when by an agreement of 30 July/11 
August 1817 Russia sold warships to Spain. Not surprisingly, Alexander rejected 
the hostile characterization and even hinted that Britain should act as mediator 
between Spain and its American colonies.4 Russia’s policy toward Spain, o-
cial statements contended, needed to be understood as part of a larger eort to 
strengthen the integrity (tselost’) of Europe’s general political system through 
moral inuence. To restore the power of the Spanish crown, a process that had 
to occur in both hemispheres, Spain required assistance from all the European 
powers. To that end, Alexander’s diplomats in Madrid received orders to com-
municate Russia’s views to the Spanish king and his ministers, who should be 
urged to reach agreement with Britain about the slave trade and to accept British 
mediation in reconciling with the colonies.5 By the time the great powers met in 
Aix-la-Chapelle in September 1818, both of these suggestions had been accepted.6
Another source of concern arose from ongoing competition between Spain 
and Portuguese Brazil in the territory north of the Rio de la Plata. In 1816 Por-
tuguese troops moved into the disputed territory of Uruguay, and in 1817 they 
occupied Montevideo, extending Brazil’s frontier to the river.7 e 
ve great 
powers unanimously condemned the attacks on Spain’s American territories, 
and when the Spanish monarchy requested assistance, accepted the role of me-
diator in the interest of preserving the general peace.8 A note sent in February 
1817 from the ministerial conference in Paris to the government of Portuguese 
Brazil stated that refusal to accept mediation would be seen as de
nite proof of 
evil intent. e European powers recognized King Ferdinand VII’s legal right 
to the territory but also wanted to make sure that in responding to the dispute 
Spain did not abandon the rules of moderation. According to the Russian over-
view of June 1817, the success of the mediation eort remained uncertain, and 
by the time of the conferences in Aix-la-Chapelle, the conict had not been 
resolved.9 Although the 
ve great powers plus Portuguese Brazil accepted a Brit-
ish proposal for the restitution of Montevideo, in October 1818 Spain had not 
yet agreed to the plan. Nor did the Spanish monarchy succeed in reestablishing 
authority over the colonies. By 1825 the independence movements of Central 
and South America became eectively victorious, though as events unfolded 
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and as the allies faced the harsh realities of revolution on the peninsula, the fate 
of Spanish America seemed less critical to the preservation of European peace.
Early Responses to the Spanish Revolution
When the revolutionary troubles began on the peninsula, neither rebellion in 
the colonies nor the conict with Portuguese Brazil over Montevideo had been 
resolved.10 As the crisis deepened, Russian diplomacy focused less on the Span-
ish monarchy’s relations with the colonies and more on the general problem of 
revolution in Europe. Documents of Russian provenance attributed the revolu-
tion in Spain to the government’s lack of moral authority and to the persistence 
of the revolutionary spirit among sectarians and Jacobins. Here as elsewhere, 
Russia’s diplomats called for political reform and good governance to combat 
disorder. In the mind of Emperor Alexander, support for constitutional reform, 
and sometimes even liberal principles, could be reconciled with the acceptance 
of absolutist monarchy.11 Even when Restoration governments experienced ex-
plosive political conict over the meaning of principles such as constitutionalism 
and the rights of nations (or peoples), Emperor Alexander clung to a view of 
European politics based on strict legality (adherence to treaties) and Christian 
morality. In the monarch’s thinking, calls for liberal reform did not assume the 
acceptance of a speci
c ideology or political system.
Two weeks aer the mutiny led by Lieutenant Colonel Rafael Riego, Count 
Mark N. Bulgari, Russia’s chargé d’aaires in Madrid, wrote to co-minister of 
foreign aairs Nesselrode about the weakness of the Spanish government and 
the boldness of the insurrectionists and their sympathizers.12 In contrast to the 
good order displayed by the rebel troops, the king’s forces appeared demoral-
ized and the monarchy paralyzed. Over the next few weeks, Bulgari’s commu-
nications became increasingly critical of the Spanish government’s inaction, the 
silence of the monarchy’s defenders, and the failure of King Ferdinand VII to 
ful
ll his promises of political reform.13 While acknowledging that a revolution 
had occurred, Bulgari also continued to argue that Ferdinand could salvage what 
had become a dangerous situation for all of Europe by announcing to his na-
tion meaningful reforms. e Russian diplomat even went so far as to urge the 
king to call the Cortes and grant a constitution. e granting of constitutions 
by legitimate monarchs remained consistent with Russian policy, though on 7 
March, when Ferdinand proclaimed the constitution of 1812, he reportedly did 
so under duress to avoid the threat of violence. As Bulgari described the situa-
tion, the king had become a prisoner in his own palace.14
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While Europe watched and waited, Russia’s monarch and Ministry of Foreign 
Aairs held to the belief that the great powers acting in concert could preserve 
the peace. ey also hoped to establish extraordinary forms of deliberation that 
would allow the allied monarchs to respond quickly and eectively to future 
emergencies.15 e Russian desire for collective action became more insistent 
aer Ferdinand decided to accept the constitution. us, to ascertain what al-
lied cooperation might mean, on 3/15 March 1820 Nesselrode wrote to Count 
Christoph Lieven, Russia’s ambassador in London, seeking information on how 
the British government viewed the latest developments in Spain.16 According 
to Nesselrode, precisely because the spirit of insurrection had assumed diverse 
forms, the allies had an obligation to discuss con
dentially how they would 
apply the moral force of the alliance to the revolutionary situation. Quoting a 
communication from Vienna, the co-minister identi
ed several key principles: 
the intimate union (union intime) of the 
rst courts; the spirit of benevolence 
animating the great monarchs; and the uniformity of their thinking and com-
mon experience, which kept at bay all political complications. Given the current 
crisis, did these principles still represent the cornerstone of the social edi
ce? 
To answer this question, Emperor Alexander wanted to know what measures 
the allies would take if: (1) the wisdom and energy of the Spanish government 
failed to suppress the volcano simmering under the throne; (2) the king of Spain 
sought assistance from his allies; or (3) the crisis continued in a manner that 
appeared more dangerous for the peninsula, the colonies, and the rest of Europe.
Austria’s position, communicated to Nesselrode on 13/25 April 1820 by Count 
Iurii A. Golovkin, recognized the threat of the Spanish insurrection, including 
the possibility of a massive revolutionary pact that could engulf the peninsula 
and the colonies.17 Even so, the Austrian government did not accept any allied 
responsibility to act. To date the Spanish king had not sought advice or help 
from the European powers. e Russian government acknowledged this rea-
soning but continued to press for a collective response. On 19 April/1 May 1820, 
Nesselrode wrote to Golovkin, Lieven, and Alopeus (Russia’s representatives in 
Austria, Britain, and Prussia) that Emperor Alexander wished to hold a meeting 
of the allies.18 Stability in France remained fragile, and now the fall of the Span-
ish government threatened disaster for all Europe. Again, Russia viewed allied 
unity, which had saved Europe from the French Revolution and Napoleonic 
conquest, as the best means to resolve the Spanish crisis.
Signi
cantly, King Louis XVIII also appeared ready to discuss action in 
Spain, and the Russian government recognized France’s right to take the ini-
tiative in negotiations concerning the Spanish monarchy. But based on alliance 
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agreements, Alexander and Louis could discuss Spain only aer Austria, Britain, 
and Prussia responded to the overture of 3/15 March.19 Nesselrode therefore ad-
vised the French government to approach the other allies, without referring to 
Russia’s memorandum, also dated 19 April/1 May, which called for allied action, 
if the Spanish government did not rectify the situation.20 As things turned out, 
Britain would consider collective action in Spain only if the royal family or the 
integrity of Portugal seemed to be in danger.21 Unable to respond to Russia’s 
proposal with an ocial statement, due to internal political constraints and op-
position to cooperation with France, Foreign Secretary Castlereagh nonetheless 
communicated to Count Lieven, and to the courts of Vienna and Berlin, that 
Britain remained committed to the general European system.22
Russia’s memorandum to the allies arose from a note of 7/19 April 1820 ad-
dressed to Nesselrode by Spain’s emissary in Saint Petersburg and future foreign 
minister, Francisco Cea Bermúdez (1779–1850).23 e note informed Emperor 
Alexander of Ferdinand VII’s decision to accept the 1812 constitution and ex-
plained why he had done so. e king wished to provide security, tranquility, 
and harmony for his people, and he hoped to thwart insurrection by deliver-
ing happiness in the form of wise and stable institutions that corresponded to 
“the spirit and enlightenment of our time.” Precisely because the Spanish people 
strove for freedom and the glory of the monarch, the king’s action would unite 
the Spanish nation with the legal sovereign and therefore deserved the respect of 
the allies. e constitution of 1812 had been promulgated by the Cortes elected 
in 1810, and the Treaty of Velikie Luki (8/20 July 1812), which Russia had con-
cluded with the anti-Napoleonic Central Junta of Spain, recognized the exiled 
King Ferdinand, the Cortes, and the constitution.24 Based on this treaty, the 
Spanish note proclaimed, Russian acceptance of the king’s recent decision would 
rest on legal grounds.
Emperor Alexander responded to the Spanish appeal in a note of 18/30 April 
1820, addressed to Cea Bermúdez by Nesselrode.25 e monarch recognized that 
the prosperity of the Spanish state could not be separated from the glory of the 
king. In addition, one could argue that the events of March 1820 had become in-
evitable as early as 1814, the year Ferdinand VII returned to the throne. Regard-
less, the illegal act that had subjected Spain to the rule of popular passions could 
not be justi
ed. Russia had accepted the Treaty of 8/20 July 1812 out of respect, 
admiration, and gratitude for Spain’s role in overthrowing the French yoke, sen-
timents shared by all the European powers. e allies also had shown ongoing 
concern for the fate of Spain, and Emperor Alexander himself repeatedly had ex-
pressed the hope that through legal rules and wise state constitutions the power 
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of the Spanish king in Europe and America would be secured. But in order to 
strengthen the state, political reform had to be a gi from the government. As 
history and experience proved, changes arising from disarray and anarchy led to 
ruin, not happiness. e Spanish government still had time to correct the situ-
ation; however, the constitution, established by violence and revolution, could 
not be accepted. e current danger to Spain aected all the European powers, 
and Alexander needed to confer with the allies before pronouncing on the events 
of 7 March.26 To facilitate deliberations, he asked the Spanish government to 
address the allies as he had been addressed. In other words, from the moment 
of Ferdinand VII’s initial solicitation, Alexander insisted on responding to the 
Spanish crisis in concert with allied governments. e Russian government held 
to this position until the conferences in Verona 
nally produced agreement on 
supporting a French intervention.
e memorandum approved by Emperor Alexander on 19 April/1 May 1820, 
which Austria and Britain later refused to endorse, described the exchange of 
notes with Cea Bermúdez.27 Although the Spanish government sought a state-
ment from Alexander on the political changes of 1820, the monarch did not want 
to act independently of the powers adjacent to Spain and therefore in a better 
position to judge the threat to that country. Indeed, precisely because the revolu-
tion contained seeds of development that might become critically important for 
all educated peoples, it had attracted the attention of leaders in Europe and the 
New World. Certain to have a global impact, the revolution demanded a timely 
response. Otherwise, ill-intentioned men would use the uncertainty as a weapon 
to further their goals. To prevent this, Alexander wished to make a pronounce-
ment on the unfolding crisis, which he hoped the allies would approve. As the 
memorandum clearly stated, the monarch wanted his position on Spain to be 
consistent with “the general principles (pravila) of European Policy.”
How did Emperor Alexander understand European policy? In 1812 the al-
lied monarchs had taken an interest in the fate of Spain and admired the he-
roic struggle of the Spanish people against the foreign foe. At the time, they 
had viewed the constitution as the best way to unite the nation and preserve 
its political independence. Even aer Divine Providence returned Ferdinand 
VII to the throne, the allies continued to believe that wise and 
rm institu-
tions were needed to improve the foundations of the old Spanish monarchy. 
us, during discussions related to paci
cation of the colonies and the conict 
with Portuguese Brazil, the allies tried to impress upon Spain’s rulers that po-
litical reform would lead to prosperity and calm, only if the people perceived 
the changes as a free gi emanating from the goodwill of the government. If, by 
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contrast, the government appeared to institute change under duress, in an act of 
self-preservation, the reform would be seen as evidence of weakness.
Following the events of 7 March, the allies generally assumed that the rev-
olution in Spain represented a direct threat to France. Although the protocols 
of Aix-la-Chapelle (3/15 November 1818) had aimed to eliminate the last traces 
of the French Revolution, the destructive spirit of the revolutionary evil had 
survived and now attacked Spain, once again obligating the monarchs to con-
front political upheaval. Sadly, the allies expected that rebellion in Spain would 
be no less horri
c than it had been in France. Describing 1820 as an unlucky 
time, Emperor Alexander nonetheless hoped to see the formation of a Span-
ish government capable of restoring order. But regardless of how conditions in 
Spain developed, he expressed con
dence that the allies would approve Russia’s 
response to Cea Bermúdez and therefore felt compelled publicly to declare oppo-
sition to the illegal means employed to introduce the new Spanish institutions. 
Perhaps, the Russian memorandum suggested, the allies already had sent similar 
notes to the Madrid court. Indeed, Alexander believed that the unity of wishes 
and principles de
ning the alliance inevitably produced likeminded opinions. 
us, the allied monarchs shared the opinion that illegal actions always led to 
disastrous results, in this case not only for the Spanish nation but also for Europe 
as a whole.
Because European governments had reacted with sorrow to the new crime 
imposed on Spain by the rebels, the Russian memorandum suggested a possi-
ble solution to the calamity. e best outcome would be for the Spanish nation 
to oer the peoples of the world an example of repentance. Simply put, Spain 
could reconcile with the other powers of Europe by rejecting revolution. With 
respect to the change of government, the interests of Europe and the Spanish 
Cortes actually coincided. Because the troops protecting the Cortes could rebel 
at any moment, it was in the interest of the Spanish monarch, fatherland, and 
legislative assembly to demonstrate that insurrection would not be recognized as 
legal. e Russian emperor did not expect this to happen, but he did argue that 
the moral force of unanimous opinion among the great powers, especially con-
cerning the duty of the people’s representatives, might bring about the desired 
result. e diplomats of the 
ve great powers should therefore communicate to 
Spain’s plenipotentiary in Paris their concern for the fate of the Spanish people. 
Tranquility and prosperity for all Spaniards, the memorandum stated, could 
be secured by establishing through legal means new institutions in Europe and 
Spanish America—institutions that corresponded to “the needs of the time and 
the successes of Civilization (Grazhdanstvennost’).”
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At this juncture, in both Spain and Spanish America, institutional reform 
no longer seemed sucient to counter insurrection. For the salvation of Spain 
and the bene
t of Europe, the Spanish government also needed to repress and 
denounce insurrection. Signi
cantly, the Russian government viewed the Cortes 
as part of the solution. Perhaps because King Ferdinand had called the Cortes 
before taking the oath to the constitution, and because of the assembly’s ancient 
origins, Russian ocials distinguished the actions of the revolution from the 
legitimacy of the Cortes, even though its powers, based on the 1812 constitu-
tion, continued to pose a problem.28 e Cortes possessed the legal authority to 
establish constitutional forms, as long as this was accompanied by the strictest 
prohibitions against rebellion. In these circumstances, the allied courts could re-
main in relations of friendship and trust with the Spanish government, without 
having to violate their own shared principles. In other words, if the Spanish gov-
ernment heeded the allies’ advice, they would be able to declare the revolution 
at an end. e Cortes in turn would need to pledge obedience to the king in the 
name of the nation and 
nd a way to establish internal tranquility and order on 
the peninsula and in the colonies. If these hopes were not answered, however, 
and Spain remained in the current state of anarchy and riot, at least the allies 
would have ful
lled their sacred duty and demonstrated “the true principles, 
purpose, and form of action of the great European alliance.”29
Russia’s diplomats had responded quickly and emphatically to the events of 
7 March, yet without advocating intervention or action outside the great Eu-
ropean alliance.30 Aleksandr S. Sturdza’s correspondence with co-minister of 
foreign aairs Ioannis Kapodistrias illustrated the confusion and conicting im-
pulses that found their way into Alexander I’s thoughts on the Spanish Revolu-
tion. In a dispatch of 24 April 1820 (NS), which reportedly inuenced the mem-
orandum of 19 April/1 May, Sturdza wrote that in Spain the system of liberal 
ideas had reached its apogee and therefore must either retreat or produce new 
explosions.31 Equally disturbing, the Spanish king had become a slave to plebian 
tyrants. Unable to marry or abdicate without the permission of the Cortes, he 
had been deprived of his dignity in the eyes of foreign powers. In other words, 
the liberal furor in Spain had reached the highest degree of absurdity, rendering 
retreat the only appropriate option.
But how would the retreat of the revolution unfold? Sturdza assigned sig-
ni
cant blame for the current crisis to the Spanish monarch. A power restored 
to its rights aer great disturbances needed to legislate in order to revive the 
old institutions. Sadly, King Ferdinand VII, lacking both a domestic and a 
foreign policy, had promised reform but not delivered on his pledge. Instead, 
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he had abdicated the right to control the process of reform and become a king 
who humbly recognized “all the Acts of popular Authority.” Sturdza went on 
to describe his own vision of how Ferdinand should proceed with reform. e 
restoration of ancient institutions demanded legislation that rested “on a more 
or less perfect harmony of faith, science, and Authority.” Such legislation could 
guide the government in addressing the primary causes of revolution: irreligion, 
injustice, and insolvency. Speci
cally, the Spanish government needed to make 
public education religious, invigorate police administration, and wisely adminis-
ter public wealth. None of this had been accomplished, and although Russia had 
not yet experienced the consequences of revolution, the moral contagion could 
easily spread, especially in an age of intensi
ed contact between nations. Sturdza 
did not believe that congresses or repressive alliances could stop the principle of 
revolution, but he did insist that governments should respond with force and 
vigilance to the earliest manifestation of this electric jolt.
Despite Sturdza’s strong prescriptive rhetoric, his dispatch and other corre-
spondence admitted outright that the crisis in Spain had become dicult to 
understand. He rejected the fact of revolution as legitimate grounds for inter-
vention in Spain’s internal aairs. He did argue for a formal declaration of the 
allied courts, based on international law (le droit des gens). e constitution of 
1812 denied the sovereign authority of the king, meaning that it violated rights 
universally recognized by all European peoples.32 Nor, Sturdza insisted, could 
any single policy eectively combat revolution; dierent policies were needed 
in dierent countries.33 is argument blended with Alexander I’s belief (and 
hope) that allied unity, particularly unity of principle, would ensure the preser-
vation of peace, which revolution inevitably threatened (as shown by history and 
experience). Sturdza described the Russian monarch’s reaction to the Spanish 
Revolution as profound sorrow.34 Unfortunately, profound sorrow did not move 
the allies to act.
Faced with allied inaction, Russia’s diplomats continued to argue that domes-
tic reforms could save Spain from the consequences of revolution.35 Persistent 
calls for reform suggested that the king might still be able to assert control over 
the revolution, which then could turn into legal political change. In June and 
July 1820, diplomatic communications revealed just how complicated, danger-
ous, and incomprehensible the situation appeared.36 By July reports of violent 
resistance to the constitutional system and the government in Madrid reached 
the Russian Ministry of Foreign Aairs. Writing from Paris, General Karl O. 
Pozzo di Borgo, Alexander I’s minister plenipotentiary, described the intimate 
union between the Cortes and king as Spain’s only hope for peace. By contrast, 
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a royalist reaction that the king did not direct would lead to civil war. Count 
Bulgari’s reports, which previously had described King Ferdinand as a prisoner, 
seemed to become more optimistic. In communications of 14/26 June and 21 
June/3 July 1820, he depicted the preparatory work of the Cortes as orderly and 
the discussions among the deputies as moderate. Despite hints of opposition 
from Spanish Americans, the inclusion of thirty substitute deputies to represent 
America and another three to represent Cuba suggested to Russian ocials that 
the crisis might be headed for resolution.
e Spanish Revolution and the Colonies
Inaction also remained the allied approach to Spanish America. Both before 
and aer insurrection hit the peninsula, political conditions in the Spanish Em-
pire created problems for the European alliance. Rebellion in Spain’s American 
colonies began as early as 1808–10, and the Spanish troops that mutinied on 1 
January 1820 were awaiting embarkation to South America. Although Spain’s 
relationship with the colonies did not necessarily represent a European con-
cern, the allies began to discuss possible solutions prior to the conferences in 
Aix-la-Chapelle. e Russian government accepted the Spanish monarchy’s view 
of the colonies as provinces of the metropolis and hoped that in Spain and Span-
ish America the establishment of wise institutions, including policies tailored to 
the speci
c needs of dierent territories, would ensure peace, stability, and the 
preservation of King Ferdinand VII’s authority. e allies, particularly Britain, 
might act as mediators, though in contrast to Russia, which in 1817–18 sold war-
ships to Spain, the British government refused to countenance the possibility 
of armed intervention. Equally troubling, the diplomatic eort to achieve paci-

cation through mediation failed to win consistent support from the Spanish 
monarch. In October 1817, Ferdinand rejected Britain’s proposal for allied medi-
ation on the grounds that it did not require the rebellious colonies to accept his 
sovereignty.37 Russia’s envoy in Madrid, Dmitrii P. Tatishchev, agreed that the 
British proposal did not show sincere interest in the cause of Spain.38
Allied discussions about how to pacify Spain’s rebellious colonies and resolve 
the conict with Portuguese Brazil over the Rio de la Plata continued in 1818 
and 1819. At the conferences in Aix-la Chapelle, the 
ve powers, acting as con-
ciliators rather than arbitrators, urged the Spanish and Portuguese monarchs to 
reconcile.39 On the question of paci
cation, the government in Madrid seemed 
to want allied mediation and to assume that the 
ve great powers would provide 
moral support for the Spanish position. Although France and Russia did not 
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reject outright the use of force on behalf of Spain, Britain’s opposition to mili-
tary intervention remained 
rm. Castlereagh, supported by Metternich, pressed 
for a collective declaration urging Spain to accept mediation and insisting that 
any allied action be paci
c. Kapodistrias, as reported to Emperor Alexander by 
Nesselrode, criticized the idea of announcing in principle the impossibility of 
military assistance, arguing that this would only embolden the rebels. Better, the 
co-minister pleaded, to insist that the Spanish government explain its plans for 
paci
cation. Russia’s diplomats accepted the reality of allied dierences over sup-
port for Spain, and Kapodistrias even suggested that uncertainty about the in-
tentions of the great powers could inspire salutary disquiet among the insurgents. 
But Kapodistrias also admitted that the allies lacked sucient knowledge of “the 
real state of America and the circumstances of the insurrection to be able to judge 
the ecacy of the remedies that they might like to employ to stop the progress of 
the evil.” Russia preferred to act within the alliance and during the negotiations 
withdrew support for a French-authored memorandum that implied the use of 
force. Prussia remained silent, a posture that Castlereagh interpreted as support 
for the British position. Given that Spain was not admitted to the conferences, 
France also declined to express an opinion on Castlereagh’s proposal.40
e discussions in Aix-la-Chapelle produced no action on the question of 
paci
cation, and as Emperor Alexander made clear to Ferdinand VII in a De-
cember communication, military cooperation by the intervening powers to assist 
Spain in the work of paci
cation was in fact impracticable.41 Historians also 
report that in December Ferdinand again rejected foreign involvement, this time 
explicitly. Notwithstanding the apparent 
nality of the monarch’s statements, 
from the end of 1818 through March 1819, Russia’s diplomats continued their 
eorts to persuade the Spanish king to accept British mediation.42 As noted 
in a dispatch from Kapodistrias to Tatishchev, dated 13/25 December 1818 and 
approved by Alexander, in 1815 Spain had placed itself outside the circle of Euro-
pean relations.43 “Barely restored to its independence, poorly consolidated in its 
internal relations, damaged in the administration of its colonies, this power. . . 
wanted to be isolated from all the other States with the intention perhaps to be-
come itself the center of a political system.” Indeed, in refusing to accede to the 
Final Act of the Congress of Vienna, Spain had articulated outdated pretentions 
incommensurate with the country’s “eective weight . . . in the balance of the 
great interests” of Europe or Spanish America (the other hemisphere).
Although Alexander tried to impress upon King Ferdinand the importance 
of cooperation with all the powers, based on the conservative principles cur-
rently regulating European politics, the Spanish government seemed to assign 
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primacy to relations with Russia. is created tension within the alliance, 
prompting Kapodistrias to admit that Spain’s erroneous ideas about a special 
relationship with Russia also led to equally false opinions about the inuence 
of the Russian mission in Madrid. ese opinions in turn fueled the arrogance 
of Spanish pretentions in the matter of the Rio de la Plata and in talks concern-
ing the paci
cation of the colonies. Emperor Alexander hoped to see a prompt 
and real reconciliation between the courts of Spain and Portuguese Brazil, ac-
cording to “the principles of an equitable reciprocity,” which then could lead to 
“the most perfect agreement of views and action in the paci
cation of the other 
hemisphere.” But instead, the Spanish government equivocated in relations with 
the Portuguese and temporized in dealings with the mediators. With respect to 
colonial aairs, Spain continued to seek from the allies “the promise or at least 
the prestige of military cooperation, in order to bring the colonies back to the 
mother country.”
Together with the direct communication sent to King Ferdinand by Emperor 
Alexander, Tatishchev received instructions to explain to the court of Madrid 
the conclusions reached in Aix-la-Chapelle on the matter of the colonies. Re-
gardless of the king’s desire for armed cooperation, the Spanish government 
needed to understand that any allied intervention would require a formal invi-
tation from Ferdinand addressed to the 
ve powers. Equally important, cooper-
ation with the allies could not be military, as a matter of principle for Britain and 
of impracticability for the other courts.44 Finally, allied cooperation to restore 
Spain’s legitimate power carried conditions. e government in Madrid needed 
to convince the peoples of the mother country and colonies that reuni
cation 
would place them “under the permanent safeguard of a liberal policy (système),” 
accorded to them by the Spanish government. e policy of benevolence must 
be applied quickly to the colonies, so that the paternal voice of their legitimate 
sovereign could once again exercise a happy empire.
Assuming that King Ferdinand took the steps set forth in Tatishchev’s in-
structions, Spain would be able to embark on the great work of paci
cation 
either without foreign cooperation or with friendly assistance from Britain, 
speci
cally negotiations led by the Duke of Wellington through the collective 
intervention of the other four powers. e purpose of this intervention would be 
to develop a plan for paci
cation supported by the 
ve great powers and Spain. 
Indeed, the moral pressure exerted on the insurgents by allied unity would repre-
sent a more eective guarantee of promised reform than the actions of any single 
power.45 Russian diplomats may have been justi
ed in criticizing Ferdinand (or 
his subalterns) for a policy based on false ideas and mistaken opinions, but the 
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historian also can understand Spain’s refusal to submit to the judgments of the 

ve great powers—powers that in this instance expected deference from the rul-
ers of a centuries-old metropolis and a people repeatedly praised and admired for 
their resistance to Napoleonic conquest. Not surprisingly, in rejecting mediation 
Spanish ocials deployed the language of friendship among the sovereigns to 
assert Spain’s equal status vis-à-vis the great powers.46
Tatishchev’s representations to King Ferdinand VII and his minister of for-
eign aairs, Carlos-Maria-Martinez Casa Irujo (the Marquis of Casa Irujo), con-
tinued in January and February 1819. Repeatedly, the Russian envoy reported to 
Nesselrode, he had attempted to apply to discussion of the colonies “the policy of 
conciliation introduced into the mutual relations of the European powers.”47 Try 
as he might, however, the eort to persuade Spain to accept the allies’ conditions 
and begin a process of mediation had failed to elicit the desired response. Equally 
troubling, Tatishchev’s colleagues, the ministers of the other great powers, did 
not seem to care about engaging the Spanish authorities in a discussion of Eu-
rope’s general interest or of allied unanimity on this important question. Writ-
ing directly to Emperor Alexander on 30 January/11 February 1819, Tatishchev 
described ongoing frustration at his inability to ful
ll the mission entrusted to 
him.48 Ferdinand VII refused to accept mediation by Wellington, a course he 
characterized as “perilous for Spain and humiliating for his person.” Tatishchev 
agreed that British and Spanish interests appeared irreconcilable, primarily be-
cause Britain sought only to separate Spain from Europe. Tatishchev also com-
plained of diplomatic intrigue directed against him and even his wife, a situation 
he attributed to allied suspicions about Russia’s ties to Spain and jealousy arising 
from his close personal relationship with Ferdinand. Feeling isolated and inef-
fective in the ful
lment of his duties, Tatishchev requested reassignment.
In a report to Nesselrode, dated one day aer the appeal to Alexander, 
Tatishchev elaborated on the reasons for his inability to convince Ferdinand 
VII to accept Wellington’s mediation.49 Discussions in 1817 and 1818, prior to 
the conferences in Aix-la-Chapelle, had indicated that the Spanish government 
hoped to work with Portuguese Brazil to end the insurrection in the colonies. 
Spain also had seemed willing to make concessions based on earlier British pro-
posals: a general amnesty for all insurgents, the admission of quali
ed Ameri-
cans to positions and rewards currently monopolized by European Spaniards, 
the application of liberal principles to trade between the Spanish American 
provinces and foreign states, and sincere consideration by the Spanish king of 
other measures that might be proposed by the allies, as long as they were compat-
ible with the maintenance of his rights and his dignity.50 Whatever the promises 
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contained in the plan for paci
cation, Britain eventually concluded that it did 
not justify formal negotiations. In addition, it became clear that Spain intended 
to use mediation to secure meaningful cooperation from the allies.
Despite obvious disagreements, in July 1818, Tatishchev still expected King 
Ferdinand to follow the suggestion that the political and civil regime of the 
colonies be assimilated into that of the metropolis. Russia hoped that Spain 
would announce this policy as the basis for administrative reforms in the col-
onies and present the plan for paci
cation to the allies meeting in Aix-la-Cha-
pelle. King Ferdinand then would negotiate the plan’s implementation. In the 
summer of 1818, according to Tatishchev, the Spanish government continued 
to look to Britain for support in achieving its goals. But during the conferences 
in Aix-la-Chapelle, Ferdinand suspended the discussion of foreign intervention 
in the aairs of the colonies. Changes in the composition of the Spanish gov-
ernment had led to a reappraisal of British policy and to the realization that 
British interests were opposed to those of Spain with respect to the Bourbon 
restoration(s), international trade, and Spanish American independence.
Citing communications from Casa Irujo and Cea Bermúdez, Tatishchev of-
fered a sympathetic description of Spanish policy prior to and during the con-
ferences in Aix-la-Chapelle. In the Restoration era, the Spanish government’s 
primary obligation was “to reconstitute the power of Spain for its internal hap-
piness” and to give the country the forces required to become a truly indepen-
dent power, “useful in the active system of political equilibrium.” To ful
ll this 
destiny in the system of European states, Spain’s ministers had surveyed the re-
sources that would be needed to recover the colonies and their availability on 
the peninsula. Balancing the use of these resources with the losses that the colo-
nies’ independence would bring and recognizing the “just value of the moral and 
material means of resistance” that the insurgents could mobilize, the Spanish 
government had concluded that sacri
ces would be unavoidable if Spain wanted 
to reestablish relations of patronage with America. us, the process of paci
ca-
tion envisioned by Spain, as described by Tatishchev, would need to consolidate 
the metropolis’s power through clemency and moderation. is would require 
that imperial authority be restored through strength and compromise with the 
commercial interests of other nations, assuming such compromise did not mean 
suicide for Spain. In other words, Spain had decided to rely on its own wisdom 
and energy to pacify the colonies without the complications of foreign involve-
ment. Following the conferences in Aix-la-Chapelle, and despite direct commu-
nication between Alexander I and Ferdinand VII, Tatishchev’s ongoing eort to 
encourage paci
cation within the framework of the alliance had led to naught.
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Because both Britain and the United States had interests, opinions, and a 
public mood that worked against Spain’s royal cause, Tatishchev considered Brit-
ish participation in the paci
cation to be essential. is led to the 
nal eort 
to persuade Spain to accept mediation headed by the Duke of Wellington and 
to the announcement that military cooperation between the allies and Spain 
would not be an option. In responding to Tatishchev, the Spanish government 
showed a complete lack of con
dence in both the ecacy of British mediation 
and the impact of a morally united alliance. e commercial interests of Britain, 
King Ferdinand insisted, made it impossible to oer sincere assistance to Spain. 
Nor did the Spanish government observe any positive results from the ongoing 
diplomatic negotiations with Portuguese Brazil. Alexander’s suggestion that Fer-
dinand should choose the moral support of all Europe over his own isolated ef-
forts failed to dispel Spanish distrust of allied advice. As Ferdinand remarked to 
Tatishchev, “I hope that you will never recommend to me an act of weakness.”51
Tatishchev remained in Madrid, and by the end of March 1819 (NS), he at 
least could report that the British government now appreciated his eorts to 
convince Spain to accept the allies’ oer of mediation.52 At the same time, he 
made clear that it would be pointless to engage in further conversations with 
the Spanish government concerning paci
cation of the colonies. e Paris con-
ference of ministers continued to discuss the conict over the Rio de la Plata, 
and despite Ferdinand VII’s suspicions about the negotiations, Tatishchev still 
hoped that Spain would accept the agreement with Portuguese Brazil proposed 
in August 1818.53 In general, Russia’s diplomatic communications held out the 
possibility of resolution in both the conict over the Rio de la Plata and the 
paci
cation of the colonies. Still, the Ministry of Foreign Aairs also repeatedly 
seemed to admit defeat. As Nesselrode explained in a circular dispatch of 31 
March/12 April 1819—addressed to Russia’s ambassador in London (Lieven), 
envoy in Vienna (Golovkin), envoy in Berlin (Alopeus), and minister plenipo-
tentiary in Paris (Pozzo di Borgo)—in Aix-la-Chapelle the allies had agreed to 
support mediation between Spain and its American colonies led by the Duke 
of Wellington, should Spain recognize the inadequacy of the resources at its 
disposal.54 In this scenario, Wellington would preside over the formulation of 
a plan for paci
cation appropriate to the needs and wishes of Spanish America, 
while the ministers of the other powers would mediate between Britain and 
Spain, to ensure Madrid’s deference to the intervening courts and to place just 
limits on cooperation with the British government.
Tasked with explaining to the Spanish government the allied plan, Tatishchev 
had tried but failed to obtain acceptance of the proposed mode of intervention. 
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Spain had refused all foreign involvement, preferring instead to rely on its own 
resources to reconquer its colonies. e Russian government had expected this 
response and considered it consistent with “the respect that European policy 
accords to the independence and dignity of all governments.” Yet as Tatishchev 
also pointed out, Spain’s wish to rely on its own forces, which would be ap-
propriate for a great power, rested on dangerous illusions rather than positive 
facts. Emperor Alexander therefore hoped that Spain would evaluate its real re-
sources correctly. In America, for example, Spain could augment these resources 
through a generous and liberal administrative system, capable of rallying to the 
cause of legitimacy “all interests and consequently all desires.” e Russian 
monarch wished his fellow sovereign success in the enterprise that lay ahead, 
though he also could not help but lament Ferdinand’s rejection of collective 
allied assistance.55
At a moment when religion and morality supposedly guided European policy, 
and when unity and peace reigned in the conservative system, Spain’s relation-
ship to the great powers, the Portuguese monarchy, and the Spanish American 
colonies exposed the potentially disruptive dynamics of the post-Napoleonic 
equilibrium. Delusional, ineective, and reactionary as the Spanish monarchy 
appeared, the 
ve great powers, presuming to speak on behalf of all Europe, were 
equally unrealistic about their ability to mold lesser powers and complicated 
historical processes into their vision of European peace. Perhaps in the allies’ 
unwillingness to oer military assistance to Spain, they admitted to this incon-
venient fact. With respect to Spain and the Spanish Empire, the imagined juste
milieu of harmony, tranquility, and stability in the Restoration era produced 
barely a moment of peace.56
Following the conferences in Aix-la-Chapelle, preservation of Spanish au-
thority in the Americas ceased to be an allied obligation. Yet throughout 1819 
the Russian government continued to hope that political reform emanating 
from the Spanish government would lead to reconciliation. Just days aer the 
military rebellion that marked the start of the Spanish Revolution, Emperor Al-
exander again proered advice to King Ferdinand concerning Spain’s relations 
with Portuguese Brazil and the desirability of administrative reform for all the 
monarchy’s subjects.57 Speaking for the Russian monarch, Tatishchev conveyed 
Alexander’s feelings of friendship toward Ferdinand and his interest in the pros-
perity of the king’s realm. For the moment—news of the January mutiny had not 
yet reached the Russian government—the issues at hand remained the conict 
over the Rio de la Plata and the reestablishment of durable relations based on 
unity and reciprocal assistance between Spain and Spanish America.
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e 
rst action recommended to King Ferdinand by Emperor Alexander 
was to restore friendly relations with the court of Portuguese Brazil. Since at 
least 1815, Alexander I had viewed the concept of Christian brotherhood and 
friendship among the sovereigns as critical instruments of peacemaking. In this 
instance, the monarch expected friendship between the Spanish and Portuguese 
kings to produce a solution to the conict over the Rio de la Plata. Friendly re-
lations between Spain and Portuguese Brazil also would highlight Ferdinand’s 
good intentions toward the people and therefore exert a favorable inuence on 
his American subjects. More concretely, Alexander advised his fellow sovereign 
to equalize the rights of all Spaniards in both hemispheres. Uniform adminis-
tration would guarantee the security of person and property that was needed to 
undercut the grievances invented by rogue and anarchic spirits.
As time passed, the Russian government’s hopes for a Spanish restoration 
in the Americas receded, especially aer the peninsula descended into revo-
lution and civil war. Two detailed memorandums preserved in the papers of 
co-minister of foreign aairs Kapodistrias illustrated ocial Russian thinking 
on the colonies during the early months of the Spanish Revolution. e 
rst doc-
ument, dated March 1820, began with an account of the insurrection in Spanish 
America during the years 1808 to 1817.58 e named causes included recognition 
of Joseph Bonaparte as king of Spain, the weakness of the Spanish viceroys who 
administered the colonies, British policy, and enmity among the leaders and 
judicial ocials operating in dierent territories of Spanish America. Condi-
tions on the peninsula likewise caused problems: the uncertainty surrounding 
royal authority, resistance to Ferdinand VII and to Napoleon, French military 
success, the audacity of political factions, and disorder within the Napoleonic 
government. e memorandum went on to survey the patterns of insurrection 
in various parts of Spanish America, where loyalists, legislatures, and separate 
jurisdictions competed for power and legitimacy. Above all, the memorandum 
highlighted the loss of political resources brought on by the revolutionary explo-
sion in Spain. Absent the crisis on the peninsula, the ordinary causes of disorder 
would not have been sucient to fuel rebellion in Spanish America.
e author of the memorandum attributed persistent rebellion to the precari-
ous condition of Spain that had begun with the Napoleonic invasion in 1808 and 
continued until the return of King Ferdinand VII in 1814. Based on the lessons 
of history, the maxim that every revolutionary movement invariably produced an-
other explained the simultaneity of the uprisings across Spanish America. As royal 
authorities tried to maintain neutrality in the struggle between Napoleon and the 
defenders of Ferdinand, demagogues and factions used the political uncertainty 
Spain and the European System (1820–23) 183 
to spread their inuence. e memorandum described the Spanish American 
insurrections as the work of propertied classes and elites of birth engaged in a vast 
conspiracy. In other words, the revolts did not represent a popular movement or 
“great political revolution founded on principles.” Nor, despite the participation 
of subalterns, did the American revolutionary scene embody the suering of a 
people who demanded change. To the contrary, the troubles in Spanish America 
arose from an anarchic operation that renounced order and concord.
e second memorandum, dated 30 April/12 May 1820 and attributed by his-
torians to Kapodistrias, oered a more pointed analysis of Spanish America, in 
light of the reestablishment of the constitutional system in Spain—the same 
system that had existed in 1814 at the time of Ferdinand VII’s restoration to the 
Spanish throne.59 Given the events of March 1820, how could the union of Spain 
with its old American possessions be strengthened? Describing Spanish America 
as a hybrid society, Kapodistrias highlighted the relationship between Spain’s 
political interests and the future of Spanish America. e revolution in Spain 
had changed the meaning of political alignments in the colonies and might oer 
a solution to the problem of paci
cation. Although freedom of the press in places 
such as Mexico, Peru, and Cuba deprived Spain of an authority forti
ed by “the 
enlightened compression of partial dissent,” the Cortes now had the opportu-
nity to enact equitable legislation on the rights and duties (devoirs) de
ning 
commercial relations between Europe and the colonies. Kapodistrias imagined 
a relationship between Spain and Spanish America similar to the one that had 
existed between Britain and the North American colonies in 1775 (before the 
Declaration of Independence). He also argued that in the current situation the 
government in Madrid should make sacri
ces to achieve reconciliation with the 
colonies. Although some of Kapodistrias’s comments could be interpreted as 
support for constitutional restoration, his overall analysis adhered to the prin-
ciples of Russian foreign policy. roughout the peacemaking of 1814 to 1823, 
Emperor Alexander’s diplomats responded to the upheavals in Spanish America 
and later to the revolution in Spain with calls for enlightened reform granted by 
the legitimate monarch, Ferdinand VII.
e vision of reform from above, a product of enlightened monarchy across 
Europe, made it dicult for peacemakers to adapt the legal stipulations of 1814, 
1815, and 1818 to the reality of open political contestation. Simply put, their vi-
sion of harmoniousness, stability, and transformation could not contain the 
social and political changes underway in Europe or the Americas. As the Span-
ish American independence movements, the Greek insurrections, and the Rus-
sian-Ottoman war scare of 1821–22 all illustrated, the suppression of revolution, 
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understood to be essential to the preservation of peace in Europe (and eectively 
carried out in Italy, Portugal, and eventually Spain) did not depend entirely on 
developments within the boundaries of Europe. European order had become 
a transatlantic, transpaci
c, and transcontinental aair. In March 1822, the 
United States recognized Spanish American independence in principle, and 
by December the Russian government admitted that emancipation appeared 
inevitable, even if it was not yet imminent.60 Indeed, when emancipation came, 
Russia did not immediately recognize the newly independent states. In other 
words, the opaque and contradictory response of Russia’s diplomats to the in-
surrections in Spanish America highlighted the ongoing failure to understand 
that liberalization had become inevitable. In keeping with eighteenth-century 
discussions of political dissent and religious toleration, Russia’s rulers continued 
to assume that a handful of instigators—or in post-Napoleonic Europe, a faction 
of revolutionaries, sectarians, or Jacobins—was responsible for the persistent dis-
orders. As historians document for multiple aspects of Russian political culture, 
the reliance on personalized relationships of authority meant that disorder and 
corruption represented individual rather than institutional behavior. Conse-
quently, the solution to inequity and abuse was not systemic reform, but the 
moral self-reformation of subjects, citizens, and ocials.
e Verona Conferences and the Spanish Revolution
During the initial phase of the Spanish Revolution, stretching from the mili-
tary mutiny of January 1820 until early March, when King Ferdinand VII ac-
cepted the 1812 constitution, Emperor Alexander I tried to reach agreement with 
the allies on a collective European response. e eort failed, though aer the 
conferences in Troppau and Laibach sanctioned Austrian intervention in Italy, 
Russia’s policymakers again dared to hope that Britain and France would join 
the eort to save Spain. Writing from Laibach to Russia’s chargé d’aaires in 
Madrid, Count Bulgari, co-minister of foreign aairs Kapodistrias expressed 
the view that restoration in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, by illustrating the 
eectiveness of allied action, could lead to the same result in Spain.61 Alexan-
der agreed and supported intervention, but only with French participation and 
British acquiescence. In the meantime, the monarch continued to instruct his 
diplomatic representatives to maintain a posture of neutrality.62
By the time the Verona conferences opened in October 1822, developments 
within the alliance, especially the three monarchs’ accession to the Troppau pro-
tocol and successful restorations in the Two Sicilies and Piedmont, combined 
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with events in Spain to produce a new calculus among the allies. Of particular 
concern, the government in Madrid, still crowned by Ferdinand VII, appeared 
to take a more radical position on the question of revolution outside Spain’s 
borders. From January 1821, before the Austrian military intervention in Naples, 
the Spanish government reportedly had come under domestic political pressure 
to support revolt in other parts of Europe. Notwithstanding proclamations of 
neutrality from ocials in Madrid, it looked as if Spanish diplomats had become 
involved in revolutions in Italy and Portugal. In addition, although both the 
Spanish king and government claimed to support implementation of the 1812 
constitution, debates in the Cortes revealed that some political leaders viewed 
allied action in Naples as the precursor to intervention in Spain. Finally, in July 
1822, fear of a counter-revolutionary conspiracy inside the king’s guard led to 
disorders that brought Spanish radicals to power.63 ese developments pushed 
the French government to side with the legitimist alliance and the allies to view 
King Ferdinand as a prisoner to be saved.64
On 20 October 1822 (NS), the day the Verona conferences opened, the French 
foreign minister, Vicomte Mathieu de Montmorency (1767–1826), delivered a 
con
dential verbal note to the plenipotentiaries of Austria, Britain, Prussia, 
and Russia. e Russian response to Montmorency’s communication, which 
described an imminent threat to France emanating from Spain, began with an 
overview of Alexander’s position on the Spanish Revolution.65 Since April 1820 
the Russian government had expressed concern about the situation in Spain and 
had encouraged the allies to show benevolent solicitude for the Spanish nation, 
which deserved to enjoy happiness aer the glorious struggle against foreign 
rule. Russia had hoped to prevent the misfortunes that inevitably resulted from 
violent attacks on legitimate authority. But sadly, the fears of Emperor Alexan-
der now seemed justi
ed. Few countries in Europe had suered as Spain suf-
fered, and few had brought down on Europe comparable disasters.
Among Spain’s internal suerings, the Russian government identi
ed an-
archy, destruction, insults to the throne and religion, the loss of rich territo-
ries in the New World, the dissipation of public wealth, the open preaching 
of subversive doctrines, and bans against subjects loyal to the sovereign. Not 
content with domestic transformation, the artisans of the troubles in Spain had 
spread revolution to other countries, compelling the allied powers to use mili-
tary force to restore legitimate authority. In the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies 
and in Piedmont, beautiful lands desolated by war, sects had conspired against 
the tranquility of all European states. In other words, by the time the allies met 
in Verona, the revolution in Spain had become more radical, and so too had the 
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great powers’ understanding of legitimacy and restoration. Russia’s condemna-
tion of Spain’s revolutionaries bemoaned the obligation of governments—an 
obligation imposed by the law of the peoples’ salvation (salut)—to engage in 
rigorous surveillance, which in turn prevented them from pursuing more useful 
improvements. In Spain at least—if not also in Italy, Portugal, and Greece—the 
enlightened balancing of reform and repression had tilted in favor of repression. 
What Russia’s monarchy failed to see, and what it would continue to ignore until 
the end of the old regime, was the unstoppable advent (or necessity) of vigorously 
contested participatory politics. For the moment, the inevitability of further 
change could be ignored in France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, and Greece, but 
not in Spain or Spanish America.66
By the fall of 1822, the insurrection that had begun in Cadiz came to be seen 
as a deplorable example of the results of revolution. According to the Russian 
government, the events in Naples and Turin had endangered primarily Austria. 
e Spanish threat to France, however, aected every European power. Emperor 
Alexander accepted Montmorency’s claim that the Spanish Revolution exposed 
France to imminent peril. He therefore stood ready to act in concert with France 
and the other allied courts, based on the proposals of the French foreign minis-
ter. Speci
cally, Russia’s plenipotentiary received authorization to reach agree-
ment on breaking diplomatic relations with Spain, de
ning the moral assistance 
that France currently sought, and stipulating within limits the material aid that 
France might demand, if compelled to use military force. Simply put, the inter-
ests of all Europe required suppression of the Spanish Revolution.
On 19/31 October 1822, the Austrian government responded to this new phase 
in the discussion by proposing concerted action in Spain.67 Approved by Russia, 
the Austrian proposal highlighted two questions that the allies needed to ad-
dress. First was the danger to all Europe represented by the victory of revolution, 
and second was the crisis in political relations between France and Spain. e 
French government had explained its predicament to the allies, and although 
it hoped to maintain peace, the Spanish Revolution had the potential to force 
France to repel aggression. For this reason, the French government had asked the 
allies whether or not, in case of a just and necessary defense, France could count 
on their moral and material support. Austria, Prussia, and Russia had replied 
in the armative, a response that now required a more precise de
nition of the 
casus foederis and the reciprocal obligations to be assumed. To meet this need, 
the allied governments agreed to compose appropriate diplomatic transactions.
e Austrian proposal then turned to Spain’s internal situation, where revo-
lutionary anarchy, which also fueled civil war, challenged the eorts of the allied 
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sovereigns to conserve social order. e language and attitude of the Spanish 
toward foreign countries had become so provocative that the European powers 
could no longer remain silent. us, the allies had asserted the right to discuss 
Spain collectively, thereby ful
lling their obligation to deliberate on the means 
to save Europe from the dangers posed by the triumph of the revolution. Not 
only France, but also all of Europe would bene
t from the elucidation of com-
mon commitments that aimed to restore order on the peninsula. Although the 
great powers continued to hope that the victims and enemies of the revolution in 
Spain would have the courage to end the troubles, the Austrian proposal openly 
stated that relations between Spain and the allies depended on restoration of the 
king’s legitimate authority. e king’s continued captivity created a new claim 
or right that allowed the allied powers to decide the basis for future relations 
with Spain. Austria hoped, and Russia accepted, that any intervention would 
be paci
c and take one of three possible forms. e 
ve powers could adopt a 
common language by issuing a collective declaration or separate notes that were 
uniform in their principles and objective. France could rely on the four allies 
to address the current diculties, even if they did not agree to participate in a 
common course of action. Or 
nally, one of the powers could communicate to 
the Spanish government the common position of the allies.
Russia’s plenipotentiaries formally responded to the Austrian proposals at the 
conferences of 21 October/2 November 1822.68 e response conveyed Emperor 
Alexander’s agreement that the allies should pursue a course of action designed 
to hasten the end of the revolution in Spain by encouraging the Spanish nation 
to “shake o the yoke of the factions oppressing them.” Russia’s representatives 
had received authorization to accede to the Austrian proposals and participate 
in the development of appropriate resolutions. ese resolutions, combined with 
the commitments arising from France’s propositions, would de
ne allied policy 
toward Spain. Looking beyond broad statements of principle, the Russian gov-
ernment also urged the allies to consider (and specify) how each would proceed, 
if the representations of their diplomats in Madrid did not yield the desired 
result. From the start of the Spanish crisis, Alexander had wished to address 
the situation in concert with his allies. At the meetings in Verona, in light of 
Austria’s reluctance to become materially engaged and Britain’s continuing in-
sistence on allied neutrality, Russia accepted the decision to send separate notes 
of uniform content to the Spanish government.
e Russian response did not explicitly mention the reservations of Austria or 
the opposition of Britain. By contrast, an unsigned secret memorandum, dated 
15 November 1822 (NS) and listed in the Acts of the Conferences, expressed the 
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Austrian fear that British separateness threatened the alliance, even though Brit-
ain remained free in its decisions and actions due to its direct inuence over the 
peninsula (that is, its relations with Portugal).69 e memorandum also high-
lighted the agreement among the other great powers to support the Spanish king 
and end the revolution. e allies currently maintained diplomatic relations 
with the revolutionary faction in Spain, yet they also functioned as a “league of 
moral action” united in principle on the acceptability of defensive material ac-
tion. In other words, the need to de
ne a casus foederis in association with France 
was agreed to in principle, though the actual de
nition required more speci
cs. 
e memorandum also voiced concern about the weakness of the French gov-
ernment and the danger that a new revolutionary shock in France posed for 
all Europe. Finally, the memorandum reiterated the allies’ hope that once they 
declared their collective readiness to break diplomatic relations with revolution-
ary Spain, British neutrality would become untenable. Britain would then be 
compelled to explain its position on preserving political peace between Spain 
and the allies, restoring order on the peninsula, and maintaining the alliance, 
“the dissolution of which could be brought about by an unforeseen dierence 
between the course taken by the four continental Courts and that of England.”
In conference minutes signed on 7/19 November 1822, the plenipotentiaries 
of Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia addressed ongoing worries about how 
the powers should respond, if the Austrian proposal for peaceful intervention 
in Spain failed.70 e conference record identi
ed the circumstances that might 
lead the courts of Austria, Prussia, and Russia to act with the court of France 
in a declared war or a war provoked by the current government of Spain. Two 
articles speci
ed the conditions that would make such engagements obligatory. 
e 
rst focused on three actions by the Spanish government that the allies 
would treat as the casus foederis for war: (1) a military attack by Spain on French 
territory or an act of the Spanish government that directly provoked rebellion 
among the subjects of one or another of the powers; (2) the declared downfall 
(déchéance prononcée) of the Spanish king or legal proceedings against him or 
members of his family; and (3) a formal act by the Spanish government that re-
stricted the royal family’s rights of legitimate succession. Article 2 of the minutes 
le open the possibility that additional unspeci
ed developments might also 
be treated as the casus foederis. Any signatory could present a case to the allied 
governments, which then would consider whether or not the circumstances be-
longed to the class of casus foederis as foreseen and de
ned. e understanding 
reached on the casus foederis showed once again that the alliance of the great 
powers—including the Holy Alliance so oen identi
ed with Austria, Prussia, 
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and Russia—did not aim to prevent political change or social reform in Europe. 
To the contrary, the peacemakers’ de
nition of the casus foederis addressed the 
consequences of violent revolution, based on their experience of the French Rev-
olution and Napoleonic conquests. e allies may have been willfully blind to 
the realities of emergent democratic politics, but they already had lived through, 
and now worked assiduously to prevent, the destruction of legitimate rulers and 
the spread of revolution by military aggression or direct external provocation.
In contrast to the Troppau protocol by which Austria, Prussia, and Russia had 
declared a common position on resolving the crisis in the Kingdom of the Two 
Sicilies, at the Verona conferences on 8/20 November 1822, the allies agreed not 
to issue a general protocol, but to send separate instructions to their ministers in 
Madrid.71 ese instructions explained mutual concerns and principles of action 
and ordered diplomats to act in concert with colleagues. On 14/26 November 
1822, Emperor Alexander signed instructions to his chargé d’aaires in Madrid, 
Count Bulgari. Designed to provide a tableau of the Spanish Revolution and its 
consequences, which Bulgari was directed to propagate in government and elite 
social circles, the instructions began with a statement of the allies’ determina-
tion to consolidate peace in Europe and prevent any action that compromised 
the current state of general tranquility.72 In March 1820, a military revolt had 
forced the Spanish king to accept the liberal constitution of 1812—“laws that 
the public reason of Europe, enlightened by the experience of centuries,” greeted 
with outcries of disapproval. e allied governments had condemned these de-
velopments, and the Saint Petersburg government in particular had warned of 
the misfortunes that would follow. Based not on theories or principles but on 
the facts, the warnings and fears of 1820 now appeared prescient.
e allies assumed that the Spanish nation shared the wishes of its king and 
that the Spanish government sought to preserve the integrity of the monarchy. 
Consequently, the Verona decisions oered to Ferdinand VII an amicable inter-
vention, designed also to restore Spanish authority in the empire’s distant prov-
inces, which provided so much wealth and power. According to the instructions, 
the March events seemed to justify rebellion in America by encouraging loyal 
provinces that suered under the weight of revolutionary despotism to separate 
from the motherland. Regardless of causes and motivations, the anarchy of rev-
olution threatened the prosperity of Spanish America. In conditions of disorder, 
public and private fortunes were decimated, rights were revoked, heavy contri-
butions were levied, and ruinous loans were needed. Respect for the throne and 
religion already had been despoiled at the moment when the blind passions of 
the multitude replaced legitimate authority. For three years the allies had clung 
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to the hope that the character of the Spanish people, who had stalwartly op-
posed revolution during the Napoleonic conquest, would prevail over the spirit 
of insurrection and allow the king to reclaim the legitimate rights of the throne.
But instead of being restored, the Spanish monarchy had fallen into ruin. 
Although Spain’s people had endured six years of bloodshed in support of the 
monarchy, following the revolt of 7 July 1822, the king and his family became 
captives.73 Civil war ensued, which produced higher levels of violence and larger 
numbers of victims. Nor did the conspirators limit their activities to Spain. ey 
worked openly to spread rebellion, took credit for the revolutions in Italy, and 
currently threatened France. Emperor Alexander did not seek conict with the 
Spanish government; however, the revolutionary menace could not be denied, 
and the radical doctrines on display could be seductive and fatal. us, despite 
the allies’ desire for friendly relations with Madrid, they feared that the king 
lacked the freedom to end the civil war or prevent foreign conicts. It remained 
for the Spanish government to remedy the situation by restoring the country to 
the honorable position in the European family that it had occupied in 1814. is 
could be done only by defeating the revolution and returning to government 
based on ancient virtues and respect for religion.
Emperor Alexander further instructed Count Bulgari to communicate his 
good intentions toward the Spanish government. e allies claimed no right of 
intervention and did not seek to dictate laws to Spain or attack the country’s 
independence. ey did, however, want to see Spain freed from torment and 
bloodshed, and they hoped that the Spanish government would be reestablished 
as a wise and national administration. Currently, the revolution endangered the 
prosperity of Spain and the security of France. e revolutionary government 
in Madrid not only encouraged civil strife, but also prevented reconciliation 
with the colonies. Sadly, the allies no longer believed that the king would be 
able to reclaim his authority or restore social order. Because Ferdinand and his 
family had become virtual prisoners, the Spanish monarch was not free to work 
with the allies. As the instructions stated, only the men ruling in Madrid could 
accept the means being oered to lead Spain to a tranquil and glorious future. 
us, although the allies did not insist on any particular form of government, 
they clearly rejected the constitution of 1812 and wanted to see the authority of 
the king and religion restored.
A second dispatch, also dated 14/26 November 1822, explained to Count 
Bulgari how he should proceed in the present grave and perilous situation.74
e allies aspired to ameliorate the future of Spain, which implied persuading 
the Spanish nation and government to abandon the revolution. is tactic had 
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proven eective in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, where the allies had reached 
agreement with King Ferdinand I to end the revolution. Yet evil as the conse-
quences of the Spanish Revolution appeared to be, Alexander I and his allies 
did not expect their eorts to succeed: “In the tumult of the passions, the voice 
of reason is rarely heard.” Assuming that the men who exercised power in Ma-
drid refused to listen to reason, it nonetheless remained critically important to 
give the Spanish nation the opportunity, based on authentic documents, to hear 
the views of the allied courts. Diplomats such as Bulgari had therefore received 
instructions highlighting the losses to Spain caused by the March revolution, 
the captivity of the king and his family, and the intelligence that exposed how 
the artisans of the Spanish troubles aimed to incite revolt in France and other 
countries. Bulgari’s assignment was to campaign against the current Spanish 
government, both among ocials and in society, in order to weaken the party 
oppressing Spain and strengthen the one 
ghting for the country’s deliverance. 
To that end, he was authorized not only to read to the Spanish foreign minister 
the allies’ chronicle of the revolution and its consequences, but also to provide 
him with a copy of the document. If the government did not heed the advice of 
the intervening powers or respond within 
een days, Bulgari should request 
the passports of the Russian legation and leave the country. e diplomats of 
Austria and Prussia received the same instructions, and although all were per-
mitted to negotiate with the Spanish minister of foreign aairs, they could not 
alter the conditions for preserving diplomatic relations with Spain.75
e Verona instructions and the diplomatic maneuvering in Madrid failed 
to change Spanish policy. In January 1823, Austria, Prussia, and Russia broke 
diplomatic relations with Spain, and at the opening of the French Chambers, 
Louis XVIII announced that his troops were ready to march. e actual inva-
sion of Spain began in April, and by September the French army had restored 
royal rule. In October, King Ferdinand VII rescinded the amnesty he had 
granted in September, declared that in eect he had been a prisoner since 1820, 
and renounced the constitution of 1812, together with all laws passed under the 
revolutionary government. According to historians, aer a period of repression 
in 1823–24, the king pursued more moderate policies, and in 1827 French troops 
le Spain. e peacemakers of post-Napoleonic Europe won a temporary vic-
tory. Still, the Spanish Revolution exposed not only the intractable political 
schism between liberals and royalists, but also the ease with which political 
conict could degenerate into civil strife, guerilla warfare, and atrocities on all 
sides.76 Among the peacemakers of 1814, 1815, and 1818, political conditions in 
Spain caused palpable confusion.
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Whither European Peace?
Just one day before Emperor Alexander departed Verona, the courts of Austria, 
Prussia, and Russia signed a circular on Italian aairs that summed up the deci-
sions taken in response to insurrections in Italy, Greece, and Spain.77 e three 
governments viewed the circular of 2/14 December 1822 as a follow-up to in-
structions issued in May 1821, at the close of the Laibach conferences, and as 
a common instruction that would be sent to their diplomatic agents abroad. 
e circular began with the military occupation of Piedmont, which, based on 
an agreement with the king of Sardinia-Piedmont, would end by 30 September 
1823.78 With respect to the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, the allies and King 
Ferdinand I had agreed to reduce the army of occupation to 17,000 troops as 
quickly as possible.79 As the circular recalled, in Laibach the three sovereigns also 
had expressed the hope that the intervention in Italy, which they called a painful 
duty imposed on them by necessity, would be brief and that another would never 
be necessary.80 e monarchs further noted that despite their intentions, allied 
actions in Italy had produced false alarms, hostile interpretations, and sinister 
predictions designed to misdirect the opinion of the peoples.81 e allies had 
acted not out of secret ambition or calculated interest, but out of the need to 
resist revolution and prevent the countless disorders, crimes, and calamities that 
rebellion had inicted across Italy. In other words, “the sole objective of the 
thoughts and eorts of the Monarchs” was to restore order and peace and to 
provide legitimate governments with the assistance they had a right to demand. 
e sovereigns of Italy remained independent, charged by Divine Providence to 
ensure the security and tranquility of their peoples, and the three allied mon-
archs wanted nothing more than to restore power to these princes. Indeed, they 
characterized their decisions for the relief of Italy as the ful
lment of the alli-
ance’s very purpose.
But soon aer the allies reached agreement on action in Italy, another com-
plication emerged. e revolutionary genie spread from Spain and Italy to the 
Ottoman Empire. e allies agreed that all of the recent revolts arose from the 
same evil (mal). e revolutionaries might invoke dierent pretexts, but the or-
igin, substance, and language of the evil were identical. e men who directed 
the movement likewise sought to divide the powers and neutralize the forces 
that could oppose them. In response, the three monarchs had decided “to repel 
the principle of revolt in whatever place and under whatever form it appeared.” 
During this momentous period for the alliance, the 
ve great powers (Austria, 
Britain, France, Prussia, and Russia) had exchanged numerous con
dential 
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communications, and at the conferences in Verona, they had consecrated and 
con
rmed the supposed unanimity already achieved. In December 1822, the 
three sovereigns who had signed on to intervention in Italy also still expected to 
overcome the obstacles preventing the ful
lment of their wishes in relation to 
the Eastern Question.
e circular then turned to the deplorable situation on the western penin-
sula of Europe.82 Spain shared the misfortune of countries that embraced un-
fortunate means to seek out the good (le bien). us, a group of disoriented and 
perverse men presented the evil of revolution as a good deed (bienfait), calling it 
“the triumph of the century of Enlightenment,” “the necessary and happy fruit 
of the progress of civilization,” the means to support and bring about civiliza-
tion, and the motor of a fertile patriotism. If civilization had as its objective the 
destruction of society, and if military forces could with impunity seize control 
over empires—the internal and external peace of which they were supposed to 
guarantee—then, yes, the Spanish Revolution deserved the admiration of the 
ages, and the military insurrectionists oered a model for reformers. But this 
was not the reality. Truth demanded its rights, and Spain represented a sad ex-
ample of the consequences that resulted from violating the eternal laws of the 
moral world.
Conditions in Spain did indeed look bleak. Legitimate power, currently in 
chains, was being used to overturn all rights and legal liberties. Arbitrariness 
and oppression assumed the form of law, all classes of the population appeared 
agitated, and the kingdom suered from convulsions and disorders. As civil war 
consumed the resources of the state, Spain’s rich colonies justi
ed their own 
emancipation with the same maxims proclaimed by the mother country in es-
tablishing public law. e misfortunes aicting a loyal people explained in turn 
why countries in immediate contact with the peninsula had become worried, 
troubled, and confused. e current disorganization of Spain threatened the 
conservative principles that served as the basis for the European alliance. In a 
situation that became more alarming each day and that posed so many dangers 
to others, the monarchs could not remain tranquil spectators. Precisely because 
the presence of allied diplomats in Madrid implied tacit approval for the acts of 
a faction—a faction that would do anything to preserve its deadly power—the 
monarchs’ missions had received orders to leave Spain.
e decision to break diplomatic relations with Spain would prove to Eu-
rope that the allies had not retreated from the “resolve sanctioned by their in-
timate conviction.” e monarchs had agreed to act, based on their friendship 
toward the Spanish king and their interest in the well-being of the Spanish 
194 chapter 5
nation, which more than once in its history had been distinguished by its 
virtues and grandeur. e allied transactions aecting Spain adhered to the 
principles that guided the monarchs as they addressed all the great questions 
of order and stability exposed by recent events. To refute calumnies leveled 
against them, the monarchs pointed to the evidence of their deeds, the loy-
alty and benevolence of their intentions, and the force and cohesion of their 
union. British neutrality and the absence of a general Verona protocol belied 
the claim of unity, though the acceptance of a possible French intervention in 
Spain could be seen as proof of a stronger and more broad-based alliance. Still, 
in the tone of the Verona circular one detects growing frustration and a trace 
of desperation. Could the moderate reformism of the peacemakers constrain 
revolutionary war?
e monarchs, the circular continued, wished only for peace. All Europe 
should therefore recognize that the course pursued by the allies remained fully 
consistent with the independence of governments and the interests of the peo-
ples. e monarchs viewed as enemies only those who conspired against le-
gitimate authority and misled others to follow them into the common abyss. 
Indeed, peace among states, even when well established, brought no bene
t to 
society, as long as spirits remained agitated. e circular attributed the current 
agitation to the per
dious suggestions and criminal endeavors of one faction 
that wanted only revolution and upheaval. e leaders and instruments of this 
faction, whether operating in the open or in the shadows to organize sinister 
plots and to poison public opinion, continued to torment the peoples through 
the propagation of a somber and mendacious account of current conditions. 
According to the revolutionaries’ tableau, governments did not prosper, im-
provements did not succeed, and trust among men no longer existed. To ren-
der these odious plots powerless, the monarchs had set about the noble task of 
destroying the weapons that the factions could use to disrupt the tranquility 
of the world.
e closing section of the circular instructed the diplomats of Austria, Prus-
sia, and Russia to promote its content among the governments to which they 
were accredited. ere could be no true happiness for the nations without calm 
and stability. Nor could the three signatories to the circular achieve their goals 
without sincere and constant support from all the governments (of Europe). e 
monarchs called for this assistance “in the name of their primary interests,. . . in 
the name of the conservation of social order, and in the name of future genera-
tions.” ey recognized the great truth that their power rested on a sacred trust, 
for which they must account not only to their peoples, but also to posterity. 
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Numerous documents of the era emphasized the obligation to implement the 
laws and ensure good governance. In this instance, the Verona circular high-
lighted the monarchs’ responsibility to deliver their peoples from the errors and 
misfortunes for which they as rulers might have prepared the way. e mon-
archs liked to believe that they would 
nd in all those called to exercise supreme 
authority, under whatever form (of government), true allies who respected the 
letter and positive stipulations of the acts constituting the basis of the European 
system. As important as the spirit and principles of the European system were 
the legal obligations de
ned in the treaties. e circular ended with a simple 
armation of the monarchs’ determination to use all the means that Divine 
Providence had put at their disposal for the welfare of Europe.
e revolutionary situations in Piedmont and the Kingdom of the Two Si-
cilies had been eectively addressed, if not fully resolved. Portugal belonged to 
the British sphere, and France, the Verona documents implied, would take the 
lead in Spain. At the same time, the allies expected, though ultimately failed, 
to de
ne a common position on Greece. With respect to Spain’s American col-
onies, the great powers, except for Britain, also failed to admit the inevitable 
trajectory toward independence. By 1825 the emancipation of Latin America 
was all but completed.83 Emperor Alexander died in December 1825, and Rus-
sia experienced its 
rst modern revolt, the Decembrist Rebellion, which aimed 
to restructure social and political arrangements.84 In 1830 France returned to 
the path of revolution, Belgium broke away from Holland, and Poland rebelled 
against Russian rule. By 1848 revolution again engulfed much of Western and 
Central Europe: France, Italy, the German states, and the Austrian Empire.85
e peace treaties of 1814, 1815, and 1818 remained broadly operative, but 
the vision of European order embraced by the peacemakers could not contain 
the movements of peoples or oer satisfactory answers to the radical and eth-
no-nationalist ideologies of the day. Recent scholarship praises the peacemakers 
for establishing diplomatic practices that until 1914 prevented pan-European 
war and that even aer the Great War continued to provide a foundation for 
European unity. Unlike some present-day proponents of the European idea, 
Jürgen Osterhammel oers an understated and more realistic appraisal of how 
European unity worked. Aer the Congress of Vienna, he notes, the European 
state system no longer produced “fragile balances more or less automatically but 
required political management structured by a basic set of both manifest and 
unspoken rules.”86 As the preceding chapters argue, the idealized narrative of 
European integration does not adequately account for Russia’s experience of or 
contribution to European peace. In the Restoration era, the Russian Empire and 
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its monarch stood at the center of European society, yet in the Crimean War of 
1853–56, Britain and France fought on the side of the enemy, and the European 
alliance ceased to represent the principal pathway to peace.87 e separate al-





H ow should historians characterize the diplomacy that followed upon a quarter century of pan-European revolution, war, and conquest? Did Russia’s conception of European order represent a for-
ward-looking commitment to collective security and international governance? 
Or was the eort to act in concert a substantive adaptation of enlightened 
reformism and Christian morality to the realities of European society? What 
did Russia’s peacemakers consider innovative or original about the political sys-
tem constructed in Vienna, Paris, and Aix-la-Chapelle? How did they dene the 
great European alliance and the obligations of the allies? How did they expect 
to maintain stability, tranquility, and peace? Clearly, Emperor Alexander I’s dip-
lomats saw in the treaties of 1814, 1815, and 1818 not only the end of the French 
Revolution and Napoleonic Wars, but also the start of a peacemaking process, 
which, as things turned out, would bring unprecedented challenges.
e congresses of Aix-la-Chapelle, Troppau, Laibach, and Verona highlighted 
the need for active peacemaking beyond the formal conclusion of treaties and ac-
cords. Each of these gatherings had its own personality and concerns, based on the 
concrete issues at hand, and each commanded the attention of Europe’s political 
leaders. e circumstances and questions in need of discussion, not an impulse 
toward shared governance, dened the content of the negotiations and the struc-
ture of the conferences. e forms of polite intercourse, etiquette, and reasoned 
argument observed at the congresses already had been established in the public 
spaces of Enlightenment sociability and the republic of letters.1 More noteworthy, 
therefore, than the formalities of diplomatic practice was the hard work required 
to sustain the peace. One crisis aer another challenged the decisions of the allies, 
who labored incessantly to preserve the unity that had led to peace. e novelty of 
the political process lay in the conscious commitment of allied leaders to prevent 
separate alliances and to base decisions on the European public law enshrined in 
the treaties of Paris, the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna, and the protocols 
of Aix-la-Chapelle. e treaties dened a system of peaceful relations founded on 
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legitimate sovereignty, the rights of peoples, and the direct governance exercised 
by each independent state (puissance). e role of the alliance—whether the Qua-
druple Alliance, the grand alliance of the ve powers, the general alliance, or the 
Holy Alliance—was to ensure adherence to the shared treaty obligations.
If the goal of the European political system was to preserve peace and secu-
rity in Europe (the equilibrium), the mechanism for realizing that goal was the 
commitment to act in concert (concerter). is meant that no great power would 
conclude a separate agreement with any other or with a second-order power in 
a situation that aected the general security of Europe. e coalition politics 
of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars underscored the necessity 
of this principle. Repeatedly, alliances had been formed and understandings 
reached only to evaporate due to military losses and separate agreements with 
Napoleon. e French emperor’s military accomplishments were formidable, 
but oen they resulted from disunity and weakness among his opponents. Aer 
the coalition organized in 1813–14 revealed that military eectiveness could be 
sustained, the allies recognized that in order to keep the peace, they must remain 
united.2 is was the primary lesson of the Napoleonic era and the basis for 
Emperor Alexander I’s delity to legality and collective action. As events on the 
ground would prove, preservation of the equilibrium required that diplomats 
continually reconstruct the peace through negotiation, state building, military 
mobilization, and above all the obligation to act in concert.
Aer the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle restored France to its natural status 
as a great power in Europe, allied unity appeared fully consolidated. Ironically, 
however, by completing the edice of pacication and peace, the allies also ex-
posed one of the primary contradictions in the European system: the distinction 
between the general alliance of independent states and the grand alliance of the 
four great powers plus France. In a report of 15/27 March 1818, Russia’s envoy in 
Vienna, Count Iurii A. Golovkin, explained Metternich’s justication of dom-
ination by the four (the Quadruple Alliance of Austria, Britain, Prussia, and 
Russia) in light of criticism from lesser powers. According to Metternich, Eu-
rope did indeed need a dominant or preponderant power to prevent the political 
system from becoming democratic. But Napoleonic domination had produced 
a despotic European system. In the post-war era, by contrast, the concert of the 
great powers—which eventually also included France and that Divine Provi-
dence had given to the peacemakers—tried to address unexpected developments 
in a manner that served the general good, as opposed to particular interests. 
Count Golovkin fully embraced Metternich’s appraisal when he commented, 
“I have seen that the republic of Plato already is established.”3
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In another communication prior to the meetings in Aix-la-Chapelle, 
Golovkin appeared more sensitive to the tension between great and second-order 
powers that was built into the European system. Based on article 5 of the Second 
Treaty of Paris, the four sovereigns functioned as plenipotentiaries for all Euro-
pean states that had acceded to the alliance. Based on article 6 of the Quadruple 
Alliance, which called for future meetings of the sovereigns to deliberate on 
measures to ensure the peace, the great powers acted as intervening parties and 
ocial defenders of common European interests. When Golovkin insisted that 
voices beyond those of princes and sovereigns needed to be heard, he implicitly 
acknowledged the problem of an oligarchic tendency in the European system. 
He also highlighted the question of public opinion or the public mood (l’esprit 
public) that Russia’s diplomats had begun to describe. “e moral state of Eu-
rope,” Golovkin wrote, demanded the “preponderance that the intimate union 
of the four great courts presents in order to maintain a just equilibrium between 
governments and public opinion.”4
Diplomatic discourse touting the advantages of a just equilibrium based on 
alliance unity blurred the distinction between the grand alliance of great pow-
ers and the general alliance of European states. Soon aer the conclusion of the 
meetings in Aix-la-Chapelle, Emperor Alexander reminded his diplomatic agents 
of the need to speak with one voice in response to misrepresentations of the Eu-
ropean system.5 Hinting at the concerns of second-order powers that had not 
been invited to participate directly in France’s admittance into the alliance, the 
monarch insisted that neither he nor the allies who had met in Aix-la-Chapelle 
intended to create a new system or partial combination. To the contrary, the Eu-
ropean system was not the work of any single power, but rather was held together 
by the ties of fraternal friendship that united all the sovereigns of Europe. All the 
powers contributed equally to its conservation, and all shared the sentiment that 
identied duty with interest. Because the current system had replaced the sepa-
rate alliances of the past, every state that adhered to the system enjoyed the same 
benets and security. To highlight this message, Alexander repeatedly instructed 
his diplomats to act with moderation and enlightened benevolence.
As the Russian monarch and his diplomatic agents worked to transform the 
cacophony of war and revolution into the enlightened harmoniousness of endur-
ing peace, they also articulated a set of concepts and principles that guided their 
responses to events on the ground. e principle of legality assumed the exis-
tence of a body of European public law dened in the treaties of Vienna, Paris, 
and Aix-la-Chapelle. Legality meant strict adherence to both the letter and spirit 
of these accords, a formulation that inevitably opened the door to conicting 
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interpretations. Although consistent with legislative practice in the Russian Em-
pire, the concern for outcomes that embodied the spirit of the law sometimes 
pushed the expectations of Russia’s diplomats beyond what other great powers 
would accept. Britain’s general opposition to military interventions together 
with repeated allied rejections of Alexander’s proposals for joint guarantees and 
statements of principle countered the Russian tendency to elevate desired out-
comes such as morality and justice over strict adherence to legal prescriptions.
Less susceptible to the broadening eect of eternal principles, the concepts 
of sovereignty and legitimacy played critical and complementary roles in dip-
lomatic discussions. In the restoration and reconstruction of political rights 
that followed the victory over Napoleon, sovereignty denoted respect for the 
independence and territorial integrity of all states, large and small, based on the 
treaties. e great powers may have dominated decision making and imposed 
solutions on less powerful allies, but this did not mean that they ignored the 
sovereign rights, including the ancient rights, of minor rulers and second-order 
states. On this question, principle and interest could coincide. e Russian gov-
ernment repeatedly invoked the claims of lesser powers to prevent a potentially 
oensive Austrian-Prussian alliance against Russia.6 Similarly, in dealings with 
the German Confederation, the great powers cultivated connections with indi-
vidual client states that relied on their protection. e more powerful states, in-
cluding Russia, could use the legal rights of weaker allies to counter one another. 
As ongoing negotiations revealed, the principle of legitimacy did not require the 
resurrection of prerevolutionary states, but rather the recognition of political 
power as legally constituted. Nor did the de facto existence of a government 
make it a legitimate government (de droit).7
To repeat, diplomats did not equate legitimacy as legally constituted politi-
cal authority with the restoration or preservation of old regime governments.8
Among historians, confusion on this point arises from the peacemakers’ ab-
solute rejection of revolution, embodied in both the French Revolution and 
Napoleonic Empire, as a legitimate means to remove tyrannical rulers or eect 
political change. Russian eorts to uphold the principle of legitimacy invariably 
assumed the need for good governance. e concept of good governance called 
upon rulers and ministers to take account of public opinion and the people’s 
aspirations when formulating policy. Yet unlike Britain, where the cabinet of 
ministers actually had to navigate a press and public that could inuence deci-
sion making, in Russia the government viewed public opinion as a force to be 
guided and a means to arm, not criticize, ocial policy. By publicizing allied 
decisions, Russia’s diplomats hoped to counter suspicions about government 
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intentions and mollify the public mood, which, they believed, easily could be-
come democratic and anarchic.9
e right to good governance also might require the promulgation of con-
stitutions, though references to the rights of peoples or nations did not imply 
popular participation in policymaking. Given that the primary purpose of the 
European alliance was to promote stability and ensure a durable peace, rulers 
and governments needed to be reconciled with their subjects. Clearly, Russia’s 
diplomats understood the relationship between government and people as 
something more than simple obedience to church and monarchy. To maintain 
peace and security, governments had a responsibility to counter the anxiety 
(inquiétude) of peoples, procure their happiness, and augment public authority 
through moral force. In specic circumstances, based on practical philosophy 
or experience, as opposed to “beautiful theories,” governments could reason-
ably conclude that popular reconciliation with the legitimate authority of kings 
and states depended on constitutions or representative bodies. In the midst of 
discussions about a constitution for Bavaria, which pitted the ancient privileges 
claimed by the king against the aspirations of recently incorporated Franconia, 
Count Fedor P. Pahlen, Russia’s envoy in Munich, explained to co-minister of 
foreign aairs Nesselrode that constitutional governments were needed to sta-
bilize Germany and reconcile various states with their new subjects, presumably 
due to territorial adjustments.10
Within the Russian Empire, the Polish Diet could be viewed as a model of 
moderate constitutionalism sanctioned from above. When in March 1818 Em-
peror Alexander spoke at the opening of the diet, he declared that liberal in-
stitutions were not subversive, as long as they were “created in good faith and 
steered.  .  . with pure intentions toward a goal that is conservative and useful 
for humanity.” In the appropriate conditions, liberal institutions were perfectly 
consistent with order and led to “the true prosperity of the nations.”11 Given the 
absence of constitutional reform in Russia proper, such comments may seem dis-
ingenuous.12 e Russian government never permitted full implementation of 
the Polish constitution, and Russia’s diplomats operated under strict orders not 
to become embroiled in the constitutional debates of other powers, irrespective 
of ocial or personal opinions. e correct diplomatic posture, as explained in 
repeated communications, remained one of impartiality. e appearance of im-
partiality strengthened “the [alliance] system of cohesion and reciprocal trust” 
upon which European peace depended.13
References to cohesion and reciprocal trust hinted at another critical aspect of 
allied unity: sentiments of friendship and intimate union among the sovereigns. 
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From the vantage point of the twenty-rst century, statements about the polit-
ical ecacy of personal bonds and feelings can seem contrived and even cyn-
ical. A similar skepticism arises when historians describe social relationships 
dened by the duty, obedience, and hierarchies of the patriarchal household or 
by paternalistic interactions between persons in positions of authority and their 
subordinates—for example, husbands and wives, parents and children, masters 
and serfs, commanders and soldiers, or monarchs and subjects.14 As citizens of 
modern bureaucratic states, today’s scholars are likely to dismiss the substantive 
meaning of sentiment and morality in the exercise of political power.15 Even for 
those inclined to accept ocial pronouncements as sincere statements of intent, 
one cannot help but wonder how the peacemakers imagined that the bonds of 
friendship, deemed so necessary for successful diplomacy, would be perpetuated 
once they passed from the scene. Perhaps because the coalitions formed to ght 
the armies of revolutionary and Napoleonic France had for so long proven inef-
fective, and equally, because in 1813–15 allied unity nally had made victory over 
Napoleon possible, the monarchs and diplomats of the Restoration era could not 
imagine a peaceful Europe without direct personal relationships cemented by 
the sentiment of friendship.
e monarchies of old regime Europe all practiced some form of personalized 
politics grounded in Christian morality and patriarchal family relations. In the 
diplomatic discourse of the Restoration era, where the sentimentalist language of 
the late Enlightenment and early Romanticism held sway, aective ties of friend-
ship also provided the means to transcend the reality of great-power domina-
tion. e political system of restored Europe relied on the language of friendship 
among the sovereigns to sustain the peacemakers’ narrative of independent states 
participating equally in the benets and responsibilities of the alliance. Ties 
of fraternal friendship united monarchs and promoted unanimity of purpose 
among governments. Not surprisingly, policy dierences arose, and divergent 
interests persisted. But as Emperor Alexander I explained in a rescript of 12/24 
January 1818 to Count Golovkin, recently assigned to the court of Francis I, the 
count always should keep in mind the aectionate trust between the two mon-
archs and the unalterable reality of their personal sentiments.16 According to the 
instructions, “the principle of cohesion of the European system resides in the sen-
timents of fraternal friendship to which the sovereigns devoted themselves, and 
in the intimacy of relations that was established between their governments.”17
At a moment when the Russian monarch could not help but recall the hostile 
Treaty of 3 January 1815 and also suspected that Austria continued to pursue a 
defensive system against Russia, the principle of friendship among the sovereigns 
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helped to preserve alliance unity.18 Indeed, the general causes that guaranteed 
the stability of the European system found “a point of reference (point d’appui), 
a central direction in the sentiments of esteem and fraternal friendship, in the re-
lations of intimacy that were established between the principal sovereigns of Eu-
rope, [and] between their respective governments during the memorable epoch 
of the years 1813, 1814, and 1815.”19 e evidence for this truth, the instructions 
to Golovkin declared, lay in “the experience of all the disastrous coalitions and 
all the illusory alliances of past times.” is same truth characterized the cur-
rent alliance and dened the assiduous and persistent attention that the Russian 
monarch brought to maintaining inviolably “the relations of mutual condence 
that fortunately exist between H. I. M. and his august brothers in arms, eir 
Majesties the Emperor of Austria and the king of Prussia, [and] between his 
government and the governments of these two powers.”
During the war against Napoleon, the goal of unity had been easy to achieve. 
e intimate and personal union of the sovereigns had presided over military 
operations and over the political arrangements upon which they depended. In 
1813–15 there had been a clear enemy, and the universality of the danger had ne-
cessitated the fusion of military and moral forces, which alone could vanquish 
the hydra of revolution. But outside of combat, another “common and general 
interest. . . supported and continues to support the existing agreement (accord) 
among the sovereigns.” is interest consisted of showing the states of Europe 
and the world the advantages of “a durable peace founded on the eternal prin-
ciples of justice and legitimacy (bon droit).” Recognizing the egoism and diplo-
matic habits of some governments, as exemplied by the secret alliance against 
Russia (and Prussia), Emperor Alexander nonetheless looked to the friendship 
of the sovereigns to protect and preserve “the edice of the universal pacication 
and of the general alliance” that represented its foundation.20
In March 1818 preparations for the meetings in Aix-la-Chapelle were under-
way, and Count Golovkin reported from Vienna to co-minister of foreign af-
fairs Kapodistrias on an audience with Francis I.21 Like Alexander, the Austrian 
emperor viewed tender and loyal friendship between the sovereigns as the best 
guarantee for the happiness of the two empires and for the conservation of the 
general peace. Precisely because the concert of the allies represented a political 
phenomenon, direct meetings between the sovereigns, during which they de-
veloped the habit of seeing one another and speaking of their common aairs, 
could ameliorate the consequences of dierent interests that might arise. e 
harmony of sentiments and opinions embodied in the concert could not pre-
vent the natural inuence of divergent interests or the conicting views they 
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produced. But the painful results of these dierences could be less disruptive 
and disappointing. Golovkin described the allies’ relationships as “a new order of 
things founded on mutual trust and proven habits between the sovereigns them-
selves.” British foreign secretary Castlereagh likewise emphasized the impor-
tance and utility of personal meetings. As reported to Kapodistrias by Christoph 
Lieven in May 1818, Castlereagh believed that because personal relationships 
helped to unite the sovereigns, repeated contact would produce happy outcomes 
for European politics.22
Yet just as it appeared that the great powers had solidied alliance unity, 
events in Europe began to test their conception of how to preserve the peace. Po-
litical uncertainty in France and the German Confederation, and later outright 
revolution in Spain, Italy, Portugal, and Greece—all seemed to emanate from 
liberal ideas advocating the legitimacy of insurrection and the sovereignty of the 
people. roughout the unfolding crises, Russia’s monarch and diplomats re-
mained convinced that the union of the powers, as stipulated in Aix-la-Chapelle, 
remained the only eective means to combat revolutionary agitation.23 Just as 
Emperor Alexander felt “united with the sovereigns, his allies, by the ties of 
personal friendship and truly Christian fraternity,” he also expected the same 
intimacy, trust, and amicable frankness to characterize relations between his 
representatives at foreign courts and their counterparts from other countries. 
Regardless of personal habits or motives, and likewise at moments when re-
lations with colleagues became problematic, the cultivation of intimacy and 
friendship continued to oer the best guarantee for the peacefulness of Europe.
Before dismissing as mere rhetoric the loy proclamations and sentimentalist 
language of ocial sources in early nineteenth-century Russia, and before de-
scribing Emperor Alexander’s foreign policy as abstract, inconsistent, or utopian, 
the historian must ask if there could have been an alternative approach—other 
than through the aspirational language of Christian morality and friendship 
among the sovereigns—to overcome the distrust and dismay of the Napoleonic 
era. Was there another mechanism or principle capable of holding together the 
allies who had ended the war and arrived at the peace? Was there a dierent 
way to sustain the seemingly endless eort required of them as they worked 
to ensure the repose of Europe? In the face-to-face meetings of congresses and 
semi-permanent ministerial conferences, the proclaimed sentiments of friend-
ship among the monarchs and their diplomats helped to soen the unavoidable 
disappointments and suspicions that arose from divergent interests, goals, and 
expectations. In conditions of historic upheaval and unequal power, personal 
bonds held out the hope of stability.
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But how in practice could the friendship of the sovereigns ensure peace? For 
Emperor Alexander, the answer lay in the moral force codied by the Treaty 
of Alliance of 14/26 September 1815 (the Holy Alliance), which established the 
intimate union of the allies on the good faith, love, and humility required of 
them by the divine savior.24 During the years of peacemaking from 1815 to 1823, 
the moral force of allied unity became a key concept in discussions of what it 
meant to act in concert (concerter). Russian sources identied three grounds 
for collective allied action: legal obligations, the authority of historical experi-
ence, and moral principles. In the meetings of Aix-la-Chapelle, Troppau, Lai-
bach, and Verona, and in response to revolutions in Spain, Italy, and Greece, 
Russia’s initial position and proposals invariably stressed the need for a unied 
allied response. Allied unity constituted the great moral force that could pre-
serve peace, and if necessary, legitimize and guarantee success in war. From this 
perspective, Britain’s reluctance to engage in foreign interventions not directly 
related to British interests did not pose a serious problem, as long as the lack of 
engagement did not imply the formation of separate alliances of the old type 
that had allowed Napoleon to subjugate Europe. As men of European society, 
Russia’s diplomats and above all the tsar diplomat looked beyond the conicting 
interests that individual states might have in specic situations to the overarch-
ing unity represented by the harmony of sentiments and agreement on eternal 
principles. Although governments existed under dierent regimes and could 
not always be united in their actions, moral solidarity among the great powers 
could be maintained. To do this, the allies needed always to show the public 
that there were no dierences “in their fundamental principles or in their real 
and unanimous wishes.”25
e moral dimension of the Vienna settlement remained critical to the for-
eign policy of Emperor Alexander I. Close reading of Russia’s diplomatic com-
munications reveals a conception of European restoration that implied not a 
return to the old regime, but rather a Europe restored to peaceful relations, recip-
rocal obligations, and moral integrity. In Russia proper there was no actual need 
for restoration—the newly constituted Kingdom of Poland occupied a special 
and unprecedented position within the Russian Empire. ere was, however, 
a need for economic recovery, institutional recalibration, and moral recuper-
ation. Russia’s contribution to the process of European restoration indicated 
neither nostalgia for the eighteenth-century supremacy of God and monarchy 
nor progressive movement toward global integration and transnational gover-
nance. Rather, Alexander’s conservative diplomacy focused on the construction 
of an enduring peace and a stable political system in Europe. An uncomfortable 
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mélange of principle and pragmatism, the monarch’s policies of moderation and 
moral force helped to dene European diplomacy more broadly.
Even aer the so-called turn to repressive conservatism in 1820–21, Emperor 
Alexander preferred to rely on persuasion, sentiment, and morality to combat 
radicalism. During the conferences in Troppau, the monarch rejected his min-
isters’ proposal to order students from the Baltic provinces to leave German uni-
versities where they might be inuenced by harmful ideas. Instead, Alexander 
instructed the governor-general of Riga to use friendly exhortations and moral 
pressure, applied on an individual basis, to persuade parents and tutors that 
their children or charges should either return home or transfer to less radical-
ized German institutions.26 Although failure to comply might hinder the career 
prospects of the individuals in question, the monarch did not want to address 
the danger by issuing a general decree.27 e hints of potential damage to young 
careers may sound more like coercion than persuasion. But when historians view 
political pronouncements through the lens of distinct experiences and cultures, 
dierent interpretations inevitably arise.
In early nineteenth-century Russia, the gap between liberal ideas and concrete 
realities was particularly striking. Emperor Alexander’s domestic programs, like 
his foreign policy, moved uncomfortably between religious idealism, aspirational 
liberalism, practical possibilities, and the heavy-handed exercise of absolutist po-
litical power. e humanistic sentiments, providential beliefs, and cosmopoli-
tan cultural habits that Alexander and his diplomatic agents brought to foreign 
policy resembled the concerns of enlightened reformers across Europe. Among 
Russian intellectuals and policymakers, this thinking also coincided with key 
aspects of the moderate mainstream and religious Enlightenments, particularly 
the blending of universalistic assumptions with principles such as equality, rea-
son, progress, toleration, and “human ourishing.”28 One need not accept Paul 
Schroeder’s judgments about the originality or ecacy of the Vienna settlement 
in order to see that like the moderate reformism of the eighteenth century, the 
congress system of 1815–23 established or gave modern meaning to a set of polit-
ical principles that allowed change in the present without radical rejection of the 
past and that to this day dene the practical conduct of international relations.29
For historians it can be dicult to reconcile Emperor Alexander’s moralistic 
sensibilities with his stubborn and generally eective pursuit of war, peace, and 
Russian interests.30 Virtually every account of the Napoleonic Wars and Vienna 
settlement highlights the monarch’s political idealism, religious experience, 
emotional fervor, and ights of spiritual inspiration. Yet whatever Alexander’s 
psychological qualities, as chronicled by scholars (and described with hints of 
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derision by historians of Europe), they did not prevent him from making tough, 
intelligent, and unpopular policy choices, and equally important, from sticking 
to those choices during more than two decades of costly combat and exhausting 
diplomacy. Whatever the divinely inspired mission assigned by Alexander and 
others to the Holy Alliance, the idea of a political union cemented by Christian 
morality represented a reasonable and pragmatic perspective on the European 
system—one that echoed Russian literary culture, the teachings of enlightened 
Orthodox prelates, and the established ideology of the Russian monarchy. Put 
another way, the historiographical categories of modern European politics—
categories such as radical, liberal, conservative, constitutional, republican, ro-
mantic, and nationalist—do not necessarily t the Russian case or describe the 
thinking of the empire’s diplomatic agents.
Generations of historians have recognized Russia’s European identity during 
the Napoleonic Wars and the peacemaking that followed. Historians also have 
highlighted Russia’s developmental and political divergence from liberal dem-
ocratic Europe starting in the second quarter of the nineteenth century and 
continuing to the present day. Given this trajectory, it is important to focus at-
tention on the intersection of Russian political culture and the European state 
system during the years of restoration. What were the priorities, characteristics, 
dynamics, and achievements of Russian foreign policy that made integration 
into European society and the international order so meaningful? It is clear from 
Russian sources devoted to war and peace in the rst quarter of the nineteenth 
century that Emperor Alexander and his associates believed in the reality of a 
European political system and viewed Russia as a full-edged member of that 
system. So how and why did Russia end up on the intellectual and psycholog-
ical periphery of European politics? Is this something that happened later in 
the nineteenth century, perhaps because of Slavophilism (a form of romantic 
nationalism), church retrenchment, Eurasianist political thought, or economic 
development? Or is it simply a conceptual or ideological product of the Bolshe-
vik Revolution and Cold War?
Many unanswered questions remain, and many more will arise, as histori-
ans working in the relatively free conditions of post-Soviet Russia rewrite their 
country’s history. At this juncture, study of Alexander I’s European diplomacy 
illuminates a critical dynamic in the political culture of the nineteenth-century 
Russian Empire. From the perspective of the Russian monarchy and loyal service 
classes, the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars had little impact on fun-
damental religious and political institutions. Notwithstanding the devastation 
and trauma of 1812 and the subsequent wars of liberation, the Romanov tsardom 
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and Russian Orthodox Church emerged from the period of crisis as strong and 
legitimate as ever. Not only did Napoleon’s invasion fail to unleash popular re-
volt or widespread support for political change, Russia’s conscript army of legally 
“emancipated” serfs and state peasants, a creation of the Petrine reforms, pre-
vailed over France’s dynamic citizen army. e strength and stability of Russia’s 
institutions during a quarter century of revolution and war reinforced, and jus-
tied, longstanding practices of enlightened reform combined with moderate 
censorship and severe punishment of rebellion against legitimate monarchical, 
hierarchical, and religious authority.
Put another way, the years of peacemaking that followed the victory over Na-
poleon strengthened the Russian monarchy’s legal-administrative approach to so-
cial progress and political change. As the great powers and their allies responded 
to revolutions in Spanish America, Spain, Italy, Portugal, and Greece, they artic-
ulated a denite distinction between old and modern institutions. But tellingly, 
they did not bemoan change by equating modern development with revolution. 
To the contrary, revolution threatened “with total ruin the existence of all the 
States and all the institutions, old as well as modern.”31 In other words, political 
change could be legitimate and might even be encouraged, as long as it did not 
come about through revolutionary or other violent means.32 When revolution 
did occur, Russia’s policymakers invariably hoped for reconciliation between 
legitimate (that is, legal and lawful) governments and their rebellious subjects.
e Decembrist Rebellion of 1825 is usually described as Russia’s earliest ex-
perience of a modern insurrection that sought to transform social and political 
arrangements. But like Napoleon, the elite military ocers at the center of the 
rebellion also failed to ignite a popular response. Eighteenth-century practices 
of reform and repression clearly had begun to falter, yet in the Russian setting, 
this shi occurred in conjunction with the emergence of romantic nationalism 
and proto-Slavophilism. In ocial and societal forms, the nationalist orienta-
tion insisted on the special world historical mission of the Russian people and 
on the nation’s unique qualities, all understood in contradistinction to political 
and socioeconomic development in Western and Central Europe.33 Despite the 
realization that revolution could not be totally prevented, the belief in Russian 
exceptionalism strengthened the old regime commitment to enlightened reform 
from above.34 Aer decades of revolution and war, post-Napoleonic Russian di-
plomacy helped to perpetuate this powerful eighteenth-century tradition.
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	e appendix is limited to the diplomats mentioned in this book. Sources: Ocherki
istorii Ministerstva inostrannykh del Rossii. 1802–2002. Volume 3: Biograi ministrov in-
ostrannykh del. 1802–2002 (Moscow: Olma-Press, 2002); Diplomaticheskii slovar’, 3 vols. 
(Moscow: Nauka, 1984–86); Ministerstvo inostrannykh del SSSR, Vneshniaia politika
Rossii XIX i nachala XX veka. Dokumenty Rossiiskogo ministerstva inostrannykh del, 
volumes 6–12 (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury, Izda-
tel’stvo “Nauka,” 1960–95); Russkii biogracheskii slovar’, 25 vols. (Saint Petersburg: 
I. N. Skorokhodov, 1896–1918).
Alopeus, Count David Maksimovich (1769–1831)
	e son of a diplomat from the nobility of Finland, Alopeus was born in Berlin and 
educated in the Stuttgart Military School. In 1789 Alopeus began service in the Russian 
Ministry of Foreign Aairs as a secretary in the Stockholm mission. In 1801 he became 
chargé d’aaires (poverennyi v delakh) in the mission and in 1803 envoy extraordinaire 
(chrezvychainyi poslannik) and minister plenipotentiary (polnomochnyi ministr) at the 
Swedish court. Alopeus’s diplomatic service was interrupted by the Russian occupation 
of Finland in 1808 and by the subsequent replacement of the Swedish king with a regency 
in 1809. Alopeus participated in the negotiations leading to the Treaty of 5 September 
1809 by which Sweden ceded Finland to Russia and joined the Continental System. An 
appointment as envoy in Naples never materialized, and in 1811 Alopeus became envoy 
(poslannik) in Württemberg. From 1813 he served as envoy extraordinaire and minister 
plenipotentiary to the king of Prussia, an assignment delayed by the military campaigns of 
1813–14. Aer Napoleon’s second defeat Alopeus became envoy in Berlin where he served 
from 1815 until his death in 1831. In 1820 Alexander I made Alopeus a count of the Polish 
Kingdom, and in February 1825 the diplomat concluded a trade agreement with Prussia, 
following years of discussion about trade and borders between Prussia and Poland.
Anstett, Baron Ivan Osipovich (1770–1835)
Anstett entered Russian service from French service in 1789, served in the cavalry with 
the rank of lieutenant (poruchik), and saw action in the war against Sweden (1788–90). In 
April 1791 he was appointed to the College of Foreign Aairs with the rank of collegial 
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assessor. In 1794 he participated in the negotiations that brought Prussia into the coali-
tion against France. During the Polish campaign, he served in the suite of the Prussian 
king and then participated in the negotiations leading to the third partition of Poland. 
In 1801 Anstett served as councilor (sovetnik) in the Vienna Embassy and in 1803–4 as 
chargé d’aaires. In 1809–13 Anstett performed diplomatic duties arising from relations 
with Austria, dissolution of the Confederation of the Rhine, organization of the coalition 
against France, and the supply of allied armies. Anstett served in the suite of Alexander I in 
Paris and in 1815 became envoy extraordinaire and minister plenipotentiary in Frankfurt-
on-Main, attached to the Diet of the German Confederation. From 1825/1826, Anstett 
served simultaneously in Stuttgart and from 1829 also in Hessen-Kassel.
Benkendor, Major-General Konstantin Khristoforovich (1785–1828)
At age thirteen, Benkendor became a junker in the College of Foreign Aairs, and 
from 1803 he served at embassies in Berlin and other German cities, followed by service 
as secretary in Naples. In 1812 he returned to Russia and entered military service. In 1816 
illness temporarily ended Benkendor’s military career, and in 1820–26 he served as 
envoy extraordinaire at the courts of Württemberg and Baden. Benkendor returned to 
active military service in the war with Persia (1826–28); he died in the Russian-Ottoman 
War that began in 1828.
Bulgari, Count Mark Nikolaevich (1788–1829)
From 1818 Bulgari served as a civil servant (chinovnik) and from 1819 as chargé d’aaires 
at the mission in Madrid.
Czartoryski, Prince Adam Ezhi (1770–1861)
Of Polish princely origins, Czartoryski entered Russian service in 1795 and by 1799 had 
been appointed envoy to the Kingdom of Sardinia. From 1802 he served as assistant min-
ister of foreign aairs and in 1804–6 as minister of foreign aairs. In 1805 Czartoryski 
put forward a project to restore the Polish state within the borders of 1772 by means of a 
dynastic union with Russia. 	is led in 1815–16 to service in the provisional government 
of the Polish Kingdom and to support for incorporating Lithuania, Belarus, and Right-
Bank Ukraine into the kingdom. During the rebellion of 1830–31, Czartoryski served 
as minister of foreign aairs in the government established by the diet. Aer Russia 
suppressed the rebellion, he emigrated to Paris.
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Dolgorukii, Prince Dmitrii Ivanovich (end c. 18–1867)
	e grandson of Princess Natali’a Borisovna, Dolgorukii served in the Moscow pro-
vincial administration from 1816. Aer entering diplomatic service, he served as secre-
tary at the Russian missions in Constantinople, Rome, Madrid, London, 	e Hague, 
and Naples. In 	e Hague and Naples, Dolgorukii also served as chargé d’aaires. In 
1848–54 Dolgorukii was minister plenipotentiary at the court of Persia and from 1854 
a member of the Senate.
Golovkin (Golowkin), Count Iurii Aleksandrovich (1768–1846)
In 1805–6 Golovkin headed an embassy (posol’stvo) to China that failed to gain entry 
into Beijing. In 1813–18 he served as envoy in Stuttgart; in 1818–22 he performed a special 
mission in Vienna and then became envoy to Austria.
Italinskii, Andrei Iakovlevich (1743–1827)
Born into the lesser (nebogatyi) Ukrainian nobility, Italinskii graduated from the Kiev 
	eological Academy (Kievskaia dukhovnaia akademiia) and went on to study med-
icine in Saint Petersburg, Edinburgh, and London. His diplomatic career began in 
1781 as secretary at the mission in Naples, where he also served as chargé d’aaires and 
envoy. In 1802–6 and 1812–16, Italinskii was envoy in Constantinople, and in 1817–27, 
envoy in Rome.
Kapodistrias, Count Ioannis Antonovich (1776–1831)
Born into the Greek aristocracy of Corfu, Kapodistrias studied medicine, political sci-
ence, and philosophy at the University of Padua. In 1802 he was appointed state secre-
tary for foreign aairs in the Republic of the Seven United Islands, then under Russian 
protection. By the Treaty of Tilsit (1807), the republic became a French protectorate and 
Kapodistrias entered Russian service. In 1815 he became state secretary of foreign aairs 
and from 1816 co-headed the Ministry of Foreign Aairs with Count Karl Nesselrode. 
Kapodistrias repeatedly accompanied Alexander I on trips in Russia and abroad, includ-
ing the Congresses of Aix-la-Chapelle, Troppau, and Laibach. During the revolutions of 
1820–21 Kapodistrias preferred moral action over armed intervention, but he continued 
to look to Russia to support full independence for Greece, including the possibility of 
military support independently of the European alliance. In May 1822 Kapodistrias le 
Russian service on indenite leave, and in July 1827 he retired. In April 1827 the national 
assembly of Greece meeting in Trizin elected him president, and on 27 September 1831 
he was assassinated.
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Khanykov (Canico), Vasilii Vasil’evich (1759–1829)
From 1815 to 1829, Khanykov served as envoy in Saxony, Dresden, Hanover, 
Hessen-Kassel, Weimar, Mecklenburg, Oldenburg, and Saxony-Weimar.
Kozlovskii, Prince Petr Borisovich (1783–1840)
In 1812–18 Kozlovskii served as envoy to the Kingdom of Sardinia and in 1818–20 in 
Württemberg and Baden. From 1820 he was assigned to the Ministry of Foreign Aairs 
and from 1827 he was in retirement.
Liven (Lieven), Prince Khristofor (Christoph) Andreeevich (1774–1839)
Lieven began service in the Ministry of Foreign Aairs in 1808, and in 1809–12 served 
as envoy extraordinaire and minister plenipotentiary in Berlin. In 1822 Lieven repre-
sented Russia as a plenipotentiary at the Congress of Verona, and in 1812–34 he served 
as ambassador (posol) in London. From 1834 he served as guardian (popechitel’) to the 
future Alexander II.
Mochenigo (Mocenigo), Count Georgii Dmitrievich (1764–1839)
In January 1811, Mochenigo was appointed envoy in Turin, but he travelled only as far 
as Vienna, where he remained in 1811–12. In September 1812, he was appointed envoy 
in Naples, arriving there only in June 1815. In 1815–27, Mochenigo served as envoy in 
Naples, from 1818 simultaneously in Turin, and from 1823 simultaneously in Parma, 
Plaisance, and Guastalla. He retired in 1827.
Nesselrode, Count Karl (Karl Robert) Vasil’evich (1780–1862)
Born in Lisbon where his father served as Russian envoy, Nesselrode was the son of a 
Lutheran mother from a rich merchant family and a Catholic father from an old family 
of German counts. He himself was baptized in the Anglican Church and completed 
gymnasium in Berlin. In 1788 Nesselrode’s father enrolled him in Russian naval service 
from which he retired in 1799. Aer beginning diplomatic service in 1801, Nesselrode 
worked at the missions in Berlin and Paris. In 1812–14 he was attached to the army where 
he performed diplomatic tasks such as service in the entourage of Alexander I during 
the campaigns of 1813–14. In 1814 Nesselrode became a civil servant (dokladchik) in the 
Department of Foreign Aairs, and from 9 August 1816 until 15 April 1856, he directed 
the Ministry of Foreign Aairs. Nesselrode participated in the Vienna, Aix-la-Chapelle, 
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Troppau, Laibach, and Verona congresses. He retired soon aer the conclusion of the 
Paris Peace Treaty of 18 March 1856 that ended the Crimean War.
Nikolai (Nicolay), Baron Pavel Andreevich (1777–1866)
Nikolai’s father was president of the Academy of Sciences and at age eight he was sent to 
study at Eton. Subsequently, he completed studies at Erlangen University and in 1796 
began service in the chancery of the Ministry of Foreign Aairs. Appointed in January 
1800 to the Russian mission in London, Nikolai served there as a civil servant (chi-
novnik), secretary, chargé d’aaires, and councilor. In 1808 he returned to the Ministry 
of Foreign Aairs, and from February 1810 worked on the survey of the Russian-Swedish 
border as a commissar plenipotentiary. In 1811 Nikolai became councilor at the embassy 
in Stockholm, and from August 1812 he served as councilor and then chargé d’aaires 
at the embassy in London. From May 1816 until April 1847, Nikolai served as minister 
plenipotentiary in Copenhagen. In 1828 he became a baron of the Grand Duchy of Fin-
land, where he spent his retirement on a family estate.
Novosil’tsev, Nikolai Nikolaevich (1761–1838)
One of Alexander I’s “young friends” and member of the Unocial Committee, No-
vosil’tsev served as vice president of the Supreme Provisional Council for the Admin-
istration of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw in 1813–15, Russian commissar attached to the 
Governing Council of the Kingdom of Poland in 1815–31, and chairman (predsedatel’) of 
the State Council and Committee of Ministers in 1832–36.
Obreskov (Obresco), Aleksandr Mikhailovich (1793–1885)
Obreskov began service in 1804 as a junker in the College of Foreign Aairs. He served 
at the Stuttgart mission from 1811, followed by service in Constantinople from 1813. 
In 1815 Obreskov became secretary of the mission in Tuscany, which in 1817 merged 
with the mission in Rome. In 1817–18 Obreskov served as secretary at the mission in 
Rome, and in 1818 he was sent to Vienna. In 1820–25 he served as councilor (sovetnik) 
at the mission in Vienna, an assignment that included service as chargé d’aaires at 
the Austrian court in September–November 1822. In 1825 Obreskov served in Meck-
lenberg-Schwerin and Anhalt-Zerbst, followed from 1826 by work on Ottoman aairs 
in Saint Petersburg. In 1827 he became a diplomatic agent attached to troops ghting 
against Persia, and in 1828, as second plenipotentiary (upolnomochennyi), he participated 
in peace negotiations with Persia culminating in the Treaty of Turkmanchai. 	is led 
to appointment as envoy extraordinaire and minister plenipotentiary in Stuttgart in 
1828–31, followed by appointment to the same position in Turin from December 1831 
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to April 1838. Obreskov ended his service career as a senator in 1838–40 and lived for 
many years in retirement.
Palen (Pahlen), Count Fedor Petrovich (1780–1863)
Palen received a home education and at age fourteen entered service in the Cavalry 
Guards Regiment. Soon aer, he began to prepare for a diplomatic career in Sweden, 
Paris, and London. In 1810–11 Palen served as envoy in Washington, in 1812–14 as envoy 
at the Portuguese court in Rio de Janeiro, and in 1815–22 as envoy in Munich. He also 
served as governor-general of New Russia and helped to negotiate the Peace of Adriano-
ple. From 1832 until his death, Palen was a member of the State Council, where he played 
an active role in preparing the 1861 emancipation of the serfs.
Pini, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich (1756–?)
In 1812–17 Pini served as general consul in Jassy and in 1817–22 as general consul in 
Bucharest. From 1822 he was in retirement.
Poletika, Petr Ivanovich (1778–1849)
Born in Kiev province, Poletika was the son of a Ukrainian nobleman and a Turkish 
mother captured in the siege of Ochakov. From age four Poletika attended the Noble Land 
Cadet Corps and in November 1796 joined the suite of Emperor Paul with the rank of 
lieutenant. In February 1798 Poletika became a translator in the College of Foreign Aairs, 
and from 1799 he worked as a chancery ocial under vice chancellor Count V. P. Kochu-
bei. In November 1801 Poletika began service in the chancery of the Stockholm mission 
and in 1803 returned to Saint Petersburg, where he conducted diplomatic correspondence 
under A. R. Vorontsov. Poletika continued these duties under D. P. Tatishchev in Saint 
Petersburg and Naples, and then in 1805–8 under various military commanders in the 
eld. He returned to Russia in 1808, an assignment followed by service as councilor at the 
embassy in Finland (from April 1809), Rio de Janeiro (from June 1811), and Madrid (from 
February 1812). In 1814 Poletika returned to the work of diplomatic correspondence under 
Field Marshal Barclay de Tolly. From January 1816 he served as councilor at the embassy 
in London and from November 1817 as envoy extraordinaire and minister plenipotentiary 
in Philadelphia. In 1822 he returned to Saint Petersburg, and in 1824–25 he participated 
in trade negotiations with the United States and Britain. From 1825, as privy councilor 
and senator, Poletika carried out a range of diplomatic and administrative assignments, 
retiring in 1842.
Appendix. Biographies of Diplomats 215 
Pozzo di Borgo, Count Karl (Charles André) Osipovich (1768–1842)
In 1789–91 Pozzo di Borgo served as Corsican representative to the French Constituent 
Assembly, and in 1796 he (and other royalists) emigrated from France. In 1805 Pozzo 
di Borgo entered Russian service and performed diplomatic tasks in Vienna, Naples, 
and Constantinople. Aer the Peace of Tilsit, he retired and le Russia. In 1812 Pozzo 
di Borgo returned to Russian service, and in 1814 became minister plenipotentiary and 
then from 1821 ambassador in Paris. Pozzo di Borgo also served as a Russian plenipoten-
tiary at the Congresses of Vienna, Aix-la-Chapelle, Troppau, Laibach, and Verona. In 
1835–39 he served as Russia’s ambassador in Britain, retiring in 1839.
Razumovskii, Prince Andrei Kirillovich (1752–1836)
In 1777 Razumovskii began diplomatic service as envoy extraordinaire and minister 
plenipotentiary in Venice, followed in 1778–84 by service in Naples. From 1784 he 
served in Denmark and from 1786 in Sweden. Recalled to Russia in 1799, Razumovskii 
became ambassador to Austria in 1801. In 1807 Razumovskii retired but continued to 
undertake diplomatic missions for Alexander I. For example, Razumovskii participated 
in the Congress of Vienna, and as Russia’s rst plenipotentiary, he signed the Paris peace 
treaties of 1814 and 1815.
Stackelberg (Shtakel’berg), Count Gustav Ottonovich (1787–1850)
In 1810–18 (with an interruption in 1812–13), Stackelberg served as envoy in Vienna. In 
1818–20 and 1822–35, he served as envoy in Naples, retiring in 1835.
Stroganov, Baron Grigorii Aleksandrovich (1770–1857)
A count from 1826, Stroganov was born into an aristocratic Orthodox family of enno-
bled merchants from the Urals. He received a liberal education at home and on tour in 
Europe (1787). Stroganov began diplomatic service in November 1804, and from April 
1805 until February 1810, he served as minister plenipotentiary in Spain. In September 
1812 he was appointed envoy extraordinaire and minister plenipotentiary in Sweden, and 
from 1816 he held the same position in the Ottoman Empire. He remained in Constan-
tinople until the break in diplomatic relations in July 1821. In October 1827 Stroganov 
became a member of the State Council.
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Struve, Genrikh Antonovich (1770–1850)
From 1815 Struve served as chargé d’aaires in Hamburg and from 1820 as resident min-
ister in Hamburg. From 1827 he simultaneously served as resident minister in Lübeck 
and Bremen; from 1829, as resident minister in Oldenburg; and from 1843, as envoy in 
Oldenburg.
Sturdza (Stourdza), Aleksandr Skarlatovich (1791–1854)
Known for his romantic nationalist and proto-Slavophile ideas, Sturdza served as a civil 
servant (chinovnik) in the Ministry of Foreign Aairs from 1809. He participated in the 
Congresses of Vienna and Aix-la-Chapelle and in 1816 became a civil servant in the Min-
istry of Spiritual Aairs and Popular Enlightenment. He retired from service in 1819.
Tatishchev, Dmitrii Pavlovich (1767–1845)
Tatishchev began service in 1782 in the Preobrazhenskii Guards Regiment. In June 1799 
he transferred to civil service in the College of Foreign Aairs. In 1802–3 and 1805–8, 
Tatishchev served as minister plenipotentiary in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies; in 
1804–5 he helped to negotiate and then signed the anti-French coalition agreement be-
tween Russia and Austria (	ird Coalition). From September 1810 Tatishchev served as 
a senator, and in 1812 he was appointed envoy extraordinaire and minister plenipoten-
tiary in Spain, arriving in Madrid in 1814. From 1815 until 1821 (de facto 1819) he served 
as envoy in Madrid. From July 1821 he served as envoy extraordinaire and minister pleni-
potentiary in the Netherlands, including envoy in 	e Hague in 1821–22. In February 
and May 1822 Tatishchev undertook special missions in Vienna; he participated in the 
Congress of Verona (1822) as Russia’s third plenipotentiary; and from August 1823 he 
returned to special mission at the court of Austria. From August 1826 until September 
1841, he served as ambassador extraordinaire and plenipotentiary in Austria.
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